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‘The	private	sector	brings	a	very	clear	sight	on	what	is	required	for	a	return	on	investment,	
and	that’s	about	looking	for	undervalued	environmental	assets.	That’s	of	course	what	the	
central	thesis	is	about:	that	we	have	deplorable	and	at	great	scale	undervalued	the	
ecosystem	services	on	which	we	rely.	What	we	need	is	capital	markets	to	begin	to	recognise	
that’	(Investor	4).	
	
‘REDD+	and	a	green	economy	has	to	make	sense	for	the	businessman.	It’s	important	to	
remember	that	there	is	no	such	thing	as	the	private	sector;	it’s	a	very	heterogeneous	beast,	
Linking	the	financial	and	the	physical	economy’	(International	Consultant	2).	
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Abstract	
This	thesis	explores	the	role	of	private	finance	within	REDD+	(Reducing	Emissions	
from	Deforestation	and	forest	Degradation)	programmes	in	Indonesia.	Since	its	
debut	in	2007	as	a	potential	investment	opportunity,	enterprising	and	innovative	
private	sector	actors	have	moved	to	establish	REDD+	projects	within	a	voluntary	
carbon	market,	while	the	United	Nations	Convention	on	Climate	Change	continues	
negotiations	to	establish	a	comprehensive	global	mechanism.	These	profit-seeking	
actors	have	invested	millions	of	dollars	developing	REDD+	projects	within	a	rapidly	
evolving	voluntary	market	that	has	emerged	alongside	the	turmoil	of	global	climate	
change	negotiations.	This	dynamic	market	context	brought	about	a	wide	variety	of	
expressions	of	REDD+	in	Indonesia,	which	this	research	seeks	to	untangle	and	
illuminate.	The	thesis	yields	insights	into	the	workings	of	market	environmentalism,	
and	complicates	widespread	notions	of	‘private	finance’	as	a	homogenous	and	
predictable	category	of	actor.	
	
In	order	to	better	understand	the	emergent	REDD+	industry	in	Indonesia,	and	the	
role	of	private	finance	in	shaping	it,	this	research	draws	on	the	global	value	chain	
(GVC)	framework	to	analyse	processes	of	commodification	and	governance	within	
REDD+	projects	and	‘supply	chains’.	This	approach	identifies	key	private	finance	
actors,	and	explores	why	they	are	involved	across	motivations	for	social,	
environmental	and	financial	outcomes.	It	also	reveals	REDD+	projects	as	a	produced	
commodity	and	provides	insight	into	the	multiple	ways	they	are	valued.	The	research	
thus	highlights	how	private	finance	actors	evaluate	REDD+	commodities	as	they	
engage	with	them.	These	logics,	and	the	profit-seeking	rationale	of	private	finance	
actors,	are	seen	to	have	important	governance	implications	in	shaping	the	
characteristics	of	REDD+	projects	and	the	networks	of	actors	involved	in	them.	
However,	simultaneously,	the	malleable	and	selective	characteristics	of	the	REDD+	
commodity	itself	shapes	certain	governing	implications	of	private	finance.	This	thesis	
	ii	
contributes	to	debates	concerning	the	commodification	of	nature	within	market	
environmentalism	and	the	neoliberalisation	of	nature,	providing	insights	into	the	
nature	and	agency	of	private	finance.		
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1		Introduction	
Forests	have	recently	attracted	attention	from	investors	seeking	capital	gains	from	a	
novel	commodity.	Not	traditionally	the	concern	of	international	finance,	the	carbon	
stored	within	forests	has	emerged	as	an	investable	object.	Following	global	efforts	to	
reduce	greenhouse	gas	emissions,	the	conservation	of	forest	carbon	has	been	touted	
to	deliver	capital	profits	through	carbon	markets.	The	intervention	is	through	the	
REDD+	(Reducing	Emissions	from	Deforestation	and	forest	Degradation	plus)1	
mechanism	(UN-REDD,	2015).	REDD+	is	a	real	world	exercise	in	“putting	a	value	on	
nature	[emphasis	added]”	(Sukhdev,	2011),	aiming	to	revalue	and	reconstitute	
forests	as	commodities	that	can	be	invested	in.	Profit-seeking	finance	packages	
forests	as	environmental	assets	for	exchange	and	accumulation.	However,	this	
entanglement	between	REDD+	and	profit-seeking	finance	in	Indonesia	has	yielded	
mixed	results.		
	
Despite	supposed	coherence	as	a	global	programme	–	championed	by	the	United	
Nations	Collaborative	Programme	on	REDD+	(UN-REDD)	and	the	World	Bank’s	Forest	
Carbon	Partnership	Facility	(FCPF)	–	REDD+	is	emerging	in	highly	contingent	ways	
across	the	global	South.	As	part	of	wider	voluntary	carbon	market	mechanisms,	
REDD+	has	developed	in	a	decentralised	fashion,	with	minimal	formal	regulation,	
and	confronting	numerous	methodological	obstacles.	Sometimes	considered	the	
‘wild	west’	of	the	carbon	economy,	these	voluntary	forest	carbon	markets	evolved	
alongside	the	various	and	much	larger	compliance	markets	established	under	the	
international	climate	regime,	most	notably	the	Clean	Development	Mechanism	
(CDM).	The	process	of	consolidation	and	regulation	for	REDD+	has	brought	about	
increasingly	reputable	voluntary	private	standards.	However,	REDD+	offsets	remain	a	
																																																						
1	The	‘+’	refers	to	the	sustainable	management	of	forests	and	conservation	and	
enhancement	of	forest	carbon	stocks.	
	2	
small	part	of	the	voluntary	carbon	market,	accounting	for	around	nine	per	cent	of	
transactions	(Kossoy	&	Guigon,	2012;	Peters-Stanley	&	Yin,	2013).	
	
The	future	costs	of	addressing	climate	change	are	unclear,	and	estimates	of	the	
financial	resources	required	over	the	coming	decades	vary	widely.	The	United	
Nations	Convention	on	Climate	Change	(UNFCCC,	2007)	estimated	new	and	
additional	investment	required	by	2030	to	be	around	0.3-0.5	per	cent	of	global	GDP	
per	annum.	This	is	expected	to	include	$200-210	billion	for	mitigation	and	$49-171	
billion	for	adaptation.2	These	preliminary	figures	have	since	been	described	as	
considerably	under-estimated	(e.g.	Fankhauser,	2010;	Parry,	Lowe,	&	Hanson,	2009).	
Efforts	to	‘cost’	climate	change	typically	reference	impacts	on	(global)	GDP,	and	take	
as	given	a	need	for	continued	economic	growth.	While	such	cost	estimates	are	
therefore	prone	to	the	same	critiques	as	GDP	as	a	flawed	indicator	of	social	welfare	
and	development	(Fleurbaey,	2009),	international	climate	change	policy	is	currently	
shaped	by	a	dominant	narrative	constructed	around	the	financial	costs	of	mitigation	
and	adaptation,	and	the	need	to	leverage	considerable	new	and	additional	finance.		
	
The	likely	costs	are	therefore	assumed	to	be	very	high	and	to	outstrip	the	resources	
available	to	national	governments	and	multilateral	institutions	(Ervine,	2013).	
Consequently,	the	‘private	sector’	has	been	invoked	as	the	last	bastion	with	
sufficient	finance	to	fund	mitigation	and	adaptation	(Newell	&	Paterson,	2010).	This	
assertion	runs	counter	to	the	standard	liberal	notion	of	states	as	the	investors	of	last	
resort.	However,	given	the	considerable	financial	resources	controlled	by	the	private	
sector,	and	considering	the	role	that	private	business	has	played	in	driving	global	
emissions,	private	finance	is	touted	as	a	potential	source	of	socially	just	climate	
change	mitigation	and	adaptation	investment.	This	desired	co-option	of	private	
finance	has	driven	the	establishment	of	requisite	market	mechanisms.	This	favour	of	
‘flexible	mechanisms’	has	brought	about	the	preference	of	emissions	trading	and	
offsets,	rather	than	mitigation	via	command	and	control.	Subsequently,	increasing	
attention	focuses	upon	optimising	markets	and	incentivising	the	shifting	of	global	
																																																						
2	All	references	to	dollars	refer	to	US	dollars.	
	 3	
private	investment	patterns	towards	mitigation	and	adaptation	activities	(Corbera,	
2012;	Fulton	&	Capalino,	2014;	Héritier	&	Lehmkuhl,	2008;	Petherick,	2011;	UNEP-FI,	
2014;	World	Economic	Forum,	2013).		
	
Despite	the	UNFCCC’s	slow	progress	in	developing	a	mechanism	to	avoid	
deforestation,	significant	public	sector	resources	have	been	channelled	into	REDD+	
(Nakhooda	et	al.,	2013).	Bilateral	grant	–	and	conditional	loan	–	based	finance	from	
donor	countries	(e.g.	Norway,	Germany,	the	United	States)	and	multilateral	
institutions	(e.g.	the	World	Bank,	UN-REDD)3	has	comprised	the	vast	majority	of	
finance	so	far.	It	has	focused	primarily	on	research	and	capacity	building	in	order	to	
help	forested	countries	attain	‘REDD+	readiness’	through	establishing	the	
institutions,	strategies	and	practices	required	to	implement	national-scale	REDD+	
programmes.	Anticipating	this	market	readiness	and	inclusion	within	compliance	
markets	like	the	CDM,	a	diversity	of	REDD+	projects	or	demonstration	activities	have	
been	developed	in	a	number	of	developing	countries.	Just	as	private	market	actors	
boosted	emissions	trading	while	the	Kyoto	process	lagged	through	the	late	1990s	
(Newell	&	Paterson,	2010),	diverse	non-state	actors	have	driven	an	early	
proliferation	of	REDD+	projects.		
	
This	research	is	focused	on	the	emergence	of	REDD+	in	Indonesia,	which	has	been	of	
major	relevance	to	global	forest	carbon	mitigation	efforts	because	of	the	country’s	
large	forest	area,	extensive	peatlands,	and	high	rates	of	deforestation	(Margono	et	
al.,	2014).	At	the	same	time	palm	oil,	timber,	mining	and	other	extractive	land-based	
industries	represent	politically	and	economically	powerful,	deeply	embedded	
interests.	As	such,	Indonesian	forests	have	become	ideal	candidates	for	REDD+	
finance,	and	Indonesia	has	sought	to	position	itself	internationally	as	a	REDD+	
pioneer.		
	
Indonesia	began	concerted	planning	for	REDD+	relatively	early	on,	and	actively	
sought	a	lead	role	in	piloting	avoided	deforestation.	In	advance	of	the	2007	Bali	
																																																						
3	For	detail	on	climate	funds	focusing	on	REDD+	finance	see	
http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/themes/redd	(Accessed	30.10.2015).	
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climate	talks,	the	Indonesian	Ministry	of	Forestry	oversaw	the	Indonesia	Forest	
Climate	Alliance	(IFCA),	which	explored	the	feasibility	of	implementing	REDD+	in	
Indonesia.	Since	2007	Indonesia	has	built	on	the	IFCA	assessment	with	a	number	of	
supporting	laws	and	landmark	achievements.	By	2009	the	Government	of	Indonesia	
committed	to	a	national	emissions	reduction	target	of	26	per	cent	below	business-
as-usual	by	2020,	or	41	per	cent	with	international	support.	Shortly	after,	the	
Government	established	the	Indonesia	Climate	Change	Trust	Fund	to	link	
international	donor	funds	to	national	mitigation	and	adaptation	activities.	The	
National	Action	Plan	Addressing	Climate	Change	was	also	established,	and	forest	
rehabilitation	was	included	in	Indonesia’s	2010-2014	National	Medium	Term	
Development	Plan.		
	
In	2011	Indonesia	attracted	significant	international	support	for	its	efforts,	signing	a	
Letter	of	Intent	with	Norway,	which	committed	$1	billion	in	support.	In	response,	
Indonesia	established	a	moratorium	on	new	permits	to	clear	primary	forests.	By	late	
2011	the	national	REDD+	Task	Force	was	established	to	implement	the	moratorium	
and	oversee	Indonesia’s	REDD+	programme.	The	Task	Force	launched	Indonesia’s	
National	REDD+	Strategy	in	2012.	Meanwhile,	Indonesia	has	continued	to	progress	
within	UN-REDD	and	FCPF	programmes	to	support	its	national	REDD+	readiness	and	
finance	efforts.	Exact	figures	are	hard	to	come	by	but	between	44	and	77	REDD+	
projects	and	provincial	REDD+	pilots	are	currently	in	various	states	of	operation	
(Jaung	&	Bae,	2012;	Minang	et	al.,	2014;	Myers	et	al,	2010).		
	
Indonesia	was	selected	as	the	case	for	this	research	because	of	its	high	rates	of	
carbon	emissions	from	deforestation	(approximately	903,000	tonnes	per	annum)	
and	the	REDD+	activities	it	is	pursuing	to	mitigate	them	(Indrarto	et	al.,	2012).	The	
Indonesian	Government	has	sought	to	demonstrate	commitment	and	leadership	in	
the	emerging	global	REDD+	programme	through	efforts	to	balance	deforestation	
drivers	like	palm	oil,	timber,	pulp	and	paper	and	mining	with	ambitions	for	forest	
conservation.	This	has	seen	the	establishment	of	institutional	structures	and	
strategies	to	prepare	REDD+	systems	for	implementation	across	Indonesia.	These	
efforts	to	create	a	supportive	context	for	REDD+	have	increased	the	attractiveness	
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of,	and	investment	appetite	for,	REDD+	demonstration	and	pilot	projects	in	
Indonesia,	and	drawn	in	a	variety	of	private	and	profit-seeking	finance.	Together,	
these	developments	make	Indonesia	an	ideal	case	to	investigate	the	influence	of	
REDD+	finance	in	the	context	of	market-environmentalist	efforts	to	mitigate	climate	
change.	
1.1	Research	outline	and	questions	
REDD+	is	an	example	of	market	environmentalism,	which	seeks	to	govern	resources	
via	market	mechanisms	whilst	optimising	economic,	social	and	environmental	ends	
(Anderson	&	Leal,	2001).	Drawing	on	principles	of	environmental	economics,	market	
environmentalism	seeks	to	address	environmental	problems	by	internalising	
environmental	externalities	within	market	exchanges	(Anderson	&	Leal,	2001).		
	
Concepts	like	‘ecological	overshoot’	(Parry	et	al.,	2009;	Wackernagel	et	al.,	2002)	and	
‘limits	to	growth’	(Ekins,	1993;	Meadows,	Meadows,	Randers,	&	Behrens,	1972)	have	
encouraged	research	on	‘sustainable	development’	(Rogers,	Jalal,	&	Boyd,	2008),	
‘green	growth’	(Bowen	&	Fankhauser,	2011;	Hallegatte,	Heal,	Fay,	&	Treguer,	2011;	
OECD,	2011)	and	even	‘de-growth’	(Kerschner,	2010;	Martínez-Alier,	2009;	Martínez-
Alier,	Pascual,	Vivien,	&	Zaccai,	2010).	Initiatives	in	pursuit	of	these	ideas	have	
mobilised	from	diverse	coalitions	of	interests	and	historical-political	agreements	and	
compromises	–	from	formal	global	governance	institutions	like	the	United	Nations4	
and	the	Global	Green	Growth	Institute	to	locally	inspired	actions	of	individuals	
(Adger,	Arnell,	&	Tompkins,	2005;	Cash	et	al.,	2006).		
	
Historically	depending	upon	unpredictable	financial	aid,	market	environmentalism	
espouses	that	such	efforts	would	receive	reliable	financial	support	if	they	are	subject	
to	the	same	financial	allocation	logics	as	the	wider	global	market-based	economy	
(Adler,	2002;	Bakker,	2005;	Ervine,	2013;	Newell	&	Paterson,	2010).	However,	the	
revaluation	of	global	forests	is	complicated	by	an	unstable	relationship	between	
																																																						
4	Notably	the	1992	United	Nations	Conference	on	Environment	and	Development	(UNCED),	
and	the	2012	follow-up	United	Nations	Conference	on	Sustainable	Development	(UNCSD).	
	6	
profit-seeking	finance	and	the	novel	REDD+	forest	carbon	asset	(Boyd,	Boykoff,	&	
Newell,	2011).	The	response	and	behaviour	of	profit-seeking	finance	has	proven	
heterogeneous,	with	each	foray	into	REDD+	characterised	by	different	strategies	and	
measures	of	success	(Fosci,	2013;	Kossoy	&	Guigon,	2012;	Peters-Stanley	&	Yin,	
2013;	UNEP-FI,	2014).	
	
These	behaviours	remain	relatively	unexplored	(Bernard,	McFatridge,	&	Minang,	
2012),	but	through	a	market	environmentalism	lens	they	reflect	the	evaluative	cost-
benefit	decisions	that	capital	makes	in	its	search	for	profits.	Subsequently,	
understanding	the	ways	that	profit-seeking	finance	evaluates	REDD+	investment	
opportunities	offers	insight	into	the	rationales	and	motivations	that	in	turn	shape	
REDD+	and	forest-climate	governance	(Lövbrand	&	Stripple,	2012;	Nadvi,	2008;	
Okereke,	Bulkeley,	&	Schroeder,	2009;	Steurer,	2013).	It	is	this	broad	theme	of	
market	environmentalism	and	the	privatisation	of	environmental	governance	that	
this	thesis	explores,	via	detailed	empirical	inquiry	into	how	and	why	profit-seeking	
finance	has	engaged	with	REDD+	and	how	that	involvement	is	influencing	forest-
climate	governance.		
	
This	thesis	uses	the	term	‘profit-seeking	finance’	rather	than	‘private	finance’	to	
refer	to	the	collection	of	finance	that	is	seeking	a	return	on	its	investment	in	REDD+.	
By	doing	so	it	excludes	aid-based	or	grant	finance	that	does	not	seek	a	return,	and	is	
thus	not	profit-seeking	–	falling	outside	of	market	environmentalism.	The	term	
‘profit-seeking	finance’,	which	may	include	public	and	private	investments,	is	
preferred	as	it	directly	connects	the	profit-seeking	mode	of	governance	and	
allocation	that	is	espoused	within	market	environmentalism.	In	contrast	the	term	
‘private	finance’	refers	to	finance	that	is	privately	owned	and	thus	it	is	also	likely	to	
be,	but	not	necessarily,	seeking	a	return	on	investment.		
	
Charitable	private	finance,	for	example,	may	not	seek	a	profit.	The	public/private	
finance	distinction	risks	further	muddling	as	‘public	finance’	need	not	be	charitable,	
and	may	instead	seek	returns	on	investment.	For	these	reasons	‘profit-seeking	
finance’	(PSF)	is	used	to	refer	to	finance	in	REDD+	that	is	seeking	financial	returns	on	
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investment	(Lövbrand	&	Stripple,	2012).	However,	in	following	the	environmental	
governance	literature,	the	governing	role	and	influence	of	PSF	and	actors	within	it	is	
examined	as	an	important	manifestation	of	‘private	governance’,	in	terms	of	
governance	by	‘new’	governing	actors	beyond	the	state	and	its	agencies.		
	
Forest	conservation	initiatives	based	on	PSF	principles	and	the	‘neoliberalisation	of	
nature’	have	attracted	critique	for	exploiting	forests	and	forest	peoples	for	financial	
profit	(Castree,	2008;	McAfee,	1999).	The	focus	of	this	research	is	to	explore	and	
unpack	the	diverse	engagements	of	often	homogenised	‘profit-seeking’	actors	in	
these	processes	(Lövbrand	&	Stripple,	2012).	In	so	doing,	the	aim	is	to	bring	to	the	
surface	and	tease	out	the	diverse	characteristics	of	PSF	actors	and	their	influence	as	
agents	of	private	governance	within	REDD+	projects	in	Indonesia.	Three	core	
questions	guide	this	research:		
	
1.	Who	are	PSF	actors	that	support	REDD+	projects?		
2.	Why	do	PSF	actors	support	REDD+	projects?		
3.	What	are	the	governance	implications	of	PSF	actors	on	REDD+	projects?	
	
This	thesis	has	been	written	in	the	context	of	a	wider	Marsden-funded	research	
project	investigating	the	political	ecology	of	REDD+	in	Indonesia	(Dixon	&	Challies,	
2015;	McGregor	et	al.,	2015;	McGregor,	2015).	The	research	draws	on	key	informant	
interviews	with	actors	across	Indonesia’s	REDD+	community,	focusing	upon	those	
relevant	to	PSF.	Three	REDD+	projects	were	selected	as	case	studies	to	analyse	and	
illuminate	the	above	questions.	These	case	study	projects	involve	a	variety	of	PSF	
actors	and	exemplify	the	differing	governance	characteristics	and	influences	they	
exert	in	the	creation	and	evaluation	of	REDD+	projects.	The	theoretical	basis	for	this	
research	is	introduced	below.	
1.2	Theorising	the	research	questions	
Within	their	market	environmentalism	framing,	REDD+	projects	are	often	
conceptualised	as	commodities.	As	a	form	of	commodity	REDD+	projects	are	open	to	
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analyses	of	their	movement	and	circulation	within	global	value	chains	(Gereffi,	
Korzeniewicz,	&	Korzeniewicz,	1994;	Gereffi	&	Fernandez-Stark,	2011).	This	research	
draws	on	the	global	value	chain	(GVC)	framework	to	analyse	REDD+.	Such	an	
approach	facilitates	exposure	and	in-depth	analysis	of	the	practices	by	which	actors	
coalesce	and	commodify	bundles	of	REDD+	attributes	(conservation	and	
enhancement	of	forest	carbon	stocks,	sustainable	management	of	forests,	
community	development,	biodiversity	conservation)	and	‘put	a	value	on’	them.		
	
A	GVC	framework	supports	close	analysis	and	helps	provide	a	clear	picture	of	exactly	
what	REDD+	projects	and	attributes	are	and	the	ways	that	they	are	governed.	It	
helps	gather	and	interpret	the	components	and	actors	on	‘supply	chains’	that	
contribute	to	the	‘production’	of	commodities	(Bernstein	&	Campling,	2006a,	
2006b),	and	in	doing	so,	expose	the	inner	workings	of	such	commodities.	A	GVC	
framework	can	also	assist	in	teasing	out	the	governance	characteristics	within	and	
amongst	REDD+	projects,	including	the	influence	of	private	actors.	Here	a	broad	
definition	of	governance	is	taken	(following	Kooiman,	2003)	as	encompassing	a	wide	
spectrum	of	arrangements	among	societal	actors	(within	and	across	the	public	and	
private	sectors,	and	civil	society)	aimed	at	negotiating	and	securing	collective	
interests.	Governance,	in	this	vein,	comprises:	
	
the	totality	of	interactions	in	which	public	as	well	as	private	actors	participate,	
aimed	at	solving	societal	problems	or	creating	societal	opportunities;	attending	to	
the	institutions	as	contexts	for	these	governing	interactions;	and	establishing	a	
normative	foundation	for	all	those	activities	(Kooiman,	2003,	p.	4).	
	
Such	a	definition	demands	that	governance	research	explores	the	roles	and	
strategies	of	a	variety	of	the	‘non-traditional’	governing	actors	beyond	the	state.	
Processes	of	commodification	occur	within	institutional	contexts	manifested	by	
public	and	private	cross-scalar	regulation	across	forestry,	land-use,	economic	and	
environmental	sectors.	These	contextual	and	institutional	settings	influence	the	way	
that	PSF	actors	evaluate	REDD+	projects,	which	in	turn	affects	the	nature	and	
dynamics	of	forest-climate	governance	more	generally.	In	this	way,	REDD+	projects	
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introduce	the	desires	of	investors,	companies,	customers,	shareholders,	public	and	
local	actors	into	broader	governing	frameworks	(Fieldman,	2013;	Harmes,	2011;	
Lazonick	&	O’Sullivan,	2000;	Sullivan,	2013).	This	influence	of	PSF	actors	is	captured	
within	the	term	financialisation,	which	refers	to	the	increasing	role	of	financial	
motives,	markets,	actors	and	institutions	in	the	operation	of	economies	(Epstein,	
2005;	Knox-Hayes,	2015).	
	
Exploring	REDD+	through	a	GVC	lens	has	been	suggested	by	some	authors	(Bumpus	
&	Liverman,	2011;	Gibbon,	Bair,	&	Ponte,	2008),	but	so	far	has	not	been	undertaken.	
Whilst	some	practitioners	have	described	REDD+	supply	chains	in	a	general	sense	
(Bernard	et	al.,	2012),	this	thesis	responds	to	the	opportunity	to	connect	REDD+	with	
insights	from	GVC	approaches	and	contribute	to	the	advancement	of	these	
literatures.	In	addition	to	focusing	on	the	commodity,	the	actors	and	the	governance	
relations	among	them,	a	GVC	approach	can	also	shed	light	on	the	circulation	of	
meanings	and	knowledges	as	epistemic	circulation	(Büscher,	2014;	Graham,	2006).	
Here,	epistemic	circulation	is	defined	in	line	with	Büscher	(2014,	pp.	79–80)	as:		
	
general	circulation	of	interpretations	of	value	through	time	and	space	with	a	
particular	focus	on	…	a	specific	community	of	experts	sharing	a	belief	in	a	common	set	
of	cause-and-effect	relationships	as	well	as	common	values	to	which	policies	
governing	these	relationships	will	be	applied.		
	
In	the	context	of	this	research,	this	implies	a	focus	on	the	ways	in	which	REDD+	
projects	are	about	the	creation	and	exchange	of	meanings	along	a	GVC	and	within	an	
economy	that	is	primarily	concerned	with	knowledge.	For	REDD+	this	knowledge	
concerns	the	meanings	that	are	being	made	within	forest	conservation	and	
development	activities	supported	by	specific	REDD+	standards.	This	extends	the	
scope	of	analysis	beyond	the	material	flows	that	concern	many	traditional	GVC	
analyses,	and	moves	into	the	spatial	circulation	of	meanings.		
	
The	GVC	framework	becomes	particularly	useful	in	exposing	the	processes	and	
politics	that	‘put	a	value	on’	natural	forest,	thereby	illuminating	what	REDD+	‘is’.	
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With	an	improved	understanding	of	how	natural	forests	are	valued	within	REDD+,	
the	evaluative	practices	of	PSF	actors	can	also	be	examined	and	interpreted	to	better	
understand	why	they	are	involved	(Gibbon	et	al.,	2008;	Starosta,	2010a;	Vagneron	&	
Roquigny,	2011).		
1.3	Summary	and	thesis	structure	
In	linking	these	ideas,	this	research	feeds	into	broader	thinking	about	market	
environmentalism.	The	case	of	PSF	in	REDD+	contributes	an	instructive	example	of	
the	complex	processes	of	valuing	nature.	Market	environmentalism	sits	at	the	
awkward	intersection	between	subjective	private	perceptions	of	an	ecosystem’s	and	
community’s	value,	and	the	supposed	objective	valuations	of	REDD+	standards	and	
natural	capital	accounting	techniques.	REDD+	projects	analysed	here	demonstrate	
the	contradictions	of	capitalism	that	rest	at	the	centre	of	market	environmentalism	
and	its	neoliberal	convention	of	‘selling	nature	to	save	it’	(Bakker,	2010,	2012;	
McAfee,	1999).		
	
Following	this	introductory	chapter	the	research	questions	are	addressed	according	
to	the	following	thesis	structure	(also	depicted	in	Figure	1.1).	Chapter	2	presents	the	
theoretical	framework	which	underpins	the	research.	It	begins	by	framing	market	
environmentalism,	private	governance,	and	financialisation	within	international	
carbon	emission	reduction	economies.	This	is	then	linked	to	GVC	analysis	and	
epistemic	circulation	to	further	understand	the	REDD+	commodity	and	evaluation	
practices.	The	research	methodology	is	described	in	Chapter	3,	and	illustrates	the	
types	of	information	and	breadth	of	public	and	private	informants	that	were	
targeted	in	Indonesia	and	beyond.	I	explain	how	I	approach	three	case	study	projects	
exploring	PSF	and	governance,	while	also	reflecting	upon	my	positionality	as	
researcher.	Chapter	4	outlines	the	contextual	setting	of	this	research	within	the	
global	program	of	REDD+	and	its	expression	in	governance	arrangements	in	
Indonesia.	Chapters	5,	6,	7,	and	8	discuss	the	results	of	the	research.		
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Figure	1.1:	The	following	thesis	structure.	
	
Chapter	5	lays	out	the	role	of	PSF	within	the	context	of	Indonesia’s	emergent	REDD+	
programme	and	reflects	upon	this	in	the	context	of	the	privatisation	of	governance	
and	market	environmentalism.	It	expands	on	types	of	PSF	and	the	strategies	of	PSF	
actors	–	most	specifically,	how	they	have	responded	to	the	REDD+	experiment	in	
Indonesia.	Chapter	6	draws	on	the	GVC	framework	to	analyse	REDD+	in	Indonesia	
using	three	case	study	REDD+	projects.	Chapter	7	refers	to	the	case	studies	to	
discuss	processes	of	commodification,	the	character	of	the	REDD+	commodity,	and	
how	PSF	actors	evaluate	it.	Chapter	8	presents	evidence	of	financialisation	within	
Indonesia’s	REDD+	program,	exploring	how	financial	mechanisms	influence	the	
governance	of	REDD+	projects,	their	commodities,	and	knowledge	economies.	
Chapter	9	concludes	the	thesis	and	responds	to	the	overall	research	aim	of	
understanding	the	governing	influence	of	PSF	in	Indonesian	REDD+	projects.	
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2		Theoretical	Framework	
2.1	Introduction	
This	chapter	lays	out	the	theoretical	framework	underpinning	the	research.	It	begins	
with	an	exploration	and	theoretical	justification	of	REDD+	as	market	
environmentalism.	Next,	the	global	value	chain	framework	is	introduced.	The	ways	
in	which	a	GVC	approach	illuminates	the	mechanics	of	REDD+	market	
environmentalism,	specifically	processes	of	commodification	and	the	commodity,	
are	discussed.	The	section	following	this	links	the	REDD+	GVC	framework	to	concepts	
of	the	knowledge	economy	and	‘epistemic	circulation’,	which	provide	insight	into	the	
characteristics	of	the	REDD+	commodity,	its	value,	and	the	processes	of	evaluation	
that	support	it.	
	
The	thesis	therefore	makes	theoretical	contributions	in	three	areas:	the	
conceptualisation	of	the	REDD+	commodity,	the	exploration	of	value	within	GVC	
theory,	and	the	motivations	and	governing	influence	of	PSF	within	REDD+.	The	
concepts	introduced	in	this	chapter	are	applied	and	expanded	upon	in	the	
subsequent	discussion	chapters.	Figure	2.1	below	illustrates	the	narrative	of	this	
theoretical	framework	and	reiterates	the	research	questions.	
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Figure	2.1:	Narrative	and	approach	Chapter	2.	
2.2	Market	environmentalism		
Market	environmentalism’s	‘putting	a	value	on	nature’	typically	manifests	putting	a	
price	on	environmental	services.	Damaging	those	services	costs	more	-	making	them	
less	attractive	to	market	actors	and	thus	facilitating	more	sustainable	decision-
making	(Bakker,	2005).	Processes	within	REDD+	projects	ascribe	attributes	
(conservation	and	enhancement	of	forest	carbon	stocks,	sustainable	management	of	
forests,	community	development,	biodiversity	conservation)	that	REDD+	markets	
evaluate	and	price	in	their	program	of	‘selling	nature	to	save	it’	(McAfee,	1999).	
Subsequently,	PSF	actors	satisfy	their	desire	to	associate	and	attach	these	attributes	
to	their	identities	by	financing	a	REDD+	project.	
	
The	literature	on	market	environmentalism	intersects	with	work	on	the	
neoliberalisation	of	nature	(Bakker,	2005).	The	latter	describes	the	prevalence	of	
neoliberal	capitalist	regimes	in	environmental	governance	and	resource	
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management	(Bakker,	2005).	The	neoliberalisation	of	natural	resources	and	natural	
places	(such	as	forests)	frequently	entails	practices	of	commodification	to	facilitate	
market	exchange	(Bakker,	2005).	Market	environmentalism	uses	these	practices	to	
attempt	a	type	of	‘moral	economy’	with	‘moral	commodities’	that	either	rely	on	or	
subvert	customers’	moral	compass	and	willingness	to	‘care	at	a	distance’	from	the	
where	they	are	produced	(Bryant	&	Goodman,	2004;	Goodman,	2004;	Sayer,	2003).		
	
There	has	been	increasing	interest	in	how	consumers	consume	such	moral	
commodities	(Barnett,	Cloke,	Clarke,	&	Malpass,	2005;	Clarke,	2008),	particularly	
regarding	carbon	and	offset	commodities	(Ciscell,	2010;	Lovell,	Bulkeley,	&	Liverman,	
2009;	Spaargaren	&	Mol,	2013).	Globalised	society	and	economy	appears	to	be	
relying	on	market	environmentalism	and	green	products	to	facilitate	consumers	
‘purchasing’	their	economies	out	and	away	from	the	climate	change	issue	
(Krahmann,	2012;	Girod,	van	Vuuren,	&	Hertwich,	2014).	In	these	cases	a	corporate	
approach	to	carbon	accounting	and	management	has	become	standard	practice	
(Pinkse	&	Busch,	2013),	and	PSF	actors	and	customers	are	investing	in	offsets	in	the	
hope	that	capitalism	and	consumption	can	solve	the	problem	(Ervine,	2012).	As	
McGregor	et	al.	(2015,	p.	141)	point	out,	the	“pervasiveness	of	this	market	
environmentalism…	as	‘common	sense’	is	evident	in	the	design	and	rationale	of	
REDD+”.	However,	this	market-based	allocation	of	resources	under	capitalism	
remains	subject	to	critique.		
	
Critique	of	market	environmentalism	engages	its	neoliberal	roots	(Bakker,	2010,	
2012;	Castree,	2008).	It	directs	attention	to	the	ways	that	capitalist	modes	of	
production	exacerbate	inequality	within	society	whilst	harbouring	an	insatiable	
appetite	to	perpetually	accumulate	value	(Bakker,	2005;	Harvey,	2006)	–	the	same	
appetite	that	is	credited	with	the	existing	environmental	and	social	damages	that	
REDD+	is	attempting	to	remediate	through	the	revaluation	of	forests	(Dunlap,	2015).	
In	this	way,	REDD+	is	reflected	as	a	re-embedding	and	‘renaturing’	of	the	economy	
(Boyd	et	al.,	2011;	Bumpus,	Liverman,	&	Lovell,	2010;	Dunlap,	2015;	Dwyer	&	Ingalls,	
2015;	Lohmann,	2010;	Robertson,	2012).	This	illustrates	the	literal	contradictions	of	
capitalism	that	McAfee	(McAfee,	1999,	2012)	captures	in	the	phrase	‘selling	nature	
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to	save	it’.	Critics	suggest	that	capitalism’s	inner	private-profit	ambitions	may	not	
align	with	ecologically	sustainable	societies	(Bakker,	2010).	As	Bakker	(2012)	points	
out,	scholarship	of	neoliberal	natures:		
	
moves	us	beyond	neoliberalism-as-doctrine,	through	offering	a	rebuttal	to	proponents	
of	‘free	market	environmentalism’	(or	‘green	neoliberalism,’	as	opponents	term	it).	
This	is	accomplished	through	documenting	the	limits	to	nature’s	neoliberalisation	
(Bakker,	2012,	p.	111).		
	
This	research	aims	to	contribute	to	this	broad	area	of	work	through	exploration	and	
documentation	of	the	behaviour	of	PSF	actors	in	evaluating	and	governing	REDD+	
projects	in	Indonesia.	At	the	same	time,	it	is	important	to	recognise	that	
neoliberalisation	is	not	a	homogenous	and	universally	pernicious	process,	and	
demonising	it	risks	missing	potential	opportunities	to	improve	environmental	and	
social	wellbeing	(Bakker,	2005;	Castree,	2003).	Bakker	(2005,	p.	561)	cautions	against	
causal	assumptions	that	the	neoliberalisation	of	natures	is	negative:	
	
Acknowledging	that	market	environmentalism	is	implicated	in	broader	processes	of	
reregulation,	which	do	not	necessarily	have	negative	implications	for	the	
environment,	may	open	up	opportunities	for	securing	improvements	in	
environmental	quality.		
	
This,	according	to	proponents,	is	precisely	where	REDD+	sits.	Whist	clearly	being	an	
exercise	in	privatisation	and	commodification,	it	is	potentially	advantageous	to	
reserve	judgement	as	to	the	negative	connotations	that	such	paradigms	often	bring,	
and	take	up	the	opportunity	to	explore	the	“geographical	dimensions	of	neoliberal	
contradictions”	(Mansfield,	2004,	p.	571).	As	Lefebvre	(1991,	p.	341	emphasis	in	
original)	writes	“[t]he	commodity	is	a	thing:	it	is	in	space	and	occupies	a	location”.	
Thus	the	REDD+	commodity	might	also	express	essential,	tangible	and	diverse	
geographical	roots	as	it	generates	value	and	meaning.	Importantly,	Bakker	(2005,	p.	
560)	recognises	that:	
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this	approach	avoids	the	pitfall	of	assuming	that	neoliberalisation	is	hegemonic;	
rather,	acknowledging	that	the	architects	of	privatization	lacked	a	clear	blueprint	for	
how	a	privatized	system	would	function	(beyond	the	abstractions	of	economic	theory)	
allows	for	a	focus	on	the	ensuing	process	of	experimentation	and	reregulation,	
thereby	recasting	commodification	as	transient	and	partial.	In	refusing	to	treat	
neoliberalism	as	a	totalizing	project,	this	approach	opens	up	analytical	opportunities	
for	undermining	the	narratives	of	resource	triumphalism	often	associated	with	
projects	of	neoliberal	nature,	such	as	market	environmentalism.	
	
The	reregulation	process	of	market	environmentalism	usually	involves	three	
interrelated	processes	of	privatisation,	commercialisation	and	commodification	
(Bakker,	2005).	Privatisation	refers	to	increasing	private	sector	management	and	
governance.	Commercialisation	refers	to	the	ways	that	a	project’s	principles,	
methods	and	objectives	are	increasingly	geared	to	and	shaped	by	the	market	(Leys,	
2001).	Privatisation	is	the	‘who’,	while	commercialisation	is	the	‘how’	and	neither	
necessarily	require	the	other	(Bakker,	2005).	Commodification	is	the	‘creation	of	an	
economic	good	through	the	application	of	mechanisms	intended	to	appropriate	and	
standardize	a	class	of	goods	or	services,	enabling	these	goods	or	services	to	be	sold	
at	a	price	determined	through	market	exchange’	(Bakker,	2005,	p.	544).	The	process	
of	commodification	positions	commodities	as	the	‘DNA	of	capitalism’	as	they	
embody	the	capitalist	programming	that	enables	market	exchange	(Watts,	2014).	
	
Neoclassical	economics	recognises	commodification	as	a	precondition	for	efficient	
and	optimal	allocation	of	resources;	where	rational	evaluation	decisions	are	
predicated	upon	options	being	known	and	decision	makers	being	informed	
(Gasparatos,	2010;	Lo	&	Spash,	2013;	Sijtsma,	Van	der	Heide,	&	Van	Hinsberg,	2013).	
However,	political	economics	understands	commodification	as	more	complex	for	
things	formally	outside	marketised	spheres,	and	draws	attention	to	the	
socioeconomic	(pricing,	charging,	allocation	and	exchange	mechanisms),	discursive	
(transforming	identities	and	values	of	things	abstracted	from	their	natural	context)	
and	material	(isolating	and	extracting	desired	nature(s)	as	standardised	goods	for	
exchange)	dimensions	of	commodification	(Bakker,	2005;	Kaika	&	Swyngedouw,	
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2000;	Robertson,	2000;	Castree,	2003).	These	dimensions	are	often	ongoing	
processes	that	evolve	and	change	the	nature	of	the	commodity	through	its	
commodification	(Bakker,	2005;	Swyngedouw,	1999).	In	this	sense	commodification	
“is	not	so	much	a	durable	state	as	a	series	of	passing	moments,	and	is	continually	
being	negated	in	consumption	or	use”	(Sayer,	2003,	p.	345)	where	commodities	are	
perpetually	re-created.	This	re-creation	is	exacerbated	by	the	changing	emotional	
attachments	and	meanings	that	consumers	often	bestow	upon	commodities	
(Bakker,	2005;	Bridge	&	Smith,	2003).	These	insights	recognise	that	
“commodification	is	transitory,	imbued	with	symbolic	as	well	as	economic	meaning	
and	may	be	destabilized	through	consumption”	(Bakker,	2005,	p.	545).	Some	
‘natural’	commodities	are	uncooperative	as	they	embody	biophysical	and	spatial	
characteristics	that	contradict	the	requirements	of	capitalist	markets	and	
commodification	(Bakker,	2005).		
	
REDD+	essentially	entails	a	variety	of	schemes	oriented	at	generating	payments	for	
ecosystem	services	(PES)	on	the	basis	of	techniques	of	natural	capital	accounting.	
These	techniques	attempt	to	create	a	sustainable	global	market	system	by	rewarding	
activities	that	facilitate	the	ecosystem	services	necessary	for	sustainable	
development	but	whose	contribution	had	previously	been	unaccounted	for.	Natural	
capital	is	a	concept	that	accounts	for	the	ecosystem	services	that	a	particular	
ecosystem	(e.g.	a	forest)	performs	(Costanza	et	al.,	1997;	Gasparatos,	2010;	
Neumayer,	2004).	The	services	that	an	ecosystem	provides	(a	forest	provides	clean	
water,	oxygen	and	food)	are	monetised	into	units	of	capital	to	facilitate	their	
comparison	with	monetised	human	activities	that	threaten	to	degrade	the	same	
ecosystem.	The	monetisation	of	the	ecosystem	services	rests	upon	calculative	
accounting	practices	created	and	legitimated	by	the	emerging	industry	around	
natural	capital	accountancy	(Burkhard	et	al.,	2012;	Corbera,	2012).	These	
calculations	are	designed	to	measure	the	benefit	that	the	ecosystem	provides	for	
neighbouring	and	distant	human	and	non-human	systems.	However,	these	
calculations	are	extremely	difficult	to	achieve	with	any	realistic	accuracy,	and	carry	
with	them	sizable	assumptions	(Burkhard	et	al.,	2012;	Corbera,	2012).		
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In	natural	capital	accounting	hypothetical	scenarios	are	played	out	where	the	costs	
and	benefits	of	particular	actions	are	compared	with	the	costs	and	benefits	of	
inaction.	By	putting	a	price	on	ecosystem	services,	cost	benefit	analysis	can	be	
attempted.	If	environmental	degradation	delivers	a	net	benefit	then	it	continues.	If	
degradation	delivers	a	net	cost	then	it	does	not	continue.	In	determining	which	is	
more	beneficial	-	a	forest	or	an	agricultural	plantation	-	a	cost-benefit	calculation	
facilitates	the	decision	by	accounting	for	and	internalising	the	previously	
externalised	benefits	of	ecosystem	services	into	the	financial	system.	However,	
these	decisions	often	rest	within	deeply	politicised	contexts	and	despite	appearing	
objective,	are	rarely	straightforward	(Corbera,	2012;	McGregor	et	al.,	2015).		
	
If	this	natural	capital	calculation	finds	it	most	beneficial	to	maintain	the	ecosystem	
and	its	services,	like	a	natural	forest,	then	this	might	be	facilitated	by	payments,	
known	as	payments	for	ecosystem	services	(Büscher,	2014;	McAfee	&	Shapiro,	
2010).	Payments	for	ecosystem	services	are	usually	financial	and	reward	or	
compensate	the	stewards	for	their	conservation	activities.	It	is	this	end	of	generating	
financial	payments	for	natural	forest	conservation	activities	that	attracts	the	interest	
of	PSF	actors	to	REDD+	in	Indonesia.	PSF	actors	can	profit	from	on-selling	the	
ecosystem	services	they	have	conserved.	
	
Natural	capital	accounting	and	payments	for	ecosystem	services	schemes	demand	
evidence	to	legitimately	quantify	and	measure	the	services	provided.	Activities	
within	REDD+	projects	are	compared	with	each	other	and	against	the	outcomes	that	
PSF	actor’s	desires	and	demands.	Specific	private	standards	govern	and	legitimate	
the	quantification	and	commensuration	of	REDD+	attributes,	including	carbon	
emission	reductions,	sustainable	management,	biodiversity	conservation	and	
community	development	(Bernard	et	al.,	2012;	Fosci,	2012;	Roe,	Streck,	Pritchard,	&	
Costenbader,	2013).	REDD+	standards	(such	as	VCS,	CCB	and	Plan	Vivo,	introduced	in	
Chapter	4)	perform	a	core	function	in	affording	confidence	to	PSF	actors	that	REDD+	
projects	actually	embody	the	attributes	that	they	profess	to.	The	standards	offer	a	
brand	that	REDD+	projects	can	attach	themselves	to,	and	that	PSF	actors	can	seek	
out	(Bryant,	2013;	Pike,	2015).	This	is	especially	relevant	where	finance	is	seeking	
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particular	REDD+	standards	that	align	with	certain	desires	and	motivations.	REDD+	
standards	facilitate	the	efficient	exchange	of	environmental	goods	and	services	that	
market	environmentalism	and	the	privatisation	of	environmental	governance	
espouses.	
	
These	standards	are	particularly	important	in	the	case	of	REDD+.	There	are	
considerable	risks	with	the	REDD+	program.	Given	the	wide	variety	of	forest	types	
and	governance	arrangements,	protecting	them	is	very	difficult	and	cannot	always	
be	guaranteed.	The	more	straightforward	financial	returns	of	plantation	
development	are	very	tempting	for	profit-seeking	actors	seeking	to	satisfy	their	
profit	targets.	This	becomes	a	significant	issue	in	forest	areas	where	governance	is	
problematic,	activities	like	illegal	logging	are	prevalent,	officials	engage	in	corrupt	
activities,	and	the	disenfranchisement	of	forest	communities	is	normalised.	Even	
when	a	forest	can	be	protected	via	REDD+	there	are	risks	that	the	activities	causing	
carbon	emissions	are	relocated,	or	leaked,	to	other	areas.	The	role	of	standards	–	to	
ensure	that	the	specific	outcomes	of	a	REDD+	project	are	legitimate	–	is	important	as	
it	directly	connects	the	influence	of	private	governance	to	the	REDD+	project.	If	PSF	
actors	or	their	supporters	(e.g.	investors	and	shareholders)	do	not	consider	a	project	
to	be	legitimate	then	the	chances	of	capital	being	allocated	to	support	it	are	
significantly	diminished.	This	positions	legitimacy	as	being	of	prime	importance	
within	market	environmentalism.	However,	as	legitimacy	is	a	perception	held	by	
observers,	a	REDD+	project	can	invoke	a	variety	of	indicators	to	construct	legitimacy	
in	line	with	the	evaluative	tendencies	of	target	financiers.		
	
The	outcomes	of	each	REDD+	project	must	correspond	to	the	natural	capital	
accounting	methods	of	the	associated	REDD+	standard(s).	However,	that	does	not	
necessarily	exhaust	the	attributes	that	the	REDD+	project	has	created.	It	may	have	
created	attributes	beyond	what	the	REDD+	definition	and	its	standards	request.	The	
profit-seeking	actors	that	allocate	finance	to	these	projects	may	be	including	some	
of	the	extra	attributes	into	their	calculations	when	comparing	or	developing	REDD+	
projects.	The	desirability	of	a	REDD+	project	as	perceived	by	PSF	actors	may	involve	a	
mix	of	the	REDD+	aims,	standards	and	extra	attributes.	Despite	what	draws	PSF	
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actors	to	REDD+,	it	is	the	overall	market	environmentalism	framework	and	neoliberal	
nature	rationale	that	has	legitimised	its	presence	in	the	unfamiliar	territory	of	
improving	forest	governance.	
2.3	Privatisation	of	environmental	governance		
The	processes	of	privatisation,	commercialisation	and	commodification	that	
constitute	market	environmentalism	are	re-shaping	environmental	governance.	
Governance	responsibilities	that	traditionally	rested	with	offices	of	state	
administrators	are	shifting	towards	the	logic	of	market	exchange	(Bakker,	2005)	and	
into	the	hands	of	profit-seeking	actors.	Market	exchange	begins	to	weigh	on	the	
allocation	of	resources,	contesting	and	displacing	some	of	the	authority	of	state	
administrative	systems.	In	this	way,	capitalist	market	actors	are	positioned	as	
influential	agents	in	climate	governance,	and	environmental	governance	more	
generally	(Lövbrand	&	Stripple,	2012;	Okereke	et	al.,	2009;	Steurer,	2013).	
Importantly,	this	does	not	simply	necessitate	research	on	non-state	governing	
actors,	but	rather	on	new	configurations	of	actors,	and	changing	rationalities	and	
strategies	of	governance.	Therefore,	while	this	research	focuses	on	actors	engaged	
in	financing	REDD+	projects	for	financial	profit,	the	central	concern	is	the	different	
strategies	they	pursue,	and	their	role(s)	in	shaping	REDD+	projects.	The	project	is	
interested	in	“the	ways	in	which	business	activity	is	both	a	response	to,	as	well	as	
constitutive	of,	environmental	governance	at	the	global	level”	(Levy	&	Newell,	2005,	
p.	2).	
	
Boyd	et	al.	(2011,	p.	604)	describe	the	‘carbon	economy’	as	“an	historically	
unparalleled	experiment	in	marketised	environmental	governance”.	Through	the	
making	of	carbon	markets,	climate	change	is	reconstituted	as	a	business	opportunity	
–	or	rather	multiple	new	opportunities	for	capital	accumulation	(Bumpus	&	
Liverman,	2008;	Paterson,	2012)	–	rather	than	only	a	business	risk.	In	this	sense,	
while	carbon	markets	appear	as	a	particular	mechanism	for	the	governance	of	
climate	change,	carbon	markets	themselves	are	reliant	on	considerable	enablement	
and	regulation	by	governments	and	multilateral	authorities;	the	markets	themselves	
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emerge	as	a	field	in	need	of	governing.	This	is	particularly	the	case	for	voluntary	
markets,	including	the	market	for	REDD+	offsets.	Very	few	REDD+	exchanges	are	
directly	regulated	by	formal	state-based	institutions,	but	they	do	occur	in	the	
shadow	of	regulation,	in	interaction	with	existing	and	anticipated	compliance	
markets,	and	in	the	context	of	increasingly	social	and	ecological	interpretations	of	
business	risk.	
	
The	most	obvious	source	of	governing	authority	in	the	voluntary	market	is	perhaps	
the	various	private	voluntary	carbon	standards,	which	verify	emissions	reductions	
and	certify	project	compliance	with	social	and	ecological	safeguards	in	the	form	of	
REDD+	standards.	These	have	been	a	focus	of	recent	research	on	non-state	climate	
governance	(Bakker,	2012;	Lovell	&	Liverman,	2010;	Melo,	Turnhout,	&	Arts,	2014),	
but	their	importance	in	shaping	how	REDD+	projects	unfold	varies.	Guthman	(2007)	
points	out	how	these	types	of	voluntary	standards	and	branding	attempt	to	bring	
nature	back	into	market	exchange	but	at	the	same	time	privatise	property	creating	
access	and	exclusion	barriers	where	none	previously	existed	(see	also	Li,	2014).	
Certification	to	a	given	standard	provides	a	basis	on	which	projects	and	offsets	are	
differentiated	in	the	market,	becoming	sources	of	branding	and	acts	of	governance	
(Bryant,	2013).	There	is	also	scope	to	go	above	and	beyond	these	brands	to	attract	
investors	and	buyers	with	‘charismatic’	carbon	credits	(Corbera,	Estrada,	&	Brown,	
2009;	Wang	&	Corson,	2015).	
	
Pinpointing	important	loci	of	governance	within	REDD+	is	difficult,	as	programmes	
and	projects	are	complex,	heterogeneous,	and	multidimensional	(Visseren-
Hamakers,	Gupta,	Herold,	Peña-Claros,	&	Vijge,	2012).	Governance	arrangements	
implicate	broad	constellations	of	actors	in	pursuit	of	a	variety	of	(sometimes	
competing)	ends.	Furthermore,	roles	often	overlap	and	while	project	development,	
financing,	brokerage	and	so	on	may	be	performed	by	distinct	actors,	this	need	not	be	
the	case.	Therefore,	it	is	of	limited	value	to	examine	actors	in	isolation,	or	to	locate	
governing	agency	a	priori	with	certain	categories	of	actors	(Mol,	2012;	Steurer,	
2013).	The	focus	on	strategies	and	motivations	of	finance	is	not	intended	to	reify	a	
certain	set	of	actors,	but	rather	seeks	to	explore	one	locus	of	governing	agency	
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(Harmes,	2011)	and	an	aspect	of	the	wider	REDD+	governance	assemblage	that	
remains	under-researched	(for	instance,	in	comparison	to	voluntary	private	
standards	or	public	regulation).	
	
Subsequently,	this	research	adopts	an	open	approach	to	private	governance.	The	
research	focuses	its	questions	on	how	private	governance	is	emerging	and	shifting	in	
light	of	REDD+	projects.	Such	hybrid	state	and	market	exchange	governance	systems	
have	been	theorised	in	the	literature	on	‘non-state	market	driven’	and	‘private	
market-based’	governance	(Angelsen,	Brockhaus,	Sunderlin,	&	Verchot,	2012;	
Bernstein	&	Cashore,	2007;	Cashore,	2002;	Loconto	&	Busch,	2010;	Schroeder	&	
Lovell,	2012).	This	body	of	research	is	particularly	concerned	with	how	private	
entities	become	politically	legitimate	through	such	hybrid	governance	systems,	
which	“encourage	compliance	by	recognizing	and	tracking,	along	the	market’s	supply	
chain,	responsibly	produced	goods	and	services”	(Bernstein	&	Cashore,	2007,	p.	
347).	Because	of	this	they	are	recognised	as	offering	the	greatest	potential	to	
“socially	embed	global	markets”	that	align	with	a	functioning	form	of	market	
environmentalism	(Bernstein	&	Cashore,	2007,	p.	347).	Bumpus,	Liverman	and	Lovell	
(2010,	p.	1)	recognise:		
	
emerging	self-regulation	of	the	voluntary	carbon	market	as	companies	set	quality	
standards	in	order	to	respond	to	criticisms	and	to	anticipate	and	steer	government	
rules…	standards	aim	to	provide	a	legitimacy	that	can	support	both	innovation	and	
credible	carbon	reductions	driven	by	the	private	sector,	rather	than	imposed	by	
regulatory	policy.		
	
Okereke,	Bulkeley	and	Schroeder	(2009)	also	recognise	non-state	actors	as	
influential	governing	agents,	dovetailing	with	Lövbrand	and	Stripple’s	(2012,	p.	671)	
observations	of	the	“replacement	of	formal	and	hierarchical	techniques	of	
government	with	more	indirect	regimes	of	calculation”.	In	this	sense,	
commodification	and	disambiguation	methods	to	package	measureable	and	fungible	
attributes	of	REDD+	projects	are	empowering	financial	rationales.	Paterson	(2012,	p.	
83)	recognises	that	carbon	markets	“have	become	popular	because	they	have	
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enabled	businesses	to	imagine	a	cycle	of	investments,	profits	and	growth	centred	on	
these	markets	that	may	help	processes	of	decarbonisation”.	Both	Paterson	(2012)	
and	Lövbrand	and	Stripple	(2012)	also	expect	these	carbon	market	rationalities	to	
continue	to	influence	climate	governance	in	the	future.	The	inevitability	of	hybrid	
public-private	governance	of	the	climate	response	has	been	recognised	by	Newell	
and	Paterson	(2009,	p.	81):		
	
like	it	or	not,	neo-liberal	capitalism(s)	will	provide	the	context	and	historical	moment	
in	which	action	has	to	take	place.	This	implies	engagement	with	prominent	actors	in	
neo-liberalism	from	business	and	finance,	whose	strategies	need	to	be	aligned	with	
the	goal	of	climate	protection.		
	
In	this	view	the	role	of	markets,	and	private	finance	actors’	involvement	in	them,	
shifts	the	focus	away	from	‘whether’	and	towards	‘how’	markets	and	private	finance	
actors	can	be	involved	in	sustainable	governance	(Mol,	2012;	Mol	&	Janicke,	2009).	
This	understanding	of	how	PSF	influences	environmental	governance	is	where	this	
research	contributes,	exploring	variations	within	market	environmentalism.	These	
are	typically	expressed	as	a	gradient	between	unconstrained	market	activities	on	
one	hand,	and	institutional	arrangements	for	limiting	the	mobility	of	financial	capital	
and	thereby	constraining	its	“structural	power”	on	the	other	(Gill,	2003,	p.	98).	
Clearly	the	financialised	influence	of	investors	and	shareholders	is	becoming	more	
important	in	governance	(Fieldman,	2013;	Knox-Hayes,	2013).		
2.4	Financialisation	in	REDD+	
A	key	factor	shaping	financial	strategies	within	a	market	economy	is	the	degree	to	
which	PSF	actors	are	influenced	by	the	desires	of	their	shareholders	for	maximal	
financial	returns,	and	how	much	freedom	they	have	to	enfranchise	their	own	
motivations	and	supportive	actors	(Fieldman,	2013;	Knox-Hayes,	2013).	These	
variations	in	financial	structures	refer	to	the	increasing	role	of	financial	motives,	
markets,	actors	and	institutions	in	the	operation	of	economies	which	are	“intended	
to	accelerate	the	rate	of	profit	accumulation	from	the	exchange	of	financial	
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instruments”	(Knox-Hayes,	2013,	p.	120;	Epstein,	2005).	These	processes	are	
captured	by	the	term	financialisation.	Their	influence	on	how	a	corporation	is	
governed	sets	the	tone	for	its	external	relations	and	hence	the	nature	of	the	
economy	it	contributes	to	(Fieldman,	2013;	Lazonick	&	O’Sullivan,	2000).	This	
distinction	is	relevant	as	“innovation	of	any	kind	is	more	likely	to	occur	when	the	
power	of	shareholders	over	management	is	constrained,	enabling	managers	to	turn	
their	attention	inward	and	towards	innovative	processes”	(Fieldman,	2013,	p.	10).	
This	constraint	on	shareholders	enables	capital	investment	in	long-term	projects	
with	a	financial	commitment	to	innovation	and	long-term	gains,	like	those	
demanded	by	REDD+	projects	(Crepaz,	1995;	Fieldman,	2013;	Jahn,	1998;	Luttrell,	
Resosudarmo,	Muharrom,	Brockhaus,	&	Seymour,	2014;	Scruggs,	2003).		
	
Without	sufficient	limits	on	the	influence	of	certain	financial	actors	within	markets,	
corporate	and	managerial	functions	in	businesses	can	be	limited	and	disintegrate	
into	a	subservient	pursuit	of	financial	profits	(Fieldman,	2013;	Harmes,	2011;	
Lazonick	&	O’Sullivan,	2000).	This	is	particularly	pertinent	as	the	collective	power	of	
institutional	investors,	and	customers	that	help	constitute	them,	can	put	pressure	on	
companies	to	prioritise	their	stock	prices	and	financial	profits	over	corporate	
innovation	(Lazonick	&	O’Sullivan,	1997).	The	phenomenon	of	financialisation	within	
market	environmentalism	has	positioned	private	finance	actors	such	that	they	tend	
to	find	themselves	bound	to	deliver	financial	profits	for	their	stakeholders,	while	
seeking	to	reshape	operations	through	remediating	environmental	and	social	
externalities	(Fieldman,	2013;	Harmes,	2011;	Lazonick	&	O’Sullivan,	2000).	
	
Ervine	(2013)	argues	for	the	separation	of	carbon	finance	from	carbon	markets	for	
precisely	the	reasons	that	the	latter	have	become	mechanisms	of	capital	gain	subject	
to	risk	volatility	and	collapse,	“since	carbon’s	market	value	functions	as	the	primary	
factor	determining	levels	of	investment”	(Paterson,	2012,	p.	8).	The	World	Bank’s	
2012	‘State	and	Trends	of	the	Carbon	Market’	report	supports	this,	stating	that	the	
growth	seen	throughout	2011	in	the	global	carbon	market	was	not	driven	by	a	
demand	for	offsets,	but	rather	for	quick	re-sale	or	to	manage	risk	(Kossoy	&	Guigon,	
2012;	World	Bank,	2014).	Ervine	(2013)	sees	this	as	the	reason	carbon	was	
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recognised	as	2011’s	worst	performing	global	commodity,	and	as	such	sees	“a	
pressing	need	to	step	back	and	problematise	the	increasing	reliance	on	market-
based	carbon	finance	as	the	predominant	mechanism	through	which	mitigation	
funds	are	to	be	delivered	to	the	global	South”	(Ervine,	2013,	p.	3).	The	opportunity	
for	financial	speculation	within	carbon	markets	is	risking	their	diversion	from	their	
purpose	to	mitigate	climate	change	(Mol,	2012).	This	tendency	is	recognised	by	
Hiraldo	and	Tanner	(2011b,	p.	iv),	who	observe	that	the	drive	for	“cost	effective	
climate	change	mitigation	mechanisms,	national	government	impetus	on	growth	and	
the	productive	power	of	capitalism	within	environmental	governance	has	led	to	the	
prevalence	of	market-liberal	approaches”,	including	REDD+.		
	
There	is	a	substantial	literature	on	the	transformation	of	ecosystem	services	into	
commodities	and	derivatives	that	can	be	traded	on	financial	markets	(e.g.	McAfee,	
1999;	Lohmann,	2011;	Paterson,	2012).	Several	authors	have	discussed	how	
international	climate	change	governance	has	developed	within	a	“permissive	
normative	context”	of	contemporary	neoliberalism	(Paterson,	Hoffmann,	Betsill,	&	
Bernstein,	2011,	p.	3).	That	is,	climate	change	governance	has	preferred	market	
mechanisms	and	permitted	the	structural	power	of	capital	interests	in	policy	
discourse	and	practice	(Bailey	&	Maresh,	2009;	Ervine,	2013;	Lohmann,	2010;	Newell	
&	Paterson,	2010;	Paterson,	2012;	Spash,	2010).	This	discussion	has	been	helpful	to	
understand	the	character	of	‘environmental’	commodities	but,	as	Fieldman	(2013,	p.	
3)	points	out,	three	key	areas	have	received	little	attention,	namely:		
	
financial	liberalisation	as	a	transformative	global	process	influencing	state-level	
social	structures	of	accumulation,	the	corporate	governance	systems	that	are	
prominent	parts	of	these	institutional	ensembles,	and	finally	corporations	
themselves.		
	
Essentially,	Fieldman	(2013)	argues	that	understanding	the	governance	relationship	
between	corporations	and	their	neighbouring	actors	that	express	financialised	
influence	is	an	important	part	of	understanding	ecosystem	service	and	climate	
change	commodities	and	the	involvement	of	PSF	in	conservation	more	generally	
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(Harmes,	2011;	Knox-Hayes	&	Levy,	2011;	Lazonick	&	O’Sullivan,	2000;	Lohmann,	
2011;	Pattberg,	2012).	
	
Securing	sufficient	time	and	financial	commitment	for	innovative	programmes	like	
REDD+	demands	that	long-term	efforts	for	sustainable	development	are	rewarded	
rather	than	short-term	profit-seeking	motives.	However,	the	financialisation	that	has	
been	normalised	in	contemporary	neoliberalism	is	such	that	the	demands	and	
whims	of	shareholders	and	customers	tend	to	directly	and	immediately	impact	
decisions,	and	thus	the	allocation	of	finance	in	the	global	economy.	This	degree	of	
financialisation	risks	demanding	a	level	of	responsiveness	beyond	what	REDD+	
activities	are	capable	of	and	may	distract	REDD+	projects	from	social	and	ecological	
goals.	Much	depends	on	the	motivations,	strategies	and	tactics	of	PSF	actors	that	
gravitate	towards	REDD+	in	Indonesia,	something	this	thesis	will	focus	upon,	in	part	
by	drawing	on	a	global	value	chain	approach.	
2.5	Global	Value	Chain	analysis		
Global	value	chain	(GVC)	research	and	analogous	approaches	(for	instance,	global	
commodity	chains	and	global	production	networks)	hold	considerable	potential	for	
researching	REDD+.	GVC	analysis	is	an	analytical	frame	highly	suited	to	the	
exploration	of	geographies	of	globalising	production	and	consumption	in	the	context	
of	what	has	been	termed	an	emerging	‘network-led	development	paradigm’	
(Sturgeon,	1999;	Starosta,	2010a;	Selwyn,	2012).	GVC	analyses	have	been	employed	
effectively	to	explore	different	aspects	of	globalisation	–	including	geographies	of	
production,	trade	and	development,	divisions	of	labour,	governance,	firm	upgrading,	
power	relations,	and	market	dynamics	(Durand,	2011;	Gereffi	et	al.,	1994;	Gibbon	et	
al.,	2008;	Hartwick,	1998;	Hopkins	&	Wallerstein,	1994;	Hughes,	2001;	Selwyn,	2012;	
Starosta,	2010a,	2010b).		
	
This	research	is	centrally	concerned	with	the	relational	dynamics	between	PSF	actors	
and	their	governance	of	REDD+	commodity	chains.	That	is,	it	considers	how	these	
actors	determine	chain	structure	and	dynamics,	and	how	this	reflects	their	efforts	to	
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maximise	the	share	of	value	captured	(Starosta,	2010a).	In	this	respect,	the	spatial	
dimension	of	GVCs	(Yeung,	2007)	–	insofar	as	this	refers	to	the	geographical	
relocation	of	competing	capitals,	and	to	network	reorganisation	in	pursuit	of	profit	
maximisation	(Harvey,	2006)	–	is	also	relevant.	This	is	consistent	with	Lansing	(2011),	
who	finds	that	the	spatial	and	organisational	character	of	forest	carbon	offset	chains	
shift	and	meld	to	capitalist	logic	as	chain	participants	pursue	maximum	value	(see	
also	Durand,	2011;	Xue	&	Chan,	2013).		
	
Despite	the	economic	and	material	focus	of	GVC	research,	value	chains	themselves	
are	importantly	shaped	and	reproduced	through	politics	and	contestation	within	and	
between	places	where	they	‘touch	down’	(Challies,	2008;	Neilson,	Pritchard,	&	
Yeung,	2014).	Indeed	much	GVC	research	to	date	has	investigated	the	politics,	
power,	governance	and	coordination	of	these	chains	(Bernstein	&	Campling,	2006a,	
2006b;	Bumpus	&	Liverman,	2011;	Gereffi,	Humphrey,	&	Sturgeon,	2005;	Palpacuer	
&	Parisotto,	2003;	Starosta,	2010a).	Starosta	(2010a)	observes	that	the	concept	of	
governance	within	GVCs	was	originally	used	to	illustrate	authority	and	power	
relationships	that	co-ordinate	the	global	division	of	labour.	For	example,	Gereffi	
(1994)	understood	GVC	governance	structure	as	socially	mediating	the	material	
interdependency	that	characterises	“how	financial,	material,	and	human	resources	
are	allocated	and	flow	within	a	chain”	(Gereffi,	1994,	p.	97;	see	also	Gibbon	et	al.,	
2008).	In	this	way,	governance	of	the	GVC	for	REDD+	offsets	can	be	seen	as	an	
expression	of	a	dynamic	forest	carbon	commodification	process	(Stephan	&	
Paterson,	2012).		
	
Drawing	on	GVC	analysis	facilitates	an	investigation	of	REDD+	value	chains	across	
four	dimensions	(Gereffi,	1994).	This	involves:	1)	understanding	the	chain’s	
institutional	context	in	terms	of	the	rules	and	norms	within	which	production	
activities	operate;	2)	determining	the	geographic	locations	of	actors	engaged	in	
these	global	chains;	3)	analysing	the	‘input-output’	structure	by	which	chain	actors	
exchange	production	material	and	information	in	the	process	of	constituting	and	
adding	value	to	the	commodity;	and	4)	interpreting	the	governance	characteristics	of	
the	chain	and	the	ways	in	which	key	actors	influence	one	another	and	direct	the	
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‘production	process’.	Exploration	of	these	four	elements	can	shed	light	on	the	
creation	of	the	REDD+	project	as	a	commodity	and	illustrate	its	social	and	ecological	
implications.	Viewing	the	establishment	of	REDD+	projects,	and	the	activities	of	
associated	actors	through	a	GVC	lens	exposes	and	helps	structure	the	flurry	of	
activity	and	investment	around	REDD+.	By	drawing	on	this	approach	the	research	
can	illuminate	how	PSF	actors	shape	and	influence	the	governance	of	emergent	
REDD+	projects.	The	first	element	is	described	and	analysed	in	Chapters	4	and	5	to	
set	up	the	institutional	context	of	REDD+	projects.	The	remaining	three	elements	are	
then	analysed	in	Chapter	6	to	expose	the	workings	within	REDD+	projects	and	how	
PSF	actors	influence	their	governance.		
	
Bernstein	and	Campling	(2006b)	describe	the	process	and	challenge	of	GVC	analysis	
as	extracting	a	slice	from	the	wider	world	system,	enabling	‘isolation’	and	
examination	of	a	discrete	network	of	actors	and	places	engaged	in	the	production-
consumption	of	a	given	commodity.	Interpreting	the	slice	requires	close	engagement	
with	the	context	from	which	it	is	extracted,	and	implies	a	not	unproblematic	exercise	
of	reinsertion	and	re-contextualisation	(2006a,	2006b),	described	in	detail	in	Chapter	
6.	Exploring	REDD+	by	drawing	on	the	GVC	framework	has	not	been	done	before	–	
although	the	potential	contributions	of	applying	a	GVC	approach	have	been	hinted	
at	by	some	authors	(Bumpus	&	Liverman,	2011;	Gibbon	et	al.,	2008).	Understanding	
the	relations	between	profit-seeking	actors	integrated	along	GVCs	offers	important	
insights	into	value	chain	governance	(Rabach	&	Kim,	1994),	and	thus	private	
governance	more	generally.		
	
Gereffi	et	al.	(2005)	posit	five	ideal-type	network	modes	that	link	profit-seeking	
actors	in	GVCs:	market,	modular,	relational,	capture,	and	hierarchy	(Gereffi	et	al.,	
2005).	These	structures	are	separated	by	high	or	low	degrees	of	transaction	
complexity,	codifiability	of	information,	and	capabilities	of	actors.	These	variables	
together	determine	the	structure,	process,	and	nature	of	knowledge	transfer	and	
legitimation	methods,	and	the	extent	to	which	this	information	can	be	codified	and	
transmitted	efficiently	between	actors	and	the	capabilities	of	these	actors	to	do	so	
(Bair,	2009;	Gereffi	et	al.,	2005).	These	five	types	of	GVC	governance	provide	a	useful	
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framework	to	make	sense	of	governance	within	REDD+	GVCs,	and	are	described	
below	and	in	Figure	2.2.	
	
Modular	networks	are	reliant	on	knowledge	that	is	codified	for	easy	exchange,	
rather	than	tacit	knowledge	that	is	more	complex	to	exchange	(Bair,	2009).	In	this	
sense,	codes	replace	trust	with	a	lower	asset	specificity	(the	degree	to	which	a	thing	
is	restricted	to	specific	exchanges)	which	allows	wider,	more	efficient	exchange	
among	actors	(Bair,	2009).	Relations	between	actors	are	highly	formalised,	with	
prescribed	information	structures	that	facilitate	sharing	of	large	amounts	of	
information	at	considerable	economies	of	scale	without	relying	on	trust-based	
relations	(Sturgeon,	2002).	Voluntary	private	REDD+	standards	can	be	seen	as	an	
attempt	at	establishing	this	type	of	relation	in	a	similar	way	to	ethical	trade	
certifications	like	Fair-Trade	(Neilson,	2008;	Taylor,	2005).		
	
	
Figure	2.2:	Types	of	GVC	governance	adapted	from	(Gereffi	et	al.,	2005,	p.	89).	
	
Relational	networks	describe	governance	situations	where	interpersonal	relations	
and	communication	between	profit-seeking	actors	is	frequent	and	important.	Under	
Gibbon	and	Ponte‘s	(2008,	p.	382)	analysis	of	GVC	governance,	relational	
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coordination	is	not	simply	one	form	of	network,	but	an	“overriding	prescription”	to	
optimise	all	exchanges.	Such	coordination	illustrates	the	ways	that	relations	and	
exchanges	on	GVCs	are	intelligently	coordinated,	rather	than	depending	on	the	
presence	or	absence	of	prescriptive	codes.	These	networks	create	mutual	
expectations	and	relations	of	trust	that	overlay	market	and	hierarchy	exchanges	with	
social	content.	This	social	content	amplifies	that	particular	relationship	within	the	
wider	governance	context	of	the	chain,	providing	for	interactive	and	collaborative	
action	not	experienced	within	markets	and	hierarchies	that	are	governed	more	by	
contractual	and	legal	mechanisms.	Relational	networks	facilitate	an	enhanced	ability	
to	transmit	and	learn	new	knowledge	and	skills.	
	
Captive	networks	are	more	asymmetrical,	where	a	certain	actor	has	allocated	
considerable	capital	to	develop	the	capacity	of	other	actors,	such	as	suppliers.	These	
vested	profit-seeking	actors	need	their	allocated	capital	to	deliver	a	required	rate	of	
return	in	order	to	remain	financially	profitable.	Consequently	these	actors	
demonstrate	controlling	strategies	to	retain	those	actors	whose	capacity	to	supply	
inputs	they	have	enhanced.		
	
These	three	types	of	GVC	governance	are	bordered	by	hierarchical	networks	and	
market	networks.	Hierarchical	networks	structure	an	actor	to	have	complete	
command	and	control	over	the	happenings	between	all	actors	on	a	GVC.	In	market	
networks,	in	contrast,	no	actor	is	structurally	positioned	as	more	influential	than	
others,	and	exchange	is	absolutely	efficient,	fungible	and	without	asset	specificity	
(Dicken,	2007;	Gereffi	et	al.,	2005).	These	governance	ideal-types	of	entire	GVCs	
offer	helpful	frames	but	can	also	be	understood	as	‘forms	of	coordination’	at	
discrete	segments	of	GVCs	and	at	varying	times	as	they	develop	(Ponte	&	Gibbon,	
2005).	Subsequently,	these	descriptors	are	useful	for	exploring	the	governance	of	
the	whole	GVC,	and	the	coordination	of	particular	parts	of	it,	in	Chapter	6	where	the	
governance	characteristics	of	REDD+	projects	and	‘supply	chains’	are	examined	and	
compared.	
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According	to	Sheppard	(2011,	p.	235),	conceptualising	a	commodity	simply	as	a	
function	of	a	production	chain	risks	“violence	to	the	complexity,	contingency,	
uncertainty,	materiality	and	complex	spatio-temporalities	that	accompany	
production”.	These	entanglements,	which	are	inherent	in	commodity	production,	
ensure	it	is	a	highly	politicised	process	where	pre-existing	power	dynamics	tend	to	
influence	‘who	finishes	up	with	what’	(Robbins,	2004).	Several	authors	have	made	a	
deliberate	analytical	distinction	between	the	agency	exerted	by	actors	seeking	to	
govern	GVCs	for	their	own	benefit,	and	the	wider	indirect	capitalist	logic	that	GVCs	
rest	within.		
	
In	this	vein,	Marxian	critiques	argue	that	the	external	manifestations	of	capital	and	
labour	allocations	along	GVCs	are	not	solely	the	prerogative	of	chain	actors,	but	are	
also	subject	to	indirect	capitalist	logic	(Rainnie,	Herod,	&	McGrath-Champ,	2011;	
Selwyn,	2012;	Starosta,	2010a,	2010b).	The	traditional	treatment	of	value	within	
GVC	analysis	has	been	to	understand	it	as	the	change	in	price	of	the	tracked	
commodity	as	it	passes	through	a	network	of	actors,	as	an	input	and	an	output	(i.e.	
‘value	added’)	(Gereffi	et	al.,	1994;	Gereffi	&	Fernandez-Stark,	2011).	Starosta	
(2010a,	2010b),	in	particular,	delivers	a	comprehensive	value	theory	analysis	of	this	
approach	on	GVCs	(see	also	Rainnie	et	al.,	2011;	Selwyn,	2012;	Taylor,	2012;	Xue	&	
Chan,	2013).	It	is	argued	that	the	role	and	value	each	actor	contributes	to	a	
commodity	along	a	GVC	is	instead	largely	a	product	of	their	position	within	the	
global	economy,	their	relationships	with	other	actors,	and	how	competitive	they	are	
(Durand,	2011;	Bailey,	Gouldson,	&	Newell,	2011;	Xue	&	Chan,	2013).	These	
competitive	capitalist	logics	constitute	important	indirect	influences	within	the	
REDD+	industry,	and	are	integral	to	the	hybrid,	networked,	non-hierarchical,	market-
based	arrangements	emerging	through	collective	governance.		
	
Actors	within	and	between	groups	on	GVCs	capture	and	accumulate	surplus	value	to	
maximise	their	benefits	and	by	doing	so	express	the	scope	of	their	agency	
(Barrientos	&	Smith,	2007;	Descheneau	&	Paterson,	2011;	Lansing,	2011;	Rainnie	et	
al.,	2011;	Selwyn,	2012;	Starosta,	2010a,	2010b).	The	understanding	of	value	
distribution,	commonly	found	in	the	GVC	literature,	as	a	function	of	profitability	
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(Giuliani,	Pietrobelli,	&	Rabellotti,	2005)	overlooks	where	value	is	actually	‘produced’	
(Vorley,	2003),	as	well	as	deeper	and	exploitative	capital-labour	relations	(Rainnie	et	
al.,	2011;	Selwyn,	2012;	Starosta,	2010a,	2010b).	Understanding	how	these	dynamics	
shape	value	is	crucial	for	understanding	how	actors	pursue	benefits	and	for	their	role	
in	REDD+	GVC	governance	more	generally	(Gibbon	et	al.,	2008;	Starosta,	2010a;	
Vagneron	&	Roquigny,	2011).	As	Vagneron	and	Roquigny	(2011,	pp.	326–327)	put	it,	
“[a]lthough	the	distribution	of	value	within	global	value	chains	should	seem	at	the	
heart	of	the	analysis,	this	question	is	often	ignored”.		
	
Building	on	some	of	the	critiques	cited	above,	a	framework	proposed	by	Selwyn	
(2012)	integrates	traditional	approaches	to	GVC	analysis	(focused	on	competitive	
upgrading	and	rents)	with	Marxian	value	theory.	The	framework	relies	on	a	central	
understanding	that	capitalism	as	a	system	is	“based	upon	two	fundamental	
relationships—competition	between	capitals	and	the	exploitation	of	labour	by	
capital”	(Selwyn,	2012,	p.	222).	It	is	these	relationships	that	give	capitalism	its	
character,	“implying	that	new	zones	of	production,	markets	and	working	classes	will	
be	forever	in	the	making	and	unmaking”	(Selwyn,	2012,	p.	222).	This	has	also	been	
conceptualised	by	Gibbon	et	al.	(2008,	p.	324)	as	a	governance	process	of	re-aligning	
practices	to	mirror	the	‘normalised’	actions	that	GVC	participants	‘should’	take	under	
capitalist	logic.		
	
Understanding	the	above	conceptual	positioning	of	value	within	capitalism	and	GVC	
analysis	becomes	important	for	REDD+.	As	Lansing	(2011,	p.	747)	points	out,	“it	is	
not	the	carbon-in-the-ground	that	gives	an	offset	its	use	value.	Instead,	it	is	the	
relational	ordering	between	the	spaces	of	carbon	storage,	the	carbon	dioxide	
emitter,	and	the	atmosphere	itself	that	ultimately	makes	a	forestry	offset	useful”	
(see	also	Newell	&	Bumpus,	2012).	The	significance	of	this	relational	ordering	is	
echoed	by	Bernstein	and	Campling	(2006b,	p.	439	emphasis	in	original)	who	note	
that	“what	most	commodity/value	chain	analysis	focuses	on	above	all	is	relations	
between	capitals”.	It	is	this	focus,	on	the	relationships	between	capitals	(and	actors	
responsible	for	them)	and	how	these	produce	value	and	influence	governance	
through	REDD+	commodification,	that	GVC	analysis	has	to	offer.	The	above	
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understandings	of	the	GVC	framework	and	analysis	are	further	elaborated	in	Chapter	
6,	to	explore	the	three	case	study	REDD+	projects	in	Indonesia.	The	following	section	
introduces	the	idea	of	epistemic	circulation	alongside	GVC	analysis	to	further	guide	
this	research	into	REDD+	PSF	and	governance.	
2.6	Epistemic	circulation	in	REDD+	GVCs	
Epistemic	circulation	refers	to	the	“circulation	of	interpretations	of	value	through	
space	and	time”,	including	those	between	actors	on	GVCs	and	their	institutional	
context	(Büscher,	2014,	pp.	79–80;	Graham,	2006).	Here	the	idea	of	a	GVC	is	
stretched	beyond	linear	material	and	actor	exchanges	that	have	traditionally	
concerned	GVC	analyses	of	value	and	governance	types	illustrated	in	Figure	2.2	
(Büscher,	2014).	Büscher	(2014,	p.	80	emphasis	in	original)	identifies	the	limitations	
of	GVCs	in	this	regard	and	elaborates	that:		
	
Exactly	what	is	meant	by	‘value’	remains	unclear	…	Value	seemingly	can	be	found	in	
almost	any	material	or	non-material	commodity;	as	long	as	it	conjures	up	
performances,	ideas	or	knowledges	that	consumers	want	to	buy	(into),	it	can	
become	a	source	of	profit	and	hence	capital.	
	
These	understandings	of	value	are	important	in	the	modern	global	knowledge	and	
finance	economy,	where	many	of	the	goods	and	services	in	circulation	are	less	
tangible,	more	ephemeral,	and	often	purely	financial	(Büscher,	2014;	Castells,	2000).	
The	knowledge	economy	is	an	economy	of	meaning	where	certain	classes	of	
meaning	are	privileged,	so	“that	there	are	more	and	less	valuable	meanings;	that	
access	to	these	meanings	is	restricted;	and	that	meanings	can	in	fact	be	owned	and	
exchanged,	if	not	entirely	consumed”	(Graham,	2006,	p.	4;	see	also	Büscher,	2014).	
Subsequently,	value	within	a	knowledge	commodity	is	an	idea	and	experience	to	be	
managed	and	manipulated	(Büscher,	2014).	Büscher	(2014,	p.	86)	describes	how	
“[t]he	commodity	here	is	these	new	worlds”	and	how	interventions	like	REDD+	are	
influenced	significantly	by	the	ways	in	which	meanings	are	produced,	exchanged,	
and	evaluated	by	actors.	As	financialised	markets	encourage	perpetual	and	
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accelerated	exchange	of	such	knowledge	commodities	they	can	become	un-hinged	
from	their	grounded	interventions	(Knox-Hayes,	2013).		
	
Meaning-making	through	demonstrating	an	interest	in	environmental,	social	and	
governance	(ESG)5	issues	within	investments	has	been	recognised	by	REDD+	PSF	
actors	as	serving,	corporate	social	responsibility	(CSR)	and	branding	purposes	
(Hamilton,	2011;	Girod	et	al.,	2014;	Goldstein	&	Gonzalez,	2014).	These	commercial	
ESG	and	CSR	interests	intersect	with	literatures	that	investigate	the	geographies	of	
branding	in	value	chains	and	attempt	to	expose	the	episteme	within	knowledge	
commodities	(Pike,	2009a,	2009b,	2011,	2013,	2015),	particularly	regarding	forests	
and	trees	(Kronenberg	&	Mieszkowicz,	2011).	Callon	(2005,	p.	6)	calls	the	web	of	
“heterogeneous	actors	...	including	marketers,	packagers,	advertisers,	designers,	
merchandisers,	sellers,	etc.”	that	perform	the	branding	that	becomes	knowledge	
commodities	“professionals	of	entangling”.	Graham	(2006,	p.	5)	conceptualises	
knowledge	commodities	as	very	strange	in	the	ways	that:		
	
they	conflate	the	problems	of	meaning	(the	production	of	socially	exchangeable	
knowledge),	mediation	(the	processes	through	which	meanings	are	distributed	and	
exchanged),	and	evaluation	(the	situation	of	various	classes	of	meanings	within	
hierarchies	of	social	significance	and	desirability).	To	understand	the	implications	of	
our	knowledge	economies	we	need	to	understand	the	processes	by	which	meanings	
are	produced,	exchanged,	and	evaluated,	and	how	such	processes	shape	the	
political	character	of	any	given	social	system.		
	
Both	Büscher	and	Graham	recognise	that	to	understand	the	way	that	meanings	are	
produced,	exchanged	and	evaluated,	and	then	contribute	to	shaping	social	systems,	
it	is	necessary	to	analyse	how	actors	attribute	meaning	to	interventions	and	how	
they	mediate	and	evaluate	these	meanings	–	specifically,	how	“performances,	ideas,	
or	ways	of	meaning-making	in	the	marketing	of	interventions	need	to	be	directed	at	
particular	donor	or	policy	audiences”	(Büscher,	2014,	p.	81).	The	ways	in	which	GVC	
																																																						
5	Environmental,	social	and	governance	(ESG)	issues	refer	to	aspects	of	investments	that	PSF	
actors	consider	or	enact	that	demonstrate	CSR	and	responsible	investment,	whilst	serving	
marketing	and	branding	outcomes.	
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actors	go	about	‘meaning-making’	within	REDD+	projects	assists	this	research	to	
understand	why	PSF	actors	are	involved	and	how	they	evaluate	REDD+	projects.		
	
Büscher	(2014,	p.	87)	draws	on	Marx	to	position	epistemic	circulation	within	the	
neoliberal	capitalist	political	economy	where	capital	is	a	“value	in	process	[emphasis	
added]”	and	depends	on	the	form	and	velocity	of	its	own	circulation	to	have	value	
(that	is,	if	capital	is	not	circulating	it	has	no	value).	This	‘value	in	process’	is	most	
clearly	apparent	in	financial	derivatives,	futures	and	the	like,	which	are	particularly	
mobile	(Büscher,	2014).	Such	instruments	are	not	too	dissimilar	to	those	of	REDD+	
projects,	where	forest	ecosystem	services	depend	upon	consistent	capital	payments	
to	remain	valuable.	The	challenge	remains	how,	empirically,	to	analyse	these	
knowledge	commodities	that	circulate	according	to	complex	geographies	of	
capitalism	(Büscher,	2014).	In	responding	to	this,	Büscher	aligns	with	Starosta	
(2010a,	2010b)	in	cautioning	against	the	narrow	interpretations	of	value	often	
present	within	GVC	work,	and	draws	on	the	complex	arrangements	of	knowledges	
that	influence	evaluation	practices.	Büscher	found	that	epistemic	circulation	“seems	
to	be	emphasized	in	particular	when	it	comes	to	value	creation	in	the	neoliberal	
political	economy	of	conservation	and	development”	(2014,	p.	87),	demonstrating	
the	importance	of	adapting	the	GVC	framework	when	applied	to	REDD+	
interventions.	Büscher	(2014,	p.	87)	continues,	stating:		
	
tracing	knowledge	commodities	through	time	and	space	helps	us	to	understand	the	
power	and	politics	of	value	creation	in	contemporary	conservation/development,	
while	appreciating	the	complex	nature	and	forms	of	this	value.	
	
Büscher	identifies	the	task	ahead	as	being	“to	trace	the	meanings,	mediations,	and	
evaluations	around	an	intervention	in	relation	to	particular	epistemic	communities	in	
time	and	space	so	as	to	clarify	how	ideas	about	success	become	capital	or	‘value	in	
motion’”	(2014,	p.	81).	As	such,	the	challenge	for	a	GVC-inspired	analysis	of	REDD+	is	
to	expose	the	multiple	meanings,	mediations	and	evaluations	playing	out	within	
REDD+	interventions.	Examining	these	through	a	GVC	lens	opens	a	pathway	to	
understanding	epistemic	circulations	within	projects	seeking	to	capture	and	
	 37	
commodify	those	notions	of	success	that	actors	desire	to	be	attached	to.	
Furthermore,	because	“value	statements	are	malleable	‘productions	of	evaluation’”,	
actors’	evaluations	of	commodities	are	observable	political	processes	that	signify	the	
‘production’	of	perceived	value	(Büscher,	2014,	p.	82).	These	political	processes	of	
evaluation	are	where	this	research	endeavours	to	engage	GVC	analysis	with	the	
epistemic	circulation	of	REDD+	in	Indonesia.		
2.7	Evaluation	in	REDD+	GVCs		
The	above	framing	of	REDD+	GVCs	as	a	financialised	form	of	epistemic	circulation	
offers	an	opportunity	to	reflect	on	the	understanding	of	value	and	private	
governance	within	the	GVC	literature.	This	project,	therefore,	responds	to	Bernstein	
and	Cashore’s	(2007,	p.	364)	call	for	future	empirical	research	into	private	
governance	to	involve	“theory	testing	that	includes	a	systematic	assessment	of	the	
full	range	of	actor	motivations,	and	the	factors	that	influence	them,	within	and	
across	[non-state	market-driven	governance]	communities	as	these	systems	evolve”.		
	
If	something	serves	some	purpose	then	it	is	considered	to	be	of	value.	It	has	an	
essentially	practical	dimension	that	is	socially-determined,	influenced	to	a	greater	or	
lesser	extent	by	social	norms	and	practices	(Lee,	2011a).	Thus	“[v]alue	is	itself	
socially	constructed	in	and	through	the	social	experience	of	its	consumption	and	
production	and	in	the	transactions	and	exchanges	involved	in	its	circulation”	(Lee,	
2011a,	p.	374).	The	exercise	of	evaluation	-	to	assign	something	a	value	-	is	a	social	
exercise	performed	as	a	function	of	an	actor’s	desire.	This	desire	rests	on	
knowledges	that	are	shaped	by	complex	and	reflexive	political	relationships	between	
material	(commodities,	objects	and	things)	and	social	(people	in	their	relationship	
network)	experiences	(Lee,	2011a,	2011b).	The	material	experiences	influence	the	
social	experiences,	which	then	influence	the	material	experiences,	with	each	turn	
shaping	and	influencing	the	knowledges,	desires	and	evaluation	processes	of	actors	
exposed	to	these	experiences.	Such	knowledges	of	what	is	valuable	become	
recurring	fixtures	upon	which	decisions	are	made	and	evaluations	based	(Lee,	2011a,	
2011b).	For	example,	a	customer’s	experience	of	a	certain	product	shapes	their	
	38	
relationship	with	the	product’s	company	and	brand,	which	in	turn	influences	the	
products	that	the	company	produces,	their	brand,	and	so	on.		
	
This	illuminates	the	importance	of	geography	and	place	in	understanding	how	actors	
in	different	locations	form	their	knowledges,	desires,	motivations	and	subsequent	
evaluations	of	commodities	in	unique	and	diverse	ways	(Lee,	2011a,	2011b).	Gibson-
Graham	(2006)	highlights	the	diversity	within	economies	as	they	are	practiced	within	
and	across	places,	stressing	the	significance	of	geography	in	understanding	how	
things	are	valued.	In	Gibson-Graham’s	(2006,	p.	195)	words,	one	of	their	goals	has	
been	to	illuminate	political	economy’s	traditionally	“impoverished	conceptual	
ground	with	a	rich	diversity	of	economic	practices	and	organizations	...	The	language	
of	the	diverse	economy	brings	into	visibility	a	great	variety	of	economic	sites	and	
practices	in	any	particular	location”.		
	
This	increased	visibility	creates	room	for	further	‘novel	economic	performances’	and	
establishes	“the	economic	landscape	as	a	proliferative	space	of	difference”	(Gibson-
Graham,	2006,	pp.	xxi–xxii).	Diversity	between	economies	in	place,	and	the	influence	
of	place	on	economies,	speaks	to	the	plural	and	reflexive	evaluation	experienced	by	
actors	across	Indonesia’s	REDD+	GVCs.	This	diverse	influence	aspires	and	reflects	“a	
vision	of	global	transformation	through	the	accretion	and	interaction	of	small	
changes	in	place”	(Gibson-Graham,	2006,	p.	196)	offered	by	the	diverse	and	
grounded	roots	of	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	(Bakker,	2005;	Hughes,	2005).	In	
this	way,	exploring	REDD+	as	an	example	of	geographies	of	alternative	exchange	and	
circulation	within	market	environmentalism	is	a	way	to	test	how	traditionally	
‘capitalocentric’	such	projects	are	in	Indonesia	(Gibson-Graham,	2006;	Jackson	&	
Palmer,	2014).		
	
This	understanding	assists	the	interpretation	of	why	PSF	actors	are	involved	in	
REDD+	projects	in	Indonesia	and	their	governing	influence	on	GVCs.	As	long	as	there	
is	geography	and	place	then	different	knowledges,	desires,	social	relations	and	
evaluations	of	commodities	will	continue	to	be	recreated.	The	conceptual	model	in	
Figure	2.3	below	illustrates	this	dynamic	across	the	GVC	production	of	REDD+	
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knowledge	commodities	within	market	environmentalism.	Each	actor	draws	on	their	
place-based	knowledges	to	evaluate	incoming	material	and	information,	which	in	
turn	influences	their	knowledges	and	future	evaluations	before	passing	on	outputs	
to	the	next	GVC	actor.	All	of	which	operates	within	contexts	of	financialisation	and	
the	epistemic	circulation	of	knowledge	commodities.		
	
	
Figure	2.3:	Conceptual	model	of	REDD+	market	environmentalism	in	Indonesia.	
	
In	this	light,	the	challenge	for	REDD+	may	become	less	about	finding	or	putting	a	
value	on	nature	(e.g.	in	the	sense	of	an	international	carbon	price),	and	more	about	
influencing	how	values	are	socially	constructed	through	knowledges	and	evaluations	
that	engage	questions	of	sustainable	development	(Büscher,	2014).	The	test	in	this	
research,	guided	by	the	conceptual	model	above,	is	how	these	types	of	questions	are	
playing	out	among	the	financial	actors	within	Indonesia’s	REDD+	projects,	whose	
shareholders	and	consumers	have	been,	are	starting,	or	are	expected	to	ask	such	
questions.		
2.8	Conclusion	
The	theoretical	strands	discussed	in	this	chapter	initially	linked	REDD+	to	market	
environmentalism,	the	privatisation	of	governance	and	financialisation.	I	then	
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introduced	the	GVC	framework	and	concepts	of	epistemic	circulation	and	knowledge	
commodities	that	lend	tools	to	investigate	REDD+	commodification	and	evaluation.	
The	spatiality	of	REDD+	market	environmentalism	and	evaluation	was	
complemented	by	the	place-specific	reflexive	evaluations	of	alternative	capitalisms,	
illustrated	above	in	Figure	2.3.		
	
Taking	up	these	theoretical	frames,	the	research	addresses	the	three	core	research	
questions:	1.	who	are	PSF	actors	that	support	REDD+	projects?,	2.	why	do	PSF	actors	
support	REDD+	projects?,	and	3.	what	are	the	governance	implications	of	PSF	actors	
on	REDD+	projects?	The	commodification	and	governance	outcomes	of	REDD+	
market	environmentalism	offer	interesting	insights	into	the	knowledge,	desires	and	
evaluations	of	PSF	actors	engaged	in	REDD+	GVCs	as	alternative	and	sustainable	
forms	of	exchange	and	circulation.	The	following	chapter	lays	out	the	methods	used	
to	explore	these	questions.		
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3		Methodology	
3.1	Introduction		
This	chapter	describes	the	methods	by	which	the	research	was	undertaken,	including	
a	fieldwork	component	between	April	2013	and	March	2014.	The	first	section	
outlines	the	qualitative	case	study	approach	taken,	and	explains	how	the	GVC	
analysis	was	used.	I	outline	how	key	informants	were	selected	and	how	they	were	
involved,	and	describe	which	methods	were	employed	for	each	type	of	informant,	
and	why.	The	chapter	then	discusses	how	my	positionality,	personal	characteristics,	
and	circumstances	influenced	the	fieldwork	and	subsequent	interpretation.		
3.2	The	case	of	REDD+	in	Indonesia		
Because	this	research	is	interested	in	generating	in-depth	knowledge	and	
understanding	about	REDD+	projects	and	value	chains	and	the	process	of	evaluation	
within	the	REDD+	private	sector,	a	qualitative	approach	to	data	gathering	was	
employed	(Bulmer	&	Warwick,	1983b).	The	research	adopts	a	case	study	approach	of	
“studying	phenomena	in	a	real-life	setting”	and	in	this	respect	followed	an	inductive	
approach	whereby	the	‘real	world’	is	tested	to	generate	a	theory	of	practice	(Kitchen	
&	Tate,	2000,	p.	225;	see	also	de	Vaus,	2001;	Sarantakos,	1993).	However,	the	
research	also	took	a	deductive	approach,	as	upon	entering	the	field	it	set	out	to	
apply	a	GVC-informed	conceptual	framework	to	the	evaluation	practices	of	private	
finance	(de	Vaus,	2001).		
	
Kitchen	and	Tate	(2000,	p.	225)	discuss	the	importance	of	and	opportunities	
provided	by	case	studies	in	qualitative	research,	in	allowing	“a	particular	issue	to	be	
studied	in	depth	and	from	a	variety	of	perspectives”	(see	also	Bulmer	&	Warwick,	
1983b).	Following	a	purposive	sampling	strategy	(Bradshaw	&	Stratford,	2000),	the	
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cases	studied	here	were	selected	to	reflect	the	typical	diversity	amongst	REDD+	
projects	in	Indonesia	and	the	accessibility	of	them	and	their	informants.	The	
concerted	emergence	of	REDD+	pilot	projects	involving	PSF	in	Indonesia	offered	
ideal	research	case	studies	to	investigate	the	research	questions	(Bumpus	&	
Liverman,	2011).	Indonesia	was	selected	as	the	country	of	study	as	part	of	a	wider	
team	project,	with	three	case	studies	of	REDD+	projects	analysed	in	depth	for	this	
thesis.	I	have	termed	them	The	Swamp,	The	Valley,	and	The	River;	after	their	
biogeographical	character	and	in	order	to	maintain	the	anonymity	of	interviewees	
and	key	informants.	To	facilitate	exploration	of	the	complexity	of	these	case	studies,	
and	maintain	anonymity	of	respondents,	descriptive	titles	are	used	to	capture	the	
type	of	organisation	and	actor	(for	instance,	‘Indonesian	Business’),	along	with	a	
unique	number	identifier,	and	their	project	of	origin	(such	as	‘INGO	Informant	4,	The	
River’.	
	
Stephan	and	Paterson	(2012)	call	for	analyses	of	emerging	carbon	markets	that	
scrutinise,	deconstruct,	and	problematise	their	taken-for-granted	routines	and	
norms;	investigating	“how	different	forms	of	emissions	reductions	are	being	
produced,	commensurated	and	commodified	and	hence	being	made	tradable	on	the	
carbon	market”	(Stephan	&	Paterson,	2012,	p.	550).	Such	an	approach,	they	argue,	
can	“open	up	new	perspectives	on	carbon	markets,	giving	us	a	better	understanding	
of	their	functioning	as	well	as	their	possibilities	and	limitations”	(Stephan	&	
Paterson,	2012,	p.	551).	This	involves	investigating	the	key	technologies	and	
practices	the	market	relies	upon,	whilst	recognising	and	accounting	for	“the	
messiness	of	commodification	and	market	creation	processes,	illustrating	their	
contingency	and	highlighting	the	power	structures	at	play”	(Stephan	&	Paterson,	
2012,	pp.	550–551).		
	
The	thesis	responds	to	this	challenge	by	seeking	to	shed	light	on	the	inner	workings	
of	carbon	markets	through	applying	an	adapted	GVC	analysis.	I	draw	on	Stephan’s	
(2012,	pp.	622–623)	investigation	of	the	commodification	of	avoided	deforestation,	
which	is	described	as	“an	active	problematisation	of	the	commodification	of	avoiding	
deforestation”	that	is	then	followed	by	“a	phase	of	retroductive	reasoning	–	moving	
	 43	
back	and	forth	between	the	empirical	material	and	theory	development	–	to	
articulate	a	plausible	explanation	to	the	research	problem”.	A	similarly	reflexive	
inductive	-	deductive	approach	to	testing	REDD+	project	case	studies	was	adopted	to	
apply	the	GVC	methodology	and	framework	in	Chapter	6.	Given	the	emergent	nature	
of	REDD+	projects	and	GVCs	this	logic	of	critical	explanation	accommodates	the	
often	“messy	process	of	experimentation	in	the	field”	(Campbell,	2002,	p.	123)	and	
the	shortage	of	primary	research	on	carbon	offsetting	and	REDD+	from	a	GVC	
perspective	(Lovell	&	Liverman,	2010).	
3.2.1	Approaching	REDD+	GVCs		
The	approach	employed	here	draws	on	GVC	analysis	to	investigate	actors	and	their	
relationships	and	interactions	in	the	creation	of	REDD+	projects.	These	‘REDD+	GVCs’	
involve	fewer	actors	and	relationships	than	the	wider	REDD+	network	that	surrounds	
them,	and	delimiting	them	as	a	manageable	object	of	study	is	an	important	and	
difficult	challenge	(Bair,	2009;	Bernstein,	2011).	GVC	approaches	and	attendant	
methodologies	to	do	this	have	been	frequently	described	in	the	literature,	and	
typically	begin	with	a	mapping	of	actors	involved	in	the	production	of	the	commodity	
and	their	respective	functions	(Bernstein,	2011;	Gereffi	&	Fernandez-Stark,	2011;	
Gereffi	&	Lee,	2012;	Vagneron	&	Roquigny,	2011).	Gereffi	and	Fernandez-Stark	
(2011,	pp.	5–6)	argue:	
	
The	role	of	the	researcher	is	to	link	these	pieces	of	information	and	create	a	united	
and	self-explanatory	chain	that	includes	the	principal	activities	of	the	industry.	The	
segments	of	the	chain	illustrate	how	different	value	adding	processes	contributed	to	
the	product	or	service,	and	in	turn,	the	differing	returns	netted	for	the	chain	actors	
behind	them.	
	
Gereffi	and	Fernandez-Stark	(2011)	describe	how	each	segment	of	the	GVC	has	
specific	characteristics	and	dynamics,	and	the	importance	of	identifying	the	types	
and	characteristics	of	stakeholders	involved	in	the	industry.	They	continue	that	this	
stakeholder	examination	should	result	in	all	industry	actors	being	mapped	in	the	
GVC	and	their	role	explained.	Such	an	approach	enables	the	analysis	of	local	
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dynamics	within	which	the	GVC	is	embedded	and	aids	in	understanding	its	
governance	structure	(Gereffi	&	Fernandez-Stark,	2011).		
	
In	a	later	publication,	Gereffi	and	Lee	(2012,	p.	29)	outline	a	methodology	to	map	
GVC	governance	structures	in	two	steps:	1)	“[map]	the	input-output	structure	of	the	
GVC,	specifically	the	value	created,	captured,	and	moved”	and	2)	“[o]verlay	the	main	
companies	involved	in	different	stages	of	the	supply	chain	and	figure	out	where	the	
lead	firms6	are”	(see	also	Fitter	&	Kaplinksy,	2001).	In	a	similar	way,	Vagneron	and	
Roquigny	(2011,	p.	327)	describe	the	GVC	approach	as:		
	
tracing	the	commodity	from	its	original	producers	to	its	final	consumers,	identifying	
the	main	actors	involved	at	each	stage	of	the	chain	and	their	respective	
responsibilities	and	estimating	the	amount	of	value	added	at	each	stage	of	the	chain	
(and	its	distribution	among	the	various	chain	actors).	All	these	stages	involve	
interviewing	the	different	stakeholders	of	the	…	value	chain.		
	
These	framings	focus	on	actors,	broadly	defined	here	as	any	organisation	or	
individual	that	expresses	agency	to	produce	or	add	value	to	the	commodity	
generated	within	the	REDD+	project.	All	actors	involved	in	production	exert	personal	
and	professional	influence	on	an	individual	and	organisational	level.	As	such,	‘actors’	
includes	organisations	of	multiple	individuals	with	a	common	purpose,	and	
individuals	within	and	between	these	organisations,	provided	they	are	contributing	
to	the	production	of	the	commodity.		
	
Lovell	and	Liverman	(2010,	p.	257)	recognise	that	specialist	knowledges,	
technologies	and	discourses	within	emission	offsetting	have	meant	that	“offset	
organisations	are	key	players	in	understanding	how	carbon	offsets	are	produced	and	
consumed”.	Consequently,	their	research	examines	actors	along	the	length	of	REDD+	
GVCs,	both	‘upstream’	and	‘downstream’	from	on-the-ground	REDD+	projects	in	
their	institutional	contexts.	This	research	also	draws	on	Boyd	and	Goodman’s	(2011)	
																																																						
6	‘Lead	firms’,	in	traditional	GVC	lexicon,	describes	the	actors	within	a	GVC	that	are	the	most	
influential	in	governing	the	GVC	and	the	other	actors	within	it.	
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function	based	typology	of	actors	within	carbon	offset	GVCs	and	uses	key	informants	
from	producers	to	buyers	across	geographic	spaces	from	Indonesian	forests	to	head	
offices	in	consuming	countries.	In	identifying	informants	beyond	immediate	and	
more	obvious	GVC	actors,	who	occupy	institutional	and	governing	roles	or	positions	
that	indirectly	contribute	value	and	production,	I	follow	Bernstein	(2011,	pp.	27–28),	
in	an	effort	to:		
	
identify	political	communities	wherever	they	form,	whether	in	professional	or	
technical	networks,	relevant	marketplaces,	transnational	or	local	civil	society,	or	the	
traditionally	demarcated	‘international	society’	of	diplomats	and	state	officials.		
	
As	Bernstein	(2011)	acknowledges,	this	endeavour	is	empirical	and	interpretive,	and	
potentially	fraught.	Each	REDD+	project	case	revealed	itself	and	became	known	
gradually	through	extended	field	research.	By	mapping	the	context	within	the	GVC	
analysis,	the	relationships	between	actors	and	institutions	can	be	analysed	and	used	
to	develop	an	understanding	of	how	REDD+	projects	are	governed.		
	
In	conventional	GVC	analyses,	the	commodity	generally	equates	to	primary	
products,	or	manufactured	goods	where	“value	added	is	the	difference	between	the	
cost	of	inputs	and	outputs	at	each	stage	of	the	chain”	(Gereffi	&	Fernandez-Stark,	
2011,	p.	18;	Bair,	2009;	Sturgeon	&	Gereffi,	2009).	However,	as	Gibbon	et	al.	(2008)	
point	out,	this	approach	has	its	limitations	for	measuring	value	on	GVCs.	
Importantly,	such	approaches	would	struggle	to	characterise	the	complexity	of	the	
REDD+	commodity	in	any	depth.	Selwyn	(2012,	p.	206)	has	also	expressed	concern	
with	the	way	that	many	GVC	case	studies	are	conducted,	remaining	“somewhat	
sceptical	of	the	ability	of	any	single	researcher	to	incorporate	all	the	relevant	actors,	
relationships	and	network	configurations	[that	constitute	a	GVC]	in	a	meaningful	
way”.	However,	Selwyn	(2012)	concedes	that	the	GVC	framework	does	offer	
methodological	and	theoretical	insights	into	the	specifics	of	commodity	production	
that	can	be	reformulated	to	facilitate	valuable	empirical	investigation	into	
governance	and	capitalism.		
	
	46	
This	research	adapts	the	GVC	framework	to	explore	REDD+.	It	draws	on	Bernstein	
and	Cashore’s	(2007)	call	for	more	empirical	research	into	private	governance	on	
these	networks	including	systematic	assessments	of	actor	motivations	and	the	
factors	that	influence	them.	The	discussion	of	the	GVC	approach	and	methods	here	
is	to	indicate	the	overall	approach	that	forms	the	basis	of	the	research.	The	methods	
employed	to	gather	this	information	are	described	below.	
3.3	Field	research	strategy	in	Indonesia	
Before	entering	the	‘field’,	several	experienced	Indonesian	researchers	from	the	
University	of	Indonesia,	the	Centre	for	International	Forestry	Research	(CIFOR),	the	
Clinton	Climate	Initiative	and	Fauna	and	Flora	International	were	consulted	to	advise	
on	the	field	research	strategy.	I	collaborated	with	these	and	other	academic	
researchers	throughout	the	fieldwork	period,	sharing	ideas	about	useful	informants	
and	research	sites.	The	fieldwork	was	based	in	Indonesia’s	forestry	research	capital,	
Bogor,	south	of	Jakarta	on	Java,	where	CIFOR	is	located.	To	address	the	research	
questions,	information	was	gathered	via	interviews	with	various	actors	across	REDD+	
GVCs	and	their	supporting	institutions.	These	included	international	and	Indonesian	
Government	institutions,	public	and	private	sector	financiers,	project	developers,	
businesses,	consultants	and	contractors,	international	non-governmental	
organisations	(INGOs),	local	NGOs	(LNGOs)	and	forest	community	members	(see	
Table	3.1).		
	
The	first	phase	of	the	research	concentrated	mainly	on	interviews	with	English	
speaking	representatives	of	global	governance	institutions,	governments,	NGOs	and	
PSF	actors	in	Bogor	and	Jakarta	(see	Appendix	C	for	list	of	non-government	and	PSF	
informants).	These	initial	interviews	were	generally	broader	contextual	discussions	
about	Indonesia’s	national	REDD+	situation,	the	culture,	institutions	and	language	
(Parfitt,	2005).	This	built	cultural	and	subject	matter	competence	and	preparedness	
for	the	more	challenging	second	phase	of	the	research,	involving	interviews	with	key	
informants	from	specific	REDD+	project	case	studies.	Speaking	with	a	wide	variety	of	
informants	allowed	for	comparison	and	triangulation	among	the	accounts	of	
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different	actors,	providing	a	‘checking	procedure’	for	the	reliability	of	findings	and	
the	quality	of	the	research	(Bradshaw	&	Stratford,	2000;	Parfitt,	2005).		
	
Table	3.1:	Number	of	informants	of	different	types.	
Informant	type	 Description	 No.	
Global	governance	
institution	
Non-profit	actors	that	receive	their	mandate	from	a	global	
constituency	(e.g.	UN-REDD	and	the	World	Bank)	 19	
International	NGO	 Non-profit	actors	that	work	with	international	businesses,	governments,	investors,	developers,	and	contractors	 17	
Government	 Actors	that	represent	a	sovereign	government	unit	or	agency	(including	at	supra-	and	sub-national	scales)	 19	
Local	NGO	and	
community		
Non-profit	community	actors	that	are	active	within	local	villages	
and	contribute	to	forest	carbon	conservation	activities	 7	
Investor		
For-profit	actors	that	are	actively	investigating	or	contributing	to	
a	forest	carbon	conservation	activity	(e.g.	investment	funds	and	
banks);	including	1	foundation	and	1	sovereign	wealth	fund		
33	
Investor/developer	
For-profit	actors	that	are	both	investing	in	a	specific	forest	
carbon	conservation	activity	and	responsible	for	its	delivery	(e.g.	
private	REDD+	companies)	
15	
Extractive	industry	
For-profit	actors	whose	supply	chains	intersect	with	forest	carbon	
conservation	issues	and	activities	(e.g.	palm	oil	plantations	and	
manufacturers)	
25	
Contractor		
For-profit	actors	that	help	investors	and	extractive	industry	
achieve	their	financial	and	forest	carbon	conservation	goals	(e.g.	
consultants,	universities	and	research	institutes)	
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3.3.1	Interviews	and	observation	
The	sampling	method	followed	what	Bradshaw	and	Stratford	(2000,	p.	44)	describe	
as	‘snowball’	or	‘chain	sampling’,	whereby	cases	of	interest	or	informants	are	
pursued	following	recommendations	from	earlier	informants;	and	‘opportunistic	
sampling’,	where	there	is	flexibility	to	follow	new	leads	and	take	advantage	of	the	
unexpected.	Snowball	sampling	is	used	extensively	in	academic	fieldwork,	relying	on	
a	‘trait’	or	commonality	that	is	shared	by	the	participants	allowing	the	researcher	to	
“seek	out	more	easily	interviewees	with	particular	experiences	or	backgrounds”	
(Parfitt,	2005,	p.	117;	Browne,	2005).	As	the	key	informants	pursued	within	phase	
one	were	part	of	the	community	of	REDD+	organisations	in	Indonesia,	these	
methods	were	the	most	appropriate.	The	first	informants	to	be	contacted	were	
recommended	by	one	of	my	supervisors,	who	was	researching	a	broader	project,	
and	identified	by	searching	relevant	organisations	on	the	internet.	Initial	contact	
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with	these	informants	was	via	email	or	telephone	to	establish	a	suitable	opportunity	
to	meet.		
	
During	these	phase	one	interviews	particular	examples	of	REDD+	projects	were	
identified,	with	certain	informants	having	a	good	knowledge	of	successful	and	
unsuccessful	cases,	and	the	organisations	involved.	On	this	basis	it	was	possible	to	
connect	with	a	wide	variety	of	government,	finance,	project	developer	and	INGO	
organisations	within	specific	REDD+	projects.	The	case	studies	then	proceeded	using	
a	variety	of	methods	including	further	semi-structured	key	informant	interviews,	
informal	interviews,	and	participation	in	and	observation	of	events	(Bulmer,	1983).	It	
is	recognised	that	the	rich	detail	that	this	approach	offers	is	accompanied	by	limits	to	
the	generalisability	of	findings,	given	the	subjectivity	of	informants	(Bulmer	&	
Warwick,	1983a).	However,	the	research	does	not	seek	to	support	wide	
generalisation	from	the	cases	studied,	but	rather	aims	for	an	analysis	of	actors,	
activities	and	meaning	in	context	(Bradshaw	&	Stratford,	2000).		
	
Open	and	informal	interviews	can	allow	informants	to	“construct	their	own	accounts	
of	their	experiences	by	describing	and	explaining	their	lives	in	their	own	words”	
(Parfitt,	2005,	p.	111),	allowing	spontaneous	responses	to	express	their	
“experiences,	feelings	and	opinions”	(Kitchen	&	Tate,	2000,	p.	213;	Parfitt,	2005).	As	
the	research	is	interested	in	gathering	these	perceptions	from	various	participants	
within	the	case	studies,	informal	and	semi-structured	personal	interviews	were	
employed	(see	Appendix	B	for	ethics	approval,	information	sheet	and	consent	form).	
The	structure	and	style	of	these	interviews	varied	according	to	the	profession	and	
social	situation	of	the	respondent,	ranging	from	what	Dunn	(2000)	describes	as	
professional	interview	styles,	for	situations	requiring	formal	conduct	(such	as	a	work	
place),	to	creative	interview	styles	where	the	informant	is	relaxed	in	an	informal	
atmosphere	(such	as	a	café).	Semi-structured	interviews	allowed	a	conversation-like	
atmosphere	to	develop	around	relevant	issues	of	interest	to	the	informant,	whilst	
ensuring	that	all	the	relevant	topics	were	covered	(Dowling,	2000;	Kitchen	&	Tate,	
2000).	An	interview	guide	(see	Appendix	A)	was	used	to	ensure	this	and	facilitate	
comparability	between	responses	(Bulmer	&	Warwick,	1983a;	Dunn,	2000;	Kitchen	&	
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Tate,	2000;	Wuelker,	1983).	This	was	the	primary	method	used	for	gathering	data	
from	key	informants	from	the	types	of	organisations	listed	above	and	contacted	
through	a	snowball	sampling	technique.		
	
Often	these	interviews	were	conducted	at	the	margins	of	a	conference,	seminar	or	
workshop	that	had	gathered	groups	of	REDD+	experts	and	stakeholders	together.	
Following	Mikecz	(2012)	these	gatherings	were	targeted	as	a	way	to	gain	access	to	
otherwise	often	distant	and	time	pressured	elite	informants	such	as	investors,	
project	developers,	international	NGO	representatives,	policymakers	and	other	
governing	actors,	and	private	sector	actors	and	businesspeople	(Mikecz,	2012;	
Welch,	Marschan-Piekkari,	Penttinen,	&	Tahvanainen,	2002).	This	enabled	me	to	
approach	potential	informants	at	a	time	when	they	were	away	from	the	immediate	
pressures	and	problems	of	their	office	and	were	exposed	to	external	ideas	and	
narratives	of	REDD+.	In	many	ways	this	prepared	them	for	my	type	of	questions,	and	
made	them	more	willing	to	talk	about	their	role	within	Indonesia’s	REDD+	sector.	
While	these	interviews	were	relatively	informal,	advance	preparation	to	familiarise	
myself	with	these	‘elite’	informants	and	their	roles,	was	invaluable	and	made	
informants	far	more	receptive	and	prepared	to	engage	in	a	longer,	more	in-depth	
discussion	(Mikecz,	2012;	Yeung,	1995).	This	was	particularly	important	given	the	
popularity	of	REDD+	research	in	Indonesia,	and	the	risk	of	research	fatigue	among	
key	informants,	as	one	informant	advised:		
	
There	are	so	many	PhD	students	studying	REDD+	that	we	have	to	have	a	PhD	filter.	
Every	week	we	get	a	question.	We	just	can’t	do	it	…	You	need	to	be	specific	with	
people	and	do	background	research	before	you	take	their	time.	Everyone	has	
students	demanding	of	them	(INGO	Informant	2	The	Swamp).		
	
Previous	GVC	analyses	involving	similar	elite	informants	have	found	qualitative	
interviews	to	be	highly	appropriate	for	this	type	of	research	(Yeung,	1995).	The	
‘studying	upwards’	of	highly	positioned	and	influential	elites	and	investors	in	this	
way	meant	that	a	small	number	of	particularly	important	key	informants	for	the	case	
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studies	could	not	be	met	in	person	and	had	to	be	contacted	via	email,	phone	or	web-
conferencing	(Aguiar	&	Schneider,	2012).		
3.3.2	Case	study	REDD+	projects		
Through	snowballing,	and	multiple	meetings	with	REDD+	actors,	close	relationships	
were	built	with	key	informants	and	stakeholders	in	REDD+	projects.	These	
relationships,	along	with	essential	characteristics	and	accessibility,	then	informed	
case	study	selection.	Other	case	study	sites	were	available	in	Indonesia,	but	many	of	
these	had	attracted	so	much	attention	from	researchers	that	key	informants	were	
fatigued	and	less	open	to	assisting	another	PhD	student.	The	relationships	in	
selected	case	studies	proved	very	beneficial	and	informative,	often	because	the	
research	questions	were	of	direct	interest	and	relevance	to	informants;	whose	
feedback	helped	refine	them	(Cook,	2005;	England,	1994).	There	were	many	
opportunities	for	informal	conversations	and	interviews	with	additional	information	
gathered	through	observational	techniques.	My	observational	presence	during	the	
undertakings	of	the	REDD+	projects	led	to	informants	quickly	embracing	and	
involving	me	in	their	operations,	their	day-to-day	responsibilities	and	the	issues	that	
they	encountered.	This	direct	‘participatory	observation’	allowed	me	to	become	a	
“research	instrument”,	and	cross-check	what	had	been	said	in	interviews	about	the	
actors	involved,	specifically	private	finance	and	project	developers	(Cook,	2005,	p.	
186;	see	also	Dowling,	2000;	Kitchen	&	Tate,	2000).		
	
Between	10	and	15	key	informants	from	across	each	of	the	three	REDD+	project	case	
studies	offered	interviews,	often	welcoming	additional	follow-up	interviews	and	
observation	opportunities.	These	informants	covered	the	breadth	of	informant	types	
needed	to	comprehensively	map	REDD+	GVCs	and	included	all	of	the	most	important	
actors	involved,	including	community	members,	NGOs,	contractors	and	investors	of	
Indonesian	and	international	ethnicities	and	both	males	and	females.	Some	of	these	
informants	were	based	near	the	REDD+	project	areas,	but	most	were	situated	nearer	
cities	in	Indonesia	and	internationally.	Subsequently	between	one	to	two	weeks	
were	spent	in	or	near	each	REDD+	project	area,	whilst	informants	outside	these	
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areas	were	accessed	separately.	Further	details	of	the	three	case	study	sites	and	
their	informants	are	shared	in	Chapter	6.	Some	case	study	informants	encouraged	
my	active	participation	in	the	development	of	REDD+	projects	given	my	experiences	
across	the	industry:	
	
You	should	raise	your	hand	in	REDD+	meetings	and	ask	why	the	private	sector	is	not	
there.	That	would	be	really	helpful	for	this	problem.	You’re	a	stakeholder	that	has	
probably	spent	more	time	speaking	to	private	sector	than	they	have.	NGOs	and	
public	sector	are	often	very	grateful	to	hear	frank	input	from	us.	That	makes	you	
more	interesting	than	other	consultants	in	REDD+.	Some	consultants	are	bound	to	
the	company	line	and	some	don’t	know	as	they	have	only	worked	with	the	
Indonesian	government	(Investor	1,	The	Swamp).	
	
However,	this	is	not	something	I	felt	comfortable	doing,	and	I	did	not	act	on	it.	
Instead,	I	restricted	my	participation	to	conversations	with	actors	and	informants.	To	
retain	an	overview	of	developments	in	Indonesia’s	REDD+	programme	and	particular	
REDD+	projects,	a	daily	research	journal	was	kept	(Kitchen	&	Tate,	2000;	Brockington	
&	Sullivan,	2003).	
	
The	second	stage	of	the	field	research	involved	interviews	in	or	near	the	forests	of	
the	case	study	REDD+	projects,	typically	involving	local	people,	their	groups	and	the	
NGOs	based	there.	Very	few	of	these	informants	spoke	English,	so	translating	
assistance	was	often	needed.	The	use	of	translators,	however,	comes	with	inherent	
problems,	as	the	additional	information	filter	can	bring	translator	interpretation	and	
bias,	misunderstanding	and	equivalence	issues	(Bulmer	&	Warwick,	1983a;	Leslie	&	
Storey,	2003;	Müller,	2007).	There	were	times	in	this	research	where	translation	was	
provided	by	the	same	INGO	that	was	supporting	or	responsible	for	implementing	the	
case	study	REDD+	project	under	question.	This	raised	unequal	power	relations	in	the	
interview	and	risked	the	INGO	translating	to	support	their	own	version	of	events	and	
offering	similarly	compromised	interview	question	guidance.		
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Bulmer	and	Warwick	(1983a,	p.	32)	recognise	qualitative	methodologies	as	“a	
western	product	which	cannot	be	straightforwardly	exported	to	the	developing	
world”.	They	list	the	translation	of	questions	and	responses	as	an	issue	affecting	the	
quality	of	information	gathered	(see	also	Wuelker,	1983).	During	the	analysis	of	
these	INGO	responses	and	those	they	were	translating,	care	was	taken	to	cross-
reference	them	with	previous	responses	and	those	of	other	relevant	informants.	
Despite	these	risks,	the	guidance	of	these	INGOs	did	ensure	that	interviews	and	
questions	were	culturally	specific	and	appropriate	(Bulmer	&	Warwick,	1983a;	
Wuelker,	1983).		
	
Furthermore,	the	involvement	of	local	community	and	NGO	members	in	discussions	
about	the	REDD+	project	may	have	restricted	the	answers	of	some	project	
developers	to	those	that	would	be	supported	by	the	on-looking	constituency	
(Kitchen	&	Tate,	2000).	Although,	on	comparison	between	answers	from	developers	
with	and	without	local	members	present,	there	does	not	appear	to	have	been	any	
significant	difference	in	the	nature	of	the	responses	received.	However,	it	was	these	
encounters	that	offered	insight	into	the	experiences	and	perspectives	of	the	local	
communities	and	NGOs	as	they	drew	confidence	in	each	other’s	supportive	presence	
and	information	seemed	to	flow	quite	freely	(Kitchen	&	Tate,	2000).		
3.4	Coffee	and	batik	to	beer	and	suits:	Positionality	and	
reflexivity		
During	the	entirety	of	my	time	in	Indonesia	my	social	position	was	obvious	and	
inescapable.	In	all	my	social	encounters	I	carried	with	me	my	“bodily	presence”	and	
associated	personal	characteristics	such	as	race,	sex	and	age	that	Kearns	(2000,	p.	
110)	recognises	as	potentially	carrying	affiliated	power	dynamics	(see	also	Dowling,	
2000).	In	the	Indonesia	context,	these	personal	characteristics	worked	to	my	
advantage	in	many	ways.	Being	a	young,	white,	English-speaking	male	conducting	
postgraduate	research	in	a	Muslim	community,	where	white	people	often	associated	
with	easy	money	and	power,	opened	doors	to	people	and	places	that	may	not	have	
opened	had	I	been	a	local	(Brockington	&	Sullivan,	2003;	Dowling,	2000;	Kitchen	&	
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Tate,	2000).	Furthermore,	my	outsider	status	enabled	me	to	ask	for	explanations	in	
conversations,	and	for	responses	to	be	clarified,	where	a	local	researcher	may	have	
been	seen	as	incompetent	for	doing	so.	
	
Researching	across	GVCs	placed	me	in	a	wide	variety	of	social	situations,	ranging	
from	the	company	of	the	poorest	in	the	community	to	the	wealthiest.	Leslie	and	
Storey	(2003,	p.	187)	describe	this	as	“moving	up	and	down	power	structures”.	They	
ask	“how	do	you	scale	hierarchies	successfully	and	ethically?”	(Leslie	&	Storey,	2003,	
p.	187).	I	found	myself	adopting	roles	in	order	to	blend	into	the	immediate	setting	
and	to	put	the	informant	at	ease;	from	drinking	coffee	and	wearing	batik	(customary	
Indonesian	dress	shirt)	with	Indonesian	informants,	to	drinking	beer	and	wearing	a	
suit	with	foreign	funding	elites,	and	all	manner	of	mixing	in-between.	These	
appearance	adaptations	proved	vital;	one	informant	advised	regarding	the	agents	of	
major	investors,	“they’ll	probably	only	tell	you	over	a	stiff	drink”	(Investor	1	The	
Swamp).	In	a	similar	sense,	I	was	advised	“don’t	be	a	TOB	–	a	task	orientated	
bastard”	(International	Volunteer	1	the	River)	–	meaning	to	remain	patient	and	
vigilant,	to	go	with	the	flow	and	wait	for	the	right	moment	before	asking	any	
questions	regarding	my	research.	In	some	cases	this	might	take	several	meetings	or	
occasions	before	the	relationship	was	at	a	point	where	informants	were	comfortable	
‘getting	down	to	business’.	It’s	likely	that	this	personal	approach	and	relaxed	
attitude	helped	me	to	gain	the	insights	that	I	did.	
	
Traversing	the	REDD+	project	GVCs	like	this	led	to	occasions	where	those	in	forest	
communities	knew	I	was	conversing	with	influential	government	and	investor	
informants,	and	vice	versa.	An	example	of	this	was	captured	where	one	informant	
from	a	REDD+	project	asked,	“so	you	must	be	the	most	important	guy	right,	you’re	in	
touch	with	the	investors!”	(Indonesian	Consultant	1	The	River).	Sometimes	these	
groups	were	pursuing	conflicting	interests,	which	placed	me	in	awkward	positions	
where	I	felt	like	my	‘allegiance’	to	either	‘side’	was	being	questioned.	To	negotiate	
this	I	had	to	be	flexible	and	improvise	and	represent	myself	according	to	the	
situation.	It	was	important	not	to	deceive	informants,	but	to	remain	as	open	and	
objective	as	possible,	without	ignoring	my	own	positionality	(Leslie	&	Storey,	2003).	I	
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found	it	impossible	not	to	sympathise	with	forest	communities	and	their	advocates	
that	were	struggling	to	improve	their	livelihoods	through	REDD+,	and	hence	hold	a	
position	of	bias	against	those	elites	in	power	who	the	disadvantaged	begrudged.	This	
has	no	doubt	influenced	my	understanding	of	the	research.	The	importance	of	such	
a	tendency	and	my	awareness	of	it	has	allowed	and	encouraged	me	to	minimise	its	
influence	in	my	analysis.		
	
In	some	of	these	social	situations,	especially	with	marginalised	informants,	there	is	
some	risk	that	they	would	seek	to	appease	me	with	answers	they	thought	I	wanted	
to	hear,	or	give	answers	they	understood	they	should	be	giving,	thereby	concealing	
actual	personal	opinions	(Valentine,	2005;	Wuelker,	1983).	Among	the	forest	
communities	and	local	NGOs	I	was	often	seen	as	an	external	expert	and	professional.	
Often	I	was	initially	mistaken	for	an	NGO	representative	(Brockington	&	Sullivan,	
2003;	Kitchen	&	Tate,	2000).	This	occasional	perception	of	my	role	as	‘powerful’	and	
even	‘superior’	in	a	postcolonial	setting	was	further	augmented	by	apparent	
affiliations	with	the	project	developers	I	was	seen	with	(Valentine,	2005).	Members	
of	forest	communities	and	local	NGOs	gave	a	lot	of	their	time,	and	offered	their	
homes	and	their	hospitality,	which	was	significant,	given	their	financial	means.	This	
special	treatment	may	have	also	been	reflected	in	informants’	responses	and	
behaviour,	insofar	as	they	may	have	felt	“beholden	to	cooperate”	(Valentine,	2005,	
p.	125).		
	
In	a	similar	sense,	the	positionality	of	several	REDD+	case	study	informants,	who	also	
acted	as	guides	and	translated	for	other	informants	in	the	field,	will	have	influenced	
the	research	in	some	way,	as	discussed	in	the	previous	section	(Pasquini	&	Olaniyan,	
2004;	Valentine,	2005).	One	such	informant	that	was	locally	embedded	and	
possessed	extensive	knowledge	of	REDD+	in	Indonesia	was	able	to	quickly	develop	
an	understanding	of	the	research.	This	informant	facilitated	highly	informative	
discussions	with	community	and	NGO	members,	such	that	at	times	I	felt	(like	
Pasquini	&	Olaniyan,	2004)	that	I	was	observing	the	interview	rather	than	conducting	
it.	This	informant’s	respectful	and	professional	demeanour	created	a	relaxed	
conversational	space	within	which	informants	appeared	pleased	to	share.		
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Of	the	four	translators	used	in	the	case	study	areas,	two	would	sometimes	struggle	
to	verbally	express	themselves	and	would	compensate	with	animated	personal	
expression	and	translation	books	and	computers.	It	was	stressed	at	the	outset	that	
the	translation	should	not	develop	into	interpretation	of	informants’	responses.	This	
was	to	prevent	the	alteration	of	the	information	given	by	informants	through	the	
translators’	own	perceptions	of	what	information	was	relevant,	what	was	not,	and	
what	it	meant	(see	Leslie	&	Storey,	2003,	p.	133).	These	translators	and	I	grew	to	
understand	each	other	very	well,	developing	a	hybrid	vocabulary	of	limited	English	
and	Indonesian	between	us.	However,	whilst	useful,	this	shared	vocabulary	risked	
allowing	single	words	to	carry	with	them	a	variety	of	different	meanings,	potentially	
limiting	the	information	gathered	from	informants.	As	Müller	(2007,	p.	207)	
observes,	“the	transfer	of	cultural	meanings,	embedded	in	linguistic	expressions,	
from	one	language	to	another	constitutes	one	of	the	most	challenging	tasks	of	
translation”.	Bulmer	and	Warwick	(1983a)	further	recognise	a	host	of	equivalence	
issues	in	translation;	such	as	whether	words	and	concepts	will	carry	the	same	
meaning	in	questions,	and	if	not	then	how	can	responses	be	measured	and	will	
response	patterns	give	the	same	meaning	across	these	cultures.	This	is	particularly	
important	given	the	complexity	of	the	REDD+	context,	as	one	case	study	informant	
expressed:		
	
I	am	very	conscious	of	the	power	that	the	meanings	of	words	can	do	to	a	frame	of	
thinking.	It’s	very	apparent	in	REDD+.	Like	‘benefit	sharing’	and	‘safeguards’.	It’s	
hard	in	an	organisation	where	people	develop	their	own	language	and	meanings	for	
things	and	then	try	to	communicate	this	to	others.	I	try	and	break	this	down,	but	it’s	
hard	(INGO	Informant	2	The	Swamp).		
	
Consequently,	it	could	not	be	taken	for	granted	that	the	languages	and	discourses	of	
the	REDD+	industry	–	relating	to	complex	and	contested	principles	like	community	
participation,	green	growth,	and	sustainable	development	–	that	Indonesian	
speaking	informants	adopted	were	intended	to	carry	the	same	meaning	as	I	
understood	them	to	mean.	The	use	of	some	of	these	terms	may	serve	other	
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purposes,	such	as	demonstrating	(apparently)	complex	knowledge	of	REDD+	or	
familiarity	with	the	English	language.	This	tendency	risked	clouding	the	
understandings	shared	between	the	translator	and	myself,	presenting	a	potential	
weakness	of	the	research	and	could	have	been	avoided	had	I	had	an	advanced	grasp	
on	the	Indonesian	language.	Subsequently,	a	shared	communication	strategy	
catering	to	the	abilities	of	each	translator	was	established	to	ensure	the	meanings	of	
terms	were	clarified	and	confusing	REDD+	jargon	was	avoided	as	much	as	possible.		
	
Many	of	the	investor,	developer,	international	NGO,	global	governance,	extractive	
industry,	and	contractor	informant	types	were	in	positions	of	power,	spoke	English,	
and	were	often	in	secure	career	positions.	Therefore	they	could	be	considered	to	be	
foreign	or	local	elites.	There	is	an	established	literature	on	issues	around	
interviewing	elites	(Brockington	&	Sullivan,	2003;	Desmond,	2004;	Smith,	2006)	that	
inverts	the	assumption	that	the	interviewer	has	the	power	(Lindsay,	1997;	Valentine,	
2005).	For	example	Sabot	(1999)	found	that	elites	may	be	open	and	encouraging	of	
local	researchers,	but	reluctant	to	cooperate	with	foreign	researchers.	It	was	
apparent	during	my	own	research	that	this	was	an	influencing	factor,	with	some	
informants	cancelling	last	minute	and	others	taking	phone	calls	from	friends	and	
joking	with	colleagues	during	the	interview	(Brockington	&	Sullivan,	2003;	Lindsay,	
1997).		
	
Furthermore,	several	times	elite	informants	asked	who	I	had	already	spoken	to,	
putting	me	in	an	awkward	position	as	refusing	to	divulge	would	appear	rude,	while	
providing	names	risked	offending	or	embarrassing	informants,	possibly	altering	
responses,	and	breaching	confidentiality	assured	to	previous	interviewees.	To	avoid	
being	rude,	when	asked	who	I	had	spoken	to	I	explained	how	I	was	not	able	to	
divulge	that	information,	or	give	names	of	people	or	organisations	I	hoped	to	speak	
with.	This	became	less	of	an	issue	as	the	snowballing	technique	progressed	to	the	
point	where	I	had	a	comfortable	understanding	of	the	informants	relevant	to	my	
research.	There	were	even	situations	where	I	had	a	preceding	reputation,	where	
interviewees	had	heard	about	me	and	my	questions	before	I	had	approached	them.	
Furthermore,	throughout	my	11	months	in	Indonesia	I	would	often	‘catch	up’	with	
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relevant	informants	irregularly	and	by	coincidence	at	formal	or	informal	events.	This	
enabled	me	to	follow	their	story	through	time	and	as	their	REDD+	project	and	
Indonesia’s	REDD+	context	evolved	and	offered	opportunities	to	‘cross	check’	and	
revisit	informants’	predictions	regarding	the	REDD+	industry	and	voluntary	forest	
carbon	projects	and	markets	(Hopkins	&	Wallerstein,	1994).		
3.5	Summary		
Considering	my	position	within	this	foreign	cultural	context	and	the	confusions	and	
misunderstandings	that	could	potentially	accompany	it,	a	structured	and	inflexible	
approach	would	not	have	been	the	most	effective	and	efficient	approach	to	this	
research.	The	suitability	of	the	case	study	approach	to	the	GVC	framework	and	the	
specifics	of	the	Indonesian	context	required	my	persona	and	methodology	to	be	
flexible	and	open	to	all	forms	of	qualitative	information.	Doing	so	enabled	the	
development	of	an	in-depth	understanding	of	the	REDD+	situation	in	Indonesia	and	
the	role	and	governing	influence	of	profit-seeking	finance	within	it.	The	potential	
disadvantages	of	this	approach	discussed	above	are	outweighed	by	its	ability	to	
facilitate	a	reflexive	approach	to	applying	the	GVC	framework	to	suit	REDD+	projects.	
The	following	chapter	introduces	the	contextual	setting	within	which	the	research	is	
situated.		
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4		Context	of	REDD+	in	Indonesia		
4.1	Introduction	
The	emergence	of	REDD+	projects	in	Indonesia	has	come	about	within	a	context	
characterised	by	dynamic	and	rapid	but	often	frustrating	change.	Since	2009	the	
Indonesian	Government	has	achieved	a	number	of	important	milestones,	namely:	
committed	to	ambitious	emission	reduction	targets;	established	national	climate	and	
REDD+	plans	with	UN-REDD	and	the	World	Bank;	agreed	to	a	memorandum	of	
understanding	with	Norway	and	aid	partnerships	with	Germany,	Japan	and	Australia;	
and	established	a	presidential	REDD+	task	force	and	REDD+	pilot	provinces	and	
projects.	However,	all	these	efforts	have	been	frustrated	because	the	expansive	
agricultural	drivers	of	deforestation	continue,	particularly	palm	oil	plantations.	Many	
PSF	actors	appear	to	prefer	clearing	forest	for	these	agricultural	land-uses	rather	
than	establishing	REDD+	projects	(GCP,	IPAM,	FFI,	&	FI,	2014;	Luttrell	et	al.,	2014),	
perpetuating	Indonesia’s	high	deforestation	rates	(Indrarto	et	al.,	2012;	Margono	et	
al.,	2014).	This	chapter	explores	this	shifting	context	surrounding	REDD+	rhetoric	and	
reality	in	Indonesia,	and	situates	REDD+	PSF	within	this.	The	chapter	begins	with	the	
development	of	REDD+	policy	and	institutions	in	Indonesia.	It	then	introduces	the	
Indonesian	land-use	concession	system	and	the	extractive	industries	that	surround	
and	compete	with	REDD+.	Together	these	accounts	illustrate	the	political	economic	
context	shaping	the	roll-out	of	REDD+	in	Indonesia.			
4.2	REDD+	regulatory	frameworks	in	Indonesia	
The	idea	of	a	global	mechanism	to	finance	the	reduction	of	emissions	from	
deforestation	and	forest	degradation	began	development	in	2005	(Luttrell	et	al.,	
2014).	REDD+	surfaced	as	part	of	the	2007	Bali	Action	Plan	from	COP7	13	of	the	
UNFCCC.	The	United	Nations	and	World	Bank	began	to	allocate	funding	and	
																																																						
7	Conference	of	the	Parties,	where	all	States	that	are	Parties	to	the	UNFCCC	are	represented.	
	60	
development	resources	towards	researching	and	preparing	countries	for	REDD+	
economies	(Indrarto	et	al.,	2012).	The	UNFCCC	continues	to	develop	and	refine	the	
design	of	REDD+,	and	it	is	not	yet	recognised	as	an	official	offset	mechanism	in	
formal	compliance	markets.			
		
The	former	Indonesian	President	Susilo	Bambang	Yudhoyono’s	2009	announcement	
of	ambitious	emissions	reduction	targets	generated	considerable	interest	in	REDD+	
because	of	Indonesia’s	large	forest	area	and	vulnerable,	carbon	dense	peatlands	
(Indrarto	et	al.,	2012).	Several	donors	have	responded	in	support,	the	most	notable	
being	the	Norwegian	government,	which	in	2010	signed	a	Letter	of	Intent	(LoI)	with	
Indonesia	to	set	up	a	bilateral	arrangement	related	to	REDD+	(Luttrell	et	al.,	2014).	
This	arrangement	promised	$200	million	to	assist	with	achieving	governance	
readiness	for	REDD+,	and	$800	million	for	performance	based	payments.	Conditions	
included	consultations	concerning	the	design	of	a	REDD+	national	strategy,	the	
establishment	of	an	independent	agency	for	measuring,	reporting	and	verification	
(MRV),	a	presidential	decree	for	a	moratorium	on	issuing	new	land-use	concessions	
on	forest	land,	and	the	selection	of	a	province	for	pilot	implementation	(Indrarto	et	
al.,	2012).	Each	of	these	are	underway.	In	parallel,	additional	support	came	from	the	
UN-REDD	program,	the	World	Bank’s	Forest	Carbon	Partnership	Facility	(FCPF)	and	
the	Forest	Investment	Program,	all	of	which	work	with	the	Indonesian	Government	
to	finance	and	develop	‘REDD	readiness’	(Indrarto	et	al.,	2012;	Luttrell	et	al.,	2014).	
Financial	and	technical	support	for	the	Government	from	the	governments	of	
Australia,	Germany,	France,	the	United	Kingdom,	and	Japan	(among	others)	has	also	
been	directed	towards	governance	readiness	and	pilot	REDD+	projects	to	advance	
Indonesia’s	preparedness	(Dermawan	&	Sinaga,	2015;	Indrarto	et	al.,	2012).		
	
To	facilitate	these	readiness	activities,	and	in	response	to	the	LoI	between	Norway	
and	the	Indonesian	Government,	the	ad	hoc	REDD+	Task	Force	was	established	in	
2010	to	coordinate	institutions	involved	with	REDD+	in	Indonesia.	These	included	the	
National	Development	Planning	Agency	(Bappenas),	the	Ministry	of	Forestry	(MoF),	
and	the	President’s	Working	Unit	for	Development	Supervision	and	Control	(Indrarto	
et	al.,	2012).	The	REDD+	Task	Force’s	terms	of	reference	included	six	main	tasks:	
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• ensure	the	development	of	a	National	REDD+	Strategy	and	a	National	Action	
Plan	to	Reduce	Greenhouse	Gas	Emissions	(RAN	GRK)	
• prepare	the	establishment	of	REDD+	institutions		
• prepare	instruments	and	mechanisms	for	REDD+	funding		
• establish	an	independent	and	reliable	REDD+	MRV	agency		
• develop	criteria	for	selecting	pilot	provinces	and	ensuring	their	preparedness;	
and		
• implement	other	activities	relating	to	preparing	implementation	of	the	LoI	
with	the	Government	of	Norway	(Indrarto	et	al.,	2012).		
	
The	Task	Force	was	also	responsible	for	establishing	the	National	REDD+	Agency	to	
replace	itself	in	2013.	The	Agency	reports	to	the	President	and	is	the	designated	
national	authority	for	REDD+	in	Indonesia,	assisting	the	President	in	coordinating,	
synchronizing,	planning,	facilitating,	managing,	monitoring,	overseeing,	and	
controlling	REDD+.8	The	Agency	is	establishing	a	funding	instrument	for	REDD+	in	
Indonesia	termed	FREDDI9	to	administer	the	different	funds	investing	in	REDD+	
projects.	FREDDI	provides	national	and	subnational	initiatives	to	implement	REDD+,	
competitive	cycles	where	REDD+	implementers	compete	for	funding,	and	small	scale	
grant	initiatives	(Dermawan	&	Sinaga,	2015).		
	
The	Agency	is	also	developing	a	safeguard	program	termed	Principles,	Criteria,	
Indicators	for	REDD+	Safeguards	in	Indonesia	(PRISAI)	as	a	basis	for	implementing	
REDD+	projects.	PRISAI	is	developed	alongside	and	complemented	by	the	REDD+	
safeguard	information	system	(SIS-REDD+)	coordinated	by	the	newly	combined	
Ministry	of	Environment	and	Forestry	(MoEF)	(Dermawan	&	Sinaga,	2015).	The	
Agency	is	also	responsible	for	developing	a	national	measuring,	reporting	and	
verification	(MRV)	system	to	support	the	National	REDD+	Strategy	and	a	National	
Action	Plan	to	Reduce	Greenhouse	Gas	Emissions	(RAN	GRK)	and	ensure	compliance	
																																																						
8	A	change	in	government	and	President	in	2014	saw	the	Government	reposition	the	REDD+	
Agency	into	the	newly	combined	Ministry	of	Environment	and	Forestry	(MoEF).	It	remains	
unclear	what	this	means	for	the	future	of	REDD+	and	the	Agency,	with	concerns	the	Agency	
may	be	dissolved	into	the	MoEF	(Dermawan	&	Sinaga,	2015).	
9	Fund	for	REDD+	Indonesia.	
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with	UNFCCC	REDD+	standards	(Dermawan	&	Sinaga,	2015).	The	system	will	take	
advantage	of	a	combination	of	satellite,	forestry,	agricultural,	and	topographical	data	
to	calculate	and	monitor	carbon	emissions	(Dermawan	&	Sinaga,	2015).	By	2013	the	
MRV	design	document	had	been	prepared	and	undergone	consultation	with	
stakeholders	(Dermawan	&	Sinaga,	2015).		
	
The	Agency	has	identified	priorities	for	preparing	for	REDD+	implementation	at	the	
provincial	level,	including	the	development	of	provincial	strategy	and	action	plans,	
the	development	of	baseline	data	and	a	comprehensive	map	(termed	‘OneMap’)	of	
forest	lands	and	land-use	concessions	(Dermawan	&	Sinaga,	2015).	By	2013	
provincial	action	plans	had	been	finalised	in	33	provinces.	The	Agency	plans	to	
establish	memoranda	of	understanding	with	provincial	and	district	governments	on	
REDD+	implementation	and	establish	a	reference	carbon	emission	level	across	
Indonesia	to	assist	with	MRV	design	(Dermawan	&	Sinaga,	2015).		
	
The	Indonesian	Government	has	also	released	regulations	regarding	REDD+	
demonstration	projects	and	the	associated	movement	of	finance.	Four	national	
regulations	have	emerged	directly	related	to	REDD+.	These	include	regulations	
dealing	with	establishing	pilot	projects	(Ministerial Decree P.68/2008);	mechanisms	
(Ministerial Decree	P30/2009);	permit	and	benefit	sharing	procedures	(Ministerial 
Decree	P36/2009);	and,	principles	and	criteria	for	pilot	projects	and	the	rights	and	
obligations	of	proponents	(Ministerial Decree	P20/2012).	These	policies	are	widely	
regarded	as	opaque	and	confusing,	particularly	as	the	regulation	on	benefit	sharing	
has	continued	to	be	resisted	and	contested	within	the	government	itself	(Luttrell	et	
al.,	2014;	Costenbader,	2010;	Luttrell	et	al.,	2013;	Indrarto	et	al.,	2012;	Minang	et	al.,	
2014;	Jaung	&	Bae,	2012;	Ituarte-Lima,	McDermott,	&	Mulyani,	2014).	However,	
they	have	provided	some	regulatory	guidance	for	the	private	sector	and	PSF	actors	
developing	REDD+	projects	alongside	the	bilateral	government	agreements	and	
strategies.		
	
These	REDD+	regulations	compete	and	co-exist	with	previous	forest	land-use	
regulations,	particularly	those	regulating	land	tenure.	These	regulations	suggest	that	
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carbon	rights	and	tenure	belong	to	those	with	rights	to	a	forest’s	environmental	
services,	which	include	carbon	sequestration	(Indrarto	et	al.,	2012).	The	
Government’s	control	over	state	forests	means	that	carbon	rights	and	tenure	in	
state	forests	are	limited	to	the	right	of	enterprise,	not	ownership.	But	just	like	the	
use	of	forest	products	by	extractive	industries	such	as	timber	and	mining,	the	
benefits	of	carbon	enterprise	(i.e.	carbon	offsets)	can	be	sold	to	other	parties	
(Indrarto	et	al.,	2012).	The	following	section	elaborates	on	existing	tenure	regulation	
within	Indonesia’s	forests	and	its	relationship	to	REDD+	projects.	
4.3	Forest	tenure	and	land-use	concessions	
For	the	past	four	decades	Indonesia	has	focused	on	exploiting	natural	forest	to	drive	
development	in	rural	areas	and	generate	national	revenue	from	the	export	of	wood	
products	(Luttrell	et	al.,	2014).	The	timber	industry	was	the	industry	of	choice	for	
investors,	provided	important	employment	opportunities	and	made	a	significant	
contribution	to	the	Indonesian	economy	(Indrarto	et	al.,	2012;	Luttrell	et	al.,	2014).	
Today,	most	productive	lowland	areas	have	been	subject	to	a	mixture	of	logging,	
burning	and	clearing,	with	many	in	a	state	of	degradation	that	leaves	very	limited	
profitable	intervention	options	for	commercial	forest	enterprises	(Wana	Hijau	
Nusantara,	2011).		
	
Many	remaining	forest	areas	have	been	abandoned	but	remain	prone	to	further	
degradation,	especially	from	forest	fires	and	illegal	logging	and	clearance	for	
agriculture	(Wana	Hijau	Nusantara,	2011).	This	neglect	of	concessions	with	partially	
degraded	forests	has	been	a	growing	concern	for	the	MoF,	which	released	
regulations	in	200410	to	initiate	the	concept	of	ecosystem	restoration	licenses	(ERC)	
within	the	production	forest	estate.	ERC’s	are	defined	as:	
	
A	license	for	business	given	to	develop	an	area	of	natural	forest	within	production	
forest	that	contains	important	ecosystems.	The	purpose	of	such	development	is	to	
																																																						
10	Minister	of	Forestry	(Minister	of	Forestry)	Regulation	No.	SK	159/	Menhut-II/2004	
regarding	Ecosystem	Restoration	in	Production	Forest,	and	Minister	of	Forestry	Regulation	
No.	P.18/Menhut-II/2004	regarding	Criteria	for	the	Provision	of	IUPHHK-RE	Licenses	in	
Production	Forest	Using	Ecosystem	Restoration	Activities.	
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restore	the	biotic	and	abiotic	components	of	an	ecosystem	to	its	original	state,	
including	through	planting,	enrichment,	separation,	animal	breeding,	release	of	flora	
and	fauna	to	restore	biological	substances	(flora	and	fauna)	as	well	as	non-biological	
substances	(soil,	climate	and	topography).	Once	restored	to	its	original	state,	
biological	and	ecosystem	‘equilibrium’	will	have	been	achieved	(Wana	Hijau	
Nusantara,	2011,	p.	15).	
	
Further	MoF	regulations	in	2007	and	2010	set	out	the	processes	for	issuing	ERC’s.	
Interest	in	securing	ERC’s	originally	came	from	conservation	groups,	who	helped	
pioneer	the	concept	and	set	the	precedent	for	managing	a	significant	proportion	of	
Indonesia’s	State	forests	(Wana	Hijau	Nusantara,	2011).	This	accompanied	ERC’s	
exemption	from	the	license	moratorium	and	the	MoF’s	commitment	to	issue	them	
over	2.5	million	hectares	of	State	Forest	by	2014	(Wana	Hijau	Nusantara,	2011).	
These	pieces	came	together	to	resemble	a	viable	framework	of	secure	tenure	to	
develop	REDD+	projects	and	PSF	actors	began	to	gain	confidence	to	develop	ERC	
business	models	(Wana	Hijau	Nusantara,	2011).			
	
Whilst	most	early	REDD+	pilots	in	Indonesia	were	ERCs,	regulation	exists	for	the	MoF	
to	issue	land-use	concession	types	for	smaller	areas	of	forest	within	customary	or	
community	boundaries	(Jaung	&	Bae,	2012;	Minang	et	al.,	2014;	Myers	Madeira	et	
al.,	2010;	Indrarto	et	al.,	2012).	These	types	of	land-use	concessions11	remain	the	
custody	of	the	community	and	permit	a	variety	of	otherwise	restricted	forest	uses,	
including	carbon	sequestration	services	and	their	sale	(Indrarto	et	al.,	2012).	
Although	also	fraught	with	legislative	inconsistencies	and	uncertainty,	they	offer	an	
entry	point	for	communities	to	secure	tenure	over	their	own	forest	areas	and	REDD+	
projects	(Indrarto	et	al.,	2012).	This	tenure	is	an	important	motivator	for	these	forest	
communities,	who	have	struggled	to	achieve	land	title	since	about	70	per	cent	of	
Indonesia	was	nationalised	as	state	forest	area	in	the	1960s	(Indrarto	et	al.,	2012;	Li,	
2014).	
	
																																																						
11	Examples	include	Hutan	Desa	(village	forest)	and	Hutan	Kemasyarakatan	(community	
forestry).	
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Each	of	these	ERC	and	community	type	concessions	followed	their	own	separate	and	
complex	processes	through	the	Indonesian	bureaucracy.	The	experiences	of	
applicants	with	these	processes	are	characterised	by	frustration	and	confusion	
(Indrarto	et	al.,	2012).	Opaque	and	conflicting	advice	from	across	local,	provincial	
and	national	levels	of	the	Government	leave	concession	applicants	to	determine	
processes	themselves	through	a	bureaucratic	back-and-forth	between	officials	
(Indrarto	et	al.,	2012;	Luttrell	et	al.,	2014).	The	details	of	these	experiences	are	
specific	to	the	circumstance	of	each	applicant	and	the	relationships	they	share	with	
relevant	positions	of	authority.	The	GVC	case	studies	in	Chapter	6	explore	three	of	
these	in	detail.	However,	here	it	is	helpful	to	introduce	the	tenure	and	land-use	
concession	challenges	that	Indonesia’s	REDD+	projects	generally	face.	The	political	
economic	conditions	that	make	these	REDD+	land-use	concessions	so	contested	
have	important	governance	implications	and	are	introduced	below.	
4.4	Politics	of	Indonesia’s	land	use	and	REDD+	
Indonesia’s	economy	is	dependent	upon	natural	resource	extraction	and	trade,	and	
particularly	the	products	of	palm	oil,	timber	and	mining	(Indrarto	et	al.,	2012;	Luttrell	
et	al.,	2014).	Each	of	these	are	significant	drivers	of	deforestation	and	forest	
degradation	in	Indonesia,	and	underpin	the	Government’s	economic	growth	plan	
(Indrarto	et	al.,	2012;	Luttrell	et	al.,	2014).	Indonesia’s	palm	oil	plantation	estate	
grew	from	1.7	to	8.4	million	ha	between	1989	and	2010	(Indrarto	et	al.,	2012).	High	
prices	for	palm	oil,	driven	by	increased	demand	in	food	products	and	biofuels,	are	
expected	to	have	expanded	Indonesia’s	palm	oil	plantations	to	over	10	million	ha	by	
2015	(Indrarto	et	al.,	2012).	Mining	is	also	a	major	cause	of	deforestation	but	is	
generally	underestimated	in	the	shadow	of	the	palm	oil	industry.	Illegal	logging	of	
forests	has	attracted	a	lot	more	attention	for	its	role	in	deforestation	in	the	past,	but	
now	it	also	appears	to	be	overshadowed	by	palm	oil	plantations,	despite	remaining	a	
major	cause	of	deforestation	and	degradation	(Indrarto	et	al.,	2012).	More	recently,	
forest	fires	have	increased	in	frequency	and	scale	within	Indonesia	and	are	
understood	to	be	the	consequence	of	human	activity	such	as	clearing	and	cultivating	
lands	for	agriculture	and	to	secure	tenure	(Indrarto	et	al.,	2012).	
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These	important	drivers	of	Indonesia’s	economy	are	inevitably	set	to	collide	with	the	
ambitions	of	REDD+	policies	and	programmes	(Dermawan	&	Sinaga,	2015;	Luttrell	et	
al.,	2014).	A	stark	example	is	the	projected	loss	of	$3	billion	from	Indonesia’s	
economy	because	of	the	Government’s	moratorium	on	new	concessions	in	forest	
lands	to	facilitate	REDD+	(Luttrell	et	al.,	2014).	Attempts	to	reconcile	this	include	the	
facilitation	and	encouragement	of	voluntary	sustainability	standard	systems	for	palm	
oil	plantations,	through	which	higher	value	palm	oil	can	be	sold.	These	standards	are	
facilitated	through	the	international	Roundtable	on	Sustainable	Palm	Oil	(RSPO)	and	
the	Indonesian	counterpart,	the	Indonesian	Sustainable	Palm	Oil	Foundation.	
Requirements	include	the	preservation	of	high	conservation	value	forests	within	
palm	oil	plantations	(Richardson,	2014;	UNEP,	2014).	Global	corporations	that	source	
palm	oil	from	Indonesia	are	increasingly	subscribing	to	these	initiatives	and	pledging	
to	buy	from	plantations	with	such	accreditations,	in	response	to	their	customers	and	
shareholders	demanding	sustainable	production	and	business	models	(Oosterveer,	
2015).		
	
Additionally,	parts	of	the	Indonesian	timber	industry	have	been	implementing	
changes	to	pursue	sustainable	forest	management	principles.	Two	important	
examples	include	the	voluntary	sustainable	timber	standards	of	the	Forestry	
Stewardship	Council	(FSC)	and	the	Forest	Law	Enforcement,	Governance,	and	Trade	
regulations	that	ensure	timber	exports	to	Europe	are	from	legal	operations	(Cashore,	
2002;	Dermawan	&	Sinaga,	2015).	Indonesia	is	no	stranger	to	sustainable	
development	initiatives	for	forest	conservation.	Traditionally	these	have	taken	the	
form	of	integrated	conservation	and	development	projects;	particularly	amongst	
local	communities	and	in	a	similar	way	to	REDD+	(Blom,	Sunderland,	&	Murdiyarso,	
2010).		
	
However,	there	is	debate	within	government	as	to	whether	these	efforts	and	the	
wider	economy	can	continue	to	grow	at	their	desired	rate	alongside	REDD+,	adding	
to	the	stressed	relations	between	business	and	government	across	local,	provincial,	
and	national	levels	(Luttrell	et	al.,	2014).	Luttrell	et	al.	(2014,	p.	67)	describe	how	
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“[p]oliticisation	of	the	bureaucracy	and	increasing	business–government	
relationships	are	important	features	of	the	parliamentary	dynamic	at	the	national	
level	and	are	reportedly	intensifying	at	the	local	level”.	This	local	level	politicisation	
of	bureaucracy	is	particularly	relevant	for	REDD+	projects,	as	the	land-use	
concessions	required	to	secure	tenure	over	the	project	area	depend	upon	achieving	
the	approval	of	these	local	bureaucrats.	However,	these	actors	often	depend	on	
election	campaign	contributions	and	endorsements	in	exchange	for	promises	to	
grant	land-use	concessions	to	palm	oil	plantations	(Indrarto	et	al.,	2012).	
	
As	such,	REDD+	initiatives	have	intruded	upon	local	bureaucracy’s	traditional	
territory	of	forestland	exploitation	and	tenure	(Dermawan	&	Sinaga,	2015).	The	
question	of	Indonesia’s	ability	to	govern,	and	the	legitimacy	of	its	institutions,	
including	new	REDD+	institutions,	recur	throughout	this	research	and	emerge	
notably	within	the	GVC	case	studies	presented	in	Chapter	6.	Corruption	and	poor	
governance	within	Indonesia’s	forest	land-use	sector	became	a	background	
assumption	raised	in	every	informant	conversation,	and	many	in	the	REDD+	
community	believe	it	explains	why	Indonesia’s	REDD+	initiative	appears	to	have	
stagnated,	despite	its	earlier	rapid	progress	(Dermawan	&	Sinaga,	2015;	Luttrell	et	
al.,	2014).	This	is	so	much	so	that	hopes	for	the	future	of	REDD+	in	Indonesia	are	
increasingly	linked	to	Indonesia’s	recently	formed	Corruption	Eradication	
Commission	(KPK)	(Dermawan	&	Sinaga,	2015;	Luttrell	et	al.,	2014).	
4.5	REDD+	standards	and	processes	
By	way	of	navigating	these	problems,	various	voluntary	REDD+	standards	have	been	
developed	and	applied	at	jurisdiction	and	project	levels.	Jurisdictional	standards	aim	
to	certify	national	and	subnational	territories	such	as	a	region	or	a	province,	like	
those	involved	with	the	UN-REDD,	FCPF	and	REDD+	Social	and	Environmental	
Standards	(REDD+	SES)	processes.12	The	Indonesian	REDD+	Task	Force	has	adopted	
																																																						
12	The	REDD+	SES	were	developed	through	engaging	governments,	NGOs,	civil	society	
organisations,	Indigenous	People’s	organisations,	international	policy	and	research	
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such	standards	into	its	PRISAI,	FREDDI	and	Central	Kalimantan	pilot	province	
jurisdictional	approaches.	Project-level	standards	address	REDD+	projects	designed	
for	investment	or	development	purposes	by	private	entities	or	NGOs	in	the	voluntary	
market,	and	may	also	enable	integration	or	nesting	into	overarching	jurisdictional	
systems.	These	standards	seek	to	safeguard	against	a	mix	of	social,	environmental	
and	procedural	issues	within	REDD+	to	secure	its	permanence13	and	additionality,14	
summarised	below	in	Table	4.1.		
	
REDD+	standards	had	diverse	beginnings	as	the	voluntary	and	industry	led	REDD+	
program	evolved.	They	respond	to	the	criteria	in	Table	4.1	in	different	ways,	with	
some	being	included	and	others	being	excluded	(Roe	et	al.,	2013).	REDD+	standards	
for	projects	are	established	by	a	variety	of	organisations,	each	adopting	a	slightly	
different	methodology.	Primarily	these	concern	the	biomass	and	carbon	within	
forests,	but	also	extend	to	include	wider	environmental,	social	and	procedural	
safeguards.	The	initial	proliferation	of	REDD+	standards	in	the	2000s	slowed,	and	the	
field	has	coalesced	around	a	few	core	standards	that	certify	the	majority	of	current	
REDD+	projects	(Seifert-Granzin,	2011).	As	one	informant	observed:	“In	the	last	5	to	
10	years	it	went	from	in-house	standards	to	everyone	using	VCS	or	other	credible	
standards”	(Contractor	19).	The	REDD+	project	standards	relevant	to	the	case	
studies	conducted	in	this	research	include	the	popular	Verified	Carbon	Standard	
(VCS);	the	Community,	Climate	and	Biodiversity	standard	(CCB);	and	the	less	
prevalent	Plan	Vivo	standard	(Roe	et	al.,	2013).		
	
	
	
	
	
																																																																																																																																																											
institutions	and	the	private	sector	to	set	out	a	comprehensive,	clear	and	easy	set	of	
guidance	that	comply	with	UNFCCC	standards	(Roe	et	al.,	2013).	
13	Permanence	refers	to	whether	the	net	benefit	of	an	action,	such	as	carbon	removed	from	
the	atmosphere,	will	remain	fixed	for	a	long	period,	or	whether	the	process	may	soon	be	
reversed.	
14	Additionality	is	defined	as	whether	an	emissions	reduction	or	removal	would	have	
occurred	in	the	absence	of	new	incentives,	such	as	a	payment	for	emissions	reductions.	
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Table	4.1:	Common	criteria	and	sub	criteria	of	REDD+	standards	(Roe	et	al.,	2013).	
Social	Criteria	
• Application	of	free,	prior	and	informed	consent	(FPIC)15		
• Consideration	of	vulnerable	groups		
• Support	of	tenure	and	resource	rights		
• Enhancement	of	livelihoods	and	labour	rights		
• Inclusion	of	guidance	on	benefit-sharing16		
• Provision	related	to	the	avoidance	of	resettlement		
Environmental	Criteria		
• Mitigation	of	environmental	impacts		
• Enhancement	of	biodiversity	and	other	ecosystem	services		
• Avoidance	of	reversals	and	displacement	of	emissions		
Procedural	Criteria	
• Integration	of	safeguards	in	policies,	laws	and	regulations		
• Rules	mandating	transparency		
• Requirement	of	stakeholder	participation		
• System	for	monitoring	and	reporting	(Safeguard	Information	Systems)		
• Established	grievance	mechanism	to	address	concerns	and	conflicts		
• Regulated	compliance	assessment	process		
	
The	VCS	provides	a	robust	quality	assurance	standard	for	greenhouse	gas	(GHG)	
emission	reduction	projects,	with	the	purpose	of	issuing	credits	for	voluntary	
markets.	It	is	the	most	widely	applied	voluntary	carbon	standard,	with	58	per	cent	of	
voluntary	market	share	in	2011	(Roe	et	al.,	2013).	The	VCS	Standard	comprises	
criteria,	procedures,	and	approved	GHG	methodologies	for	REDD+	projects,	and	for	
‘Jurisdictional	and	Nested	REDD+’	that	integrate	projects,	jurisdictional	and/or	
national	REDD+	systems.	The	VCS	methodology	details	the	calculation	of	baseline	
carbon	emission	scenarios	in	the	absence	of	the	REDD+	project,	and	also	how	the	
project	will	prevent	and	measure	these	avoided	emissions.	The	VCS	has	also	
partnered	with	the	CCB	standard	to	promote	dual	registration	and	certification,	and	
																																																						
15	The	concept	of	FPIC	is	that	parties	acquire	free,	prior	and	informed	consent	from	local	and	
Indigenous	communities	before	adopting	and	implementing	development,	administrative	
measures,	projects	or	other	interventions	that	would	affect	them,	their	lands,	or	their	
livelihoods	(Roe	et	al.,	2013).	
16	Benefit	sharing	safeguards	ensure	that	benefits	are	distributed	equitably	among	
stakeholders,	including	local	communities,	government,	concession	holders,	project	
developers	and	facilitators	(Roe	et	al.,	2013).	
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a	more	robust	system	for	accounting	for	social	and	environmental	safeguards	
(Seifert-Granzin,	2011).		
	
The	CCB	standard	represents	a	partnership	and	initiative	of	non-governmental	
organisations,	corporations,	and	research	institutions.	The	CCB	does	not	account	for	
carbon	and	is	therefore	typically	used	in	addition	to	a	forest	carbon	standard	(like	
the	VCS)	and	is	the	dominant	‘co-benefit’	standard	in	the	REDD+	market.	The	CCB	is	
used	to	exclusively	evaluate	the	social	and	environmental	performance	of	a	project’s	
design,	and	includes	fourteen	mandatory	performance	criteria	and	three	optional	
‘Gold	Level’	measures.	Only	projects	using	best	practices	and	providing	significant	
climate,	community	and	biodiversity	benefits	earn	CCB	approval	(Roe	et	al.,	2013).	
An	important	part	of	this	is	community	involvement	in	management	of	the	forest	
area	and	in	deciding	how	REDD+	payments	are	used.	Typically	funds	are	distributed	
as	compensation	for	required	activities	(such	as	forest	patrols,	nurseries,	planting,	
and	community	education);	the	development	of	existing	and	new	small-scale	
businesses	through	micro	finance	loans	and	grants;	and	provisions	for	community	
welfare,	education	and	health	services	(Roe	et	al.,	2013).		
	
The	Plan	Vivo	standard	is	similar	to	CCB	in	that	it	does	not	include	a	GHG	emissions	
accounting	component.	Consequently,	like	CCB,	Plan	Vivo	is	considered	a	co-benefit	
standard	and	would	require	a	forest	carbon	standard	like	VCS	to	engage	in	with	
REDD+.	Plan	Vivo	is	designed	to	be	accessible	for	smallholder-	and	community-led	
projects.	The	standard	is	underpinned	by	four	principles:	(1)	livelihoods,	(2)	transfer	
of	capacity	and	continuous	improvement	of	projects,	(3)	restoring	and	conserving	
native	ecosystems,	and	(4)	equitable	distribution	of	benefits.		
	
Each	of	these	standards	prescribes	a	similar	establishment	process	for	REDD+	
projects,	beginning	with	the	Project	Idea	Note	(PIN).	The	PIN	outlines	the	
deforestation	trends	and	feasibility	analysis	of	the	proposed	REDD+	project	to	the	
standard	secretariat	(Seifert-Granzin,	2011).	Following	the	secretariat’s	positive	
reception	of	the	PIN	an	in-depth	analysis	of	how	the	project	will	engage	the	relevant	
environmental,	social	and	procedural	criteria	(see	Table	4.1)	is	undertaken	and	
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compiled	within	the	project’s	proposed	methodology.	This	methodology	is	often	
supplied	by	the	REDD+	standard	and	customised	by	project	proponents;	however,	
new	methodologies	occasionally	need	to	be	developed.	This	culminates	in	the	
Project	Design	Document	(PDD)	(or	Project	Description	(PD)	in	the	case	of	VCS)	and	
is	submitted	to	the	secretariat	for	validation	(Seifert-Granzin,	2011).	If	validated	by	
the	standard	secretariat	the	project	is	effectively	operational	and	follows	the	
monitoring,	reporting	and	verification	(MRV)	plan	specified	in	its	PDD	(Seifert-
Granzin,	2011).	If	the	prescribed	MRV	review	of	the	project	verifies	that	it	is	keeping	
to	the	plan	in	the	PDD	then	it	is	issued	the	agreed	amount	of	verified	emission	
reductions	(VERs)	(Seifert-Granzin,	2011).		
	
These	processes	are	investigated	in	further	detail	in	Chapters	6	and	7	when	analysing	
REDD+	project	development	and	commodification	processes.	Voluntary	standards	
like	these	continue	to	dominate	the	sector,	and	despite	negotiations	within	the	
UNFCCC	having	made	considerable	progress	on	the	design	of	a	global	REDD+	
mechanism,	they	are	yet	to	secure	funding	for	its	implementation	within	any	future	
climate	agreement	(Fischer,	2015;	Leonard,	2015).	However,	the	UNFCCC’s	Green	
Climate	Fund,	which	aims	to	mobilise	an	annual	$100	billion	from	public	and	private	
sources	by	2020	for	global	climate	change	mitigation	efforts,	will	likely	direct	a	
proportion	towards	funding	REDD+	type	mechanisms	and	projects	being	developed	
in	Indonesia	(Bernard	et	al.,	2012;	Fischer,	2015;	Kanak	&	Henderson,	2012;	Hiraldo	
&	Tanner,	2011a;	UNEP-FI,	2014).	The	following	chapter	investigates	the	ways	that	
PSF	actors	have	engaged	REDD+	in	Indonesia,	and	explores	the	strategies	and	tactics	
of	PSF	actors	in	this	emerging	field.		
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5		Rationales	and	strategies	of	PSF	in	REDD+		
5.1	Introduction	
This	chapter	presents	an	analysis	of	the	changing	rationales	and	tactics	of	actors	
engaged	in	mobilising	PSF	for	Indonesia’s	REDD+	programme.	Despite	limited	flows	
of	finance	from	PSF	actors	so	far,	they	have	been	responsible	for	a	great	deal	of	
development	and	innovation	in	the	forest	carbon	sector	in	Indonesia,	and	have	thus	
played	–	and	continue	to	play	–	an	important	part	in	shaping	the	country’s	REDD+	
programme.	This	chapter	focuses	on	the	roles,	tactics	and	strategies	of	actors	
engaged	in	efforts	to	generate	financial	profits	from	REDD+	projects	in	Indonesia.	A	
range	of	financing	and	governance	activities	that	are	commonly	assigned	to	the	
realm	of	PSF	are	examined.	In	this	way,	this	chapter	provides	an	important	
contextual	and	institutional	background	to	the	REDD+	GVC	framework	analysis	that	
follows	in	Chapter	6.	
	
This	chapter	seeks	to	unsettle	straightforward	notions	of	the	‘private	sector’,	and	
‘private	finance’,	which	tend	to	be	of	only	limited	analytical	value	to	understanding	
the	behaviour	of	REDD+	actors	and	finance	observed	in	Indonesia,	and	further	
justifies	the	adoption	of	the	term	‘profit-seeking	finance’	(PSF).	There	are	a	variety	of	
PSF	actor	motivations,	strategies	and	tactics	to	be	found	within	the	range	of	
activities	taking	place	in	Indonesia	under	the	aegis	of	REDD.	Many	of	these	depart	
considerably	from	the	common	understanding	of	REDD+	as	avoided	deforestation	
funded	through	carbon	offsets.	As	non-state	actors	from	the	private	sector	and	civil	
society	increasingly	shape	emerging	REDD+	projects,	they	assume	important	roles	as	
agents	of	environmental	governance	–	working	through	a	variety	of	market	and	
hybrid	voluntary	modes	of	forest/climate	governance.	By	examining	the	motivations	
and	behaviour	of	these	actors	an	improved	understanding	of	the	nature	of	profit-
seeking	REDD+	finance	in	Indonesia	is	generated,	which	lays	a	foundation	for	later	
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discussions	of	the	implications,	potential	and	limits	of	private,	profit-seeking,	
market-based	climate	governance.	
	
The	mix	of	finance	to	develop	and	purchase	REDD+	Verified	Emissions	Reductions	
(VERs)	has	remained	relatively	limited	and	is	only	gradually	increasing	(Fosci,	2013).	
REDD+	offsets	deliberately	retain	traceability	to	originating	projects,	resembling	“not	
a	standardized	commodity,	but	…	a	product	market	where	preferences,	prices,	and	
projects	vary	greatly”	(Peters-Stanley	&	Yin,	2013,	p.	58).	Whilst	recognising	the	
importance	of	market	environmentalism	critiques,	this	research	does	not	advance	a	
particular	position	‘for’	or	‘against’	REDD+,	noting	with	Lovell	and	Liverman	(2010)	
that	these	often	polarised	debates	may	fail	to	do	justice	to	the	variety	of	experiences	
on	the	ground.	By	drawing	attention	to	the	character	of	REDD+	finance,	however,	
the	research	responds	to	calls	for	greater	attention	to	climate	governance	beyond	
the	international	climate	regime	(Lövbrand	&	Stripple,	2012;	Okereke	et	al.,	2009),	
and	helps	to	lay	the	groundwork	for	more	critical,	nuanced	and	differentiating	
accounts	of	‘the	carbon	economy’	and	carbon	markets	(Boyd	et	al.,	2011;	Harmes,	
2011;	Pattberg,	2012).	Research	to	date	generally	concludes	that	little	is	known	
about	the	motivations	and	forms	of	involvement	of	private	sector	or	PSF	actors	in	
REDD+	(Bernard	et	al.,	2012).		
	
As	discussed	below,	the	complex	and	diverse	nature	of	PSF	engagement	with	REDD+	
in	Indonesia	means	that	the	programme	itself	is	being	realised	in	highly	diverse	
ways.	A	variety	of	tactics	and	strategies	are	evident	in	the	behaviour	of	PSF	actors	
within	Indonesia’s	emergent	and	evolving	REDD+	sector,	from	philanthropic	and	
charitable	donors	to	speculators	and	‘carbon	cowboys’.	How	the	character	of	finance	
–	the	strategies	pursued	by	different	financial	actors	–	influences	and	shapes	REDD+	
on	the	ground	is	explored;	illuminating	how	many	activities	that	are	presented	and	
officially	listed	as	REDD+	projects	arguably	bear	little	resemblance	to	REDD+	as	
commonly	understood.	Insofar	as	the	future	of	REDD+	is	tied	to	PSF,	and	policy	
interventions	are	structured	around	incentivising	capitalist	investment,	the	chapter	
provides	important	insights	into	the	PSF	actors	involved	and	the	ways	in	which	their	
strategies	and	tactics	produce	different	expressions	of	REDD+.	The	chapter	discusses	
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the	state	of	financial	capital	in	Indonesia’s	emergent	REDD+	sector,	remaining	
cognisant	of	contextual	factors	that	shape	challenges	and	opportunities	for	PSF	
actors.	It	then	outlines	the	motivations	and	tactics	of	PSF	actors	as	they	seek	to	set	
up	and	steer	REDD+	projects	in	Indonesia	to	various	ends,	and	concludes	by	
reflecting	on	their	implications	for	market-based	governance	of	REDD+	projects.		
5.2	Financial	capital	in	Indonesia’s	REDD+	programme	
Alongside	national-level	developments,	REDD+	pilot	projects	have	proliferated	in	
Indonesia	since	2008.	Scattered	throughout	the	Indonesian	archipelago	–	but	
particularly	concentrated	on	the	islands	of	Kalimantan	and	Sumatra	–	these	projects	
encompass	areas	ranging	from	30,000	to	1,000,000	hectares.	Most	REDD+	projects	
are	co-funded	and	co-implemented	by	a	range	of	actors,	including	governments,	
local	and	international	NGOs,	consultancies,	research	institutes	and	private	
companies.	REDD+	finance	in	Indonesia	is	rapidly	evolving	and	somewhat	
tumultuous,	and	although	there	has	been	national-level	progress	in	developing	
institutional	structures	for	REDD+,	there	have	also	been	recent	high-profile	examples	
of	donors	and	investors	effectively	abandoning	major	projects	having	made	little	
headway.17		
	
Some	$2.4	billion	has	been	committed,	$158.1	million	has	been	approved	and	$102	
million	disbursed	to	date	from	a	variety	of	bilateral	and	multilateral	funds	for	REDD+	
in	Indonesia,	including	funds	from	the	$1	billion	committed	by	Norway.18	Figures	are	
less	clear	for	non-state	funds,	as	there	is	no	publicly	available	official	record.	
However,	since	the	programme’s	inception,	some	$44.9	million	is	reported	to	have	
been	committed	by	public	funds	to	private	sector	efforts,19	and	about	$10	million	is	
attributed	to	private	offsetting	transactions	in	Indonesia	(Peters-Stanley	&	Yin,	
2013).	Despite	Indonesia’s	best	efforts,	and	the	efforts	of	PSF	actors	to	consolidate	a	
																																																						
17	For	example	the	dissolution	of	the	Kalimantan	Forest	Carbon	Partnership	with	Australia.		
18	See	Climate	Funds	Update	(www.climatefundsupdate.org)	and	the	REDDX	initiative	
(http://reddx.forest-trends.org/country/indonesia/overview),	which	both	track,	monitor	and	
report	on	climate	change	and	REDD+	funds.	
19	See	the	REDDX	initiative	(http://reddx.forest-trends.org/country/indonesia/overview).	
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domestic	REDD+	‘industry’,	some	PSF	actors	have	since	departed.	It	appears	that	
current	arrangements	in	Indonesia’s	REDD+	programme	are	not	attractive	for	
market-based	finance,	and	that	donors	and	non-profit	organisations	may	be	left	to	
fund	REDD+	activities	for	the	foreseeable	future	(GCP	et	al.,	2014;	Luttrell	et	al.,	
2014;	Streck,	2012;	Streck	&	Parker,	2012).	Despite	the	bulk	of	REDD+	funding	to	
Indonesia	having	come	from	governments,	many	developments	at	the	project	scale	
can	be	attributed	to	non-state	private	sector	and	civil	society	actors.		
	
Indonesia’s	experience	with	private	sector	and	PSF	actors	for	REDD+	has	been	
shaped	to	a	great	extent	by	injustices	and	unfulfilled	promises	of	easy	money	
associated	with	the	activities	of	early	speculators	and	‘carbon	cowboys’.	Informants	
from	across	the	REDD+	industry	offered	an	understanding	of	REDD+	PSF	actors	that	
were	very	much	influenced	by	these	experiences.	Many	communities	remain	highly	
sceptical	towards	promises	of	financial	returns	from	avoided	deforestation,	even	
though	much	of	the	hype	and	speculation	around	REDD+	has	subsided	in	recent	
years.	As	one	project	developer	and	investor	noted:	
	
Carbon	cowboys	were	attracted	because	they	thought	you	just	protect	the	forest	and	
don’t	have	to	do	anything	and	you	make	a	bunch	of	money	…	Most	investors	are	
attracted	to	that	simplicity.	They	don’t	know	it’s	so	complex	and	part	of	a	bigger	
story	of	natural	resource	management.	But	they’ve	left	and	now	we	have	public	
money.	They	cannot	invest,	so	just	do	capacity	building	and	safeguards	because	of	
the	cowboy	story.	But	people	are	scared	to	do	project	level	because	of	carbon	
cowboys,	so	they	focus	on	readiness	and	safeguards.	But	now	they’re	stuck	because	
readiness	and	safeguards	are	so	hard.	So	now	they	want	to	move	back	to	project	
level	activities	(Investor	and	Developer	6).	
	
One	of	the	more	high-profile	cases	exemplifying	these	sorts	of	behaviours	is	the	
project	known	as	Ulu	Masen	in	Aceh.	Colloquially,	because	of	its	flaws,	Ulu	Masen	
has	become	something	of	a	fable:	“Ulu	Masen’s	Dorjee	Sun	[the	project	developer]	
had	an	innocence	about	him	that	he	was	going	to	make	a	billion	dollars	and	save	the	
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world.	He	wasn’t	embarrassed	or	uncomfortable	about	it	either”	(Contractor	4).	As	
one	informant	remarked:	
	
Ulu	Masen	was	stupid	on	a	number	of	levels,	but	showed	how	little	everyone	knew	at	
the	time.	I	think	it	was	a	100	million	or	200	million	[dollar]	type	deal.	Ulu	Masen	was	
already	a	reserve,	already	protected	by	law.	So	what’s	changed?	So	that	law’s	either	
working	or	it	isn’t.	If	it	isn’t	working,	how’s	your	project	going	to	change	that?	If	it	is	
working,	why	is	your	project	needed?	…	To	protect	the	forest	Dorjee	Sun	said	they	
were	going	to	arm	the	ex-GAM	[Acehnese	separatist	group]	to	protect	it	and	tell	
locals	what	they	can	and	can’t	do	in	their	own	forest.	Then	Dorjee	Sun	sells	Carbon	
Conservation	[the	project	development	company]	to	a	Canadian	oil	firm,	which	now	
has	a	deal	with	the	Aceh	government	to	unprotect	that	forest	to	do	oil	exploration	
(Contractor	1).	
	
The	Indonesian	REDD+	projects	that	are	still	active	are	being	developed	in	a	variety	
of	directions.	However,	it	is	possible	to	distinguish	between	a	group	of	high-profile	
projects	that	have	secured	relatively	large	land-use	concessions	for	ecosystem	
restoration	activities	–	for	instance,	the	Rimba	Raya	Biodiversity	Reserve	and	
Katingan	Peatland	Restoration	and	Conservation	Project	(Central	Kalimantan)	and	
the	Harapan	Rainforest	Project	(Sumatra)	–	and	a	greater	number	of	lower-profile	
projects	that	have	slowed	or	stalled	as	it	became	evident	that	there	would	be	
considerable	delay	in	the	issuance	of	necessary	land-use	concessions	and	licenses.	
The	various	experiences	of	these	different	projects	offer	important	insights	into	the	
rationales	and	behaviour	of	PSF	actors	within	REDD+	in	Indonesia.		
	
The	numerous	projects	still	pursuing	land-use	concessions	have	tended	to	become	
defined	by	that	pursuit.	Some	of	these	have	been	developed	by	Indonesian	
proponents,	while	others	have	been	developed	by	international	proponents.	
Informants	often	distinguished	among	projects	on	this	basis;	several	of	the	
Indonesian-proposed	projects	were	“intended	for	local	investors,	their	friends	and	
partners	that	are	well	connected	in	government	who	could	pre-package	an	
investment	terrain	for	external	investors	to	buy	…	about	12	were	in	the	pipeline”	
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(Contractor	1).	However,	such	projects	appear	to	have	struggled.	As	one	embattled	
investor	reflected,	“when	I	started	this	five	years	ago	there	were	about	twenty	of	us	
[investors],	now	there	are	about	two	…	I	think	anyone	like	me	is	probably	crazy”	
(Investor	and	Developer	5).	Foreign	investors	have	inevitably	needed	to	do	more	to	
build	relationships	with	local	partners	than	Indonesian	investors:		
	
They	started	with	great	local	government	partnerships	that	were	interested	in	
conservation	and	community	development;	and	working	with	local	palm	oil	
companies	that	were	interested	in	shifting	their	concession	or	giving	up	one	in	
exchange	for	help	to	get	another	somewhere	else	(Contractor	4).		
	
While	investor	enthusiasm	was	initially	high,	increasing	instability	with	the	expansion	
of	the	forest	carbon	market	served	to	undermine	many	of	these	projects:	“carbon	
value	dropped,	and	palm	oil	was	a	proven	short-term	development	opportunity,	
nobody	believed	anymore	that	forests	are	worth	more	standing	than	as	palm	oil.	Not	
even	close	[…	and]	one	by	one	those	projects	fell	apart”	(Contractor	4).	One	
informant	succinctly	described	these	REDD+	projects:	“You’re	just	a	forestry	
company	that’s	got	a	pretty	shitty	way	of	making	money	out	of	forests”	(Investor	and	
Developer	1).	NGOs	and	NGO-led	projects	have	also	been	affected	by	the	
uncertainties	surrounding	REDD+,	effectively	caught	in	the	middle	between	forest	
communities	and	international	finance	in	search	of	projects	and	programmes	to	
invest	in:		
	
NGOs	working	on	peat	domes	were	about	working	with	local	government	and	
communities	to	make	REDD+	a	viable	business	model	to	support	conservation.	For	
NGOs	it	was	all	about	conservation	and	making	it	pay	for	itself.	A	national	park	to	
pay	for	itself	(Contractor	4).		
	
With	the	departure	of	financial	support	for	these	projects,	only	very	limited	finance	
remains	for	forest	carbon	investments.	However,	motivated	by	the	need	to	address	
deforestation,	climate	change	and	related	social	and	ecological	problems,	NGOs	
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have	tended	to	persevere	with	REDD+.	One	investor	and	project	developer	described	
this	as	‘keeping	the	faith’:		
	
It	will	be	very	hard	to	go	back	if	we	lose	the	carbon	market.	The	people	that	are	still	
around	are	those	who	keep	the	faith,	who	operate	at	the	conviction	level,	not	the	
basic	return	calculation	level	…	It’s	like	a	rite	of	passage;	once	some	private	money	
has	been	committed	then	public	money	will	flow.	I	think	that’s	what’s	going	to	
happen	(Investor	and	Developer	6).		
	
Other	investors	and	project	developers	have	moved	away	from	forest	carbon	and	
towards	other	projects	(mainly	‘sustainable	commodities’	initiatives)	that	align	with	
their	corporate	strategies.	Many	such	projects	are	orientated	towards	social	and	
ecological	certification	of	traditional	products	such	as	timber	and	palm	oil.	Examples	
include	the	efforts	of	Keep	the	Habitat,	Earth	Innovation	Institute,	and	consultants	
involved	with	community	teak	plantations	in	central	Java.	As	one	investor	and	
project	developer	claimed:	“if	it’s	not	a	healthy	business,	not	providing	profits,	not	
providing	revenue	to	the	communities	and	investors,	it	will	die.	If	after	all	that,	you	
get	carbon	credits	then	it’s	a	bonus”	(Investor	and	Developer	10).	Others	are	more	
direct	about	their	relationship	with	REDD+:	“we’re	focusing	on	deforestation,	
because	REDD+	has	become	a	sector	all	of	its	own	and	I	think	it’s	for	the	worse.	
Stakeholders	hate	the	term	REDD+,	so	we’re	moving	away	from	it”	(Contractor	22).	
These	examples	are	suggestive	of	the	range	of	strategies	that	actors	involved	in	
financing	activities	have	adopted	to	confront	challenges	facing	REDD+	in	Indonesia.	
The	following	section	explores	these	various	actor	and	strategy	types	in	the	context	
of	financing	the	Indonesian	REDD+	programme.		
5.3	Beyond	carbon	as	core	business?	Shifting	rationales	and	
strategies		
As	Boyd	et	al.	(2011,	p.	610)	note	regarding	climate	change	mitigation	finance,	
“[m]obilising	the	influence	of	powerful	factions	of	capital	means	identifying	viable	
accumulation	strategies	that	are	compatible	with	the	goal	of	decarbonisation”.	Given	
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the	manifold	issues	with	which	REDD+	intersects	across	scales	(McGregor	et	al.,	
2015),	REDD+	projects	are	potentially	compatible	with	a	range	of	investors	and	
investments.	There	is	certainly	a	need	for	policymakers	and	project	developers	to	
understand	better	the	nature	and	determinants	of	different	business	and	investment	
behaviour	(Levy	&	Newell,	2005)	if	PSF	is	to	be	harnessed	for	REDD+.	An	important	
but	under-researched	field,	then,	is	that	of	the	strategies	and	behaviours	of	actors	
financing	REDD+	at	the	project	level.	These	actors	face	turbulent	market	conditions,	
political	uncertainty	and,	consequently,	high	business	risks;	they	adopt	out	of	
necessity	a	variety	of	adaptive	and	innovative	tactics.	Interviews	with	investors	and	
other	actors	engaged	in	mobilising	REDD+	finance	in	Indonesia	confirm	that	many	
are	new	to	the	mixture	of	conservation,	social	development	and	investment	finance	
that	REDD+	activities	demand	(see	also	Agrawal,	Nepstad,	&	Chhatre,	2011;	Corbera	
&	Schroeder,	2010).	At	the	same	time,	however,	the	apparent	‘win-win-win’	
potential	in	REDD+	(Brockhaus	&	Angelsen,	2012)	was	reported	as	having	attracted	
most	of	these	diverse	actors	to	work	together.	The	actor	rationales	and	tactics	
described	below	continue	to	evolve	in	response	to	changing	conditions	within	the	
Indonesian	REDD+	programme	as	discussed	in	section	5.3.	The	four	broad	strategy	
‘types’	addressed	are	identified	as:	(1)	investment	in	REDD+	VERs;	(2)	corporate	
social	responsibility	(CSR);	(3)	sustainable	commodities;	and	(4)	impact	investment.		
	
These	strategies	are	not	mutually	exclusive	–	actors	might	adopt	any	mix	to	meet	
their	goals.	The	strategies	pursued	by	financial	actors	directly	shape	the	REDD+	
activities	they	support,	in	terms	of	both	outcomes	sought	and	relationships	involved.	
In	this	sense,	the	character	of	PSF	actors	has	considerable	influence	in	the	
governance	of	REDD+.	The	following	focuses	on	PSF	actors	engaged	at	the	REDD+	
project	level,	and	how	they	balance	and	trade-off	financial	benefits	with	social	and	
environmental	co-benefits.	Figure	5.1	maps	key	types	of	PSF	actors	in	relation	to	the	
broad	types	of	strategies	being	pursued	within	Indonesian	REDD+.	PSF	actors	in	this	
context	are	understood	as	belonging	to	one	of	six	groups	identified	during	the	
interviews,	namely:	corporate	sponsors,	foundations,	sovereign	wealth	funds,	
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extractive	industry,	corporate	offsetters,	and	institutional	investors.20	This	
classification	is	based	on	actor	approaches	to	balancing	financial	returns	and	social	
and	environmental	outcomes	from	forest	carbon	and	REDD+.		
	
Corporate	sponsors	and	foundations	are	the	only	PSF	actor	types	that	typically	
accept	zero	direct	financial	return	on	investment.	Some	foundations,	however,	may	
require	some	return,	or	that	a	portion	of	disbursed	funds	is	repaid,	although	
conditions	can	be	very	flexible	and	are	sometimes	unenforced.	Much	like	public	
finance,	corporate	sponsors’	and	foundations’	lesser	need	for	financial	returns	from	
REDD+	projects	allows	them	to	pursue	alternative	outcomes	and	co-benefits.	While	
corporate	sponsors	typically	do	not	require	direct	financial	returns,	most	do	seek	
legitimate	VERs	to	use	as	offsets.	These	actors	may	prioritise	social	and	
environmental	outcomes	from	such	projects,	provided	this	does	not	erode	their	
financial	bottom	line.	One	corporate	sponsor	stated:	“As	a	banker,	when	I	first	
looked	at	REDD+	I	thought:	‘how	can	I	make	money	whilst	still	doing	the	right	thing?’	
I	didn’t	know	about	triple	bottom	line,	I	was	a	banker”	(Investor	and	Developer	5).	In	
contrast,	corporate	offsetters	require	REDD+	VERs	for	emissions	reductions	or	
carbon	neutrality,	and	may	also	maintain	the	option	for	resale.	Therefore	they	
typically	seek	cheap	and	fungible	VERs.	These	actors	tend	to	pursue	social	and	
environmental	outcomes	to	legitimate	their	offsetting,	but	only	so	far	as	this	does	
not	undermine	profits.	This	is	generally	in	contrast	to	the	rationale	of	corporate	
sponsors,	who	usually	provide	much	smaller-scale	finance	for	social	and	
environmental	outcomes.	
	
The	three	remaining	groups	represent	actors	more	clearly	motivated	to	profit	
directly	from	REDD+	and	less	likely	to	compromise	on	financial	returns.	Sovereign	
wealth	funds	typically	pursue	low-risk	investments	for	relatively	low	financial	return	
given	their	large	size	and	long-term	outlook.	This	is	compatible	with	the	nature	of	
forestry	investments,	and	REDD+	project	developers	tend	to	target	these	actors	as	
																																																						
20	The	terms	‘corporate	sponsor’	and	‘corporate	offsetter’	refer	to,	respectively,	corporate	
actors	associated	with	REDD+	primarily	for	CSR	or	brand	association	reasons,	and	corporate	
actors	associated	with	REDD+	primarily	for	emissions	reductions	and	offsetting	reasons.		
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investment	partners.	On	the	other	end	of	the	‘required	financial	return’	spectrum	
are	institutional	investors,	whose	tolerance	of	high	risk	in	pursuit	of	high	financial	
returns	over	short	timeframes	fuelled	euphoria	and	great	expectations	in	REDD+	
early	on.	Such	actors	have	investment	options	worldwide	and	weigh	investment	
decisions	(including	on	REDD+)	on	a	cost,	benefit	and	risk	type	analysis.	Finally,	
extractive	industry	are	at	the	nexus	of	forestry	and	land	use	in	Indonesia,	where	
palm	oil,	timber,	mining,	and	rubber	operations	are	attractive	options	for	those	in	
control	of	forested	lands.	Any	decision	to	engage	REDD+	entails	weighing	
opportunity	costs	in	terms	of	these	alternative	land-use	and	commodity	options.	
	
	
Figure	5.1.	Financial	bottom	lines,	social	and	environmental	benefits,	and	risk	in	
REDD+	finance	in	Indonesia.	
	
Figure	5.1	locates	key	types	of	actors	(in	plain	font),	and	types	of	investment	and	
financing	strategies	(grey	dashed	circles),	according	to:	(x	axis)	financial	bottom	line,	
or	minimal	financial	return	required	by	a	given	actor	to	justify	investment,	and;	(y	
axis)	social	and	environmental	outcomes	sought	by	a	given	actor	alongside	financial	
returns.	The	risk	threshold	(dashed	line)	represents	the	frontier	beyond	which	the	
	 83	
pursuit	of	social	and	environmental	outcomes	becomes	too	risky	for	actors	requiring	
the	corresponding	financial	return.	The	relative	positions	of	the	risk	threshold,	actor	
types,	and	investment	strategies	are	based	on	information	gathered	via	key	
informant	interviews.	
	
Figure	5.1	shows	how	actors	within	each	of	these	PSF	groupings	typically	balance	
financial	profits	and	social	and	ecological	benefits.	Most	interviewees	put	this	in	
terms	of	‘triple	bottom	line’	management.	Such	a	schematic	helps	to	map	out	
diverse	rationales	and	strategies	of	actors,	but	should	not	underplay	the	continuing	
importance	of	financial	returns	that	typically	underpin	the	full	spectrum	of	activities,	
as	depicted	by	vertical	shading	in	Figure	5.1.	Generally,	quantity	of	available	finance	
is	related	to	an	actor’s	position	on	the	x	axis.	That	is,	the	greater	the	required	
financial	return,	the	greater	the	quantity	of	finance	potentially	available.	Thus	
initiatives	supported	by	institutional	investors,	corporate	offsetters,	and	extractive	
industry	actors	tend	to	involve	larger	amounts	of	finance	and	land	than	those	
supported	by	corporate	sponsors	and	foundations.	Sovereign	wealth	funds	are	an	
exception,	as	they	typically	have	the	greatest	financial	resources,	but	pursue	a	lower	
financial	return.		
	
Figure	5.1	is	based	on	the	strategies	and	rationales	of	key	actors	as	expressed	in	
interviews	in	2013	to	early	2014.	Included	within	it	are	the	four	most	popular	
strategy	types.	The	proximity	of	actors	and	strategies	in	the	figure	is	indicative	of	the	
likelihood	of	such	an	actor	adopting	such	a	strategy.	Each	of	these	strategy	types	is	
explored	below.	
5.3.1	REDD+	VERs	
The	first	PSF	strategy	focuses	on	pursuing	REDD+	VERs	as	the	central	activity	and	
source	of	financial	profit.	The	primary	market	in	VERs	involves	transactions	between	
project	developers	and	end	users	who	use	them	to	offset	particular	emissions	and	
retire	them.	A	smaller	secondary	market	comprises	onward	transactions	among	
offset	retailers,	traders	and	buyers.	End	users	of	VERs	–	who	predominantly	occupy	
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the	manufacturing,	energy,	transport,	and	finance	and	insurance	sectors	in	Europe	
and	North	America	(Peters-Stanley	&	Yin,	2013)	–	are	seeking	to	either	voluntarily	
reduce	emissions,	or	prepare	for	a	compliance	environment	(known	as	pre-
compliance	purchases).	Organisations	that	adopted	this	strategy	are	typically	
institutional	investors	directly	concerned	with	selling	VERs	for	financial	gain.	These	
investors	are	often	able	to	shift	their	finance	to	and	from	REDD+	(e.g.	towards	lower-
risk	CDM	activities),	managing	a	balance	of	REDD+	VERs	to	match	their	risk	appetite	
and	in	case	the	market	becomes	positive.	One	international	fund	manager	described	
how	a	REDD+	project	that	was	stalled	by	provincial	governance	issues,	while	
frustrating	at	the	time,	may	have	been	a	‘blessing	in	disguise’,	as	it	prevented	them	
from	investing	more	in	a	REDD+	project	‘without	an	investment	case’	within	an	
uncertain	context	‘that	you	would	not	call	a	market’	(Investor	1	The	Swamp).	
	
Despite	uncertainties	around	the	robustness	of	REDD+	markets	and	governance	that	
have	driven	the	departure	of	important	actors	previously	committed	to	funding	
Indonesian	VER	projects,	some	PSF	actors	remain	committed	to	the	pursuit	of	
financial	profits	via	REDD+	VERs.	These	actors	persevere,	seeking	advance	market	
commitments	with	developed	country	governments	in	search	of	carbon	offsets	or	
corporations	pursuing	CSR	outcomes	(Kanak	&	Henderson,	2012).	However,	given	
the	current	low	demand	for	REDD+	VERs,	these	actors	are	struggling	to	secure	sales	
and	funding.		
5.3.2	Corporate	social	responsibility	
A	considerable	share	of	REDD+	finance	in	Indonesia	has	shifted	away	from	VERs	
towards	CSR	type	strategies.	According	to	Peters-Stanley	et	al.	(2013),	58	per	cent	of	
forest	carbon	offset	purchases	from	projects	in	Asia	are	motivated	by	CSR	activities.	
The	notion	of	CSR	covers	a	broad	range	of	(not	unproblematic)	strategies	on	the	part	
of	corporate	actors	(Carroll	&	Shabana,	2010;	Prieto-Carrón,	Lund-Thomsen,	Chan,	
Muro,	&	Bhushan,	2006).	Here	the	concern	is	generally	with	corporate/financial	
strategies	wherein	the	importance	of	carbon	accounting	diminishes	(in	relation	to	a	
project’s	capacity	to	generate	and	showcase	social	and	environmental	benefits.	
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There	is	a	documented	growing	interest	in	‘charismatic’	forest	carbon	projects	
amongst	corporate	sponsors	and	foundations	that	are	interested	primarily	in	the	
legitimation	of	other	core-business	processes	and	products,	as	opposed	to	VER	sales	
(Peters-Stanley	&	Yin,	2013).		
	
This	approach,	like	CSR	generally,	can	be	critiqued	for	not	delivering	genuine	social	
or	environmental	change	proportional	to	the	scale	of	an	organisation’s	operations	or	
effects	(Bernard	et	al.,	2012).	Despite	this,	and	following	recent	decline	in	corporate	
offsetting	from	REDD+,	key	informants	describe	CSR	as	the	funding	‘life-line’	to	
which	REDD+	projects	in	Indonesia	are	currently	gravitating:	“if	the	market	is	going	
to	be	private	companies	at	its	heart,	it’s	either	because	its	capped,	or	for	CSR	
reasons”	(Investor	and	Developer	1).	Without	corporate	sponsors	and	foundations	
developing	and	expanding	their	interests	in	this	area,	many	REDD+	project	activities	
would	not	have	been	able	to	continue	over	recent	years.	Shifting	funding	
partnerships	associated	with	the	growth	of	CSR	strategies	within	REDD+	have	seen	
project	developers	adapt	and	repackage	their	activities	in	line	with	the	requirements	
of	new	types	of	PSF	actors.	As	one	contractor	explained:		
	
It’s	not	as	though	the	profit	seekers	have	suddenly	gone	green.	They’re	in	this	space	
because	they	see	business	opportunity.	So	if	these	two	parties	that	are	not	
traditionally	working	together,	suddenly	are,	it’s	more	likely	that	the	NGO	has	
somehow	shifted	their	motivations	than	it	is	the	business	partner.	I	think	that’s	what	
the	nature	of	those	relationships	reflect	(Contractor	4).	
	
Generally	speaking,	changing	demands	of	capital	are	shifting	emphasis	away	from	
pure	carbon	accounting	and	towards	social	and	ecological	indicators	and	monitoring.	
Most	project	developers	involved	with	CSR	strategies	are	not-for-profit	
organisations,	and	are	in	many	ways	returning	to	‘integrated	conservation	and	
development	project’	approaches.	Such	CSR	strategies	are	arguably	rather	distant	
from	the	original	REDD+	concept	of	performance	based	payments	and	carry	their	
own	unique	risks:	
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But	there’s	a	risk	that’s	built	into	corporate	sponsorship	model.	You	can’t	sign	an	
enforceable	agreement	for	25	years	of	corporate	sponsorship	support	of	a	charitable	
donation.	You	just	have	to	continually	nurture	relationships	so	you	have	that	long-
term	commitment	of	donor	support,	who	are	basically	getting	nothing	substantive	in	
exchange	beyond	that	CSR	stamp	(Contractor	4).	
	
In	the	context	of	CSR,	social	and	environmental	outcomes	bolster	brand	legitimacy	
and	competitive	advantage.	These	rewards	derive	less	from	actual	ecological	and	
social	benefits	generated	at	the	project	level,	than	from	the	stories	they	underpin.	
The	large-scale	cap	and	trade	model	envisaged	by	REDD+	proponents	would	
potentially	deliver	far	more	finance	for	forest	conservation	than	what	CSR-driven	
investment	can	deliver.	Indeed	the	view	among	PSF	actors	seems	to	be	that	CSR-
oriented	REDD+	is	bound	to	remain	a	limited	source	of	finance.	While	CSR	is	not	
new,	the	process	by	which	diverse	CSR	activities	have	embraced	and	been	
incorporated	within	REDD+	in	Indonesia	highlights	the	tendency	for	REDD+	to	
reshape	underlying	landscapes	of	conservation	and	development	finance,	and	‘soak	
up’	pre-existing	activities.	
5.3.3	Sustainable	commodities	
REDD+	projects	are	increasingly	interacting	with	a	variety	of	corporate	strategies	for	
‘sustainable’	commodity	production.	In	Indonesia	there	are	several	examples	of	such	
strategies,	through	which	corporate	actors	in	the	agribusiness	and	extractive	sectors	
attempt	(more	or	less	genuinely)	to	address	social	and	environmental	impacts	of	
commodity	production.	The	aspiration	is	that	business	models	and	supply	chains	are	
reformed	or	even	revolutionised	through	‘self-regulation’	for	sustainability	(Steurer,	
2013).	It	is	asserted	that	such	strategies,	applied	across	sectors,	but	particularly	in	
the	primary	sector	and	land-based	industries,	can	engage	the	underlying	drivers	of	
deforestation	(Butler,	Koh,	&	Ghazoul,	2009;	Indrarto	et	al.,	2012;	Pacheco,	Putzel,	
Obidzinski,	&	Schoneveld,	2012).	Perhaps	most	notable	are	the	cases	of	the	
Roundtable	on	Sustainable	Palm	Oil	(RSPO)	and	the	Forest	Stewardship	Council	
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(FSC),	both	of	which	have	been	‘adopted’	by	REDD+	project	developers	into	their	
repertoires.		
	
The	rationale	(and	the	subsequent	story	that	is	available	for	marketing)	becomes	
one	of	protecting	forests	–	and	thereby	mitigating	climate	change	–	through	
‘sustainable’	commodity	production	(of,	for	example,	palm	oil	or	timber).	As	one	
informant	expressed:	“we	were	about	VERs	but	there’s	no	business	case	for	them	
now	–	so	we’re	just	about	profitable	FSC	community	timber.	There’s	a	window	for	
forest	carbon	and	REDD+,	should	it	become	viable	again”	(Investor	and	Developer	
10).	Such	activities,	then,	will	likely	continue	to	account	for	carbon	in	case	REDD+	
and	carbon	trading	does	deliver	some	financial	benefit	in	a	future	market.	This	new	
“focus	on	critical	interplay	between	sustainably	sourced	commodities,	forest	carbon	
mitigation,	and	forest	protection”	(Peters-Stanley	&	Yin,	2013,	p.	27)	has	been	
described	as	an	important	trend	in	REDD+.	In	exploiting	these	emerging	
opportunities,	project	developers	have	begun	to	“experiment	with	‘stacking’	forest	
carbon	assets	onto	other	certified	forest	and	agricultural	commodities”	(Peters-
Stanley	&	Yin,	2013,	p.	66);	such	as	including	sustainable	timber	and	agriculture	
certifications	within	REDD+	projects.	Such	projects	are	reported	to	be	producing	
higher-value	VERs	than	those	with,	for	example,	only	third-party	voluntary	
certification.	The	additional	revenue	associated	with	sustainable	commodities	
projects	means	they	are	perceived	as	less	risky,	and	are	therefore	more	attractive	to	
investors,	than	projects	relying	on	VERs	alone.	However,	as	Figure	5.1	suggests,	this	
type	of	strategy	is	currently	compatible	with	a	rather	limited	subset	of	PSF	investors	
that	are	closer	in	character	to	sovereign	wealth	funds	and	foundations.	
5.3.4	Impact	investment	
‘Impact	investment’	is	a	small	but	growing	class	of	investment	that	will	not	forgo	
meaningful	social	and	ecological	outcomes	for	financial	returns.	This	type	of	
approach	parallels	sustainable	commodity	strategies	but	is	not	restricted	to	forest	
carbon	outcomes.	Impact	investments	are	typically	defined	by	a	minimal	financial	
return	and	are	designed	to	avoid	financial	loss	by	delivering	social	and	
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environmental	benefits	through,	for	example,	fostering	sustainable	community	
enterprise.	This	type	of	investment	might	include	government-guaranteed	(but	
potentially	unsecured)	bonds,	where	the	risk	is	shouldered	by	profit-seeking	financial	
capital	(albeit	backed	by	Northern	governments	or	institutions).	Other	models	
include	variations	on	equity-sharing,	and	funds	explicitly	designed	to	disperse	risk	
among	investors	and	realise	financial	profits	through	financial	surplus	or	the	sale	of	
the	business	(see	Fosci,	2012).	Many	interviewees	perceived	such	investments	as	
high-risk,	with	one	fund	manager	describing	them	as	offering	“nowhere	near	any	risk	
adjusted	rate	of	return,	we’re	not	even	thinking	in	those	terms”	(INGO	Informant	1	
The	Swamp).		
	
Of	central	importance	to	impact	investment	strategies,	then,	is	a	social/ecological	
‘impact’.	As	one	fund	manager	explained,	“it’s	a	low	return,	high	risk	opportunity	–	
but	a	very	high	environmental	and	social	impact”	(INGO	Informant	1	The	Swamp).	As	
with	sustainable	commodities	strategies	the	risk	is	considered	too	high	for	most	PSF	
actors,	and	financing	is	typically	sourced	from	corporate	sponsors	and	foundations.	
As	one	fund	manager	observed,	“when	there	are	clear	pay	back	opportunities	then	
they	[investors]	will	be	interested.	But	if	it’s	REDD+	credits	or	something	then	they’ll	
be	less	interested”	(Investor	22).	Sovereign	wealth	funds	are	a	potential	PSF	
supporter	for	impact	investment	approaches,	but	given	their	reaction	to	REDD+	thus	
far,	the	risks	are	likely	still	seen	as	too	great.	These	types	of	activities	remain	
relatively	early	in	their	development	in	Indonesia.		
5.4	Conclusion	
This	chapter	has	mapped	out	some	of	the	diverse	and	sometimes	contradictory	
rationalities	and	behaviours	that	characterise	PSF	within	Indonesian	REDD+.	While	all	
actors	supporting	REDD+	in	Indonesia	are	in	pursuit	of	some	combination	of	benefits	
(economic,	social,	environmental),	the	discussion	has	highlighted	how	diverse	the	
rationales	and	tactics	of	profit-seeking	financial	actors	are.	The	chapter	has	provided	
some	insight	into	the	types	of	motivations,	behaviours	and	strategies	of	PSF	actors	in	
the	context	of	Indonesia’s	evolving	REDD+	programme.		
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Considerable	public	sector	finance	has	gone	into	REDD+	institution	and	capacity	
building	at	the	international	scale	and	within	Indonesia,	but	the	evolution	of	REDD+	
at	the	project	level	has	been	driven	to	a	large	extent	by	non-state	actors	and	PSF	in	
the	context	of	the	voluntary	carbon	markets.	The	relative	lack	of	formal	regulation	of	
REDD+	has	seen	a	diverse	array	of	projects	unfolding.	This	is	attributable	on	one	
hand	to	the	space	afforded	to	project	developers	and	investors	to	innovate	with	
project	types	and	methodologies	in	the	absence	of	regulation.	On	the	other	hand,	
on-going	regulatory	and	market	uncertainty	has	dampened	profit-seeking	investor	
interest	in	REDD+,	and	driven	many	of	those	already	involved	to	seek	out	new	ways	
of	securing	returns	from	REDD+	investments.	The	strategies	pursued	by	financial	
actors	in	Indonesia’s	emergent	REDD+	sector	are	illustrative	of	these	dilemmas,	and	
fundamental	in	influencing	how	REDD+	takes	shape.		
	
The	behaviour	of	PSF	actors	in	this	regard,	can	be	explored	in	relation	to	the	mix	of	
benefits	they	pursue,	but	specifically,	how	financial	imperatives	are	balanced	against	
non-financial	benefits.	This	is	found	to	depend	on	where	finance	is	drawn	from,	and	
whether	actors	are	primarily	in	search	of	independent	financial	profits,	or	rather	
prepared	to	accommodate	lower	short-term	financial	returns	in	the	scheme	of	a	
wider	project,	such	as	a	CSR	initiative	or	sustainable	commodity	scheme.	Generally,	
the	most	active	participants	in	REDD+	type	activities	at	present	tend	to	be	those	
actors	most	willing	to	derive	little	or	no	financial	return.	PSF	actors	engaged	in	
activities	prioritising	financial	profits	are	typically	found	to	have	paused	or	slowed	
their	activities	pending	improved	market	conditions.	Others	are	currently	either	
spreading	(hedging)	risk	across	CSR	initiatives,	sustainable	commodities	projects,	or	
impact	investments,	or	withdrawing	from	REDD+	altogether.	Essentially,	investment	
focused	purely	on	REDD+	VERs	is	increasingly	deemed	too	risky	for	almost	all	PSF	
actors.	
	
The	four	broad	strategies	sketched	in	this	chapter	are	neither	mutually	exclusive	nor	
exhaustive,	and	cases	are	observed	of	actors	adopting	multiple	strategies.	Each	actor	
effectively	has	a	particular	mandate	and	rationale,	which	uniquely	shapes	their	
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behaviour.	The	research	broadly	confirms,	however,	that	despite	evident	diversity	in	
the	tactics	and	strategies	pursued	by	financial	actors,	most	are	still	primarily	
concerned	with	their	financial	‘bottom	line’,	and	therefore	reluctant	to	pursue	
REDD+	VERs	in	isolation	given	their	current	low	market	demand	and	high	production	
cost	and	risk.	However,	the	variety	of	projects	created	with,	and	attracting,	PSF	in	
Indonesia	suggests	varying	degrees	of	VERs	(or	carbon)	centrality	in	REDD+	projects	
and	that	offsets	are	being	replaced	by	a	number	of	other	co-benefits.	For	actors	
adopting	CSR,	sustainable	commodities,	or	impact	investment	type	strategies,	the	
delivery	of	VERs	has	itself	taken	on	the	nature	of	a	secondary	co-benefit	or	
contingency	to	be	engaged	if	VER	markets	stabilise	in	the	future.	This	illustrates	how	
the	original	vision	of	the	mechanism	being	driven	by	REDD+	VER	strategies	has	
shifted	due	to	the	difficulties	and	risks	in	producing	VERs	and	the	market’s	reduced	
demand	for	carbon	offsets.	This	has	attracted	different	types	of	PSF	actors	and	given	
rise	to	different	types	of	REDD+	projects	and	GVCs.	Based	on	these	insights	the	
following	chapter	presents	an	investigation	of	the	specific	commodification	
processes	within	three	REDD+	projects	–	conceptualised	as	value	chains	–	to	better	
understand	their	value,	the	PSF	actors	involved,	their	governing	influence	and	how	
they	evaluate	REDD+	projects.	
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6		A	GVC	framework	and	analysis	for	REDD+	in	
Indonesia	
6.1	Introduction		
This	chapter	analyses	REDD+	projects	supported	by	PSF	in	Indonesia.	To	do	so,	it	
draws	on	and	adapts	a	global	value	chain	framework,	as	discussed	in	Chapters	2	and	
3.	The	GVC	framework	helps	to	provide	insights	into	PSF	and	governance	within	
REDD+	projects,	REDD+	as	a	process	of	commodification,	and	the	REDD+	commodity	
itself.	In	what	follows	the	GVC	literature	is	drawn	upon	to	adapt	a	GVC	framework	
for	this	REDD+	analysis.	The	three	Indonesian	REDD+	project	case	studies	are	then	
introduced	in	section	6.2,	and	analysed	using	the	developed	framework,	with	
attention	on	their	input-output	commodification	structures	and	general	governance	
and	coordination	dimensions.	Section	6.3	then	focuses	on	the	specific	governance	
and	coordination	implications	of	PSF	actors	on	each	of	the	case	study	REDD+	
projects.	This	analysis	thus	contributes	to	addressing	research	questions	2	and	3,	
which	are	concerned	with	understanding,	respectively,	why	PSF	actors	support	
REDD+	projects,	and	how	PSF	actors	influence	the	governance	of	these	projects.	The	
case	studies	detailed	here	are	also	drawn	upon	in	Chapters	7	and	8.		
6.2	Applying	GVC	analysis	to	REDD+	
GVC	analysis	employs	well-established	methods	for	analysing	globalised	capitalist	
production	networks	and	their	governance	(Gereffi	&	Fernandez-Stark,	2011;	Gereffi	
&	Lee,	2012;	Kaplinsky	&	Morris,	2001).	Recent	work	has	called	on	commodity	chain	
researchers	to	expand	and	deepen	their	approach	to	institutional	and	governance	
components	(Starosta,	2010a).	Visseren-Hamakers	et	al.	(2012)	argue	that	this	is	
necessary	for	REDD+	research	given	its	unique	and	complex	global	environmental	
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governance	characteristics.	Bumpus	and	Liverman	(2011)	suggest	that	value	chain	
analyses	of	REDD+	could	offer	important	insights	into	how	value	is	captured	
throughout	its	production	and	consumption	in	commodity	form.	Selwyn	(2012)	
offers	a	framework	that	can	support	interdisciplinary,	holistic	and	historicised	
analysis	of	GVCs,	an	approach	that	is	adapted	and	applied	here	to	three	case	study	
REDD+	projects.			
	
A	GVC	approach	typically	includes	the	analysis	and	mapping	of	the	tangible	inputs	
and	outputs	to	the	‘production	process’	on	commodity	chains	(such	as	land,	labour,	
offices,	consultants/expertise,	audits,	finance,	and	information),	and	the	strategies	
and	practices	of	key	actors	at	each	stage	along	the	GVC	(Gereffi	&	Fernandez-Stark,	
2011;	Gereffi	&	Lee,	2012;	Kaplinsky	&	Morris,	2001).	This	approach	also	
accommodates	calls	to	explore	REDD+	commodification	requirements	to	measure,	
disentangle	and	commensurate	the	attributes	and	additionality	of	REDD+	projects,	
and	actors’	balancing	of	profits	with	ethical	production	(Lansing,	2011;	Selwyn,	2012;	
Stephan,	2012;	Vagneron	&	Roquigny,	2011;	Xue	&	Chan,	2013).	While	the	notion	of	
‘input-output	structure’	may	seem	less	applicable	to	the	REDD+	context,	it	is	
nevertheless	relevant,	as	inputs	and	outputs	are	of	a	less	tangible,	but	no	less	real,	
nature.	I	focus	on	these	‘inputs’	of	actors,	flows	and	activities	to	provide	insights	into	
each	actor’s	role	in	producing	a	REDD+	project,	and	to	thereby	better	understand	
what	the	REDD+	project	and	commodity	is.	In	so	doing,	this	chapter	provides	
empirical	groundwork	for	discussions	in	later	chapters	that	engage	research	question	
2,	why	do	PSF	actors	support	REDD+	projects?	
	
In	what	follows,	the	movement	of	value	on	these	REDD+	GVCs	is	graphically	
presented	in	the	connections	and	flows	between	actors	involved	in	the	case	study	
REDD+	projects.	Each	relationship	and	the	types	of	information,	processes	and	
actions	that	actors	are	involved	in	is	analysed	in	detail.	This	assists	with	tracing	flows	
of	materials,	finance	and	information	through	the	GVC,	in	order	to	illustrate	who	
shapes	specific	aspects	of	projects	on	the	basis	of	what	information.	The	input-
output	structures	of	these	chains	reflect	a	geography	of	globally	connected	actors.	
These	actors	range	from	international	investors	and	consultants,	to	project	
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developers	and	NGOs,	to	Indonesian	forest	communities.	The	requirements	of	
finance	and	information	culminate	into	specific	components	within	REDD+	projects	
through	the	establishment	and	operational	phases	of	each	REDD+	project.	The	
descriptions	of	actors,	networks	and	strategies	in	each	case	study	REDD+	project	are	
overlain	with	their	institutional	context.		
	
Analysis	of	the	institutional	context	within	which	GVCs	are	embedded	is	important,	
as	it	significantly	influences	their	governance	characteristics	(Gereffi	&	Fernandez-
Stark,	2011;	Gereffi	&	Lee,	2012;	Kaplinsky	&	Morris,	2001;	Lansing,	2011;	Selwyn,	
2012;	Stephan,	2012;	Vagneron	&	Roquigny,	2011;	Xue	&	Chan,	2013).	Analysis	of	
the	institutional	setting	of	REDD+	in	Indonesia	is	therefore	important	for	engaging	
research	question	3,	what	are	the	governance	implications	of	PSF	actors	on	REDD+	
projects?	The	institutional	context	introduced	in	Chapter	4	and	analysed	in	Chapter	5	
is	revisited	and	drawn	upon	in	the	final	discussion	of	this	chapter.		
	
There	are	two	aspects	of	the	broader	institutional	landscape	that	are	particularly	
important	to	understanding	the	development	of	REDD+	in	Indonesia	-	the	national	
land-use	governance	framework,	and	international	REDD+	standards	(covered	in	
Chapter	4).	Attention	is	directed	to	how	actor	strategies	are	formed	and	evolve	
within	a	land-use	context	where	contending	forces	attempt	to	secure	structures	and	
practices	to	their	advantage.	This	requires	recollection	of	the	REDD+	industry	and	
actor	context	outlined	in	Chapter	4,	which	encompasses	global	governance	
institutions	and	research	organisations	that,	while	operating	at	a	distance,	have	a	
very	real	effect	on	the	structure	and	dynamics	of	specific	REDD+	GVCs.	Retaining	
links	to	these	contexts	is	important	when	re-embedding	them	for	a	situated	analysis,	
something	this	research	implemented	through	its	contextual	establishment	and	
framework	within	Chapters	4	and	5	(Bernstein	&	Campling,	2006a,	2006b).		
	
Both	the	material	input-output	arrangements	and	the	institutional	context	of	REDD+	
projects	influence	REDD+	GVC	governance.	The	REDD+	standards	and	accompanying	
MRV	methodologies	are	examples	of	project	components	that	bridge	the	material	
components	and	their	institutional	contexts.	Standards	and	methodologies	have	
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considerable	influence	on	processes	of	commodification	as	they	explicitly	detail	
methods	of	implementation	and	exactly	who	will	do	what	over	the	course	of	a	
project’s	development	and	operation	(Gupta,	Lövbrand,	Turnhout,	&	Vijge,	2012;	
Pearse,	2012;	Xue	&	Chan,	2013).	The	prescriptions	within	REDD+	standards	and	
methodologies	graduate	a	project	to	the	degree	of	the	selected	standard,	but	are	
not	a	limitation	upon	a	project’s	ambition.	Project	developers	and	their	partners	can	
go	beyond	these	measures	to	incorporate	activities	and	meanings	additional	to	the	
conventional	definitions	of	a	REDD+	project.	The	following	section	details	the	
approach	to	GVC	analysis	taken	in	this	research.	
6.2.1	A	GVC	framework	for	REDD+	projects	
In	order	to	make	sense	of	the	complexity	inherent	in	the	development	of	a	REDD+	
project,	a	common	template	of	the	material	basis	(in	actors,	flows,	activities)	of	such	
projects	was	developed	(see	Figure	6.1).	This	template,	developed	inductively	and	
iteratively	on	the	basis	of	fieldwork,	assisted	in	identifying	and	analysing	aspects	of	
the	three	REDD+	projects	to	be	discussed.	Relationships	among	key	actors	are	
analysed	in	detail	and	illustrated	as	flows	of	finance	and	information	in	the	diagrams.	
These	diagrams	are	schematic	representations	of	the	REDD+	projects	as	global	value	
chains.	They	are	not	mapped	as	unilinear	chains	linking	producers	to	buyers.	Rather	
they	are	‘slices’	of	complex	global	networks	of	actors,	illustrating	multi-directional	
flows	of	finance	and	information	as	inputs	and	outputs	that	produce	a	REDD+	project	
and	exchangeable	commodity.	The	common	requirements	of	REDD+	projects	in	
Indonesia	can	effectively	be	divided	into	separate	but	closely	integrated	
components.	The	four	key	stages	are	detailed	below.	
REDD+	project	establishment	
Reading	Figure	6.1	from	the	left	side,	the	process	begins	with	‘REDD+	Project	
Establishment’.	The	four	generic	components	(1.	Stakeholder	and	community	
engagement,	FPIC	and	analysis,	2.	Land-use	concession	and	legal	compliance,	3.	
Nature	modelling	and	measurement’;	and	4.	‘Carbon	modelling	and	measurement’)	
within	REDD+	project	establishment.	These	components	constitute	the	necessary	
attributes	for	a	project	to	be	considered	a	REDD+	activity;	consistent	with	recognised	
	 95	
REDD+	standards	and	the	UN	definition	of	REDD+.	These	attributes	derive	from	
prescribed	methodologies	that	are	designed	to	ensure:	a)	that	these	attributes	are	
achieved	to	a	certain	standard	(in	accordance	with	the	project’s	rationale	and	
ambition	and/or	a	given	REDD+	standard);	b)	that	this	delivers	benefits	to	the	forest	
area	and	associated	communities	beyond	the	benefits	of	projected	future	scenarios	
without	the	project,	referred	to	as	the	baseline	or	‘business	as	usual’.		
	
	
Figure	6.1:	REDD+	project	template	(populated	with	sample	actors/activities).	
	
Activities	within	the	‘Stakeholder	and	community	engagement,	FPIC	and	analysis’	
component	typically	include	community	livelihood	mapping,	establishing	institutions	
for	project	governance,	management	plans,	and	institutions	to	manage	project	
finance.	It	is	assumed	that	these	processes	will	contribute	to	sustainably	governed	
forests.	The	‘Land-use	concession	and	legal	compliance’	component	involves	legally	
securing	tenure	of	the	project	area	and	compliance	with	national	land–use	and	
carbon	laws.	The	‘Nature	modelling	and	measurement’	and	‘Carbon	modelling	and	
measurement’	components	concern	the	establishment	of	future	scenarios	for	the	
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project	area.	These	components	also	determine	the	methodologies	that	the	project	
will	use	to	conserve	and	improve	the	area’s	natural	character	and	demonstrate	
carbon	sequestration	and	storage.	The	processes	and	actors	involved	in	the	
development	of	each	of	these	components	are	illustrated	to	the	right	as	a	mixture	of	
international	NGOs,	local	NGOs,	governments,	consultants,	village	communities	and	
others,	each	with	arrows	indicating	the	nature	of	their	involvement.	These	
components	then	feed	into	the	second	REDD+	project	stage:	‘REDD+	Project	
Operations’.			
REDD+	project	operations	
‘REDD+	Project	Operations’	encapsulates	the	processes	and	actors	that	will	be	
responsible	for	the	REDD+	project	after	it	has	been	established.	Its	operation	should	
be	consistent	with,	and	refer	to,	the	plans	and	methodologies	developed	during	the	
establishment	phase.	Operative	activities	typically	involve	village	communities	and	
community	groups	and	comprise	forest	management	and	livelihood	development.		
REDD+	project	documentation		
‘REDD+	Project	Documentation’	refers	to	the	REDD+	project	reporting	and	
documentation	that	confirms	the	project’s	adherence	to	a	selected	REDD+	
standard(s).	In	Figure	6.1	both	the	international	NGO	and	the	local	NGO	are	involved	
in	project	documentation.	This	is	represented	in	Figure	6.1	by	the	point	of	exit	from	
the	dashed	line	surrounding	‘REDD+	Project	Establishment’,	‘REDD+	Project	
Operations’	and	the	actors	and	relationships	between	them.	In	the	language	of	GVC	
analysis,	this	is	the	down-stream	or	‘buyer’	end	of	the	chain.	The	path	from	here	is	
prescribed,	following	a	standardised	process	for	all	projects	using	a	given	REDD+	
standard.		
	
Project	methodologies	and	supporting	documents	are	first	subject	to	validation	
assessments	by	standards	administrators.	Following	any	required	revisions,	and	
approval	after	a	time-bound	reporting	period,	the	project	and	the	monitoring	
documents	are	then	subject	to	verification	processes.	Verification	should	ensure	the	
project	is	consistent	with	its	operative	plan	and	methodologies.	If	verification	is	
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achieved,	the	quantity	of	VERs	the	project	is	responsible	for	over	the	reporting	
period	is	listed	in	a	VER	registry.	It	is	from	this	registry	that	the	project’s	VERs	are	
sold	to	buyers	at	a	price	negotiated	with	representatives	from	the	REDD+	project.	
Proceeds	from	the	sale	are	then	transferred	to	the	REDD+	project	representatives	
and	distributed	through	the	REDD+	project,	consistent	with	its	‘REDD+	Project	
Operations’.	
Actors,	inputs,	and	outputs			
Finally,	Figure	6.1	reflects	relationships	between	actors	and	their	roles	in	delivering	
finance	and	information	for	the	development	of	different	stages	of	REDD+	projects.	
For	example,	international	and	local	NGOs	occupy	a	central	location,	where	they	
manage	many	of	the	functions	of	establishment	and	operation.	Their	relationships	
with	other	stakeholders	are	illustrated	by	the	mixed	connections	between	them	and	
the	project	establishment	and	operation	components.		
	
The	international	NGO	is	positioned	as	the	receiver	of	finance	from	VER	sales	and	
PSF	actors	and	is	responsible	for	its	distribution.	The	solid	and	dashed	arrows	
intersecting	the	two	overlapping	grey	boxes	of	the	NGOs	indicates	that	both	NGOs	
are	involved	in	the	distribution	of	finance	and	information	to	the	community	groups,	
and	receive	their	reciprocal	flow	of	information.	This	distribution	of	VER	sales	would	
be	consistent	with	Indonesian	law,	the	REDD+	standard,	and	the	benefit	sharing	
strategies	developed	in	project	establishment.	However,	these	arrangements	of	
finance,	information	and	actors	will	also	indicate	the	governing	influence	PSF	actors	
and	capital	across	these	GVCs.	The	grey	box	representing	the	international	NGO	
channels	the	project	establishment	and	operations	components	into	the	‘Project	
Documents’	component.	Where	the	documents	are	developed	by	more	than	one	
actor,	their	grey	boxes	are	stacked	within	each	other,	as	in	the	example	of	the	local	
and	the	international	NGOs	in	Figure	6.1.	
6.2.2	Case	study	REDD+	projects	and	GVCs	
Figure	6.1	is	intended	as	an	aid	to	understanding	REDD+	projects,	and	does	not	
constitute	a	complete	description	or	analysis.	The	complexity	of	relationships	
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between	actors,	processers	and	the	project	components	are	discussed	in	depth	
within	each	REDD+	project	case	study.	The	GVC	diagrams	are	intended	as	heuristics	
to	aid	in	understanding	the	REDD+	projects,	and	identify	significant	similarities	and	
differences	among	them.	Identifying	these	components	helps	to	untangle	and	
conceptually	map	the	production	of	each	REDD+	project.		
	
REDD+	projects	in	Indonesia	have	taken	many	years	to	get	to	their	current	state	and	
most	have	not	completed	their	establishment	or	operation	phases,	and	thus	are	not	
yet	formally	recognised	as	REDD+	projects.	As	such,	the	diagrams	presented	in	the	
following	sections	are	best	thought	of	as	representing	an	accumulation	of	past	and	
likely	future	relations	–	like	a	photographic	negative	left	exposed	and	capturing	
flashes	of	activity	as	relationships	illuminate	over	the	project’s	lifespan.	These	
depictions	are	informant-articulated	histories	of	actual	relations	and	predictions	of	
relations	between	actors	assembling	to	create	REDD+	projects.	Subsequently,	the	
diagrams	are	best	understood	as	a	shifting	sum	of	relations	involved	within	this	slice	
of	the	REDD+	project’s	network.		
	
The	three	REDD+	projects	explored	here	(termed	The	Swamp,	The	Valley,	and	The	
River)	reflect	the	typical	variety	of	suitable	case	studies	in	Indonesia.	Each	of	the	
case	studies	have	managed	to	complete	biodiversity	and	carbon	modelling	and	
measurement	components	relatively	easily,	and	are	progressing	as	anticipated	with	
the	stakeholder	and	community	engagement,	FPIC	and	analysis	components.	
However,	none	have	managed	to	secure	a	land-use	concession.	The	Valley	are	the	
closest	of	the	three	to	having	secured	this,	whereas	The	Swamp	and	The	River	are	
dealing	with	local	and	provincial	authorities	that	are	not	interested	in	supporting	or	
allowing	the	projects.	In	a	similar	sense,	only	The	Valley	was	close	to	securing	future	
PSF.	The	other	two	are	either	losing	the	PSF	funding	they	had,	or	had	yet	to	attract	
any.	The	diverse	relationships	with	PSF	makes	them	useful	case	studies	to	examine	
the	nature,	diversity	and	influence	of	PSF	in	the	REDD+	sector.	The	following	sections	
outline	the	three	GVC	case	studies	that	produced	the	REDD+	projects	in	preparation	
for	the	subsequent	section	that	analyses	the	role	and	influence	of	PSF	actors	in	each.	
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Across	the	case	studies,	the	terminology	used	to	refer	to	specific	actors	(such	as	the	
Investors,	INGO,	Indonesian	Business	and	Village	Communities)	represents	the	
relevant	actor	of	the	specific	case	study	being	discussed	in	that	section.	For	example,	
when	the	Investors	are	mentioned	in	the	section	about	The	Swamp	then	that	refers	
to	the	specific	investor	actor	involved	in	The	Swamp	REDD+	project.	These	relevant	
actors	are	noted	within	each	case	study’s	GVC	diagram	and	can	be	used	as	
reference.	
The	Swamp		
The	Swamp	is	the	largest	of	the	three	case	studies,	covering	an	area	of	forest	about	
twice	the	size	of	the	other	two.	This	project	stands	out	from	the	other	case	studies	
for	its	close	and	strategic	partnership	between	the	project	developer,	an	INGO,	and	a	
group	of	institutional	investors	(the	Investors)	that	together	sought	to	develop	
premium	VERs	using	CCB	and	VCS	REDD+	standards.	However,	the	project	had	
stalled	and	the	Investors	were	departing	the	partnership	at	the	time	of	writing.	The	
GVC	diagram	in	Figure	6.2	illustrates	the	material	input-output	structure,	and	the	
actors	involved	in	the	project.	
	
The	Investors	are	attracted	to	the	INGO’s	experience	with	developing	REDD+	
projects	in	similar	contexts	and	its	network	of	relationships	in	Indonesia,	including	in	
the	project	area.	The	INGO	has	a	long-established	and	respected	presence	in	
Indonesia	and	internationally.	The	INGO	could	see	the	benefit	in	cooperating	with	
the	Investor	to	take	advantage	of	their	considerable	resources	and	relationships	in	
finance	to	help	achieve	their	desired	conservation	and	community	outcomes.	As	
such,	the	partnership	aimed	to	develop	several	REDD+	projects	internationally	
whereby	the	Investors	would	financially	support	the	INGO’s	activities	to	facilitate	
institutional	and	community	capacity	for	REDD+	projects.		
	
	
	100
Figure	6.2:	GVC	diagram	of	The	Swamp	REDD+	project.	
	
The	INGO	and	Investors	also	received	supportive	finance	and	research	from	foreign	
donors	and	another	international	NGO	to	help	establish	this	project.	The	two	parties	
describe	the	beginning	of	the	partnership	below:	
	
We	caught	the	interest	of	the	Investors,	who	approached	us	with	a	proposal	that	
they	would	like	to	work	with	us	to	scope	out	and	identify	commercially	viable	REDD+	
globally.	There	were	lots	of	grand	ideas	about	how	many	we’d	like	to	develop,	
timeframes	for	developing	them.	That	was	all	very	much	a	result	of	the	optimism	and	
excitement	that	had	come	out	of	the	Bali	COP	…	We	had	a	plan	of	6	projects	that	
were	generating	credits	within	a	three	year	time	frame.	It	was	ambitious	(INGO	
Informant	1	The	Swamp).	
	
The	whole	thing	was	set	up	with	[the	INGO]	with	a	focus	on	Indonesia.	Back	in	the	
days	that	everybody	thought	it	was	the	El	Dorado	of	not	just	REDD+	but	of	financial	
instruments	(Investor	1	The	Swamp).	
	
	 101	
In	an	effort	to	satisfy	the	requirements	of	Indonesian	regulation,	and	to	provide	a	
structure	that	would	be	flexible	enough	to	accommodate	future	expansion	of	
activities	under	the	partnership,	the	INGO	and	Investors	established	a	private	NGO	
(PNGO)	to	behave	as	an	Indonesian	foundation.	The	INGO	explains:	
	
The	[PNGO]	is	set	up	for	environmental	and	social	benefits	in	Indonesia.	So	that	
makes	it	a	social	enterprise,	it’s	not	just	a	company	…	It	will	not	have	an	
implementation	role	on	the	ground,	they’re	just	the	highest	level	of	governance.	It’s	
not	clear	at	the	moment	exactly	what	they’ll	do.	It	will	evolve	depending	on	what	
happens	and	how	much	money	there	actually	is.	We	may	need	to	develop	funding	
proposals	for	the	[PNGO]	to	access	additional	finance	to	keep	the	project	going	
(INGO	Informant	2	The	Swamp).	
	
This	PNGO	appeared	to	offer	the	INGO	and	REDD+	project	considerable	
organisational	flexibility	and	opportunity	to	shape	and	add	social	enterprise	activities	
under	its	structural	umbrella	within	an	environment	of	funding	uncertainty.	The	
INGO	continues	to	describe	how	the	specifics	of	Indonesian	regulations	enable	
Indonesian	foundations	to	access	sources	of	finance	from	Indonesia	that	foreign	
organisations	cannot:	
	
One	thing	about	having	an	Indonesian	foundation	[the	PNGO]	is	it	enables	us	to	
access	Indonesian	sources	of	finance,	which	international	organisations	are	not	
allowed	to	do.	So	if	there’s	any	Indonesian	CSR	funding,	we	can	access	that,	whereas	
international	organisations	can’t	access	that.	So	that’s	quite	a	big	opportunity	(INGO	
Informant	2	The	Swamp).	
	
By	being	able	to	attract	funding	from	a	wide	spectrum	of	sources	and	collate	it	
across	multiple	REDD+	projects,	the	PNGO	structure	promised	to	deliver	large	
amounts	of	easily	scalable	REDD+	outcomes	and	associated	VERs.	The	INGO	
described	how	the	governance	of	the	PNGO	was	a	mix	of	the	Investors,	the	INGO,	
and	some	Indonesian	actors	that	could	facilitate	the	PNGOs	mission.	This	way	it	
could	be	considered	an	Indonesian	company:	
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The	Investors	have	a	number	of	representatives	on	the	[Private	NGO]	board	and	our	
country	director’s	on	there	too.	Then	there	are	a	number	of	independents	as	well.	
The	founders	are	international,	but	the	directors	dealing	with	the	day-to-day	things	
are	Indonesian.	It’s	considered	an	Indonesian	company	(INGO	Informant	2	The	
Swamp).		
	
The	day-to-day	implementation	and	management	of	this	particular	REDD+	project	
and	others	under	the	PNGO’s	administration	involved	a	separate	Indonesian	
Business.	The	PNGO	finances	and	directs	the	activities	of	the	Indonesian	Business,	
and	both	are	based	in	or	near	Jakarta.	The	Indonesian	Business	is	responsible	for	the	
land-use	concession	permit,	managing	the	activities	within	the	concession,	and	
managing	the	distribution	of	finance	from	the	sale	of	VERs	to	the	Community	Fund,	
the	National	Government,	and	back	to	the	PNGO	and	on	to	Investors.	The	INGO	
described	the	close	working	and	management	relationships	to	implement	The	
Swamp	REDD+	project	as	‘collaborative	management’,	whereby	the	Indonesian	
Business	leads	with	collaborative	support	from	the	INGO	and	Local	NGO	(LNGO):		
	
The	level	at	which	the	collaborative	management	would	happen	is	with	the	
[Indonesia	Business].	The	INGO	would	support	at	implementation	and	director	level	
as	well.	Along	with	the	[LNGO],	they	are	very	much	on	the	community	side	(INGO	
Informant	2	The	Swamp).	
	
The	close	working	relationship	between	the	Indonesian	Business	and	INGO	saw	the	
Indonesian	Business	benefit	from	the	INGO’s	expertise	and	relationships	within	the	
Village	Communities,	all	levels	of	Indonesian	Government,	and	the	wider	REDD+	
project	development	profession.	Figure	6.2	illustrates	how	closely	the	INGO	and	
Indonesian	Business	are	involved	with	each	other,	and	that	they	are	positioned	at	
the	epicentre	of	relationships,	remaining	closely	connected	to	the	Investors.		
	
It	was	among	these	actors	and	alongside	LNGOs,	Representative	Community	
Institutions,	and	Village	Communities	that	the	majority	of	collaboration	and	
exchange	took	place	in	establishing	the	project.	The	INGO	would	typically	instigate	
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strategies	and	lead	a	group	of	selected	LNGO	and	community	members	when	
reaching	out	to	government	institutions	and	consultants	for	necessary	inputs	for	the	
project	documents	(grey	text	in	Figure	6.2)	to	be	submitted	for	verification	and	
validation	to	REDD+	standard	organisations	and	registries.	The	INGO’s	position	as	a	
central	and	neutral	party	between	the	Indonesian	Business	and	Investors,	and	the	
Village	Communities	and	the	Provincial	Government	was	one	that	relied	on	trust	and	
confidence	in	delivering	the	promised	REDD+	outcomes.	The	INGO	was	a	critical	and	
influential	governing	actor	in	this	regard:	
		
The	[INGO]	uses	the	[LNGO]	as	a	local	NGO	partner.	The	[LNGO]	would	not	engage	
with	[the	Investors],	because	in	Indonesia	when	you	mention	the	private	sector	
people	think	you	are	greedy	and	you	are	just	capitalist,	that	you	don’t	consider	the	
people.	That’s	why	all	the	NGOs	try	and	engage	indirectly	with	the	private	sector	
(Indonesian	Business	3	The	Swamp).	
	
Trust	was	also	essential	to	accessing	funding	from	the	private	sector	and	connecting	
it	with	Local	Government	and	Village	Communities	for	REDD+	projects:	“This	is	a	
performance	based	system	and	many	international	organisations	doubt	Indonesian	
performance	so	far,	especially	in	forestry	issues”	(Indonesian	Business	3	The	Swamp).	
Again	this	is	something	that	the	INGO	was	able	to	facilitate	through	its	connections	
and	reputation	within	the	global	REDD+	community:	
	
That’s	the	benefit	of	an	[INGO],	they	have	access	to	other	relationships	and	money	…	
That’s	what	[the	INGO]	brings	as	an	international	NGO.	The	second	is	international	
connections.	[The	LNGO]	and	the	local	government	cannot	access	the	private	sector	
to	invest.	So	they	need	someone	to	connect	them	to	international	buyers	…	
International	buyers	will	have	more	trust	if	there	is	an	international	organisation	
involved.	So	that’s	what	[the	INGO]	as	an	international	NGO	can	bring:	capacity,	
connections,	and	trust,	especially	regarding	the	international	REDD+	standards	like	
VCS	and	CCB	(Indonesian	Business	3	The	Swamp).	
	
The	INGO’s	so-called	‘collaborative	management’	approach	structured	how	the	
Village	Communities	will	operate	the	project	(illustrated	at	the	top	of	Figure	6.2).	
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The	Investor,	PNGO,	and	INGO	have	representation	in	and	governance	of	the	
Indonesian	Business,	which	along	with	the	Community	Representative	Institution	
and	additional	representation	from	the	INGO,	form	the	members	of	the	
Collaborative	Management	Board.	The	composition	of	this	board	has	not	yet	been	
finalised,	but	it	will	be	responsible	for	developing	the	Collaborative	Management	
Plan	(the	Plan)	and	maintaining	oversight	of	project	operations.		
	
The	Plan	will	govern	the	relationship	between	the	Indonesian	Business	and	the	
Village	Communities	in	the	project	area.	The	Plan	will	be	designed	and	implemented	
through	a	joint	process	with	Village	Communities,	following	the	INGO’s	collaborative	
management	approach.	This	aims	to	ensure	that	Village	Communities	understand	
the	project’s	potential	benefits	and	risks	and	have	the	human	and	financial	capacity	
to	contribute	to	its	development	and	implementation.	The	day-to-day	
implementation	of	the	Plan	will	be	managed	by	an	implementation	unit	with	offices	
in	the	closest	city	and	around	the	project	site.	The	unit’s	activities	will	include	
management	and	protection	of	the	project	area,	monitoring	and	enforcement	and	
community	development.		
	
The	costs	of	these	activities	are	met	by	the	Community	Fund,	administered	by	the	
Collaborative	Management	Board	and	financed	by	the	Village	Communities’	20	per	
cent	share	of	VER	sales.	When	the	project	is	running	smoothly,	the	INGO	will	
withdraw	and	restrict	their	involvement	to	biodiversity	conservation	monitoring	and	
reporting.	The	LNGO	will	continue	their	work	with	the	Village	Communities	as	the	
primary	implementer	while	the	Indonesian	Business	will	manage	the	project	from	a	
distance,	supporting	the	LNGO	and	working	with	high-level	stakeholders	like	the	
Indonesian	Government.		
	
In	the	wider	context	of	the	conservation	finance	community,	the	INGO	is	positioned	
as	a	bridging	actor,	with	the	capacity	to	link	the	Village	Community	to	the	Investors	
and	their	Indonesian	Business	within	the	project.	As	such,	these	actors	relied	
substantially	on	the	INGO.	The	INGO	used	their	partnerships	with	the	Indonesian	
Business	and	the	LNGO	to	strengthen	their	ability	to	deliver	on	their	desired	REDD+	
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outcomes.	This	triad	became	effectively	positioned	to	engage	the	demands	of	the	
institutional	context	and	the	ambitions	of	the	REDD+	project.		
The	Valley		
The	second	case	study	involves	a	smaller	forested	area	and	population	of	community	
members,	best	described	as	a	community	forest	with	operative	conservation,	
reforestation,	organic	farming	and	healthcare	programmes	in	place	before	the	
advent	of	REDD+.	This	project	was	using	the	Plan	Vivo	REDD+	standard	and	was	
described	as	more	community	orientated	than	other	VCS	and	CCB	projects,	
endeavouring	to	remain	as	participatory	as	possible.	The	project	relationships	are	
depicted	in	Figure	6.3.	The	main	players	in	The	Valley	project	involved	the	
collaboration	of	an	INGO,	two	national	NGOs	and	three	LNGOs.	These	LNGOs	have	a	
variety	of	support	from	multiple	donors,	with	some	being	supported	by	the	INGO	
involved	in	the	project.	The	INGO	was	seeking	and	receiving	financial	support	from	
two	PSF	actors	(detailed	in	the	following	section	as	the	International	Business	and	
CSR	Agent)	and	various	donor	funds.	
	
The	close	proximity	of	a	national	park	on	one	boundary,	and	state	forest	on	the	
opposite,	positioned	this	forest	area	as	a	type	of	ecological	corridor	that	attracted	
the	interest	of	two	LNGOs	working	within	the	neighbouring	forests.	These	LNGOs	
could	see	that	the	Village	Communities	were	interested	in	securing	rights	over	their	
customary	forest	area	through	a	land-use	concession	and	that	doing	so	might	
provide	a	vehicle	for	protecting	the	forest	area	if	they	didn’t	need	to	degrade	the	
forest	for	their	wellbeing.	As	one	LNGO	put	it:	
	
[Our	work]	protects	these	forests	by	supporting	the	legal	transfer	of	management	
rights	to	those	communities	that	have	traditionally	managed	them…	[It]	is	a	practical	
way	to	reduce	encroachment	rates	into	the	National	Park	by	facilitating	the	creation	
of	local	conservation	areas	around	the	park	that	are	sustainably	used	and	managed	
by	villagers	(LNGO	Informant	1	The	Valley).		
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Figure	6.3:	GVC	diagram	of	The	Valley	REDD+	project.	
	
The	INGO	could	also	see	the	potential	for	this	and	put	the	pursuit	of	the	community	
land-use	concession	at	the	centre	of	its	work	in	the	community.	The	INGO	brought	
considerably	more	resources	to	the	REDD+	project	than	the	LNGOs,	who	are	trusted	
in	the	community	and	afforded	legitimacy	to	other	organisations	that	they	worked	
with.	As	such,	the	INGO	and	these	LNGOs	established	working	relations	that	focused	
on	gaining	land-use	concession	for	the	community	but	also	included	organic	farming,	
nursery	development,	reforestation	and	forest	and	conservation	education.	These	
livelihood	development	activities	sought	a	pathway	for	communities	to	reduce	their	
dependence	on	practices	of	unsustainable	forest	use	and	to	move	towards	
sustainable	non-timber	forest	products.	One	of	the	LNGOs	described	its	relationship	
with	the	INGO	as	collaborative,	and	geared	towards	the	shared	goal	of	securing	the	
land-use	concession.	However,	the	same	LNGO	did	express	concern	that	their	INGO	
partner	appeared	to	have	their	own	agenda,	rather	than	pursuing	the	Village	
Communities’	priorities:	
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There	are	differences	between	the	[INGO]	and	us.	The	[INGO]	generally	have	the	
same	idea	on	approaching	the	community,	but	with	some	difference.	We	start	from	
what	they	need.	But	the	[INGO]	start	with	their	own	standard	that	they	have,	like	a	
procedure,	for	their	goals	...	The	[INGO]	have	their	own	schedule	and	have	released	it	
onto	the	community	(LNGO	Informant	1	The	Valley).	
	
These	LNGOs	also	assisted	the	INGO	when	facilitating	community	mapping	and	
training	workshops.	These	workshops	are	a	necessary	part	of	the	participatory	FPIC	
process	required	to	secure	land-use	concession	over	the	forest	for	and	by	the	
community.	In	these	cases	the	relationship	between	the	INGO	and	these	LNGO	
partners	appeared	to	take	a	subcontracting	nature.	As	one	INGO	informant	put	it:		
	
The	[INGO]	pays	one	of	the	[LNGOs]	to	come	in	and	help	with	community	
consultation	and	the	concession.	The	other	[LNGOs]	just	help	the	community	with	
conservation	efforts	and	organic	farming,	they	don’t	know	about	the	involvement	of	
other	[LNGOs]	and	what	else	they	are	doing	(INGO	Informant	2	The	Valley).	
	
The	INGO	was	offered	the	assistance	of	two	national	NGOs	with	running	FPIC	
processes,	and	technical	agroforestry	and	forestry	services,	but	instead	undertook	
these	functions	themselves	and	did	not	involve	the	national	NGOs.	However	the	
INGO	did	make	use	of	an	Indonesian	Consultant	who	had	undertaken	an	
anthropological	study	of	the	communities	in	the	area	several	years	prior	to	this	
REDD+	project.	There	was	a	sense	that	the	INGO	was	deliberate	and	selective	in	who	
they	involved	with	the	project	and	how,	and	the	way	they	maintained	considerable	
influence	over	such	access	to	the	REDD+	project	and	the	Village	Communities.	
	
The	INGO	influence	within	these	establishment	activities	was	maintained	through	
the	operational	activities	of	the	project.	The	REDD+	Standard	Management	Facility	
was	established	and	administered	by	the	INGO,	and	is	responsible	for	the	sale	of	
VERs,	the	distribution	of	VER	finance,	and	managing	agreements	with	the	Village	
Forest	Institution	(made	up	by	members	of	the	Village	Communities)	(Figure	6.3).	No	
payments	had	been	made	at	the	time	of	writing,	but	the	first	payment	was	ready	to	
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deliver	to	the	Institution	for	distribution	via	the	Forestry	Management	Plan.	This	Plan	
also	details	how	ecosystem	service	payments	will	be	secured	through	monitoring,	
reporting	and	verification	processes	that	enable	VERs	to	be	listed	on	the	standards	
registry	and	sold.	Following	this,	project	sponsors	make	payments	to	the	Facility	
(Figure	6.3).	The	quote	below	illustrates	the	approach	to	PES	that	is	being	taken	in	
this	Village	Communities’	forest:	
	
The	user	groups	[in	the	Plan]	report	back	what	they’ve	achieved	[via	the	Institution]	
and	that	is	checked	by	the	[INGO]	and	[Facility],	and	then	PES	payments	are	made	to	
the	Institution	…	At	the	end	of	the	day	the	contracts	are	very	simple	...	The	sooner	
the	money	comes	through	the	Institution	the	better,	so	they	can	manage	it	and	pay	it	
to	the	patrol	team	who	feel	that	this	is	really	their	money	that	they’re	earning	–	
rather	than	[INGO]	staff	passing	money	to	people	(Standard	Consultant	1	The	
Valley).	
	
The	Institution	legally	owns	the	land-use	concession	and	is	responsible	for	its	
management,	including	its	finance,	administration,	and	the	coordination	of	activities	
that	concern	it.	This	is	detailed	in	the	Plan,	which	is	designed	and	agreed	upon	by	the	
Institution	and	the	INGO	and	must	remain	consistent	with	the	selected	Plan	Vivo	
REDD+	standard.	Figure	6.3	shows	how	proceeds	from	the	VERs	are	to	be	divided	as	
per	the	Plan.	Within	the	Village	Communities	the	vast	majority	is	directed	to	the	
activities	protecting	the	forest,	like	boundary	patrolling	and	establishing	nurseries	
and	commercial	enterprises.	PES	payments	are	being	sought	from	two	prospective	
sources	and	the	INGO	felt	the	outcome	would	be	positive.		
	
The	INGO’s	central	and	pivotal	position	on	the	GVC	afforded	it	considerable	
influence	over	many	relations	and	processes	comprising	the	establishment	and	
operation	of	this	REDD+	project.	As	the	project	developer,	the	INGO	was	in	a	
position	of	having	made	the	commitment	that	they	would	deliver	a	REDD+	project,	
or	at	least	some	sort	of	forest	carbon,	conservation	and	community	development	
initiative	involving	these	Village	Communities.	This	is	not	to	say	that	the	Village	
Communities	are	not	on	board	with	the	project,	but	it	suggests	that	the	package	of	
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initiatives	may	not	have	been	entirely	the	Village	Communities’	own	doing.	To	satisfy	
the	agreed	definitions	and	standards	of	a	REDD+	project	that	PSF	actors	desired,	
certain	attributes	need	to	be	present.	As	the	INGO	was	responsible	for	developing	
the	project	to	suit	these	desires,	they	are	also	in	the	position	of	being	responsible	for	
ensuring	that	these	qualities	are	realised.		
The	River		
Of	the	three	case	studies,	this	project	can	be	considered	as	having	made	the	least	
progress	in	developing	into	a	REDD+	project.	At	the	time	of	the	field	research,	the	
project	was	in	the	process	of	preparing	project	development	documents	(PDD)	that	
the	other	case	study	projects	had	already	completed	or	were	about	to	complete.	
Furthermore,	it	had	not	secured	PSF	to	purchase	PES	units	or	VERs,	and	the	
charitable	finance	that	had	sustained	the	project	had	finished.	As	such,	much	of	the	
analysis	here	is	based	on	what	informants	expected	would	happen	if	the	project	
does	attract	PSF,	which	the	INGO	and	other	actors	did	expect.		
	
This	project	concerned	a	relatively	small	area	of	forest	serving	as	a	buffer	zone	
between	a	wildlife	reserve	and	a	river.	It	was	championed	by	a	very	active	LNGO	
with	close	and	trusting	relationships	with	Village	Communities	and	other	groups	
connected	to	the	REDD+	project	area.	At	the	time	of	writing,	the	LNGO	had	sidelined	
the	REDD+	project	to	focus	on	other	activities	that	they	felt	would	provide	a	more	
certain	and	immediate	benefit	to	Village	Communities,	like	the	development	of	their	
businesses	and	helping	them	access	markets.	The	following	GVC	analysis	for	this	
project	is	aided	by	Figure	6.4.	
	
The	project	stemmed	from	a	large	INGO	becoming	interested	in	the	activities	of	the	
LNGO	and	the	Village	Communities	in	relation	to	the	buffer	zone.	Using	donor	
finance,	the	INGO	was	developing	pilot	REDD+	projects	to	attract	sustainable	sources	
of	PSF.	The	LNGO	had	been	working	with	the	Village	Communities	around	the	
wildlife	reserve	since	1998,	and	received	a	number	of	grants	for	their	forest	
conservation	and	community	development	programmes.	The	LNGO	used	INGO	
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finance	to	commission	an	International	Consultant	to	undertake	a	feasibility	study	
and	scoping	exercise	for	this	REDD+	project.		
	
	
Figure	6.4:	GVC	diagram	of	The	River	REDD+	project.	
	
The	INGO	was	cautiously	optimistic	about	the	opportunity	that	REDD+	might	present	
for	Village	Communities	of	this	area	and	was	interested	in	the	broad	environmental	
and	social	benefits	that	REDD+	might	bring.	The	INGO	had	extensive	practical	
experience	in	the	Indonesian	community	development	and	conservation	context,	
and	was	drawn	to	the	LNGO	and	its	reputation	as	an	honest	and	respected	broker	of	
information	and	active	implementer	of	community	development	and	conservation	
projects.	The	relations	between	the	INGO	and	LNGO	consolidated,	building	on	
relationships	between	certain	key	members:		
	
Intimate	connections	are	important.	One	lead	actor	from	the	[LNGO]	and	one	lead	
actor	from	the	[INGO]	went	to	university	together.	The	[LNGO]	actor	said	to	the	
[INGO]	actor	that	the	[INGO]	should	support	the	[LNGO]	in	REDD+.	So	the	[LNGO]	
and	the	[INGO]	started	the	project	together	…	It’s	based	on	what	the	[LNGO]	were	
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already	doing;	the	[LNGO]	see	it	as	a	way	to	support	what	they	were	going	to	do	
anyway	(International	Volunteer	The	River).	
	
The	LNGO	was	establishing	farmer	cooperatives	prior	to	REDD+,	and	the	INGO’s	
interest	in	it,	and	linked	some	ten	cooperatives	together	to	form	the	Farmers	Group	
Association	(the	Association).	This	group	became	the	official	REDD+	project	
proponent.	The	Association	also	shared	intimate	connections	with	the	LNGO,	
entangling	the	LNGO	into	the	Village	Communities	and	governance	of	the	project:	
	
Three	or	four	of	the	representatives	in	the	Farmers	Group	Association	actually	work	
for	the	[LNGO],	so	they’re	intimately	entangled.	You	can’t	look	at	the	[LNGO]	as	an	
external	actor;	they	are	of	the	community.	There	are	only	three	people	in	the	[LNGO]	
that	aren’t	from	these	communities	(International	Volunteer	The	River).	
	
Subsequently,	there	appeared	to	be	a	clear	hierarchy	between	the	LNGO	and	the	
Farmers	Groups.	The	LNGO,	Indonesian	Consultant	and	the	general	direction	of	the	
REDD+	project	appeared	to	be	governed	by	the	Association,	which	represented	the	
preferences	of	the	farming	families	that	constituted	the	majority	of	Village	
Communities	along	the	riverside:	
	
The	[Indonesian	Consultant]	does	exactly	what	the	[LNGO]	tell	them	to	do.	The	
[LNGO]	does	exactly	what	the	Association	tells	them	to	do.	The	Association	have	big	
meetings	every	two	to	three	months	and	make	decisions.	The	[LNGO]	feeds	back	to	
the	[Indonesian	Consultant]	what	the	Association	tell	them	they	decided.	The	
[Indonesian	Consultant]	writes	the	PDD	based	on	what	the	[LNGO]	says	the	
Association	wants	(International	Volunteer	The	River).	
	
The	governing	influence	of	the	Association	and	Village	Communities	was	such	that	
the	project’s	CCB	standard	“would	probably	be	a	triple	gold	REDD+	project	because	
the	project	proponent	is	the	community”	(Standard	Consultant	2	The	River).	Figure	
6.4	demonstrates	how	the	Village	Communities	shared	relationships	primarily	with	
the	LNGO	and	specific	Local	Government	agencies	regarding	the	land-use	
concession,	protection	and	mapping	of	the	area.	In	this	sense,	the	Village	
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Communities	demonstrated	a	practiced	capacity	to	participate	and	manage	their	
own	development	in	partnership	with	the	LNGO	and	through	the	Association.	
Consequently,	the	participation	component	of	this	project	was	by	far	its	most	
advanced	attribute.	The	LNGO	appeared	to	have	the	Village	Communities’	best	
interests	at	heart,	as	they	pursued	the	land-use	concession	for	community	forestry	
and	kept	ambitions	for	REDD+	at	a	pragmatic	distance.	This	approach	positioned	the	
LNGO	in	a	collegial	and	trusted	position	with	the	Village	Communities:	
	
We	talked	about	REDD+	last.	So	everyone	in	the	group	understood	that	REDD+	is	not	
the	purpose.	The	purpose	is	community	forestry	(LNGO	Informant	1	The	River).	
	
If	you	can	live	close	to	the	forest,	with	good	management,	then	REDD+	is	a	bonus	…	
Most	of	us	don’t	know	what	REDD+	is.	We	just	know	that	it’s	additional	to	forest	
management	and	so	far	it	has	been	free	from	the	[INGO]	(Farmers	Group	
Association	Member	The	River).	
	
The	PDD	for	the	CCB	standard	was	being	collated	and	developed	by	a	small,	recently	
established	Indonesian	Consultant.	The	Indonesian	Consultant	was	based	in	Jakarta,	
but	intermittently	positioned	a	staff	member	in	the	LNGO	office	to	be	nearer	LNGO	
information	sources,	the	Village	Communities,	and	the	forest.	The	Indonesian	
Consultant	was	trained	by	a	much	larger	and	influential	Standard	Consultant	who	
was	involved	in	the	design	and	implementation	of	many	REDD+	standard	
methodologies,	and	validation	and	verification	internationally.	The	focus	on	the	CCB	
standard	was	because	it	would	contribute	to	the	efforts	of	the	LNGO,	and	if	the	
REDD+	project	did	not	eventuate	the	Village	Communities	would	benefit	from	having	
gone	through	a	community	development	planning	and	mapping	exercise	that	might	
be	useful	when	pursuing	future	development	initiatives.	The	PDD	for	the	VCS	
standard	was	on	hold	because	of	the	uncertain	REDD+	VER	market	and	lack	of	a	
confirmed	buyer	or	funder	for	this	project.	
	
Subsequently	the	details	on	the	project’s	operation	are	still	being	discussed	between	
and	within	the	Village	Communities,	Farmers	Groups,	and	LNGO.	Part	of	the	reason	
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for	this	delay	was	that	the	INGO	was	the	primary	financier	of	the	REDD+	project,	and	
their	support	was	waning	and	formally	ended	in	December	2014.	The	end	of	this	
support	and	the	failure	of	others	to	step	in	was	interpreted	by	the	Village	
Communities	and	LNGO	as	an	indication	that	the	REDD+	project	could	not	be	relied	
upon	for	their	future	wellbeing,	so	it	was	not	prioritised.	However,	the	existing	
activities	of	the	Village	Communities,	the	Association,	and	the	LNGO	offer	an	
illustrative	example	of	what	their	operative	REDD+	project	might	have	looked	like;	
namely	the	expansion	of	existing	livelihoods	using	finance	from	REDD+	VER	sales:		
	
Rubber	tappers	will	plant	more	rubber	trees	and	fisherman	will	use	fish	traps.	The	
idea	is	to	leverage	the	types	of	existing	activities	that	they	already	have.	But	the	
main	aim	of	the	project	is	to	secure	the	legal	status	of	the	land	through	the	
concessions	so	they	have	access	(LNGO	Informant	2	The	River).		
	
The	Standard	Consultant,	as	shown	in	Figure	6.4,	are	responsible	for	instructing	the	
Indonesian	Consultant	how	to	deliver	the	PDD	documents	to	the	LNGO	and	INGO.	
Although	they	are	the	most	influential	GVC	member,	the	LNGO	emphasised:	“We	still	
need	other	parties	to	help.	The	[Indonesian	Consultant]	is	the	bridge	between	us	and	
the	[Standard	Consultant]”	(LNGO	Informant	1	The	River).	Similarly,	the	INGO	is	
positioned	as	a	provider	of	finance	and	information	to	the	LNGO,	with	little	other	
influence	on	the	REDD+	project	GVC.	On	the	contrary,	the	Farmers	Groups	and	
Village	Communities,	in	close	partnership	with	their	LNGO,	constitute	an	influential	
backbone	through	project	establishment,	operation	and	documentation.		
	
The	participatory	nature	of	the	project	is	one	of	the	reasons	the	INGO	was	so	
attracted	to	it:	“This	project	is	dear	to	the	[INGO’s]	heart,	it’s	their	favourite	one.	
Because	of	the	relationship	between	the	[LNGO]	and	the	communities,	and	how	the	
communities	drive	the	project”	(INGO	Informant	3	The	River).	As	the	Village	
Communities	are	understood	as	responsible	for	driving	the	project,	and	no	buyers	
for	the	VERs	are	identified,	there	was	little	outside	influence	or	opportunity	to	
generate	and	extract	financial	profits.		
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6.2.3	Summary	
This	section	has	taken	a	GVC	approach	to	analyse	the	emergence	of	REDD	in	
Indonesia.	It	has	enabled	a	‘mapping’	of	REDD+	projects	as	productive	processes	
with	inputs	and	outputs	of	certain	material	attributes	that	represent	specific	and	
important	carbon,	biodiversity,	participation	and	legal	compliance	components.	The	
section	has	also	explored	how	these	components	and	attributes	come	to	constitute	
the	projects	through	REDD+	project	documentation	and	standards.	The	following	
sections	consider	why	PSF	actors	support	REDD+	projects	(research	question	2),	and	
explore	how	PSF	actors	influence	the	governance	of	REDD+	projects	(research	
question	3).		
	
The	REDD+	GVC	analyses	highlight	some	commonalities	between	the	three	case	
studies	that	match	and	support	earlier	contextual	findings	in	Chapter	5.	First,	
achieving	the	biodiversity	and	carbon	components	was	relatively	straightforward.	
Second,	the	participation	component	was	both	difficult	and	vital	to	project	success,	
yet	something	that	project	developers	are	all	confident	about	achieving.	Third,	
achieving	the	legal	compliance	component	was	both	extremely	important,	and	
difficult	to	achieve.	Fourth,	and	closely	related,	financial	support	and	the	sale	of	
VERs	is	crucial	to	project	sustainability,	but	is	exceedingly	difficult	given	the	
complexities	of	achieving	legal	compliance	and	because	of	on-going	uncertainties	
with	the	international	carbon	market.		
	
The	governance	characteristics	of	these	REDD+	GVCs	shifted	throughout	the	
development	of	the	case	study	projects.	Applying	a	GVC	lens	helps	to	shed	light	on	
how	REDD+	projects	are	organised	and	governed,	and	the	role	of	specific	actors	in	
this.	The	influential	roles	of	certain	actors	are	evident	in	the	individual	case	studies.	
The	Valley	and	The	Swamp,	for	instance,	are	driven	by	an	INGO,	whereas	The	River	
was	driven	by	a	LNGO.	These	lead	actors	developed	trusting	implemention	
partnerships	with	other	key	actors,	including	PSF,	and	also	developed	new	business	
and	community	entities	to	expand	their	influence	and	satisfy	legal	requirements.	The	
following	section	directly	engages	the	roles	of	PSF	actors	in	these	REDD+	GVCs	and	
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the	ways	that	they	influence	the	character	and	governance	of	REDD+	projects	and	
value	chains	in	relation	to	the	wider	institutional	and	political	context	discussed	in	
Chapters	4	and	5.		
6.3	Governance	implications	of	PSF	in	REDD+	
The	following	sections	build	on	the	foregoing	analysis	of	the	REDD+	case	study	
projects	to	explore	the	roles	and	implications	of	PSF	actors	in	relation	to	project	
governance.	This	is	done	by	drawing	on	GVC	governance	types	and	forms	of	
coordination	as	outlined	in	Chapter	2.	Section	6.3.4	draws	these	case	studies	
together	to	summarise,	compare	and	re-contextualise	the	observed	governance	
characteristics	and	roles	of	PSF	actors	in	REDD+	projects	in	Indonesia.	
6.3.1	The	Swamp		
The	Swamp	project	was	dependant	on	finance	from	its	Investors	to	keep	the	project,	
and	the	actors	within	it,	arranged	as	it	had	been	designed:	
	
In	Indonesia	we	have	a	term	‘in	the	end,	it’s	all	about	money’.	The	[Investors]	want	
the	promise	and	growth	of	carbon	trading	and	the	carbon	market.	The	[INGO]	want	
their	agenda	of	biodiversity.	They	can	use	REDD+	and	the	social	funding	from	the	
[Investors].	The	[LNGO]	is	the	same;	they	want	the	community	benefit	and	to	keep	
their	program	and	role	in	the	community,	whilst	improving	the	community	livelihood	
and	capacity	(Indonesian	Business	3	The	Swamp)	
	
The	INGO	saw	REDD+	as	an	opportunity	to	continue	to	expand	their	existing	
biodiversity	conservation	work;	“REDD+	has	been	a	financial	mechanism	for	us	to	do	
what	we	have	always	done”	(INGO	Informant	2	The	Swamp).	The	INGO’s	enhanced	
ability	to	access	funding	enabled	them	to	plan	longer	term	projects	with	reliable	and	
flexible	budgets	as	well	as	expanding	their	own	capacities	and	those	of	the	Investors:	
	
For	the	[INGO]	it’s	a	great	opportunity	to	access	funding.	Being	able	to	develop	new	
commercial	relationships	with	people	like	the	Investors	has	been	massive.	It’s	
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enabled	us	to	get	out	of	the	annual	–	or	every	second	year	–	having	to	develop	donor	
proposals	(INGO	Informant	2	The	Swamp).	
	
A	lot	of	finance	was	made	available.	It	was	really	exciting	and	we	went	at	it	all	guns	
blazing	and	really	ran	at	that	opportunity.	It	was	a	fantastic	opportunity.	It	allowed	
us	to	build	our	own	institutional	capacity.	There	was	finance	available	to	do	that.	It	
helped	the	Investors	to	build	their	own	capacity	and	understanding	of	what’s	
important	with	regards	to	REDD+	(INGO	Informant	1	The	Swamp).	
	
The	excitement	generated	by	this	INGO-Investor	partnership,	and	the	sudden	influx	
of	funding	that	accompanied	it,	was	clear.	These	types	of	funding	arrangements	had	
never	been	seen	before	by	the	INGO,	and	understandably	they	seized	the	
opportunity.	The	partnership	offered	the	INGO	the	ability	to	set	comprehensive	
conservation	goals,	develop	their	capacity	in	PES	and	forest	carbon,	and	assist	Village	
Communities	to	secure	land-use	concession	and	tenure	over	their	forest.	Pursuing	
the	expensive	land-use	concession	that	was	required	to	secure	this	tenure	was	only	
made	possible	by	the	finance	that	the	Investors	offered	through	their	partnership	
with	the	INGO.	It	is	highly	unlikely	that	such	an	option	would	have	been	available	
using	the	typically	limited	and	piecemeal	funds	that	the	INGO	attracts	from	donors.	
However,	the	Investors	departed	from	the	project	because	of	the	number	of	risks	
that	had	accumulated	and	pushed	the	project	beyond	what	the	Investors	could	
accommodate.	Therefore,	the	project’s	future	is	uncertain.	These	risks	culminated	in	
the	stalling	of	the	land-use	concession	application	and	an	apparent	need	for	
payments	that	the	Investors	considered	corrupt.	The	perspective	of	the	Investors	is	
given	below:	
	
We	haven’t	put	any	more	resources	into	trying	to	obtain	those	approvals.	I’m	not	
sure	we	would	now,	given	where	the	REDD+	market	is	at.	So	maybe	that’s	been	a	
blessing.	Who	knows?	…	Do	we	really	want	to	spend	two	million	on	a	concession	fee	
in	a	market	that	looks	as	it	does?	A	voluntary	market	with	pockets	of	demand	and	
everything	has	to	be	small-scale	community;	I’m	not	sure	if	peat	lands	in	Indonesia	
do	that	for	buyers	(Investor	1	The	Swamp).			
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This	project	was	really	our	foray	into	REDD+	over-the-counter	projects.	Unfortunately	
it	ran	into	licensing	issues	with	the	Governor.	So	we	gave	up	and	stopped.	I	
remember	an	awkward	discussion	with	the	guy	from	[the	Investors]	about	the	
Governor	wanting	to	be	paid	off	for	his	signature.	He	was	asking	me	‘should	we	pay	
him?’	There’s	only	one	answer	I	can	give	you	from	our	organisation	-	no	(Shareholder	
1	The	Swamp).		
	
The	Investors	are	the	primary	implementing	agent	amongst	the	shareholders	that	
had	invested	in	the	fund	supporting	the	REDD+	project.	One	of	these	shareholders	
questioned	whether	the	Investors	had	the	capacity	to	manage	the	types	of	
relationships	that	REDD+	in	Indonesia	demanded:	“I	don’t	think	[the	Investors]	had	
the	Indonesian	experience.	The	relationship	got	messy	between	the	[Indonesian	
Business]	and	the	Governor”	(Shareholder	1	The	Swamp).	The	above	quotes	illustrate	
that	retaining	these	Investors	would	have	required	that	the	project	remained	
financially	sustainable	within	their	spectrum	of	acceptable	risk.	As	the	project	no	
longer	met	these	financial	requirements,	the	Investors	could	no	longer	justify	their	
support	and	removed	themselves	from	the	project	and	the	partnership	with	the	
INGO.	In	this	way,	the	efforts	of	the	project	developers	to	implement	REDD+	
standards	to	safeguard	communities	and	ecosystems	risked	being	undermined	by	
financial	requirements	not	being	met.	The	Investors	are	clear	that	their	involvement	
in	this	REDD+	project	first	and	foremost	concerned	the	generation	of	financial	profits	
via	REDD+	VERs,	thus	appearing	to	adopt	the	REDD+	VER	strategy	introduced	in	
Chapter	5.	There	was	no	charitable	component	to	their	strategy	and	very	little	
consideration	of	the	CSR,	branding	or	marketing	benefit	the	project	might	afford	
them:	
	
Each	of	the	shareholders	want	a	financial	return.	They’re	happy	to	do	it	in	a	clean	
sector,	but	in	the	end	they’re	all	return	driven	organisations.	None	of	them	are	
charitable	organisations	or	anything	else	…	They’re	all	very	ethical	investors,	but	
they’re	very	frank	and	they’re	interested	in	returns	(Investor	1	The	Swamp).	
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The	INGO	recognised	this	and	subsequently	did	everything	they	could	to	retain	the	
interest	of	the	Investors.	These	efforts	to	appease	the	Investors	and	meet	their	
financial	requirements	shaped	the	project	significantly,	and	show	how	the	Investors’	
financial	motives	influenced	the	project’s	governance.	The	quote	below	from	an	
informant	not	working	directly	on	this	REDD+	project,	but	observing	closely,	
recognises	that	reliance	on	profit-seeking	finance	could	be	fickle	and	even	jeopardise	
the	project	if	market	conditions	deteriorate	and	investors	depart:	
	
With	[The	Swamp],	when	the	market	fails,	the	project	fails.	That’s	a	lesson	…	If	
there’s	no	Investors,	then	there’s	no	money,	and	no	project	for	the	[INGO].	The	
[LNGO]	in	[The	Swamp]	has	no	money.	It’s	funded	by	the	[INGO]	and	was	brought	in	
because	it	had	good	networks	in	the	communities	(INGO	Informant	2	The	River).	
	
Other	informants	witnessing	the	events	of	this	REDD+	project	from	the	margins	
sensed	that	the	INGO	risked	straying	from	its	ideological	roots	and	harming	its	
reputation	as	it	wrestled	with	appeasing	the	profit	motives	of	the	Investors:	
	
There	was	an	array	of	motivations	here.	The	cowboys	were	for	profit,	and	the	NGOs	
were	for	conservation	to	pay	for	itself.	[The	INGO]	was	an	NGO	that	was	in	a	weird	
awkward	space.	They’ve	always	worked	with	business,	but	they	were	making	that	
type	of	pitch	very	strongly.	They	were	looking	at	partnering	with	an	investment	bank	
to	fund	REDD+	projects.	So	when	you	put	this	ambition	and	partnership	together	it	
started	to	look	as	though	the	[INGO]	was	in	this	for	some	conservation	and	money	to	
be	made.	They’re	a	charity	so	they	don’t	take	it	home.	It’ll	be	invested	in	other	
program	development.	But	it	started	to	take	on	this	uncomfortable	mix	(Contractor	
4).	
	
This	‘uncomfortable	mix’	of	the	Investors’	influence	on	the	partnership	with	the	
INGO	is	evident,	and	established	the	platform	upon	which	the	project’s	strategy	and	
framing	emerged,	thereby	directing	key	elements	of	the	project.	Evidence	of	this	PSF	
governing	influence	was	clear	in	the	capitalist	logics	that	structured	the	PNGO	to	be	
able	to	scale-up	REDD+	projects	and	deliver	greater	financial	returns	whilst	reducing	
or	limiting	risks	and	costs.	The	Investors’	desire	for	financial	returns	is	also	the	
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justification	behind	the	project’s	pursuit	of	the	largest	possible	forest	area	land-use	
concession	so	as	to	secure	high	numbers	of	VERs	for	sale.	Furthermore,	the	VCS	and	
CCB	standards	are	adopted	as	they	will	position	the	project’s	VERs	on	the	most	
lucrative	VER	registries	and	increase	the	likelihood	of	sales	and	high	prices.		
	
To	minimise	risks	and	costs	to	the	project,	the	INGO	found	itself	positioned	at	the	
relationship	crossroads	of	this	GVC	between	PSF	actors	and	Village	Communities.	
The	INGO	is	in	tight	partnership	with	the	Investors	and	Indonesian	Business	because	
of	its	established	reputation	for	delivering	similar	projects,	therefore	reducing	the	
risk	that	this	project	would	encounter	complications	and	jeopardise	the	Investors’	
investment.	The	project	plan	also	promises	to	position	forest	patrol	and	
management	offices	and	staff	near	the	forest	area,	in	the	nearest	town,	and	in	the	
provincial	capital.	This	comprehensive	method	of	control	and	risk	reduction	
attempts	to	safeguard	the	forest	VER	accounting	area	and	Investors’	capital	from	any	
dissent	or	mismanagement	from	within	or	near	the	REDD+	project.		
	
These	examples	illustrate	the	influence	that	the	pursuit	and	reliance	on	PSF	has	on	
the	governance	of	this	REDD+	project	and	appear	to	permeate	across	its	GVC.	Figure	
6.5	below	illustrates	the	modes	of	governance	and	forms	of	coordination	between	
actors	and	components	on	this	REDD+	GVC	that	were	described	above.		
	
The	source	of	the	arrow	indicates	the	direction	of	the	governance	and	coordination	
relationship	whilst	the	style	of	the	arrow	indicates	the	governance	or	coordination	
character	of	that	relationship	–	across	the	spectrum	between	market,	modular,	
relational,	captive	and	hierarchy	types.	As	outlined	in	Chapter	2,	the	market	end	of	
the	spectrum	experiences	low	explicit	coordination	and	low	power	asymmetry,	and	
highly	codified	information.	The	hierarchy	end	experiences	high	explicit	coordination	
and	high	power	asymmetry,	and	low	codified	information.	The	forms	of	coordination	
illustrated	above	are	drawn	upon	in	the	summary	section	below	to	inform	a	
comparison	between	the	three	REDD+	GVC	case	studies.	
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Figure	6.5:	Governance	types	and	forms	of	coordination	on	The	Swamp	REDD+	
project.	
6.3.2	The	Valley	
The	INGO	in	The	Valley	project	has	proven	to	be	an	influential	and	opportunistic	
actor	throughout	the	development	of	the	project.	The	INGO	is	developing	a	
reputation	for	packing	the	project	full	of	attractive	features	and	characteristics	that	
deliver	‘wins’	for	everyone.	This	project	is	actively	developing	the	most	advanced	
systems	for	carbon	accounting,	biodiversity	monitoring,	legal	compliance	
methodologies,	and	FPIC	and	community	participation	that	it	can	find	to	deliver	
forest	carbon	conservation	and	community	development.	The	INGO	is	striving	to	
develop	the	project	as	a	best	practice	example	to	help	guide	others	embarking	on	
such	work.	The	Standard	Consultant	recognises	the	INGO	as	going	far	beyond	the	
monitoring	requirements	for	a	REDD+	project:	
	
I	suppose	[the	INGO]	want	to	combine	the	VCS	technical	aspects,	plus	a	bit	of	stuff	
mixed	in	with	CCB,	plus	a	bit	of	stuff	from	themselves,	plus	a	bit	of	stuff	from	Plan	
Vivo,	all	thrown	into	the	same	cooking	pot.	It	won’t	get	certified	by	these	other	
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standards,	it’ll	just	be	certified	by	Plan	Vivo	…	They’ve	been	working	to	conceptually	
combine	them	all	as	best	practices.	So	while	they’re	doing	Plan	Vivo,	they	recognise	
that	maybe	the	outside	world	doesn’t	see	the	technical	elements	of	Plan	Vivo	as	
rigorous	as	necessary,	so	they	wanted	to	meet	and	establish	their	own	best	
practices.	So	in	a	way	developing	their	own	standard	(Standard	Consultant	1	The	
Valley).	
	
The	INGO	appears	to	be	looking	to	take	advantage	of	REDD+	funding	to	create	
premium	examples	of	REDD+	projects	that	prove	the	REDD+	concept	and	provide	
guidance	in	Indonesia.	As	one	consultant	put	it,	the	INGO	“were	active	here	prior	to	
this	program.	The	threat	to	the	forest	was	there,	the	baseline	was	there,	and	the	
land-use	concession	was	there;	so	they	thought	they’d	try	REDD+”	(Standard	
Consultant	1	The	Valley).	The	Standard	Consultant	pointed	out	that	the	INGO’s	
exhaustive	efforts	may	be	because	they	have	not	secured	funding	in	the	competitive	
REDD+	market,	and	funders	are	cautious.	Furthermore,	the	history	of	some	failed	
REDD+	projects,	and	the	subsequent	poor	reputation	of	REDD+	in	general,	may	have	
encouraged	the	INGO	to	focus	on	quality	as	a	way	to	compensate	for	and	distance	
themselves	and	their	projects	from	those	reputations:	
	
I	think	it’s	also	driven	by	this	fear	from	the	carbon	market,	that	people	want	to	
overdo	it	and	want	to	show	that	whilst	they	may	be	related	to	carbon	they’re	doing	
it	in	a	certain	way	and	not	a	part	of	the	cowboys	and	the	negative	impacts	that	can	
happen	(Standard	Consultant	1	The	Valley).	
	
The	inclusion	of	such	comprehensive	and	premium	attributes	into	the	REDD+	project	
was	not	demanded	by	the	Standard	Organisation	or	the	Village	Communities	and	
appeared	to	reflect	the	desires	of	the	INGO.	One	consultant	felt	that	the	Village	
Communities	may	have	exploited	this	trait	of	the	INGO	so	that	they	would	stay	
active	in	their	community:	“I	think	that’s	a	way	of	keeping	the	[INGO]	interested;	‘we	
have	5	orangutan’s!	Come	over	here	[INGO]!’”	(Standard	Consultant	1	The	Valley).	
The	INGO	is	continuously	interpreting	such	signals,	adapting	the	project	to	ensure	
they	have	support	from	the	Village	Communities,	and	remaining	consistent	with	the	
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Standard	Organisation.	In	addition,	the	INGO	was	balancing	the	desires	of	the	two	
potential	PSF	funders	and	VER	buyers	–	the	International	Business	and	the	CSR	
Agent.	
	
The	CSR	Agent	is	a	not-for-profit	organisation	that	collates	a	mix	of	carbon,	
community,	and	environmental	sponsorship	aspirations	on	behalf	of	its	clients	and,	
with	their	money,	seeks	projects	that	can	provide	the	desired	profile	for	appropriate	
sponsorship.	Their	clients	include	both	public	and	private	sources	of	finance	that	
between	them	seek	a	mix	of	charitable	and	profitable	investments	that	consistently	
deliver	ethical,	low	carbon	outcomes	and	carbon	offset	outputs.	The	second	PSF	
actor	is	an	International	Business	that	seeks	elements	of	discrete	ethical	and	
emission	reduction	attributes	to	associate	with	its	own	operations	and	triple	bottom	
line	commitments.	
	
The	perspectives	and	approaches	of	the	CSR	Agent	toward	this	project	and	forest	
carbon	initiatives	more	generally	position	them	as	a	connector	of	businesses	with	
carbon	credit	offsets.	The	CSR	Agent’s	approach	to	carbon	offsetting	is	anchored	
within	what	they	refer	to	as	high	quality	fair	trade	carbon	credits:	
	
With	the	[CSR	Agent]	you	offset	your	emissions	with	the	finest	and	fairest	carbon	
credits	on	the	market	…	You	offset	your	emissions	with	fair	traded	carbon	credits.	
The	[CSR	Agent]	offers	carbon	credits	from	pre-financed	projects	that	conform	to	the	
highest	standards	…	and	each	with	a	personal	story.	The	[CSR	Agent]	also	offers	
exclusivity	on	carbon	credits	from	a	specific	region	or	town	…	You	receive	a	
certificate	with	serial	numbers	and	promotional	materials.	In	this	way	you	can	
communicate	to	clients	and	partners	that	you	proudly	take	corporate	social	
responsibility;	for	your	clients,	for	the	climate,	and	for	families	in	developing	
countries	(CSR	Agent	The	Valley).		
	
The	CSR	Agent	uses	this	fair	trade	approach	to	portray	the	carbon	offsets	that	they	
offer	as	more	than	carbon.	These	offsets	promised	to	be	attached	to	improvements	
in	the	wellbeing	of	producers,	and	to	be	accompanied	by	personal	stories	of	that	
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improvement.	In	doing	so	they	endeavour	to	ensure	that	the	maximum	amount	of	
benefit	from	the	sale	of	carbon	credits	reach	the	producers	of	that	credit.	
Subsequently	the	CSR	Agent	would	best	fit	the	Corporate	Sponsor	PSF	type	
introduced	in	Chapter	5.	While	they	were	seeking	offsets	for	corporate	entities,	their	
financial	expense	and	return	on	the	VERs	was	of	low	importance	relative	to	the	
social	and	environmental	outcomes	of	the	project.	The	INGO	recognised	the	CSR	
Agent’s	approach	as	the	most	likely	model	to	assist	them	with	accessing	finance	for	
the	REDD+	project	and	are	very	interested	in	the	prospect	of	partnering	with	them:		
	
Consultants	are	telling	us	that	for	the	voluntary	market	there	is	most	potential	to	
attract	a	funder	that	wants	CSR.	They	say	that	this	[CSR	Agent]	goes	to	the	company	
and	helps	them	with	the	carbon	neutral	calculation	and	certification.	The	carbon	
they	cannot	reduce	they	will	offset,	and	that	creates	the	demand	for	voluntary	
credits.	It	has	nothing	to	do	with	Kyoto21	or	anything.	But	they	also	use	money	from	
governments	to	set	up	the	projects.	Whereas	other	brokers	just	do	the	brokering.	
These	guys	do	brokering	and	then	help	bring	the	funding	…	The	community-to-
community	exchange,	…	we	really	like	the	[CSR	Agent]	for	this	approach.	They	agree	
with	us	that	it	has	to	be	fair,	fair	carbon	(INGO	Informant	1	The	Valley).	
	
The	INGO	perceived	partnering	with	the	CSR	Agent	as	an	opportunity	to	develop	a	
direct	community-to-community	relationship	between	the	Village	Communities	in	
The	Valley	and	the	communities	represented	by	the	potential	government	funder	
using	the	CSR	Agent	as	a	broker.	This	community-to-community	carbon	partnership	
and	exchange	was	something	that	aligned	with	the	INGO’s	own	preferences	of	how	
REDD+	should	or	would	best	be	implemented	and	enabled	the	INGO	to	pursue	them.	
This	ideological	alignment	enabled	the	INGO	to	pursue	their	comprehensive	
‘premium’	community	development	and	forest	conservation	approaches.	It	also	
couched	the	CSR	Agent’s	governing	influence	as	enabling	the	INGO,	rather	than	an	
imposition	of	separate	or	additional	preferences	and	attributes	beyond	the	INGOs	
pre-existent	activities.		
																																																						
21	The	Kyoto	Protocol	of	the	UNFCCC	established	the	first	compulsory	GHG	emission	trading	
mechanisms	–	notably	the	Clean	Development	Mechanism	(CDM).	
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The	perspectives	and	approaches	of	the	International	Business	toward	this	REDD+	
project	and	forest	carbon	initiatives	more	generally	are	different,	and	appeared	to	
carry	a	more	commercial	and	marketing	connotation:	
	
We	use	the	voluntary	market	for	its	vibrancy.	We	like	new	projects,	rather	than	old,	
or	the	continuation	of	projects	…	We	like	to	use	partners,	like	NGOs.	About	80-90	per	
cent	of	our	offsets	come	from	NGO	partners.	We	each	have	a	reputational	stake	in	
the	projects.	The	project	works	just	like	we	want	it	to	work.	As	far	as	contracting	
goes	that’s	important	for	us.	That	enables	us	to	easily	enter	agreements	with	these	
projects.	That	model	works	for	us.	The	rest	are	over-the-counter	certified	emissions	
reductions,	but	that’s	just	to	back	fill	what	we	can’t	get	with	our	partnerships	
(Investor	25	The	Valley).		
	
The	focus	of	the	International	Business	appeared	to	be	on	offsetting	their	carbon	
emissions,	and	doing	so	through	the	security	and	novelty	of	new	projects	in	
partnership	with	NGOs	to	assist	in	sharing	and	minimising	project	risk.	They	
elaborated	how	REDD+	projects	are	particularly	attractive	as	they	offer	vibrant	
stories	and	compliance	opportunities	that	support	their	corporate	strategy	and	
enable	them	to	quickly	‘knock-off’	multiple	goals	at	a	time	with	minimal	risk,	despite	
their	frustration	that	the	trees	would	not	grow	faster:	
	
We’ve	done	REDD+	projects,	we’re	big	supporters	of	REDD+.	If	it	wasn’t	for	the	
voluntary	market	and	its	vibrancy,	such	as	VCS	and	the	CCB,	we	wouldn’t	be	
comfortable	playing	in	it.	But	the	vibrancy	and	the	compliance	nature	of	the	
verification	standards	and	their	ability	to	get	these	projects	off	the	ground	has	really	
worked	well	for	us	…	We	like	reforestation	projects,	but	the	problem	with	them	is	
that	they	have	such	a	slow	ramp-up.	But	we	like	them	and	the	story	it	tells	and	the	
other	co-benefits	that	comes	with	it	…	We	love	forestation	projects,	because	as	part	
of	our	CSR	strategy	we	have	goals	of	ecosystem	protection,	watershed	protection,	
habitat	protection,	and	reforestation	is	a	wonderful	way	to	knock	off	more	than	one	
goal	with	one	project.	So	we	love	reforestation	projects	and	are	always	looking	for	
more	to	do	(Investor	25	The	Valley)	
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The	INGO	recognised	the	motivations	of	the	International	Business	as	essentially	
reputational	and	as	searching	for	projects	that	they	could	attach	their	businesses	
brand	to;	“It’s	their	own	money.	It’s	CSR	money	for	conservation”	(INGO	Informant	1	
The	Valley).	The	International	Business	expressed	specific	interest	in	the	wildlife	
components	of	The	Valley	REDD+	project,	particularly	resident	orang-utan	and	tiger.	
Consequently,	this	became	something	that	the	INGO	focused	on	in	their	funding	
application	to	the	International	Business:	
	
The	wildlife	they’re	interested	in	is	orang-utan	and	tiger,	that’s	the	focus.	They	
believe	that	the	[INGO]	is	doing	work	on	that	so	it’s	really	up	to	the	[INGO]	to	put	this	
in	the	proposal	(INGO	Informant	1	The	Valley).			
	
The	International	Business	had	already	granted	some	money	to	the	INGO	for	the	
Valley	REDD+	project	that	was	going	to	be	used	as	the	first	PES	payment	within	the	
Village	Community’s	Village	Forest	Institution.	However,	the	INGO	was	not	sure	
whether	the	International	Business	perceived	the	grant	payment	as	part	of	the	PES	
model	for	the	VER	component	of	The	Valley	REDD+	project	and	what	they	had	
planned	for	those	VERs	that	they	had	effectively	bought.	The	INGO	believed	that	the	
International	Business	was	not	particularly	concerned	with	the	carbon	component	of	
The	Valley	project	or	whether	the	VERs	would	increase	in	value.	The	International	
Business	appeared	to	be	far	more	interested	in	the	CSR	attributes	it	would	be	
afforded	by	supporting	a	conservation	project	that	also	reduced	carbon	emissions:	
	
They	just	want	to	hear	that	the	money	helped	reduce	the	reduction	of	the	size	of	
habitat.	Then	they	can	say	that	in	addition	to	saving	orang-utan	habitat,	the	project	
retired	the	carbon	credit,	or	something	like	that	(INGO	Informant	1	The	Valley).	
	
The	INGO	felt	that	the	International	Business	may	be	pursuing	a	range	of	
reputational	CSR	attributes	across	community	development	and	forest	and	
biodiversity	conservation	that	they	could	draw	attention	to	as	it	suited	their	
commercial	and	branding	demands.	Subsequently,	the	International	Business	would	
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best	fit	the	Corporate	Sponsor	PSF	type	introduced	in	Chapter	5.	Despite	this,	the	
Standard	Consultant	felt	that	the	INGO	would	continue	to	pursue	the	accreditation	
for	the	carbon	emission	reductions	as	it	was	something	they	want	to	achieve	and	
learn	from	for	future	REDD+	project	implementation:	
	
The	[INGO]	have	the	[International	Business’s]	money	and	it’s	relatively	open	what	
they	use	it	for.	It	doesn’t	have	to	be	for	verifiable	emission	reductions	from	the	
project.	But	the	[INGO’s]	interested	in	the	idea	of	having	the	system	and	the	
standard	of	Plan	Vivo	behind	it,	some	kind	of	process	(Standard	Consultant	1	The	
Valley).	
	
This	sort	of	flexibility	from	the	International	Business	allowed	the	INGO	freedom	to	
develop	the	project	as	they	wished.	Any	restrictions	“depends	on	how	the	[INGO]	
sells	it	to	[the	International	Business]”	(INGO	Informant	3	The	River).	Between	the	
International	Business	and	the	CSR	Agent,	it	becomes	clear	that,	more	generally,	
these	PSF	actors	are	interested	in	delivering	CSR	services	to	themselves	or	their	
clients.	The	INGO	developing	this	project	understood	this	as:		
	
It’s	either	about	responsibility	or	image.	Some	of	them	it’s	about	access	to	market	as	
they	then	have	the	paper	certificate.	Some	of	them	they	have	to	provide	offsets	for	
the	carbon	they	cannot	reduce.	According	to	the	analysis	this	market	is	big…	I	don’t	
think	there	is	any	business	motive	with	these	funders.	But	there	is	an	indirect	link,	as	
the	reason	is	to	strengthen	their	business.	They	see	sustainability	as	their	business	
sustainability	–	to	continue	profiting!	(INGO	Informant	1	The	Valley).	
	
For	this	type	of	PSF	actor	the	story	of	the	project	is	important,	the	narrative	that	
REDD+	projects	like	The	Valley	deliver.	These	are	appealing	and	desirable	to	PSF	
actors	as	instruments	of	marketing	and	promotion	within	their	professional	circles;	
amongst	peers,	competitors,	supporters,	and	customers.	An	informant	pointed	out	
that	within	relatively	small	areas	of	forest	like	The	Valley	this	may	be	the	more	
feasible	option	to	sustain	the	project;	“As	a	project	developer,	like	this	[INGO]	in	[The	
Valley],	that’s	a	nice	pitch.	There’s	all	the	biodiversity,	carbon,	community	values.	
Probably	a	far	greater	income,	than	from	carbon	credits”	(Contractor	4).	
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These	PSF	actors	perceived	The	Valley	as	bringing	a	package	of	social	and	
environmental	attributes	that	ticked	the	boxes	of	their	corporate	strategies	and	
positioned	them	at	an	advantage	when	compared	to	competitors.	The	influence	and	
pressure	of	time	is	also	evident	here,	with	the	International	Business	having	a	
‘problem	…	with	such	a	slow	ramp-up’	and	being	drawn	to	REDD+’s	‘ability	to	get	
these	projects	off	the	ground’	and	‘knock	off	more	than	one	goal	with	one	project’.	
The	efficiency	of	REDD+	to	deliver	these	multiple	and	vibrant	responsibility	goals	at	a	
relatively	rapid	rate	and	with	legitimately	‘personal’,	‘fair	trade’	certification	that	
‘conform	the	highest	standards’	is	clearly	very	appealing	to	these	types	of	funders.	
Importantly,	it	is	these	types	of	PSF	actors	that	the	INGO	are	monitoring	closely	for	
future	support.		
	
Subsequently	it	is	understandable	that	the	INGO	should	want	to	shape	their	projects	
so	as	to	attract	the	interest	of	this	growing	funder	group.	The	approach	of	the	INGO	
to	‘cover-all-bases’	with	premium	REDD+	projects	is	a	strategy	to	ensure	support	for	
their	projects.	The	INGO	also	responds	to	these	funder	desires	more	directly	and	
specifically.	Most	notably,	the	key	interest	of	the	International	Business	in	orang-
utan	and	tiger,	saw	the	INGO	adjust	their	monitoring	strategy	and	demonstrate	this	
within	its	funding	proposal.	This	change	afforded	them	a	better	chance	of	securing	
funding	and	future	support	from	the	International	Business,	and	PSF.		
	
Catering	to	these	specific	and	general	PSF	desires	for	premium	REDD+	projects	
requires	the	INGO’s	influence	be	spread	across	the	GVC	(as	illustrated	in	Figure	6.3)	
to	ensure	the	project	is	crafted	appropriately	and	to	minimise	any	risks	to	their	
desired	‘best	practice	example’	of	REDD+.	This	is	reflected	in	the	comments	above	by	
informants	who	felt	that	the	INGO	harbours	a	certain	program	and	agenda	for	the	
REDD+	project	and	its	Village	Communities.	This	implication	of	INGO	involvement	is	
evident	in	the	character	and	design	of	the	Village	Forest	Institution,	its	Forest	
Management	Plan	and	constituent	expenditure	and	community	activities.	The	INGO	
leads	the	development	of	these	by	facilitating	participatory	events	with	Village	
Communities	and	certain	LNGOs,	guiding	their	decisions	towards	those	that	
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resemble	premium	REDD+	outcomes	and	stories.	The	character	of	these	governance	
relationships	across	the	project’s	GVC,	and	the	influence	of	the	two	PSF	actors,	are	
illustrated	in	Figure	6.6	below.	
	
Figure	6.6:	Governance	types	and	forms	of	coordination	on	The	Valley	REDD+	
project.	
6.3.3	The	River	
While	The	River	REDD+	project	is	yet	to	formally	attracted	interest	from	PSF,	
anticipation	of	PSF	still	influences	project	development.	This	is	evident	in	the	ways	
that	the	LNGO	has	shifted	its	focus	from	the	VCS	PDD	to	the	CCB	PDD	so	as	to	
concentrate	on	the	non-carbon	co-benefits	that	the	certification	will	bring	to	the	PES	
project.	This	risks	disqualifying	the	project	from	meeting	the	REDD+	definition,	as	
there	is	no	carbon	verification.	The	LNGO	does	not	appear	concerned	about	this	and	
is	confident	that	their	efforts	to	facilitate	development	in	the	Village	Communities	
away	from	the	forest	degradation	will	attract	project	funders.	The	greater	CSR	
emphasis	of	PSF	over	VER	interests	underpinned	this	decision.	
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Some	of	the	actors	brought	in	to	assist	in	the	development	of	the	project	are	
interested	in	the	financial	profit	prospects	that	REDD+	offered.	The	Indonesian	
Consultant	is	frank	about	rationalising	its	involvement	in	the	REDD+	project	as	
commercial,	expressing	how	they	hope	to	leverage	off	this	project	to	develop	their	
expertise	and	grow	their	business:	
	
We’ll	adapt	the	PDD	from	this	project	to	the	other	[INGO]	projects.	We	want	to	know	
how	the	budget	and	all	the	costs	play	out	with	this	PDD	so	we	can	learn	for	others	…	
I	hope	we	can	position	ourselves	on	the	top	by	getting	in	early,	but	we	don’t	know...	
This	is	a	business.	For	me	this	is	a	business	(Indonesian	Consultant	1	The	River).	
	
Overall	though,	as	no	VER	buyer	is	established	for	this	REDD+	project,	it	is	difficult	to	
analyse	the	PSF	governing	influences.	It	is	unclear	why	this	project	did	not	attract	
finance,	particularly	as	it	initially	foresaw	itself	selling	VERs	on	the	open	market	to	
PSF.	However,	the	character	of	the	project	provides	hints	as	to	why	PSF	might	be	
deterred.	The	control	that	Village	Communities	have	over	the	project	may	deter	PSF	
actors	as	it	would	likely	limit	their	ability	to	pursue	financial	profits	or	shape	the	
project	to	their	ends.	As	such,	PSF	may	consider	it	an	unpredictable	investment,	
harbouring	too	much	risk	and	liable	to	fail	or	become	something	that	VER	buyers	do	
not	identify	with.	That	PSF	have	not	materialised	has	ensured	the	project	is	
developed	in	ways	relatively	disconnected	from	direct	interests	of	PSF,	but	remains	a	
set	of	activities	justified	by	the	attraction	of	PSF	finance	for	certain	social	and	
environmental	outcomes.	The	governance	characteristics	and	forms	of	coordination	
across	this	REDD+	GVC	are	illustrated	below	in	Figure	6.7	and	drawn	upon	in	the	
summary	below.	
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Figure	6.7:	Governance	types	and	forms	of	coordination	on	The	River	REDD+	project.	
6.3.4	Summary		
The	following	compares	each	of	the	three	REDD+	GVCs	and	re-contextualises	them	
with	respect	to	their	PSF	types,	strategies	and	conceptual	location	on	the	same	
framework	developed	in	Chapter	5	–	illustrated	in	Figure	6.8	below	–	and	compares	
their	governance	characteristics.	Re-contextualising	these	case	study	GVCs	in	light	of	
the	analyses	in	Chapter	5	assists	in	understanding	why	certain	behaviours	and	
governance	modes	were	witnessed.	The	governance	types	and	forms	of	coordination	
witnessed	on	these	REDD+	GVCs	present	a	mixture	of	the	ideal-types	outlined	in	
Chapter	2.	The	GVC	governance	and	coordination	mapped	in	Figures	6.5-6.7	above	
illustrated	the	roles	of	PSF	actors	in	these	REDD+	GVCs	and	how	that	permeated	
through	to	other	relationships	on	the	GVC.	Tables	6.1-6.3	below	capture	the	most	
notable	of	these	and	categorise	them	by	the	forms	of	coordination	witnessed	on	
each	GVC	and	describes	their	type	of	governance.		
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Figure	6.8:	The	conceptual	locations	of	the	three	REDD+	GVC	case	studies.22	
	
Of	the	input	components	of	REDD+	projects,	PSF	actors	consider	both	the	land-use	
concession	and	legal	compliance	and	the	carbon	modelling	and	measurement	
components	as	essential	to	securing	each	project’s	permanence,	additionality,	
conservation	and	development	outcomes,	and	subsequent	VER	sales.	Stakeholders	
around	each	of	these	projects	told	of	how	the	communities	are	interested	in	
achieving	land-use	concessions	just	as	much	as	(if	not	more	than)	VER	payments.	The	
forest	tenure	and	access	enabled	by	these	land-use	concessions	offered	
communities	greater	opportunity	to	secure	their	livelihoods	alongside	control	of	
sites	of	cultural	importance.	However,	these	desires	are	sometimes	in	contention	
with	the	ambitions,	or	lack-there-of,	of	formal	Government	institutions.	Particularly	
those	institutions	responsible	for	processing	the	land-use	concession	at	district,	
provincial	and	national	levels;	experiencing	similar	trials	of	delay	and	deferral	faced	
by	other	REDD+	projects	in	Indonesia	(Dixon	&	Challies,	2015;	Indriatmoko,	Atmadja,	
																																																						
22	Figure	6.8	builds	on	Figure	5.1	from	Chapter	5	and	adds	the	conceptual	locations	of	the	
three	REDD+	GVC	case	studies.			
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Ekaputri,	&	Komalasari,	2014;	Indriatmoko,	Atmadja,	Utomo,	Ekaputri,	&	Komalasari,	
2014;	Luttrell	et	al.,	2014).		
	
The	inability	of	Case	Study	1,	The	Swamp,	to	achieve	its	land-use	concession	directly	
contributed	to	the	departure	of	its	investment	partners	and	the	project’s	stalling.	
The	Investors	in	The	Swamp	project	required	sufficient	financial	returns	to	justify	
their	involvement	in	the	project	and	thus	the	project	is	located	to	the	far	right	of	the	
Figure	6.8,	pursuing	REDD+	VERs	as	its	investment	strategy.	This	places	it	far	beyond	
the	acceptable	risk	tolerance	of	the	types	of	institutional	investors	that	were	
involved	but	have	since	departed.	While	The	Swamp	did	pursue	environmental	and	
social	outcomes,	its	requirement	for	financial	return	was	greater	and	thus	the	
project	was	positioned	further	towards	the	bottom	of	the	diagram	than	the	other	
case	study	projects.	As	The	Swamp	INGO	pointed	out,	evoking	the	direct	financial	
drivers	that	underpin	market	environmentalism,	“If	we	hadn’t	been	taking	a	REDD+	
approach	we	wouldn’t	have	had	the	finance,	we	wouldn’t	have	had	the	drivers”	
(INGO	Informant	1	The	Swamp).	
	
The	strategies	and	rationales	of	this	PSF	actor	are	reflected	in	the	forms	of	
coordination	witnessed	across	the	project’s	GVC,	and	tend	to	fall	on	the	captive	and	
hierarchy	end	of	the	spectrum,	shown	in	Table	6.1	below.	There	are	clear	
mechanisms	for	control	that	the	PNGO,	Indonesian	Business	and	INGO	all	press	upon	
the	LNGOs,	Village	Communities	and	general	project.	Within	this	there	are	examples	
of	relational	and	more	market	forms	of	coordination,	namely	concerning	the	REDD+	
standards	and	ultimate	VER	sale.	
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Table	6.1:	Comparison	of	governance	and	forms	of	coordination	across	The	Swamp	
REDD+	GVC.	
Market	 Modular	 Relational	 Captive	 Hierarchy	
Investor’s	
planned	sale	of	
VERs	for	the	
highest	price		
Codifying	VERs,	
conservation	and	
community	
development	
outcomes	within	
the	VCS	and	CCB	
standards	for	the	
Investors	
	
Land-use	
concession	to	
secure	legal	
compliance	and	
project	
permanence	
INGO	and	
Investor	
partnership	
	
INGO’s	
engagement	with	
LNGOs	and	
Village	
Communities	to	
develop	the	
Project	
Operations	
component		
The	Investor’s	
attempt	to	
‘salvage’	their	
investment	and	
manage	the	
project	through	
onsite	offices	
	
PNGO’s	
management	of	
multiple	projects	
	
Delegation	of	
Investor	interests	
through	the	
Indonesian	
Business	
	
Indonesian	
Business	and	
INGO’s	
management	of	
the	Project	
Establishment	
and	parts	of	the	
Project	
Operations	
components	
The	direction	
from	the	
shareholders	to	
the	Investors	
	
From	the	
Investors	to	the	
PNGO	
	
PNGO,	
Indonesian	
Business	and	
INGO’s	
construction	of	
the	Project	
Documentation	
component	
	
INGO’s	use	of	
consultants	
	
Case	Study	2,	The	Valley,	was	close	to	gaining	land-use	concession.	The	Valley	was	
also	the	only	project	that	could	be	considered	as	operating	as	a	REDD+	project	at	the	
time	of	writing.	The	character	of	the	PSF	actors	involved	in	The	Valley	positioned	it	
within	the	risk	threshold	in	Figure	6.5	above.	The	various	forms	of	coordination	
between	actors	across	this	GVC	are	summarised	in	Table	6.2	below.	Notably	there	is	
a	relatively	even	mix	of	coordination	forms	around	this	project,	and	the	INGO	is	an	
important	actor	in	most	of	them.	The	influence	of	PSF	actors	on	this	GVC	was	most	
evident	in	the	use	of	the	Plan	Vivo	standard,	and	their	desire	for	the	INGO	to	secure	
certain	biodiversity	conservation	‘storylines’.	
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Table	6.2:	Comparison	of	governance	and	forms	of	coordination	across	The	Valley	
REDD+	GVC.	
Market	 Modular	 Relational	 Captive	 Hierarchy	
CSR	Agent	
marketing	VERs	
as	‘premium	fair	
trade’		
	
The	International	
Business’	use	of	
the	project’s	
story,	orang-utan	
and	tigers	in	its	
marketing	and	
promotion	
INGO	and	PSF	
actors	
	
The	PSF	actors’	
preference	for	
the	Plan	Vivo	
standard	to	
secure	the	
project’s	story		
	
Community	land-
use	concession	
to	secure	legal	
compliance	and	
project	
permanence	
INGO	
engagement	
with	Standard	
Consultant,	
LNGOs	and	
Village	
Communities	to	
develop	the	
Project	
Operations	
component	
INGO	and	
management	of	
the	Project	
Establishment	
component	
	
INGO	and	design	
of	some	
community	
monitoring	and	
conservation	
activities	and	
planning	in	the	
Project	
Operations	
component	
International	
Business	
direction	from	
shareholders	
	
INGO’s	
management	of	
the	REDD+	
Standard	
management	
facility	
	
INGO	
construction	of	
the	Project	
Documentation	
component	
	
INGOs	use	of	
consultants	
	
Case	Study	3,	The	River,	had	yet	to	achieve	land-use	concession	and	attract	PSF,	
effectively	stalling	the	REDD+	project.	However,	while	being	too	risky	for	PSF,	the	
project’s	prioritisation	of	social	and	environmental	outcomes	position	it	at	the	top	of	
Figure	6.8.	This	shows	how	it	is	most	likely	to	attract	future	finance	from	PSF	actors	
seeking	impact	investments,	or	potentially	REDD+	VERs	if	the	project	revives	its	PDD	
for	the	VCS	standard.	Because	this	project	was	the	‘least	progressed’	the	
relationships	and	forms	of	coordination	across	its	GVC	were	fewer	and	less	diverse	
(see	Table	6.3).	It	was	clear	the	LNGO	was	the	most	influential	throughout	the	GVC	
and	shared	mostly	relational	types	of	coordination,	but	maintained	more	control	
regarding	the	project	components	that	constituted	the	project	documentation.	
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Table	6.3:	Comparison	of	governance	and	forms	of	coordination	across	The	River	
REDD+	GVC.	
Market	 Modular	 Relational	 Captive	 Hierarchy	
	 INGO	
relationship	with	
LNGO	and	
consultants	
	
Community	land-
use	concession	
to	secure	legal	
compliance	and	
project	
permanence	
LNGO	
relationship	with	
INGO,	Farmers’	
Groups	and	
Village	
Communities	
Farmers	Groups	
engagement	with	
their	Farmers’	
Group	
Association	and	
LNGO	
	
LNGO’s	
development	of	
the	Project	
Establishment	
and	Operations	
components	
The	LNGO’s	
management	of	
the	Indonesian	
Consultant	
developing	the	
CCB	PDD	and	
Project	
Documentation	
	
The	forms	of	coordination	were	seen	to	vary	across	the	REDD+	GVC	case	studies.	The	
use	of	REDD+	standards	and	VERs	illustrated	forms	of	market	or	modular	
coordination,	enabling	codified	information	to	be	exchanged	openly.	At	the	opposite	
end	of	the	spectrum,	hierarchical	and	captive	forms	of	coordination	are	also	seen	to	
be	influential,	particularly	amongst	actors	responsible	for	project	development.	
However,	most	forms	of	coordination	reflected	the	importance	of	interpersonal	and	
trust-based	relationships,	often	depending	on	the	collaborative	actions	of	respective	
project	developers	as	brokers	between	interests.	Subsequently,	as	a	governance	
descriptor	across	these	REDD+	GVCs,	they	can	best	be	considered	as	relational	
networks.	The	relationships	of	trust	and	shared	learning	between	PSF,	INGOs,	
LNGOs,	Village	Communities	and	other	key	partners	have	an	important	influence	on	
the	formation,	structure	and	governance	of	the	projects.	The	importance	of	trust	
indicates	that	the	exchanges	between	parties	on	these	GVCs	are	dependent	on	
person-to-person	relationships	and	are	generally	organised	deliberately	as	relations	
are	established	and	understandings	of	the	project	and	its	activities	emerge.		
6.5	Conclusion	
This	chapter	has	explored	how	PSF	actors	have	shaped	and	influenced	the	
governance	of	REDD+	projects	unfolding	in	Indonesia	(research	question	3).	Each	of	
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the	above	case	studies	demonstrated	aspects	of	PSF’s	governing	influence	as	direct	
responses	and	indirectly	through	their	anticipation	of	PSF	actor	preferences.	Each	of	
the	project	developers	(the	INGOs	in	The	Valley	and	The	Swamp,	and	the	LNGO	in	
The	River)	shifted	the	emphasis	of	their	project	towards	social	and	conservation	
benefits,	while	delaying	the	carbon	components	of	the	projects.	The	irony	in	this	is	
that	these	component	attributes	were	originally	considered	as	incidental	or	‘co-
benefits’	to	the	REDD	mechanism,	alongside	gains	from	the	generation	of	carbon	
offsets.	This	shift	was	in	large	part	a	response	to	the	shifting	interests	of	PSF	towards	
CSR	–	and	the	stories	they	gain	from	REDD+	(discussed	in	Chapter	5).	PSF	actors	on	
The	Valley	GVC	in	particular	clearly	wanted	to	invest	in	projects	that	demonstrated	a	
social	and	environmental	story	that	their	business	could	identify	with	and	be	
connected	to	through	a	“direct	supply	chain	relationship”	(Investor	and	Developer	7).		
	
The	governance	implications	of	the	tendency	for	PSF	actors	to	reduce	risk	within	the	
case	study	REDD+	projects	are	immediate	and	direct	across	their	GVCs.	Examples	
include	the	semi-permanent	positioning	of	INGO	staff	in	The	Valley	and	The	Swamp	
to	oversee	and	implement	REDD+	measures.	This	type	of	oversight	from	an	
international	body	was	not	present	in	The	River,	which	likely	garnered	PSF	
perceptions	of	it	being	more	risky,	contributing	to	their	deterrence.	Conversely,	the	
monitoring	systems	and	procedures	in	The	Swamp,	controlled	by	a	private	
Indonesian	Business	rather	than	the	community,	may	have	allayed	the	concerns	of	
financiers.	A	similar	emphasis	was	placed	on	operational	and	organisational	
structures	to	securely	manage	the	protected	area	and	business	groups	in	The	Valley.	
However,	within	The	River	the	structural	empowerment	of	Farmers	Groups	and	their	
Association	to	specifically	implement	REDD+	positioned	their	leaders	as	the	
preferred	channel	of	management.	This	made	the	Association	a	narrow	and	
influential	channel	through	which	The	River	project	was	governed,	beyond	the	
influence	of	the	INGOs,	LNGOs,	and	ultimately	PSF.	Its	failure	to	secure	funding	hints	
that	PSF	has	certain	requirements	that	might	conflict	with	approaches	that	
encourage	local	empowerment.		
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The	above	accounts	of	REDD+	PSF	help	to	provide	a	rich	understanding	of	the	
diverse	motivations,	characteristics	and	impacts	of	PSF	actors	within	the	GVCs	for	
REDD+	projects.	Viewing	the	case	studies	through	a	GVC	lens	reveals	how	PSF	
influences	the	character	and	likely	success	of	projects,	shaping	how	they	are	
governed	to	ensure	that	PSF	actors	secure	desired	benefits.	Through	examining	case	
study	REDD+	projects,	this	chapter	also	points	to	how	the	actions	of	PSF	actors	can	
influence	the	character	of	the	REDD+	industry	and	context	more	generally.	
Specifically,	PSF	actors	were	influential	through	their	pursuit	of	‘best	practice’	to	
standardise	and	benchmark	other	projects,	or	exiting	from	projects	because	of	high	
costs	and	risks	that	then	deter	other	PSF	actors	from	investing	in	REDD+.	The	
experiences	of	these	PSF	actors	with	REDD+	projects	contribute	to	the	general	body	
of	knowledge	that	other	PSF	actors	then	draw	upon	when	evaluating	REDD+	as	an	
investment	opportunity.	However,	PSF	actors	were	still	seen	to	respond	in	unique	
ways	to	the	specific	challenges	and	limitations	of	each	REDD+	project.	This	qualifies	
PSF	as	worthy	of	consideration	beyond	their	traditional	reputation	as	uniform	agents	
of	linear	financial	supply	in	exchange	for	commodities.	The	formation	of	such	REDD+	
commodities	is	another	important	aspect	of	market	environmentalism	and	private	
governance,	and	is	the	topic	of	the	following	chapter.			
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7		REDD+	Commodification	and	Commodity		
7.1	Introduction	
The	programme	to	commodify	forests	through	REDD+	is	recognised	as	one	of	the	
most	complex	and	diverse	attempts	to	disentangle,	qualify	and	commensurate	
carbon	emissions	reductions	into	financial	instruments	for	market	exchange	
(Stephan,	2012;	Boyd	&	Goodman,	2011;	Lovell	et	al.,	2009;	Descheneau	&	Paterson,	
2011;	Lovell	&	Liverman,	2010;	Bumpus	&	Liverman,	2011;	Lansing,	2011;	
Descheneau,	2012).	The	following	chapter	analyses	REDD+	as	a	commodity	by	
drawing	on	the	three	REDD+	GVC	case	studies	and	the	voices	of	PSF	actors	within	
REDD+.	Conceptualising	REDD+	as	a	commodity	directly	contributes	to	
understanding	what	the	value	of	REDD+	projects	is	or,	alternatively,	why	PSF	actors	
support	REDD+	projects	(research	question	2).	
	
The	GVC	analyses	in	the	previous	chapter	demonstrated	that	REDD+	project	
development	is	deliberately	designed	to	imbue	prearranged	attributes	into	a	
packaged	and	exchangeable	form.	The	nature	of	the	commodification	process	
influences	the	character	of	the	REDD+	project.	PSF	actors	are	shown	to	have	exerted	
a	governing	influence	within	this	process,	shaping	projects	as	best	they	could	to	suit	
their	desires.	The	packaged	and	exchangeable	commodity	form	that	was	the	REDD+	
project	came	to	reflect	the	sum	of	its	GVC	relationships	and	governance	
characteristics.		
	
This	chapter	lays	out	how	PSF	actors	perceived	and	evaluated	REDD+	as	a	program	
and	as	a	commodity.	The	diverse	arrangements	and	emphases	within	REDD+	project	
commodities	are	outlined	following	the	shift	from	focusing	on	VERs	to	focusing	on	
‘co-benefits’.	This	begins	with	an	analysis	of	what	REDD+	was	and	is,	its	multiple	
forms,	and	preference	for	VERs.	With	a	clear	understanding	of	the	REDD+	
commodity,	the	supporting	attributes	and	characterisations	of	REDD+	projects	are	
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analysed,	delving	into	the	complexity	in	the	REDD+	programme.	These	culminate	in	a	
series	of	mixed	meanings	about	the	REDD+	commodity	that	align	with	the	goals	of	
sustainable	development.	Such	ambitions	and	associated	meanings	leave	ample	
space	for	creative	interpretation,	and	lead	the	character	of	the	REDD+	commodity	to	
be	one	of	knowledge	circulation.	The	following	illustrates	how	PSF	actors	perceived	
and	desired	REDD+	projects	as	storied	commodities.	
7.1.1	REDD+	projects	and	PSF	stories	
Chapter	6	demonstrated	how	PSF	actors	are	seeking	to	be	involved	in	stories	that	
are	a	part	of	REDD+	projects.	The	flexibility	of	REDD+	to	be	customised	to	serve	
multiple	modern	investment	desires	highlights	the	complexity	and	diversity	of	PSF	
actors’	motivations	and	logics.	One	informant	remarked:	“It’s	everything	to	
everyone.	Pressing	all	buttons	at	once.	Everyone	loved	it	so	all	this	money	came	in.	
Capitalists	loved	it	because	it	made	money.	It’s	a	carbon	credit,	it’s	a	carbon	credit	
with	some	fluff,	or	it’s	just	fluff”	(Investor	and	Developer	1).	‘Fluff’	in	this	context	
referred	to	the	community	development,	conservation	and	sustainable	development	
outcomes	that	REDD+	facilitated.	The	same	informant	described	how	their	strategies	
to	connect	PSF	to	REDD+	projects	involved	designing	and	customising	these	‘fluffy’	
CSR	stories	to	the	desires	of	specific	PSF	actors:	
	
Find	the	company	first	then	find	the	offsets	that	will	capture	all	those	benefits	they	
want.	It	makes	sense;	if	you’ve	got	to	buy	these	things	then	you’ll	make	the	most	of	
it.	Something	in	line	with	your	business	and	your	ethic.	Here’s	one	in	Kalimantan	with	
some	monkeys,	and	here’s	one	in	Peru	with	some	monkeys.	Monkeys	sell.	Monkey	
credits.	With	some	basket	weaving.	This	is	the	plus-plus-plus;	monkeys,	websites,	
field	trips	and	all	the	rest	of	it	(Investor	and	Developer	1).	
	
Incorporating	a	variety	of	attributes	or	benefits	into	REDD+	projects	to	meet	clients’	
demands	was	similarly	articulated	by	another	investor	and	developer	informant	
who,	speaking	at	an	industry	summit,	emphasised	that	it	also	enabled	the	VERs	from	
the	REDD+	project	to	attract	a	premium	price:	
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You’ve	got	to	tailor	your	message	to	the	person	you’re	talking	to.	What	do	they	want	
to	hear?	Are	they	interested	in	biodiversity?	Carbon?	Community	development?	
Forests	more	generally?	You’ve	got	to	gauge	the	audience.	REDD+	is	what	you	call	
story	credits.	So	when	you’re	in	a	voluntary	market	it’s	a	story	and	it’s	about	what	
attributes	they	find	interesting,	and	therefore	you	can	demand	a	premium	for	that	
(Investor	and	Developer	3).		
	
When	responding	to	a	mining	company	representative	who	expressed	interest	in	
supporting	a	REDD+	project,	the	same	informant	proclaimed:	“I	can	do	that!	How	
would	you	like	it	to	look?!”	(Investor	and	Developer	3),	effectively	offering	to	craft	a	
REDD+	project	around	a	storyline	to	match	the	desires	of	the	mining	company.	
Another	informant	assisting	with	REDD+	project	development	expressed	the	
importance	of	these	stories	to	attracting	and	maintaining	the	interest	of	PSF	actors:		
	
If	we	don’t	have	that	storyline	there	to	use	to	advocate,	the	consistent	messaging	is	
not	there.	It	looks	like	self-interest	if	it’s	from	projects	or	consultants.	We	need	a	
much	clearer	deliverable	for	parties	concerned	so	they	understand	what	role	they	
play	(Contractor	6).		
	
The	complexity	involved	with	REDD+	projects	requires	that	accessible	stories	are	
available	to	easily	enable	PSF	actors	to	grasp	what	REDD+	projects	offered	them	and	
their	role	within	them.	Several	informants	described	how	PSF	actors	are	highly	
motivated	to	become	attached	to	these	pre-packaged	and	tailored	REDD+	stories.	
Such	stories	offered	an	appeal	beyond	the	pragmatic	type	of	rationality	that	
sustainable	development	often	relies	upon.	These	REDD+	stories	offered	something	
more,	along	with	potentially	attracting	premium	prices:	
	
The	company	isn’t	necessarily	looking	for	emissions	reductions	purely	for	the	sake	of	
reducing	their	emissions.	They’re	looking	for	opportunities	to	paint	a	strong	picture	
around	their	social	responsibility.	They’re	projects	that	are	providing	a	social	benefit,	
environmental	benefit	and	a	climate	change	benefit,	and	that’s	a	very	powerful	story	
to	tell.	Essentially	that’s	CSR.	Telling	that	story	is	one	way	that	you	can	have	one	
project	that	demonstrates	all	three	of	those	streams.	That	is	packaged	extremely	
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conveniently	because	there	are	these	units	you	can	purchase.	It’s	quite	a	nice	
package	in	many	ways	(INGO	Informant	1	The	Swamp).	
	
From	the	point	of	the	corporate	investor,	REDD+	credits	offer	a	story,	not	a	fungible	
commodity.	It’s	a	coherent	credible	story	about	a	place,	the	biodiversity	in	the	place.	
The	story	is	very	powerful.	From	the	point	of	view	of	the	corporate	investor	achieving	
their	CSR	goals	and	greening	their	image	and	offsetting	the	carbon	etcetera.	This	is	a	
beautiful	way	to	do	it.	Big	powerful	companies	have	a	nice	budget	for	this	kind	of	
thing	(Investor	6).	
	
Understanding	these	stories	that	PSF	actors	are	interested	in	becoming	attached	to	
through	REDD+	projects	contributes	to	the	analysis	in	previous	chapters	of	their	
motivations	and	the	character	of	the	finance	they	manage.	The	following	seeks	to	
peel	back	these	REDD+	stories	to	locate	and	examine	the	REDD+	commodity	and	
understand	its	value	and	how	it	is	evaluated	amongst	PSF	actors.	
7.2	Locating	the	REDD+	commodity		
The	vast	majority	of	informants	working	within	the	Indonesian	and	international	
REDD+	assemblage	recognised	the	diverse	ways	in	which	the	program	had	been	
interpreted	and	adopted.	Informants	representing	investors,	consultants,	NGOs	and	
project	developers	all	expressed	how	projects	are	different	and	how	this	
complicated	and	complemented	their	exchange	with	PSF.	However,	there	was	little	
consensus	on	what	a	REDD+	project	actually	was	and	how	it	might	be	defined:	
	
It’s	hard	to	put	bounds	around	what	REDD+	is,	particularly	at	this	moment	
(Contractor	19).	
	
Calling	it	a	commodity,	which	in	the	voluntary	market	it	isn’t,	it’s	not	fungible	at	all	
(Investor	1	The	Swamp).	
	
In	addition	to	the	influences	of	diverse	PSF	actors,	the	causes	of	this	diversity	and	
incommensurability	of	REDD+	projects	was	attributed	to	the	demands	of	the	specific	
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forest	context	and	the	corresponding	design	needs	of	each	project:	“It’s	going	to	be	
done	a	zillion	different	ways	around	the	world,	because	it	has	to	be.	There	are	so	
many	different	contexts,	policy	and	historical	backgrounds”	(INGO	Informant	2	The	
Swamp).	Another	informant	captured	the	diversity	and	definitional	challenge	facing	
REDD+,	stating:	
	
The	thing	with	REDD+	was	that	it	was	a	new	source	of	financing	that	was	coming	
from	a	particular	source.	Once	you	don’t	have	that	any	more,	which	is	kind	of	the	
way	it’s	going,	do	you	have	a	REDD+	story	anymore?	Or	are	you	just	talking	about	
financing	sustainable	landscapes?	…	To	me	that’s	what	REDD+	was.	It	wasn’t	the	
activity	(Contractor	2).	
	
Here,	REDD+	is	defined	as	the	method	by	which	the	outcomes	of	a	project’s	activities	
are	financed.	Those	outcomes	must	include	avoided	deforestation	and	forest	
degradation,	sustainable	management	of	forests	and	conservation	and	
enhancement	of	forest	carbon	stocks.	These	specific	outcomes	will	be	referred	to	
from	here	on	as	‘REDD+	Outcomes’.	Importantly,	the	outcomes	of	the	project	are	
not	restricted	to	this,	as	demonstrated	by	the	‘premium’	‘best	practice’	approaches	
within	The	Valley	case	study	REDD+	project.		
	
If	the	method	for	financing	these	REDD+	Outcomes	and	additional	outcomes	is	
through	payments	for	VERs	then	the	project	can	be	considered	to	be	REDD+.	Under	
this	definition,	the	range	of	activities	that	might	qualify	as	REDD+	projects	is	
immense.	Provided	the	payment	is	in	exchange	for	achieving	the	REDD+	Outcomes,	
there	is	no	limit	to	the	scope	of	activities	in	a	project	and	it	will	remain	a	REDD+	
project:		
	
REDD+	is	used	to	explain	a	lot	of	things,	but	it’s	actually	something	quite	specific:	to	
protect	and	restore	natural	forest	through	carbon	finance	[emphasis	added]	
(Investor	and	Developer	1).	
REDD+	achieves	a	lot	more	than	a	ton	of	carbon.	But	at	the	end	of	the	day	you’re	
financing	something	based	on	carbon.	If	not,	then	you’re	moving	away	from	the	
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protection	for	climate	initiative.	But	that	doesn’t	mean	that	it	cannot	be	linked	to	
sustainable	supply	chains	and	CSR	(Contractor	19).	
		
This	definition	of	a	REDD+	project	-	achieving	at	least	REDD+	Outcomes	whilst	
receiving	(planned)	finance	through	VER	exchange	-	albeit	broad,	is	helpful	in	
delineating	what	projects	and	activities	are	and	are	not	part	of	REDD+.	The	pace	at	
which,	and	the	ease	with	which,	REDD+	projects	have	become	so	diverse	is	also	
explained	by	their	rapid	absorption	and	addition	of	outcomes	over	and	above	the	
defined	REDD+	Outcomes,	whilst	maintaining	VER	exchange.	However,	since	the	
essential	aspect	and	defining	feature	of	a	REDD+	project	is	the	delivery	of	REDD+	
Outcomes	through	VER	exchange,	conceptualising	REDD+	as	a	commodity	refers	
directly	to	this	specific	characteristic.	This	exchange	moment,	where	REDD+	
Outcomes	and	VERs	are	traded	for	finance,	is	fundamental	to	the	REDD+	commodity,	
as	illustrated	in	Figure	7.1	below.	
	
	
Figure	7.1:	The	REDD+	commodity	of	exchange.	
	
In	this	moment	of	exchange	the	REDD+	commodity	is	at	its	most	tangible.	Within	the	
exchange	activity	there	are	two	sides	(Figure	7.1):	the	side	of	the	exchange	with	the	
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REDD+	Outcomes	and	VERs,	secured	and	legitimated	by	REDD+	standards	and	
supporting	regulations	(right);	and	the	side	of	the	exchange	possessing	the	finance	
(left).	To	be	clear,	for	the	remainder	of	this	thesis	when	referring	to	‘REDD+	projects’	
the	research	is	referring	to	this	definition.		
	
There	is	an	established	infrastructure	that	supports	this	REDD+	exchange	
commodity.	REDD+	registries	and	standards	play	an	important	role	in	facilitating	the	
exchange	and	securing	the	value	of	REDD+	VERs,	and	thus	REDD+	projects:	
	
Our	REDD+	standard	was	founded	to	create	credibility	in	the	market	and	the	most	
robust	credit	market	…	That	ensures	the	value	of	the	project;	it	in	fact	defines	the	
value	of	the	project.	Without	being	able	to	credibly	account	for	the	emission	
reductions,	you	don’t	actually	have	a	commodity	to	sell	(Contractor	19).	
	
Another	informant	working	with	REDD+	VER	registries	described	the	robustness	of	
their	registration	and	accounting	system	to	ensure	that	these	valuable	assets	are	not	
misplaced	or	misappropriated,	serving	the	REDD+	industry	like	VER	and	REDD+	
commodity	banks:		
	
We	have	the	whole	transaction	cycle.	VERs	can	be	transferred	just	like	you	can	
transfer	money	in	your	back	account,	or	you	can	buy	and	sell	any	kind	of	asset.	…	It’s	
just	like	a	bank	account.	These	assets	are	quite	valuable	and	that’s	why	people	want	
to	get	hold	of	them	(Contractor	21).	
	
Similarly,	some	informants	felt	that	any	REDD+	commodity	was	simply	a	
reincarnation	of	existing	commodities,	and	specifically	that	the	REDD+	exchange	
commodity	for	REDD+	Outcomes	and	VERs	was	adopted	from	existing	financial	
security	mechanisms	that	are	already	providing	similar	services	for	many	other	(non-
carbon)	commodities:			
	
Everybody	thinks	REDD+	and	carbon	is	this	totally	new	thing.	But	actually,	you	can	
buy	coal	or	t-shirts	under	very	similar	contracts	(Investor	1	The	Swamp).	
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It’s	not	as	novel	as	people	think	it	is.	I	haven’t	sold	you	the	tree	or	the	carbon	in	the	
tree.	You’ve	bought	the	assurance	that	I	won’t	cut	it	down.	That’s	a	service	(Investor	
and	Developer	1).	
	
Other	informants	felt	that	these	financial	mechanisms	would	emerge	and	adjust	in	
response	to	the	interests	of	PSF	actors	in	REDD+	projects.	They	felt	that	the	REDD+	
exchange	commodity	would	emerge	and	assume	its	form	in	response	to	whatever	
was	required	to	facilitate	REDD+	exchange:	
	
Once	you	have	the	goods,	the	commodity,	the	financial	mechanisms	will	come.	But	
we	don’t	have	the	goods	yet	because	we	don’t	have	the	regulation.	Replace	REDD+	
with	a	car	and	it’s	the	same	thing.	You	can	finance	it	many	ways.	But	you	have	to	
have	the	car	(Investor	and	Developer	6).		
	
In	this	sense	the	specific	exchange	activity	that	defines	the	REDD+	commodity	was	
ready	and	waiting	for	legitimate	REDD+	Outcomes	to	exchange.	The	following	
discusses	how	non-VER	REDD+	Outcomes	used	this	REDD+	exchange	commodity	and	
its	VER	component.	
7.2.1	The	VER	hook	for	REDD+	Outcomes	
Informants	working	with	REDD+	standards	reported	how	PSF	actors	are	interested	in	
securing	the	ability	of	their	performance-based-projects	to	adapt	and	link	to	
payments	schemes,	whatever	their	nature.	The	example	of	The	Valley	and	Plan	Vivo	
standards	illustrated	the	importance	of	adding	a	carbon	metric	component	to	the	
project	from	another	standard	to	assure	that	it	would	be	available	to	PSF	and	help	
secure	its	value,	even	though	that	PSF	actor	had	not	specifically	requested	it.	This	
desire	for	REDD+	projects	to	be	able	to	adapt	to	different	payment	schemes	
illustrated	how	PSF	actors	evaluated	a	project	as	more	valuable	if	it	was	more	likely	
to	be	able	to	receive	payments:	
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The	value	is	in	the	linking	and	ensuring	that	they	can	appropriately	account	for	
emission	reductions	in	a	way	that	allows	the	country,	state,	or	project	to	be	paid	
based	on	performance.	Whether	that’s	a	carbon	market	or	a	fund-based	mechanism,	
the	focus	has	been	on	results-based	financing	(Contractor	19).	
	
The	same	informant,	also	involved	with	REDD+	standard	institutions,	described	that	
in	addition	to	a	project’s	VERs	and	ability	to	link	to	performance-based-payment	
systems	making	it	valuable,	its	involvement	with	the	CCB	standard	was	also	an	
important	value	contribution.	In	this	way	the	carbon	emission	reductions	component	
of	these	projects	became	an	important	hook	that	the	rest	of	the	project’s	attributes	
attached	to	and	travelled	upon	through	this	financial	exchange.	The	ability	to	
securely	account	and	manage	each	project’s	VERs	influenced	the	evaluation	of	this	
REDD+	exchange	commodity	as	a	vehicle	to	deliver	REDD+	Outcomes.	Informants	
described	how	the	VER	metric	was	exploited	by	project	developers	as	a	legitimate	
system	from	which	to	hook	additional	meanings	for	the	project	and	PSF	actors,	and	
may	not	necessarily	mean	that	the	project	or	PSF	actors	are	interested	in	REDD+	
VERs:	
	
The	metric	is	carbon	and	that’s	where	you	can	monetise.	It’s	x	dollars	per	ton	for	
carbon.	Because	we	can	measure	it.	All	the	other	attributes	are	about	increased	
profitability	or	a	premium	for	credits.	So	putting	a	mixed	value	on	it	really	...	Even	if	
the	client	isn’t	necessarily	paying	for	the	carbon.	That’s	the	metric	that	we’re	utilising	
because	there’s	standards	out	there	and	methodologies	that	are	accepted;	it’s	
validated,	it’s	verified	...	What	they	really	want	to	do	is	get	the	CSR	perspective.	
That’s	what	they	want	to	hear	(Investor	and	Developer	3).	
	
Carbon	is	the	mechanism	to	transfer	the	money	to	buy	a	credit.	But	they’re	really	
buying	the	biodiversity	and	social	benefits.	Worst	case	scenario	is	that	they	bought	a	
carbon	credit	…	We	would	prefer	to	sell	a	biodiversity	credit.	But	there	are	no	
standards	out	there	like	the	VCS	(Investor	and	Developer	7).	
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REDD+	has	power	to	deliver	impact	on	the	ground	in	both	environmental	and	social	
impacts.	REDD+	is	much	more	than	just	a	carbon	tool.	It’s	a	platform	to	address	
multiple	issues	in	projects	and	forests	(Investor	3).	
	
As	such,	while	VER	metrics	and	attributes	contributed	important	value	to	a	REDD+	
project’s	exchange,	their	greatest	contribution	appeared	to	be	as	a	hook	to	attach	
and	transfer	the	remaining	REDD+	Outcomes	to.	Subsequently,	the	price	PSF	actors	
are	paying	for	REDD+	VERs	to	support	REDD+	projects	may	have	little	to	do	with	PSF	
actors’	evaluations	of	the	VER	itself,	but	rather,	reflect	their	evaluation	of	the	other	
surrounding	and	supporting	REDD+	Outcomes.	As	such,	this	brings	the	common	
understanding	of	the	market	price	for	REDD+	VERs	into	question,	as	to	whether	it	
reflects	the	price	of	REDD+	VERs	themselves,	or	a	mixed	evaluation	that	reflects	
more	PSF	actors’	desires	for	the	attached	REDD+	Outcomes.	Furthermore,	the	
REDD+	commodity	that	PSF	actors	purchase	can	develop	to	become	more	complex	
than	this	and	expand	to	encompass	meanings	beyond	defined	REDD+	Outcomes.	The	
following	section	will	explore	the	attributes	of	REDD+	projects	that	go	beyond	these	
definitional	bounds.	There	appeared	to	be	little	hesitation	among	PSF	actors	to	build	
upon	the	robust	and	adaptable	REDD+	commodity	platform,	decorating	it	with	
charismatic	stories	to	position	their	REDD+	project	as	of	premium	quality.	
7.3	Story	meanings	beyond	REDD+	VER	exchange	and	REDD+	
Outcomes	
The	commodity	that	PSF	actors	purchase	when	they	pay	for	VERs	from	a	REDD+	
project	has	come	to	represent	more	than	the	REDD+	Outcomes.	From	a	PSF	
perspective,	what	is	being	purchased	is	a	story	designed	in	response	to	their	desires.	
Such	stories	may	have	very	little	to	do	with	the	project	components	prescribed	
within	the	REDD+	Outcomes.	They	typically	have	much	more	to	do	with	non-forest	
carbon	outcomes	that	encapsulate	the	community	development	and	conservation	
attributes	of	sustainable	development	that	PSF	actor’s	desire.		
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These	motivations	for	non-forest	carbon	outcomes	can	position	REDD+	Outcomes	
and	payment	for	them	(the	REDD+	exchange)	as	secondary	to	other	benefits	of	the	
project,	although	there	is	often	considerable	overlap	between	REDD+	Outcomes	and	
non-forest	carbon	outcomes.	This	is	especially	relevant	regarding	the	REDD+	
Outcome	requiring	the	‘sustainable	management	of	forests’,	which	could	be	
interpreted	to	comprehensively	include	all	meanings	within	non-forest	carbon	
outcomes	and	REDD+	combined.	This	becomes	particularly	apparent	when	a	broad	
but	accepted	meaning	of	‘sustainable’,	that	includes	community	development	as	
necessary	for	forests	to	be	managed	sustainably,	is	considered.		
	
This	flexible	and	contingent	approach	to	developing	REDD+	projects	enables	projects	
to	easily	adapt	to	future	changes	at	the	community	development	and	conservation	
nexus.	The	REDD+	projects	in	the	quotes	below	(The	Valley	and	The	Swamp)	used	
the	REDD+	methodology	and	VER	metrics	to	attract	finance.	However,	crucially,	they	
are	not	dependent	on	carbon	emissions	reductions	to	attract	finance.	Rather	they	
are	depending	on	the	non-VER	REDD+	Outcomes	and	the	deliverables	of	non-forest	
carbon	outcomes,	that	PSF	actors	interpret	as	supporting	their	desired	REDD+	story:	
	
We’re	focused	on	getting	money	to	local	forest	communities	and	right	now	it’s	this	
PES	idea,	which	includes	carbon.	But	at	the	local	level	it’s	not	about	carbon.	It’s	
about	community	benefits	from	their	biome.	The	carbon	is	just	a	vehicle	through	
which	you	could	achieve	it	(Standard	Consultant	1	The	Valley).	
	
I	don’t	think	there’s	a	relationship	between	the	standard	and	the	finance	source	…	
They’re	seeing	opportunities	for	smaller	scale	CSR	type	investments	that	might	be	
packaged	slightly	differently;	that	have	biodiversity,	social	and	carbon	benefits.	Not	
purely	sold	on	a	commodity	basis	that	perhaps	the	VCS	projects	would	have	been	
(INGO	Informant	1	The	Swamp).	
		
The	above	disconnection	between	the	source	of	PSF	and	the	REDD+	standards	used	
in	a	project	indicate	how	adaptable	these	REDD+	commodities	can	be.	The	above	
approaches	include	the	REDD+	commodity	(delivering	REDD+	Outcomes	through	VER	
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exchange),	but	also	include	the	less	tangible	story	attributes	and	meanings	that	PSF	
actors	desire.	An	investor	informant	described	how	in	order	to	satisfy	the	multiple	
types	of	carbon	and	non-carbon	REDD+	deliverables	that	PSF	actors	desire,	a	myriad	
of	REDD+	standards	and	certifications	are	required:		
	
Many	people	might	feel	that	the	VCS	and	CCB	are	standards	of	compliance	and	
something	that	you	have	to	do.	But	a	shortcoming	of	this	in	the	market	is	that	not	
one	of	these	standards	incorporates	or	addresses	all	the	issues	that	the	market	
expects	them	to	address.	So	in	our	case,	and	pushed	a	little	bit	by	our	investors,	we	
do	the	VCS,	the	CCB	and	the	IFC23	performance	standards.	So	that	is	a	little	
cumbersome.	It’s	about	assurance	to	the	market.	From	the	off-take	and	investors’	
point	of	view,	they	want	to	ensure	their	investment	or	their	contribution	to	offsetting	
their	carbon	footprint,	isn’t	going	to	be	mixed	up	with	any	human	rights	abuses.	So	
it’s	an	incredibly	important	element	(Investor	4).	
	
The	pursuit	of	projects	like	that	described	above	by	Investor	4	has	developed	to	an	
extent	that	their	stories	no	longer	hinge	on	the	achievement	of	carbon	reductions,	or	
necessarily	their	use	as	a	point	of	attraction	for	finance.	However,	the	benefit	of	
maintaining	the	REDD+	commodity	within	these	projects	has	been	the	standard	
methodologies	and	supporting	registry	infrastructure	that	produce	a	stable	metric	
for	REDD+	projects	and	for	PSF	actors	to	use	as	the	medium	of	exchange.	The	
methodologies	and	registries	provide	the	security	and	legitimacy	that	PSF	actors	
require	to	commit	funds.		
	
The	VERs	borne	from	the	methodologies	and	registries	are	robust,	but	only	for	the	
carbon	emission	reduction	component	of	these	complex	projects.	Remarkably,	it’s	
this	VER	component	that	many	informants	agreed	was	the	least	desirable	attribute	
of	these	projects.	Whilst	other	sustainable	development	outcomes	and	stories	are	
considered	more	desirable,	there	are	not	robust	standards	and	registries	to	the	same	
degree	to	support	their	legitimation.	Sustainable	development	components	of	
																																																						
23	The	International	Finance	Corporation	(IFC)	is	the	private	sector	arm	of	the	World	Bank	
Group,	whose	performance	standards	are	a	leading	measure	of	safeguard	prudence	and	
legitimacy	(Roe	et	al.,	2013).		 
	 151	
projects	are	attached	to	VERs	through	the	qualification	of	standards	like	the	CCB	and	
Plan	Vivo,	and	through	stories	the	project	cultivated	and	portrayed.	The	refocusing	
of	attention	by	PSF	actors	from	VERs	to	sustainable	development	stories	displaced	
carbon	components	from	the	identity	of	REDD+	projects:	
	
You	could	say	effectively	that	if	you	took	away	the	carbon	side	of	things	then	
everything	else	was	the	same	as	it	was	before	REDD+.	But	I	don’t	think	this	is	so.	We	
now	have	the	CCB	standard	and	Plan	Vivo	that	actually	prescribe	certain	things	that	
need	to	be	in	place	(INGO	Informant	2	The	Swamp).	
	
The	idea	is	to	bundle	a	series	of	formerly	carbon	projects	across	Indonesia.	[INGO	
The	Swamp]	are	also	looking	to	get	capital	to	these	former	carbon	projects.	They	
were	very	focused	on	carbon	until	recently	(Investor	24).	
	
Informants	recognised	that	REDD+	projects	wouldn’t	be	feasible	without	these	
sustainable	development	components	to	complement	the	REDD+	commodity	and	
REDD+	Outcomes.	REDD+	projects	depended	upon	additional	sustainable	
development	components	to	complete	the	story	so	they	could	attract	PSF:	
	
When	people	look	at	REDD+	on	its	own	they	very	quickly	come	to	the	conclusion	that	
it’s	a	waste	of	time.	But	that’s	a	little	bit	unfair,	because	normally	if	you	take	REDD+	
out	of	the	picture	and	you	think	of	any	other	sort	of	endeavour,	whether	it’s	in	the	
land	sector	or	anything	else,	if	you	just	take	one	component	part	on	its	own	then	it’s	
not	a	viable	business	line	(Investor	2).	
	
To	this	end,	REDD+	projects	are	seen	as	becoming	interventions	by	PSF	actors	to	
pursue	their	own	interpretations	of	sustainable	development,	taking	advantage	of	
the	secure	legitimacy	of	REDD+	standards	and	methodologies:		
	
The	donor	is	funding	Plan	Vivo	because	they	believe	in	the	process	and	the	
sustainable	outcome	it	can	deliver.	The	story	becomes	relevant	when	the	PES	
payments	are	made.	Those	funders	are	buying	the	story	(Standard	Consultant	1	The	
Valley).	
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The	material	that	the	communities	are	creating	is	interesting	to	us	as	a	raw	material.	
It’s	not	why	we	invested	in	them	at	all,	and	it’s	not	likely	that	we	will	source	that.	But	
it	helps	create	a	story	that	resonates	and	people	understand	in	the	company	and	
more	broadly	about	the	value	of	how	REDD+	works,	and	how	it	works	for	
communities	and	for	micro	enterprises	(Extractive	Industry	1).	
	
In	the	case	of	the	quote	from	Extractive	Industry	1,	above,	a	clothing	producer,	part	
of	their	REDD+	payments	are	used	to	establish	sustainable	commodity	community	
businesses	to	produce	cotton.	Extractive	Industry	1	uses	cotton	in	its	business,	
however,	their	encouragement	of	community	businesses	to	produce	sustainable	
cotton	was	not	intended	as	their	own	supply,	but	rather	to	bundle	meanings	inside	a	
story	that	connected	them	with	the	sustainable	commodity,	the	community,	and	
associated	forest	and	biodiversity	conservation.	In	this	way	the	secure	legitimacy	of	
these	projects	that	are	extending	themselves	‘beyond	REDD+’	shifted	from	
exclusively	VER	registries	and	CCB	type	standards	to	include	unverified	but	
demonstrable	ESG24	stories	of	sustainable	development:	
	
ESG	and	other	standards	are	important	for	a	variety	of	reasons.	We	are	committed	
to	VCS	and	CCB	and	the	IFC	performance	standards.	The	first	is	because	there’s	trust	
between	the	public	and	private	sector,	and	these	standards	help	to	build	that	trust.	
Second,	when	we	look	at	ESG	we	look	at	the	performance	of	the	asset	itself.	We’re	in	
the	business	of	helping	develop	quality	assets	…	Lastly,	when	we	are	talking	to	our	
off-take	partners,	we	look	at	the	different	stories	that	could	be	brought	to	those	
companies	that	could	generate	CSR	values	(Investor	4).	
	
Such	REDD+	projects	are	under	pressure	to	deliver	perfect	forest	management	
arrangements	that	encompass	a	comprehensive	story	of	sustainable	development	in	
partnership	with	forest	conservation:	
	
																																																						
24	Environmental,	social	and	governance	(ESG)	issues	that	are	engaged	within	investments	
demonstrate	CSR	and	serve	sustainable	marketing	and	branding	outcomes	for	PSF	actors.	
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Right	now	projects	are	expensive	and	include	all	‘co-benefits’.	They’re	going	above	
and	beyond	what	Plan	Vivo	and	other	standards	require.	This	is	so	demonstration	
projects	cannot	be	brought	into	question	and	are	totally	legitimate	and	credible.	So	
they	can	be	used	to	create	a	system	for	roll	out	at	scale	that	will	suit	larger	funders	
that	need	a	large	outlay	and	return	of	donations,	CSR,	VERs	etcetera	(Standard	
Consultant	1	The	Valley).		
	
By	delivering	such	premium	sustainable	development	stories	using	REDD+	metrics	of	
exchange,	REDD+	projects	sought	to	secure	their	chances	of	attracting	PSF	to	sustain	
their	activities.	Premium	REDD+	projects	brought	about	a	diversity	of	stories	and	
interpretive	meanings	of	sustainable	development.		
7.3.1	Disconnecting	from	VERs		
The	REDD+	commodity	within	REDD+	projects	risks	becoming	submerged	within	the	
additional	meanings	of	non-forest	carbon	outcomes,	particularly	as	they	cater	well	
to	desired	storylines	and	increasingly	draw	a	greater	share	of	attention	from	PSF	
actors	and	project	developers.	In	some	cases	the	REDD+	commodity	could	become	
so	concealed	by	more	attractive	non-forest	carbon	outcomes	and	detached	from	any	
VER	value	or	market	price	that	individual	PSF	actors	could	determine	the	REDD+	
commodity	price	and	the	meanings	it	carried	through	exchange:		
	
I	take	a	look	at	the	prices	that	they	are	today,	knowing	that	they	are	so	artificially	
low,	and	do	an	analysis	of	project	value	out	to	2017-2020	…	It	sounds	haphazard,	but	
it’s	so	difficult	to	make	that	calculation.	We’re	talking	more	and	more	about	the	
different	risks,	prices	and	future	that	we	see	(Investor	26).		
	
This	PSF	actors’	difficulty	in	evaluating	the	price	of	the	REDD+	commodity	and	its	
attached	meanings	reflects	two	interesting	points.	First,	that	PSF	actors	are	
uncertain	how	important	REDD+	commodities	and	their	stories	are;	and	second,	that	
REDD+	project	developers	have	little	say	in	this	evaluation	exercise,	further	
illustrating	the	influence	PSF	actors	can	have	within	REDD+	projects.	This	gives	rise	to	
the	scenario	wherein	PSF	actors	are	purchasing	the	REDD+	commodity	and	its	VERs	
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for	the	purpose	of	attaining	a	mixture	of	non-VER	REDD+	Outcomes,	non-forest	
carbon	outcomes	and	attached	stories.	This	apparent	contradiction	in	the	behaviour	
and	demands	of	PSF	actors	meant	that	some	REDD+	project	developers	struggled	to	
implement	projects	that	could	cater	to	this:		
	
The	technical	specification	and	all	the	calculations	that	the	INGO	has	done	and	all	
the	money	payments	are	based	on	this	idea	of	carbon	in	the	end.	But	the	actual	
payment	isn’t	necessarily	coming	from	a	carbon	buyer.	So	that’s	where	I	think	
they’re	struggling	with	it	(Standard	Consultant	1	The	Valley).	
	
The	bounds	of	what	the	REDD+	commodity	entailed	also	bothered	some	informants	
who	were	uneasy	with	the	idea	of	selling	the	attribute	of	community	participation	in	
a	REDD+	project:	“It’s	the	connotation	of	commodifying	human	lives	that	I	find	
difficult”	(Standard	Consultant	1	The	Valley).	With	every	additional	layer	of	
sustainable	development	stories	and	meanings	on	top	the	REDD+	commodity,	the	
desirability	and	relevance	of	the	project	for	PSF	actors	becomes	increasingly	opaque.	
These	multiple	layers	of	meaning	and	interpretation	around	REDD+	projects	led	to	a	
variety	of	interpretations	among	PSF	actors.	This	complexity	and	diversity	led	some	
informants	to	feel	that	the	REDD+	commodity	needed	marketing	services	to	
untangle	it	for	PSF	actors	and	communicate	and	facilitate	the	exchange	of	projects	of	
REDD+:		
	
What	we	need	is	a	CSR	marketing	shop,	where	developers	sign	up	with	a	CSR	
marketing	agency	that	draws	demand	and	provides	investors	with	CSR	material;	a	
strategy	and	design	including	photos,	videos,	facilitated	visits	and	raw	material	for	
in-house	marketers.	The	project	developer	would	be	the	farmer	of	the	REDD+	CSR	
projects,	not	the	marketer	of	REDD+	CSR	(Contractor	20).		
	
The	above	quote	signals	a	need	for	additional	services	and	actors	in	REDD+	to	help	
PSF	actors	untangle	the	diverse	and	complex	sustainable	development	stories	from	
the	core	REDD+	commodity.	While	REDD+	projects	continue	to	negotiate	themselves	
between	their	core	VER	exchange,	REDD+	Outcomes	and	additional	sustainable	
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development	storylines,	some	project	developers	have	let	their	VER	exchange	
component	and	the	REDD+	label	fall	aside.	The	following	section	will	briefly	
demonstrate	this	latest	episode	in	the	variegated	evolution	of	the	REDD+	
commodity.	
7.4	Abandoning	REDD+	for	sustainable	commodity	revenue		
Along	the	conceptual	boundaries	of	the	REDD+	commodity	there	are	examples	of	
REDD+	projects	that	are	pursuing	sustainable	commodity	production	and	sales	not	
only	as	contributions	to	the	project	storyline,	but	also	for	financial	return.	This	
financial	return	in	addition	to	VER	sales	was	recognised	by	informants	as	being	
necessary	for	the	project	to	maintain	an	acceptable	risk	profile	in	the	eyes	of	PSF	
actors	and	thereby	attract	their	investment.	This	often	pertained	to	the	ability	of	
existing	commercial	activities	within	REDD+	projects	to	be	expanded	and	developed	
to	increase	their	financial	profits:	
	
Our	investment	thesis	does	not	only	rely	on	the	carbon	markets;	we	also	look	at	how	
to	monetise	other	environmental	assets,	whether	there	are	agricultural	or	other	
sustainable	land	uses.	A	key	innovation	is	how	we	can	begin	to	bundle	and	layer	
different	environmental	assets	together.	That	is	much	more	appealing	to	off-take	
partners	and	it	makes	special	investment	sense	(Investor	4).	
	
Further	complicating	the	position	of	the	REDD+	commodity	is	its	entanglement	with	
broader	policies	and	measures	for	sustainable	commodity	production	and	land-use	
management.	Some	informants	articulated	REDD+	as	becoming	a	component	within	
palm	oil,	mining,	timber	and	pulp	and	paper	operations,	all	major	economic	
operators	and	contributors	to	the	problems	that	REDD+	is	attempting	to	mitigate:		
	
No	one	will	pay	you	for	the	carbon,	the	water	services,	or	the	biodiversity.	That	is	the	
transition	that	REDD+	is	trying	to	make	and	it’s	proving	tough.	But	in	commodities,	
there	are	huge	markets	and	vast	turnover	of	commodities.	That’s	the	real	economy	
so	that’s	easy	for	investors	to	look	at.	Can	we	twin	these	two	things	together	
(Contractor	12).	
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It’s	a	pincer	movement.	REDD+	stampedes	the	horses.	It’s	too	new,	too	different,	too	
out	there.	But	to	sneak	it	in	you	use	things	that	already	exist.	People	in	Indonesia	
invest	in	agriculture	products.	The	plantation	systems	exist.	It’s	nothing	new	
(Investor	and	Developer	10).	
	
REDD+	brings	this	very	strong	methodological	framework	to	sustainable	
commodities.	REDD+	has	evolved	as	a	tool	to	measure,	monitor,	and	address	
leakage25	and	permanence	issues.	You	don’t	have	this	if	just	focusing	on	certified	
commodities	(Investor	3).	
	
Such	manifestations	of	REDD+	arguably	bear	little	or	no	resemblance	to	the	REDD+	
exchange	commodity	as	originally	envisaged.	However,	it	remains	unclear	whether	
such	manifestations	will	necessarily	retain	the	REDD+	exchange	commodity	and	its	
methodologies.	For	example,	the	‘impact	investment’	approach	introduced	in	
Chapter	5	entails	PSF	investing	in	the	development	of	businesses	in	forest	
communities	to	improve	their	livelihoods	and	reduce	dependence	on	extractive	or	
damaging	activities	in	the	forest.	These	investments	are	offered	to	the	community	as	
loans	or	equity	in	sustainable	community	businesses,	and	promise	to	deliver	a	
financial	profit	to	the	invested	PSF	actors:	
	
One	way	that	we’ve	been	packaging	this	–	and	that’s	what	a	lot	of	this	is	about,	is	
packaging	–	is	around	an	impact	investment	approach	…	about	how	different	
conservation	activities	can	have	associated	revenue	generation,	and	identifying	how	
those	can	be	financed,	and	where	there	are	opportunities	for	private	finance	in	
REDD+	(INGO	Informant	1	The	Swamp).	
	
The	types	of	impacts	these	projects	seek	are	very	similar	to	those	sought	by	REDD+	
projects,	and	still	they	carry	the	title	of	REDD+.	However,	their	financing	mechanism	
does	not	resemble	the	REDD+	exchange	commodity	or	VERs,	but	rather	the	
exchange	of	commodities	that	facilitate	the	conservation	of	the	forest,	typically	
																																																						
25	Leakage	refers	to	the	fact	that	while	deforestation	might	be	avoided	in	one	place,	the	
forest	destroyers	might	move	to	another	area	of	forest	or	to	a	different	country.	
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agricultural	activities	that	include	protected	forest	areas.	Similarly,	these	impact	
investment	type	projects	and	other	project	developers	may	embody	some	elements	
of	the	methodologies	to	achieve	REDD+	Outcomes	(from	the	VCS,	CCB	and	Plan	Vivo	
standards)	but	specifically	exclude	the	REDD+	label	and	VER	component:	
	
What	you	have	is	a	lot	of	REDD+	activities	that	are	not	called	REDD+.	So	it	may	have	
carbon	benefits,	but	they’re	not	calling	it	that	because	they	don’t	want	to	be	
associated	with	its	legacy	(Contractor	19).	
	
Quite	a	lot	of	the	projects	are	dropping	REDD+	out	of	their	name.	They	were	
conservation	projects	so	put	REDD+	in	their	name	to	access	the	funding.	But	it’s	
turning	out	to	be	the	opposite.	It	actually	costs	a	lot	more	than	what	you’re	getting	
back	(Contractor	2).	
	
Furthermore,	informants	described	how	they	had	actively	abandoned	more	than	the	
REDD+	label	and	VER	components	of	the	REDD+	exchange	commodity;	they	also	
dropped	the	standards	and	methodologies	related	to	the	remaining	REDD+	
Outcomes.	These	informants	felt	that	the	project	and	the	communities	involved	are	
better	off	without	the	association	with	REDD+:	
	
We’ve	already	designed	the	investment	model	to	accelerate	this,	with	good	rates	of	
return.	In	all	this	we’ve	ignored	the	standards	-	CDM,	Plan	Vivo,	CCB	etcetera.	Forget	
it.	We	go	through	whole	meetings	with	investors	without	talking	about	carbon	
(Contractor	1).	
	
Another	informant	shared	their	understanding	and	disappointment	at	this	trend,	and	
pointed	out	that	communities	will	always	be	at	risk	in	conservation	and	
development	projects:	“It	has	become	so	technical	and	specific	to	carbon	that	it	has	
ignored	the	fundamental	need	that	community	wellbeing	can	come	from	their	
resources”	(Standard	Consultant	1	The	Valley).	Accompanying	this	move	away	from	
REDD+	labels,	standards,	VER	exchanges	and	associated	storylines,	informants	
expressed	how	shifting	towards	broader	interventions	for	sustainable	development	
would	attract	a	greater	interest	from	PSF	actors.	These	types	of	projects	are	financed	
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via	bonds,	which	assure	PSF	actors	certain	financial	returns,	while	delivering	
‘sustainable	development’	outcomes.	Informants	felt	that	these	bonds	would	enable	
the	large-scale	mobilisation	of	finance	that	the	REDD+	exchange	commodity	had	
originally	promised	for	economy-wide	changes	by	taking	advantage	of	eager	and	
awaiting	PSF	actors:	
	
We	guarantee	to	get	the	investor	the	money	if	they	invest	in	an	impact	bond.	We	
guarantee	there	will	be	an	impact	to	benefit	the	community	environment	carbon	
additionally	and	financial	returns	(INGO	Informant	5	The	Swamp).	
	
Bonds	are	attractive	for	many	reasons;	they	are	a	familiar	product	to	the	investment	
community	and	they	represent	the	single	largest	pool	of	capital	in	the	world	…	Green	
Bonds	capitalise	on	a	growing	appetite	for	‘purpose-driven’	finance	and	can	help	
reduce	the	risk	and	complexity	of	greener	investing.	They	make	product	selection	
simple	and	standardised	for	investors	and	they	outsource	the	social	and	
environmental	due	diligence	to	credible	third	parties	…	Uncovering	the	large-scale	
investor	appetite	–	that	cheap	private	sector	capital	is	eager	and	available	(Investor	
19).	
	
These	types	of	large-scale	mobilisations	of	finance	for	sustainable	development	
described	above	echo	the	original	ambitions	and	narratives	of	REDD+.	The	migration	
of	the	REDD+	commodity	away	from	REDD+	standards,	VER	exchange	and	
sustainable	development	stories,	and	towards	bonds	and	sustainable	agricultural	
commodities	demonstrates	the	adaptability	and	fluidity	of	the	REDD+	idea	to	shift	in	
response	to	PSF	actor’s	perceptions	and	demands	and	take	forms	outside	its	original	
commodity	definition	of	delivering	REDD+	Outcomes	through	VER	exchange.		
7.5	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	and	epistemic	circulation		
At	the	time	of	writing,	the	resting	place	of	the	REDD+	commodity	seemed	be	
bundled	into,	and	at	times	hidden	within,	a	diverse	collection	of	sustainable	
development	stories	and	meanings.	These	meanings	swirl	about	the	REDD+	
exchange	commodity	and	REDD+	Outcomes,	concealing	and	exposing	the	
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commodity	and	Outcomes	in	response	to	PSF	actor	perspectives	and	their	preferred	
attributes	and	components.	Subsequently,	from	the	perspective	of	PSF	actors	on	
GVCs,	REDD+	projects	reflected	their	desires.	Project	developers	and	supporting	
actors	arrange	REDD+	projects	to	generate	meanings	that	suit	the	desires	of	target	
PSF	actors,	orientating	and	casting	them	across	the	GVC	like	filters	on	a	spotlight.	
Project	developers	maintained	their	agency	to	adjust	the	emphasis	of	particular	
project	components	and	their	attributes	to	best	respond	to	these	evolving	desires	of	
PSF	actors.		
	
The	way	that	the	REDD+	commodity	demanded	governance	structures	to	guarantee	
forest	conservation	permanence	and	additionality	prevented	PSF	actors	from	
investing	in	the	VER	components	of	REDD+	projects	(for	instance,	see	the	discussion	
of	The	Swamp	case	study	in	section	6.3.1).	PSF	actors	appeared	to	temporarily	
subvert	this	uncooperative	reality	by	drawing	attention	to	the	stories	that	REDD+	
projects	offered	and	the	associated	CSR	and	branding	benefits	that	they	afforded	
PSF	businesses	(for	instance,	The	Valley	case	study	in	section	6.3.2).	This	ability	of	
PSF	actors	to	adapt	their	strategies	to	suit	the	material	realities	of	the	REDD+	
commodity	reflects	the	changing	and	variable	PSF	actor	strategies	illustrated	in	
Chapter	5.		
	
In	this	sense	the	REDD+	commodity	and	the	sustainable	development	components	
and	attributes	that	cluster	around	it	constitute	an	adaptable	and	evolving	
arrangement	of	meanings.	It	is	these	meanings	that	move	about	the	GVC	alongside	
finance	and	within	the	packages	of	information	that	actors	share	and	deliver.	These	
meanings	influence	the	knowledges	of	actors,	and	their	social	relations.	INGO	
Informant	1	from	The	Valley	observed	that	“price	is	not	everything;	it’s	the	creation	
of	the	story.	So	the	social	relation	is	like	that	between	an	author	and	a	book	buyer”.	
Project	developers	create	a	story	laden	with	meanings	that	take	PSF	actors	on	the	
journey	they	requested.	The	meanings	of	the	story	reflect	back	upon	PSF	actors	as	
they	‘read’	the	story,	moulding	their	knowledges	of	what	REDD+	and	sustainable	
development	is	and	can	be.	Investor	26	described	their	experience	with	the	
meanings	of	the	REDD+	commodity	thus:		
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To	make	the	qualitative	element	more	quantitative,	I	embed	all	that	qualitative	
value	into	the	carbon	price.	So	how	important	our	brand	is	and	mitigating	that	risk	is	
built	into	that	carbon	price.	So	when	business	groups	start	to	embed	that	into	cost	
planning,	they’re	starting	to	think	that	way,	a	way	to	think	quantitatively	about	
those	qualitative	values	(Investor	26).	
	
When	in	play	with	sustainable	development	meanings	and	stories,	the	REDD+	
commodity	no	longer	appears	as	a	commodity	in	a	traditional	sense.	INGO	Informant	
1	from	The	Valley	explains:	“I	think	if	you	do	the	full	commercial	REDD+	thing	then	it	
is	commodification.	But	not	the	community-to-community	exchange	like	this”.	By	
linking	communities	within	Indonesia’s	forests	to	international	communities	of	PSF	
actors,	the	REDD+	commodity	is	propped	up	by	meanings	that	change	and	adapt,	
and	that	appear	to	constitute	a	commodity	of	knowledge:	
	
REDD+	will	always	mean	different	things	to	different	people	(INGO	Informant	2	The	
Swamp).	
	
REDD+	is	a	hard	sell.	There’s	not	just	one	message.	It	has	to	resonate	with	the	
particular	company.	How	does	it	fit	in	the	company?	Is	it	about	deforestation,	
sustainable	commodities,	or	broader	strategy?	(Extractive	Industry	1).	
	
Communities	go	through	a	whole	other	process	and	if	in	two	or	three	years	there’s	a	
biodiversity	market	that	is	quantified	differently	…	then	the	community	have	to	go	
through	that	whole	process	again	(Standard	Consultant	1	The	Valley).	
	
This	understanding	of	REDD+	as	a	shifting,	story-based	commodity	speaks	closely	to	
the	knowledge-	and	finance-based	economy	that	Graham	(2006)	describes	and	the	
epistemic	circulation	of	Büscher	(2014).	Specifically,	REDD+	projects	demonstrate	
economies	of	meaning,	extrapolation,	evaluation	and	mediation	where	certain	types	
of	meaning	are	privileged	and	protected	and	can	be	owned,	exchanged	and	
consumed	(Graham,	2006).	In	this	way,	the	REDD+	commodity	comes	to	embody	the	
character	of	relationships	along	the	GVC,	particularly	those	shared	by	PSF	actors.	
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Lansing	(2011,	p.	217)	recognises	the	importance	of	these	relationships	and	their	
meanings	in	REDD+	offsets:	
	
[T]he	offset	commodity	becomes	an	abstraction	that	is	simultaneously	imbued	with	
a	specific	materiality	-	a	materiality	that	is	not	limited	to	the	biomass	of	the	forest,	
but	extends	to	the	circulation	of	reports,	maps,	photographs	and	computer	servers	
that	hold	such	information.	In	other	words,	for	a	carbon	offset	to	come	into	being,	
both	of	these	[abstract	and	material]	forms	are	necessary.		
	
PSF	actors	recognised	that	the	above	forms	of	materiality	that	assure	the	additional	
ecological	and	social	benefits	of	projects,	and	the	knowledges	and	meanings	that	
became	the	sources	of	value	in	projects,	can	become	fuzzy	as	well:	“you	can	always	
find	additionality	with	REDD+	if	you	fish	around	for	it.	The	additionality	can	get	a	bit	
funky	after	a	while”	(Standard	Consultant	1	The	Valley).	The	Standard	Consultant	is	
referring	to	the	way	that	knowledges	and	meanings	can	be	created	and	re-created	
within	projects	to	suit	the	privileged	knowledges	and	meanings	of	PSF	actors	
involved,	despite	being	subject	to	REDD+	standards	(Graham,	2006).		
	
This	opportunistic	ability	of	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	to	become	figments	of	
the	knowledges	that	PSF	actors	draw	on	enabled	REDD+	projects	and	their	activities	
to	unfold	as	NGOs	and	local	partners	desired.	Informants	felt	that	the	activities	in	
communities	that	constitute	REDD+	projects	are	not	necessarily	any	different	to	
those	that	came	before:	“None	of	the	activities	we’re	thinking	about	doing	for	a	
REDD+	project	was	any	different	than	if	we’d	just	decided	to	do	a	normal	
conservation	project”	(INGO	Informant	1	The	Swamp).	Subsequently,	the	activities	
that	underpin	a	REDD+	project	might	be	easily	‘washed-over’	by	the	REDD+	
knowledge	commodity	and	adapted	to	suit	the	desires	of	changing	sources	of	
finance	that	evaluate	the	conservation	activities	and	REDD+	project	differently,	as	
illustrated	in	Figure	7.2	below.		
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Coincidently,	the	same	INGO	on	a	separate	occasion	described	how	the	‘landscape’26	
knowledge	commodities	that	many	PSF	actors	now	prefer	over	‘traditional’	REDD+	
commodities	are	also	“[n]ot	that	much	different	than	what	you’d	be	expecting	to	
come	out	of	the	activities	of	the	REDD+	project.	It’s	just	financing	it	differently”	(INGO	
Informant	1	The	Swamp).	Such	‘landscape’	knowledge	commodities	carry	a	slightly	
different	set	of	meanings,	brandings,	languages,	and	knowledges	that	more	closely	
align	to	broad	definitions	of	sustainable	development	than	REDD+	knowledge	
commodities.	However,	and	ironically,	they	typically	involve	the	same	activities,	
standards	and	legitimation	measures	and	objective	evaluations	within	their	projects	
as	REDD+	knowledge	commodities.	The	ability	of	REDD+	stories	to	adapt	and	“bundle	
the	values	within	the	forest	landscapes”	(Contractor	15)	enabled	them	to	be	easily	
subsumed	into	sustainable	development	paradigms.	
	
	
Figure	7.2:	The	REDD+	knowledge	commodity.	
	
																																																						
26	Recall	the	‘Landscape	Fund’	from	Chapter	7	that	was	established	to	loan	finance	to	
sustainable	commercial	activities	in	rural	communities	to	protect	nearby	threatened	forests.	
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Subsequently,	the	disconnect	between	PSF	actors	and	the	forest	and	community	
components	of	REDD+	GVCs	is	exposed	(see	Figure	7.2).	Each	exploits	the	
knowledges	of	the	other	to	pander	to	their	evaluation	tendencies	as	they	pursue	
their	desires;	be	it	associations	with	REDD+	knowledges	and	meanings,	or	persistent	
funding	for	conservation	and	community	wellbeing:	“It	brought	all	these	different	
people	together	who	all	thought	that	there	was	something	in	it	for	each	of	them”	
(Contractor	2).	The	privileging	of	certain	meanings	and	knowledges	within	the	
production	of	a	project’s	REDD+	knowledge	commodity	reflects	the	motivations	and	
desires	of	PSF	actors,	whose	variety	complicate	REDD+’s	foundational	principles	of	
fungible	market	exchange	(Lee,	2011b;	The	Munden	Project,	2011).		
	
In	this	sense	the	agility	of	the	REDD+	knowledge	commodity	is	such	that	it	can	
rapidly	adapt	to	portray	knowledges	that	align	and	reflect	those	of	the	particular	PSF	
audience	that	it	seeks	to	capture.	This	adaptive	characteristic	of	the	REDD+	
knowledge	commodity	helps	explain	its	persistent	success	whilst	simultaneously	
maintaining	such	diverse	expressions,	as	illustrated	in	Figure	7.2	above.	
7.6	PSF	knowledges	and	evaluation		
This	section	explores	how	PSF	actors	evaluate	REDD+	projects,	and	illustrates	how	
the	REDD+	knowledge	commodity	influences	that	evaluation.	This	contributes	
insights	into	the	role	and	function	of	value	within	REDD+	GVCs,	and	specifically	helps	
to	understand	why	PSF	actors	support	REDD+	projects	(research	question	2).	The	
GVC	members	that	create	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	include	distant	and	
diverse	actors,	each	looking	to	other	actors	for	knowledge	of	how	to	evaluate	
REDD+.	Lansing	(2011)	recognised	that	forest	offsets	experience	a	perpetual	and	
reflexive	process	of	becoming,	whereby	calculative	practices	to	collect	and	embody	
attributes	and	components	of	a	project’s	forest	attributes	emerge	reflexively	with	
knowledges	that	frame	the	project:		
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[T]he	calculative	agency	of	many	of	the	offset's	actors	was	a	reflexive	one,	where	
the	situated	nature	of	their	knowledge	was	itself	brought	to	the	forefront	in	ways	
that	shaped	the	kinds	of	practices	that	were	acceptable	(Lansing,	2011,	p.	217).	
	
The	development	of	REDD+	projects	involves	reflexive	processes	of	discovery	as	the	
knowledge	commodity	is	teased	out	and	customised	to	the	stories	desired	by	the	
involved	actors.	This	abstracted	knowledge	commodity	and	the	specific	VER	and	
REDD+	standards	are	necessary	for	each	and	emerge	through	unique	articulations	by	
GVC	members	(Lansing,	2011).	As	such,	“neither	markets	for	carbon,	nor	the	
materiality	of	nature	that	such	markets	seek	to	commodify,	can	be	said	to	
meaningfully	pre-exist	their	mutual	entanglements”	(Lansing,	2011,	p.	218).	The	idea	
of	‘mutual	entanglements’	between	the	PSF	side	and	the	forest	and	community	side	
of	REDD+	knowledge	commodity	resonates	closely	with	the	observed	responsiveness	
of	the	REDD+	commodity	to	the	demands	of	PSF	actors,	illustrated	above	in	Figure	
7.2.	Lansing	(2011,	p.	218)	describes	this	dynamic	as	follows:		
	
Understanding	carbon's	commodification	as	an	ongoing	performance	shows	that	
both	the	forest,	and	the	circuits	of	exchange	through	which	it	circulates	as	a	
commodity,	are	co-emergent	as	temporarily	stabilized,	mutually	imbricated,	
moments	of	being.	
	
Conceptualising	REDD+	projects	as	re-creating	themselves	through	circulations	of	
meanings	and	knowledges	between	actors	and	the	project	provides	a	helpful	
platform	from	which	to	explore	how	PSF	actor	knowledges	and	desires	also	reflexed	
and	changed	in	response	to	their	experiences	with	the	REDD+	knowledge	
commodity.	Informants	illustrated	how	meanings	bound	up	in	the	REDD+	knowledge	
commodity	influenced	the	relations	between	PSF	actors	and	the	REDD+	project:	
	
It’s	a	private-to-private	exchange.	You	can’t	generate	the	credit	and	go	looking	for	
the	buyer;	you’ve	got	to	generate	the	buyer.	The	people	that	are	going	to	buy	
credits,	they	don’t	know	it	yet.	What	you’re	selling	is	financial	securities;	if	you	
package	it	up	in	a	way	that	is	more	familiar	to	them	then	it	is	more	attractive	
(Investor	and	Developer	1).	
	 165	
	
In	this	way	the	production	of	the	REDD+	commodity	was	not	limited	to	
implementing	changes	within	forests	and	neighbouring	communities	and	capturing	
these	in	REDD+	standards,	but	also	included	processes	of	change	in	PSF	actors	
themselves	to	‘generate	the	buyer’.	These	changes	brought	about	a	shared	
understanding	between	actors	along	GVCs	to	facilitate	the	epistemic	circulation	of	
REDD+	knowledge	commodities,	making	the	story	very	influential	in	shaping	PSF	
actor	logics	and	knowledges:	“Stories	are	powerful.	If	I’ve	learned	one	thing	it’s	the	
power	of	a	story,	and	REDD+	can	deliver	that”	(Investor	6).			
7.6.1	Social	construction	of	value	
To	effectively	influence	PSF	actor	knowledges,	informants	pushed	for	the	REDD+	
knowledge	commodity	to	be	bundled	and	exposed	in	strategic	messages	about	
valuing	sustainable	development	to	influence	targeted	PSF	actors,	their	GVCs	and	
broader	social	relations:		
	
We	need	to	think	about	motivational	messages	to	those	we’re	trying	to	change,	if	we	
want	transformational	change	…	We’re	trying	to	get	major	corporations	to	change,	
to	value,	but	they	don’t.	Trying	to	get	governments	to	value,	but	they	don’t.	Trying	to	
get	consumers	to	value,	but	they	don’t	buy	the	product.	Unless	there’s	a	message,	
but	we	don’t	have	it	yet	(Contractor	6).	
	
The	informant’s	tone	captures	the	frustrated	efforts	of	certain	REDD+	actors	to	
influence	PSF	and	other	GVC	actors	to	evaluate	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	as	
valuable	and	desirable.	Their	emphasis	on	motivational	messaging	towards	these	
types	of	actors	points	to	the	importance	of	influencing	their	knowledges	and	the	
cultural	norms	that	underpin	their	evaluations	of	REDD+	knowledge	commodities.	
Other	informants	were	more	optimistic,	describing	how	these	knowledges	are	
recreated	within	groups	of	GVC	actors	to	amplify	their	influence	across	social	
networks	and	influence	PSF	actor’s	evaluations:	
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We	need	a	critical	mass.	A	tipping	point	of	companies	to	make	this	market	shift.	We	
need	a	clear	message	back	to	corporates	about	why	this	is	important	and	important	
to	them	(Extractive	Industry	1).	
	
How	do	you	start	developing	a	whole	set	of	accounting	standards	around	nature?	
We	really	need	businesses	to	just	start	doing	this	and	then	have	normalities	develop	
and	start	to	regularise	this	(Contractor	8).	
	
We	need	to	make	sure	that	the	brands	and	the	values	that	are	emotional	are	totally	
associated	with	the	environmental	message	that	we	want	to	put	through.	Then	the	
world	will	take	it	over	and	push	it	forward	(Extractive	Industry	9).	
	
The	above	recognition	of	‘critical	mass’,	‘tipping	points’	and	‘market	shifts’	to	
‘regularise’	and	‘develop	normalities’	so	that	the	‘world	will	take	it	over	and	push	it’	
reflect	how	evaluation	of	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	can	be	socially	constructed	
(Lee,	2011b).	Informants	recognised	how	it	was	crucial	to	reinforce	and	recreate	
those	knowledges	that	delivered	positive	evaluations	of	REDD+	commodities	
amongst	GVC	neighbours	and	their	social	networks	to	ensure	they	were	as	desirable	
as	possible:	
	
Things	like	REDD+	are	definitely	good	for	business.	It	allows	us	to	speak	to	the	idea	of	
climate	change	and	let	people	know	that	there’s	something	we	can	do	about	it.	It	
tells	a	nice	story	and	puts	a	story	behind	an	action.	The	more	we	learn,	the	more	
we’ll	incorporate	it	into	our	business	(Extractive	Industry	8).	
	
The	epistemic	circulation	of	the	REDD+	knowledge	commodity	in	this	way	amplifies	
the	spread	of	its	meaning	throughout	society,	shifting	evaluation	norms	and	
consumption	patterns.	By	incorporating	REDD+	knowledge	commodities,	GVCs	
showed	signs	that	their	stories	and	knowledges	are	modified	as	a	consequence,	
contributing	to	a	revaluation	of	their	products	and	business	models:	“Ultimately	
you’ve	got	to	look	for	the	future	and	start	preserving	your	system.	That’s	the	
fundamental	value”	(Extractive	Industry	3).	These	fundamental	rearrangements	of	
how	PSF	actors	are	operating	and	who	they	are	partnering	with	illustrates	how	their	
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norms	of	doing	business	and	coordinating	their	GVCs	are	beginning	to	shift	towards	
sustainability	by	involving	REDD+	knowledge	commodities.	These	shifts	represent	
revaluations	that	have	changed	the	desires	and	motivations	amongst	PSF	actors	
(Lee,	2011b).	The	following	demonstrates	how	PSF	actors	were	looking	to	use	REDD+	
knowledge	commodities	to	influence	the	knowledges	of	their	GVC	neighbours	and	
business	partners	so	they	might	re-align	to	match	their	own	(newfound)	sustainable	
development	priorities:		
	
Forests	are	being	destroyed	for	their	economic	value.	Not	necessarily	to	the	highest	
value	user	…	That’s	the	only	idea	locals	have	to	generate	value	from	land.	That	
principle	also	holds	true	for	agricultural	business	giants	…	It	was	about	us	needing	to	
do	everything	we	can	to	add	value	to	this	community	based	on	their	ability	to	move	
down	a	green	development	pathway	and	see	whether	or	not	they	succeed.	So	REDD+	
is	really	about	transformative	rural	green	development	(Investor	and	Developer	12).	
	
The	transformative	measures	this	informant	speaks	of	are	not	only	the	activities	
carried	out	within	REDD+	projects	to	satisfy	standards	and	legitimacy	demands,	but	
extend	to	the	transformation	of	GVC	actors’	ideas	and	knowledges	about	how	they	
generate	value.	An	important	part	of	this	is	the	recognition	that	existing	and	
normalised	knowledges	within	local	forest	communities	and	agri-business	regarding	
how	to	generate	value	might	not	be	most	beneficial.	Subsequently,	influencing	these	
actors	with	knowledges	that	would	evaluate	REDD+	as	desirable	might	prove	
beneficial	whilst	guiding	them	towards	business	practices	that	align	with	sustainable	
development:	
	
REDD+	offers	a	learning	lab	on	measuring	and	managing	natural	capital	and	
ecosystem	services	...	REDD+	offers	a	way	for	companies	to	stay	ahead	of	the	
broader	curve	of	how	thinking	is	emerging	around	sustainability,	environmental	and	
social	issues	more	broadly	(Contractor	17).	
	
The	above	informant	recognises	that,	for	PSF	actors,	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	
offer	a	‘learning	lab’	where	knowledges	are	‘emerging’	amongst	PSF	actors	and	
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within	a	competitive	market	context.	This	recognition	illustrates	an	amenable	
change	in	knowledges,	evaluations,	motivations,	and	desires	of	PSF	actors	towards	
REDD+.	Some	PSF	actors	considered	this	as	a	pre-condition	for	long-term	business:	
“We	have	long	moved	to	the	position	that	we	cannot	only	create	value	for	
shareholders,	but	also	create	value	for	society	...	No	viable	long-term	business	can	
ignore	this”	(Extractive	Industry	2).		
	
However,	conversely,	the	quotes	above	also	demonstrate	how	the	knowledges	PSF	
actors	use	to	evaluate	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	are	couched	within	market	
environmentalism.	The	use	of	concepts	and	terms	such	as	‘ecosystem	services’,	
‘green	development’,	and	‘natural	capital’	illustrates	the	subsumption	of	REDD+	
knowledge	commodities	into	capitalist	market	logics	of	evaluation.	One	informant	
described	these	evaluations	as:	“a	materiality	screen	for	the	major	issues	that	your	
business	might	face	if	you	had	to	pay	for	natural	capital	as	it	becomes	scarce”	
(Contractor	10).	This	‘materiality	screening’	tests	the	natural	inputs	and	pollution	
outputs	of	PSF	businesses	so	they	might	understand	their	vulnerability	to	increases	
in	scarcity	of	such	inputs	and	costs	of	such	outputs.	By	doing	so	it	couches	REDD+	
knowledge	commodities	within	logics	familiar	to	PSF	actors	and	demonstrates	their	
accustomed	commercial	rationalisation	for	adopting	REDD+	knowledge	
commodities:		
	
There	are	lots	of	cost	saving	opportunities,	innovation	opportunities,	quality	
opportunities	and	marketing	opportunities.	So	there	are	many	other	values	to	be	
made.	Essentially	an	innovation	challenge	like	any	other,	just	framed	a	little	
differently	(Extractive	Industry	3).	
	
PSF	actors’	perception	of	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	as	opportunities	to	
innovate	and	generate	more	value	for	themselves	demonstrates	their	co-option	of	
market	environmentalism	concepts	and	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	to	their	
benefit.	This	is	reinforced	when	such	ideas	are	easily	shared	with	PSF	neighbours	on	
GVCs	and	their	wider	institutional	contexts,	exaggerating	the	influence	of	these	ideas	
across	the	GVC	itself.	The	adaptation	of	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	to	serve	
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profit-seeking	outcomes	demonstrates	the	subsumptive	ability	of	capitalist	logics	
within	PSF	actors	and	their	openness	to	accommodate	them.		
7.7	Conclusion	
REDD+	projects	and	the	REDD+	commodity	in	Indonesia	evolved	through	time.	Early	
conceptualisations	of	the	REDD+	commodity,	as	being	substantiated	by	VERs,	came	
to	be	seen	as	something	that	was	not	likely	to	be	widely	realised.	Expectations	of	
Indonesian	land-use	and	concession	governance	are	unreasonable	and	hadn’t	
accounted	for	the	complex	story-based	desires	of	PSF	actors.	Through	processes	of	
commodification	and	experimentation,	REDD+	projects	developed	into	something	
quite	different.	They	became	a	sum	and	representation	of	their	sustainable	
development	relations,	their	story,	and	their	meanings.	Almost	all	projects	are	now	
seeking	social	and	ecological	improvements	for	sustainable	economies	in	and	about	
their	forests.	PSF	actors	desired	attachment	to	these	meanings,	reframing	REDD+	as	
a	component	piece	of	a	sustainable	development	knowledge	commodity.		
	
By	isolating	these	commodification	processes,	the	core	nature	of	the	REDD+	
commodity	can	be	identified	as	a	process	of	exchange.	REDD+	as	a	commodity	came	
to	be	identified	as	a	constituent	of	Büscher’s	(2014)	epistemic	circulation	as	a	
demonstration	of	capitals	‘value	in	motion’	where	the	value	of	the	REDD+	
commodity	was	its	process	of	capital	exchange,	and	ability	to	carry	sustainable	
development	meanings	and	knowledges	in	return.	Later	manifestations	of	REDD+	
projects	began	to	drop	the	REDD+	exchange	commodity	as	their	frustrations	with	
the	complexity	of	REDD+	standards	was	hampering	the	motion	of	capital	between	
communities	and	PSF	actors.		
	
This	section	also	discussed	the	careful	management	of	REDD+	project	developers	in	
crafting	the	REDD+	knowledge	commodity	to	reflect	the	desires	and	underlying	
knowledges	of	target	PSF	actors.	It	showed	how	these	PSF	actor	knowledges	are	
reflexively	constructed	through	their	experiences	with	REDD+	knowledge	
commodities.	In	this	way,	PSF	actor	knowledges	maintain	a	governing	influence	over	
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REDD+	GVCs	and	knowledge	commodities,	whilst	simultaneously	adjusting	their	
knowledges	and	evaluations	in	response	to	their	evolving	experiences	with	REDD+.	
Understanding	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	as	processes	of	knowledge	formation	
and	evaluation	is	helpful	in	exploring	why	PSF	actors	support	REDD+	projects	
(research	question	2).	The	rapidly	emerging,	experimental,	and	dynamic	
arrangements	surrounding	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	presented	opportune	
ground	to	explore	value	and	evaluation	within	GVC	analysis,	enabling	a	deeper	
insight	into	PSF	actors	and	REDD+	projects	in	Indonesia.		
	
The	following	chapter,	Chapter	8,	analyses	the	implications	of	this	understanding	of	
REDD+	as	a	knowledge	commodity	and	its	epistemic	circulation	in	relation	to	
theories	of	financialisation.	This	will	deepen	the	understanding	of	value	and	PSF	
governance	within	REDD+	GVCs	and	market	environmentalism	more	generally.	
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8		Financialisation	across	REDD+	GVCs		
8.1	Introduction	
This	chapter	discusses	the	financialised	character	of	REDD+	GVCs	in	Indonesia.	
Financialisation	refers	to	the	increasing	role	of	financial	motives,	markets,	actors	and	
institutions	in	the	operation	of	economies	(Epstein,	2005).	Financialisation	is	the	
process	by	which	the	movement	and	exchange	of	finance	becomes	more	important	
to	PSF	than	the	underlying	real	economy	that	finance	represents	and	depends	upon.	
Here	the	‘exchange	value’	of	commodities	in	the	form	of	finance	becomes	more	
important	and	pronounced	than	their	‘use	value’	(i.e.	the	contribution	of	forests	to	a	
stable	climate),	risking	the	disconnection	of	finance	from	the	real	economy	and	
eroding	the	legitimacy	of	commodities	like	REDD+	(Knox-Hayes,	2013).		
	
REDD+	financialisation	is	critically	linked	with	extractive	industries	that	directly	and	
indirectly	impact	forests	in	their	GVCs.	These	industry	actors	are	experiencing	
pressure	to	engage	with	REDD+,	with	some	starting	to	support	REDD+	activities	and	
incorporate	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	into	their	operations.	Understanding	
the	governance	relationship	between	PSF	actors	and	the	financialised	economies	
they	comprise	is	an	important	part	of	understanding	ecosystem	service	commodities	
and	the	involvement	of	PSF	actors	in	conservation	(Fieldman,	2013;	Knox-Hayes	&	
Levy,	2011;	Lazonick	&	O’Sullivan,	2000;	Lohmann,	2011).	Likewise,	interpretations	
of	climate	risk	within	investment	and	business	decisions	have	governance	
implications	across	societies	and	economies,	as	PSF	actors	adjust	their	business	
models	and	such	changes	ripple	through	their	networks	(Harmes,	2011;	Pattberg,	
2012).	
	
Understanding	how	REDD+	projects	and	REDD+	GVCs	are	influenced	by	processes	of	
financialisation	contributes	to	addressing	the	second	and	third	research	questions,	
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asking,	why	do	PSF	actors	support	REDD+	projects?,	and	what	are	the	governance	
implications	of	PSF	actors	on	REDD+	projects?	In	analysing	financialisation,	I	describe	
the	ways	that	GVC	actors	pursue	financial	profits	and	the	governing	implications	of	
that	pursuit.	The	following	section	discusses	the	evidence	of	financial	imperatives	
within	the	circulation	of	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	between	PSF	actors.	
8.2	Financialisation	within	REDD+	GVCs	
The	number	of	REDD+	VERs	retired	as	a	proportion	of	those	transacted	remains	low,	
as	does	the	proportion	then	transacted	on	the	secondary	market	among	offset	
retailers,	traders	and	buyers	(Peters-Stanley	&	Yin,	2013).	It	appears	that	VERs	are	
being	held	by	the	initial	buyers,	rather	than	exchanged	onward	to	other	actors,	or	
retired.	However,	the	epistemic	circulation	of	the	REDD+	knowledge	commodity	can	
be	seen	as	extending	beyond	the	purchaser	of	the	VER,	insofar	as	the	purpose	of	
most	REDD+	interventions	is	to	create	an	association	of	meanings.	As	such	the	
REDD+	knowledge	commodity	is	likely	to	continue	to	be	consumed	by	actors	that	
engage	or	associate	with	the	initial	VER	buyers	and	beyond,	to	customers	and	the	
public.	In	this	sense,	the	REDD+	project	continues	to	deliver	value	along	an	extended	
GVC	network.		
	
In	this	chapter	the	REDD+	knowledge	commodity	is	best	understood	as	a	branding	
ingredient	within	an	organisation’s	marketing	mix;	an	association	or	characteristic	to	
be	‘attached’	to	select	products	and	financial	instruments	targeted	at	particular	
markets	(Ponte	&	Gibbon,	2005).	Such	products	that	represent	carbon	are	complex	
and	increasingly	disconnected	from	the	nature	of	the	emission	reductions	achieved	
(Descheneau,	2012).	This	is	not	to	detract	from	the	tangible	change	that	may	have	
been	enacted	‘upstream’,	but	it	points	to	the	different	perspectives	of	actors	along	a	
GVC,	where	different	objectives	are	prioritised.	Like	a	series	of	whispers,	the	REDD+	
knowledge	commodity	at	a	certain	point	during	its	epistemic	circulation	on	the	GVC	
is	only	a	semblance	of	its	upstream	original	self	and	the	downstream	ideas	it	will	
morph	into.	This	is	characteristic	of	knowledge	commodities	as	they	reform	and	are	
re-created	(Büscher,	2014;	Graham,	2006).		
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Furthermore,	the	fluidity	and	ease	with	which	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	
circulate	among	PSF	actors	is	similar	to	that	of	finance.	PSF	actors	are	positioned	as	
both	symptoms	of	financialisation,	and	its	agents,	facilitating	and	encouraging	
financial	rationales	across	REDD+.	This	governance	relationship	between	PSF	and	
their	related	actors	is	an	important	part	of	understanding	REDD+	knowledge	
commodities	and	the	involvement	of	PSF	in	market	environmentalism	more	
generally	(Fieldman,	2013;	Harmes,	2011;	Knox-Hayes	&	Levy,	2011;	Lazonick	&	
O’Sullivan,	2000;	Lohmann,	2011;	Pattberg,	2012).	Financialisation	within	
neoliberalism	is	such	that	the	demands	and	whims	of	shareholders	and	customers	
tend	to	directly	and	immediately	impact	decisions	and	the	allocation	of	finance	in	
the	global	economy;	thus	demonstrating	their	influence	and	governing	power	(Knox-
Hayes,	2013).	
	
This	is	particularly	pertinent	in	the	ability	of	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	to	
attach	to	global	movements	of	finance	within	land-based	industries	across	forest	
landscapes.	Thus,	the	REDD+	knowledge	commodity	can	become	absorbed	into	
wider	GVCs	and	commercial	networks	of	PSF	actors	–	particularly	extractive	
industries	that	use	Indonesian	palm	oil	in	their	consumer	products.	Actors	within	
REDD+	recognise	the	opportunity	that	financialisation	offers,	and	are	attempting	to	
take	advantage	of	its	ability	to	subsume	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	into	its	
exchange.	Informants	reflect	below	on	how	they	encouraged	PSF	involvement	in	
REDD+	because	they	could	then	exploit	the	tendency	of	PSF	actors	to	search	for	
profits:		
	
The	organisation	of	people	along	production,	supply,	value,	whatever	chain	you	want	
to	talk	about;	that’s	what	needs	to	happen.	That’s	what	companies	are	actually	quite	
good	at.	But	then	it’s	the	bottom	line	they’re	interested	in	(Contractor	3).		
	
Our	purpose	is	to	facilitate	a	flow	of	capital	to	viable,	profitable	social	enterprises	in	
the	REDD+	space,	with	the	intention	of	making	a	social	impact	so	we	can	help	
capture	that	value	and	pass	that	on	to	our	offset	partners	(Investor	4).	
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This	is	actually	starting	to	become	very	core	and	material	to	business.	This	is	now	
something	that	is	discussed	in	banks	and	increasingly	by	public	sector	players	around	
the	world.	The	opportunity	now	is	to	get	ahead	and	stay	ahead	of	the	curve	
(Contractor	17).	
	
The	above	tendencies	of	PSF	actors	to	‘stay	ahead	of	the	curve’	and	‘capture	value’	
for	‘the	bottom	line’	and	their	influential	reach	across	supply	chains	positioned	them	
to	be	active	implementation	agents	within	the	wider	financial	context	of	REDD+	
GVCs.	This	was	evident	as	informants	recognised	the	diversity	of	financial	influences	
across	REDD+	GVCs;	between	investors,	banks,	companies,	customers,	shareholders,	
the	public,	and	NGOs.	As	one	informant	put	it:	
	
REDD+	offers	a	way	for	companies	to	show	investors	and	other	stakeholders	that	the	
company	understands	its	impacts	on	natural	capital	and	…	is	trying	to	explore	
whether	investments	in	environmental	assets	could	be	a	pathway	for	moving	losses	
off	balance	sheets	(Contractor	17).	
	
In	this	way,	companies	are	using	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	to	show	PSF	actors	
around	them	that	they	are	shifting	to	sustainable	business	models	and	reducing	or	
removing	the	costs	of	unsustainable	production	from	their	operations.	They	are	
pursuing	this	because	of	their	need	to	attract	investment	in	their	business.	The	
quote	below	illustrates	how	the	pressure	to	accumulate	profits	can	expose	the	
decisions	of	PSF	actors	as	vulnerable	to	the	shifting	whim	of	where	profits	come	
from:		
	
If	it’s	a	retail	bank	that	is	public	facing	then	you	have	a	stick	you	can	use.	Very	
important	that	there	are	companies	that	are	leads,	and	to	deal	with	companies	that	
are	laggards.	Shareholder	activism	is	very	important	(Contractor	18).	
	
The	ability	of	PSF	actors	to	be	influenced	to	engage	in	REDD+	by	public	opinion,	retail	
customer	preference	and	shareholder	activism	demonstrates	financial	pressure.	The	
ability	for	a	bank’s	financial	manipulation	to	motivate	PSF	actors	to	use	their	‘lead’	
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sustainability	companies	to	influence	their	‘laggard’	companies	to	adopt	REDD+	
knowledge	commodities	into	their	supply	chains	is	a	powerful	illustration	of	the	
governing	influence	of	financialisation:		
	
Although	the	financial	system	must	at	times	seem	far	removed	from	forest	and	
agricultural	systems,	they	are	in	fact	intrinsically	linked.	I	urge	you	to	follow	and	
encourage	the	positive	changes	taking	place	in	the	financial	ecosystem,	as	they	can	
be	a	powerful	force	for	good	in	the	physical	ecosystem	(Investor	19).	
	
The	whole	thing	has	been	shaped	around	these	funders	and	these	donors	and	that’s	
why	I	think	looking	at	the	source	of	the	money	in	these	projects	is	interesting.	
Because	it	does	have	a	huge	amount	of	sway	on	how	people	orientate	themselves	
(Standard	Consultant	1	The	River).		
	
Whilst	recognising	the	financialised	institutional	context	that	REDD+	GVCs	shared,	
PSF	informants	felt	that	this	was	a	positive	and	vital	force	for	sustainable	
development,	identifying	that	“we	have	a	responsibility	to	sustainable	development”	
(Investor	16).	The	quotes	below	emphasise	the	willingness	of	investors	and	
extractive	industry	actors	to	include	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	in	their	
businesses	and	participate	in	the	development	of	sustainable	economies:	
	
There	needs	to	be	mainstreaming	of	environmental	and	social	risk	criteria	for	how	
they	assess	credit	in	the	bank.	This	in	addition	to	the	standard	criteria	in	the	carbon	
credit	process	…	we	are	in	the	business	of	mitigating	risk.	This	is	mainstream,	this	is	
normal,	it	makes	business	sense,	so	we	take	it	seriously	(Investor	23).	
	
The	only	way	we	can	progress	towards	green	growth,	from	a	financial	institution’s	
perspective,	is	by	factoring	it	into	the	interest	rates	that	banks	show	their	customers;	
high	or	low	depending	on	your	environmental	liability	…	Convince	big	banks	and	
insurance	companies	to	factor	it	in	directly	to	products	they	take	to	their	clients,	to	
visualise	it	on	their	balance	sheet	(Contractor	11).	
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If	signals	are	created	to	allow	the	private	sector	to	evolve	and	adapt	and	improve	
towards	sustainable	development	then	many	private	sector	actors	are	willing	to	play	
(Extractive	Industry	7).	
	
Beyond	interest	rate	signals	and	credit	access	requirements,	PSF	actors	expressed	
their	willingness	to	adapt	their	strategies	to	actively	avoid	deforestation	in	their	
agriculturally-based	supply	chains:	“We	can	also	help	the	growers	push	the	buyers’	
side,	and	help	the	buyers	to	push	the	growers’	side.	So	we	can	push	both	sides	and	
help	in	that	respect”	(Investor	15).	In	addition	to	this	influence,	PSF	actors	that	might	
usually	compete	with	each	other	are	moved	to	cooperate	to	facilitate	
standardisation	instruments	that	would	encourage	financialised	governance	of	their	
commercial	networks:	“We	all	seem	to	rely	on	certification	and	complaints	systems	
so	we	banks	might	work	together	on	making	the	complaints	system	more	efficient	
and	effective	at	resolving	issues”	(Investor	16).	Such	investors	are	cognisant	of	their	
role	in	facilitating	and	driving	financialised	governance	and	are	actively	willing	to	
reshape	their	practices	to	encourage	it.		
8.2.1	Regulating	for	financialisation	
Despite	this	support,	PSF	actors	gave	examples	of	where	the	voluntary	nature	of	
REDD+	and	its	associated	sustainability	standards	is	insufficient	to	secure	its	
outcomes:	“The	vast	majority	of	businesses	don’t	have	them	on	their	central	decision	
making	process.	They’re	important,	but	not	that	important”	(Contractor	8).	Similarly,	
the	complexity	of	large	companies	might	lead	to	their	inconsistent	treatment	of	
sustainability	standards,	while	remaining	consistent	in	their	desire	of	financial	
profits:	“Big	companies	are	like	big	government;	they	have	different	parts	that	don’t	
necessarily	communicate	or	agree.	They	have	some	allegiance	to	the	triple	bottom	
line	and	some	are	better	than	others,	but	essentially	it’s	the	bottom	line”	(Contractor	
3).	Incorporating	‘triple	bottom	line’	(environmental,	social	and	financial)	
performance	into	operations	through	REDD+	Outcomes	voluntarily	appeared	to	be	
too	risky	and	complicated	for	some	PSF	actors.		
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Several	informants	spoke	of	the	need	for	more	regulated	action	to	encourage	more	
financial	pressure	on	PSF	actors.	One	informant	pointed	out	that	the	Brazilian	
government	“is	altering	interest	rates	based	in	environmental	liability.	This	will	have	
many	implications”	(Contractor	11).	Such	innovations	drive	PSF	actors	to	minimise	
environmental	externalities	so	as	to	be	able	to	access	low	interest	rates.	In	a	similar	
way,	informants	recognised	that	insurance	companies	may	charge	higher	premiums	
to	PSF	actors	and	businesses	that	cause	environmental	degradation,	and	that	
financial	regulators	should	understand	this	and	facilitate	such	financial	influence	in	
the	GVCs	of	PSF	actors:	
	
[It	is]	very	important	for	financial	regulators	to	see	how	environmental	factors	affect	
non-performing	assets	[defaulting	loans]	and	how	that	can	be	translated	into	capital	
dependency	ratios	[number	and	variety	of	investments	for	acceptable	risk	exposure]	
of	insurance	companies	who	control	these	(Contractor	11).	
	
Environmentally	unsustainable	business	models	reducing	the	profitability	and	ability	
of	PSF	actors	to	repay	debts	are	positioning	such	businesses	as	risky	investment	
options	and	thus	costly	to	insure.	However,	opportunities	to	reduce	high	insurance	
costs	were	anticipated	if	relevant	PSF	actors	were	seen	to	be	investing	in	sustainable	
development	projects,	like	REDD+.	Informants	also	drew	attention	to	the	Equator	
Principles27	and	the	Basel	Accords,28	which	are	attempting	to	convince	more	PSF	
actors	and	investments	into	incorporate	instruments	like	REDD+	knowledge	
commodities.	Informants	pointed	out	that	the	ambitions	of	the	Equator	Principles	
																																																						
27	The	Equator	Principles	are	a	voluntary	framework	for	determining	environmental	and	
social	risks	associated	with	project	finance.	They	are	based	on	the	‘Performance	Standards’	
of	the	International	Finance	Corporation	(IFC),	the	private	sector	arm	of	the	World	Bank.	The	
Principles	have	been	adopted	by	over	70	banks	for	transactions	over	$10	million,	although	
several	loopholes	exist	and	there	is	a	lack	of	transparency	in	their	application.	Notably,	the	
principles	are	restricted	to	project	finance	but	PSF	actor	investment	is	increasingly	using	
other	instruments	like	bonds	and	equity	to	fund	their	investments;	effectively	circumventing	
the	principles.	
28.	The	Basel	Accords	are	international	banking	regulations	issued	by	the	Basel	Committee	on	
Banking	Supervision.	These	Accords	have	little	formal	authority	but	have	been	widely	
adopted	by	national	governments.	These	Accords	demand	that	banks	reduce	their	exposure	
to	risk	and	so	may	increase	banks’	use	of	instruments	excluded	from	most	regulators	risk	
calculations,	like	bonds	and	equity.	
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and	Basel	Accords	lacked	the	necessary	tools	and	that	this	was	where	REDD+	
knowledge	commodities	could	contribute	a	“major	move	and	now	the	ideology	is	
mainstream.	But	nobody	knows	how	to	measure	and	account	for	these.	One	of	the	
few	domains	that	knows	about	this	stuff	is	REDD+”	(Contractor	17).	Another	
informant	commented	on	how	a	similar	move	by	a	financial	regulator,	the	
Government	of	the	United	Kingdom,	to	require	all	companies	to	disclose	their	
emissions	and	those	of	their	immediate	energy	suppliers	on	the	London	Stock	
Exchange	also	effectively	created	demand	for	emission	offsets,	including	REDD+	
knowledge	commodities	(Knox-Hayes	&	Levy,	2011):		
	
Government	does	have	a	role.	It	does	help,	on	the	demand	side	...	the	government	
can	move	the	bar,	and	that’ll	nudge	them	along	from	CSR	to	real	reductions	...	The	
real	value	that	the	government	could	do	would	be	to	up	the	bar,	ratchet	it	up.	That’s	
the	real	value,	as	it	drives	the	demand	(Investor	and	Developer	1).	
	
By	‘raising	the	bar	to	drive	demand’	the	informant	is	referring	to	the	ability	of	the	
Government	of	the	United	Kingdom	to	require	companies	on	the	London	Stock	
Exchange	to	disclose	the	emissions	from	their	GVCs.	Disclosing	this	information	to	
shareholders	and	customers	risks	a	negative	response	if	emissions	are	high	and	not	
offset.	As	such,	a	‘ratcheting	up’	of	this	disclosure	requirement	to	be	listed	and	
exchanged	on	the	London	Stock	Exchange	would	effectively	require	PSF	actors	to	
demand	more	carbon	offsets.		
	
One	investor	expressed	the	hope	that	“foreign	direct	investment	regulation	of	
Indonesia	will	change	to	allow	us	access	to	invest	as	a	majority	holder	in	the	market.	
That	way	hopefully	we	can	have	more	influence	of	the	operation	of	palm	oil	
businesses”	(Investor	14).	Changing	regulation	in	this	way	would	enable	the	foreign	
company	to	respond	to	their	customers,	investors	and	shareholders	to	adopt	REDD+	
knowledge	commodities	within	their	palm	oil	businesses.	However,	some	PSF	actors	
cautioned	against	exploiting	financialisation	to	influence	international	PSF	actor	
behaviour:	“Some	NGOs	and	parties	want	the	fund	to	do	more	good	and	be	used	to	
promote	sustainable	development.	But	some	argue	that	the	fund	should	not	be	used	
	 179	
to	promote	foreign	policy”	(Investor	9).	Here,	inclusions	of	natural	capital	accounting,	
sustainable	development	and	the	REDD+	knowledge	commodity	are	considered	
potentially	inappropriate,	not	because	they	might	erode	profit	margins,	but	because	
they	might	intrude	upon	the	governing	sovereignty	of	nations.	
8.2.2	Necessity	of	standards	and	opportunity	of	bonds	
Regulating	for	transparent	natural	capital	accounting,	whether	through	interest	
rates,	banking	standards,	stock	exchange	rules	or	otherwise,	reflects	the	ongoing	
financialisation	of	environmental	governance.	As	PSF	actors	disclose	their	emissions,	
their	neighbouring	PSF	actors	are	likely	to	respond	to	their	own	environmental	risks,	
seeking	offsets	or	revising	their	judgement	of	the	financial	returns	that	can	be	
expected	from	their	investments.	These	financial	approaches	are	regarded	by	many	
PSF	informants	as	the	most	influential	governance	tool	available	to	the	commercial	
networks	that	support	REDD+	projects.	It	is	these	sorts	of	measures	that	REDD+	
projects,	the	associated	ecosystem	services,	and	knowledge	commodity	become	
wrapped	up	in.	It	is	also	where	REDD+	standards	and	their	role	in	natural	capital	
accountancy	become	especially	relevant:	“To	change	this	cooperation	you	need	to	
change	policy,	prices	and	institutions.	One	is	accountancy.	It’s	a	very	important	and	
urgent	piece	of	the	puzzle”	(Contractor	15).	To	be	effective,	accountancy	requires	
defined	and	reliable	information	through	REDD+	standards:		
	
Business	needs	accurate	timely	info	to	make	decisions.	The	environment	is	becoming	
a	factor	in	decisions.	In	order	to	build	this	competence	it’s	very	much	about	common	
ways	of	assessing,	measuring	and	defining	nature	and	our	impact	on	it	(Contractor	
8).	
	
The	role	of	REDD+	standards	as	a	legitimate	accounting	tool	facilitates	financialised	
governance	by	enabling	rapid,	codified	decisions	during	evaluation	and	exchange	of	
commodities	that	such	standards	are	attached	to.	As	such,	and	as	Chapter	7	
identified,	standards	are	recognised	by	many	informants	as	an	effective	and	efficient	
way	of	influencing	business	practice:			
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It’s	about	credibility	in	the	supply	chain.	About	being	good	enough	relative	to	
competitors.	Are	you	good	enough	on	the	supply	chain	and	is	the	standard	good	
enough?	The	point	of	certification	of	the	supply	chain	is	that	you	can	trust	the	system	
and	don’t	have	to	do	all	the	checking	yourself	(Investor	18).	
	
Banks	really	want	certification	as	a	benchmark	and	a	check	off	...	They	frankly	don’t	
have	the	capacity	or	the	interest	to	go	and	ask	the	questions.	They	rely	a	lot	on	what	
the	companies	are	telling	them,	so	there’s	a	lot	of	self-reporting	(Contractor	13).	
	
We	need	to	be	clear	and	rigorous	about	what	green	growth	is,	especially	in	
complicated	areas	such	as	forestry	and	agriculture.	For	that	we	need	standards,	and	
then	third	party	verification	of	those	standards	(Investor	19).	
	
The	key	driver	for	the	use	of	these	standards	appeared	to	be	the	facilitation	of	quick	
and	easy	financial	decisions	for	PSF	actors	when	assessing	an	opportunity	that	
involves	or	supports	REDD+:	“That	makes	life	easy	for	the	investors.	It	reduces	the	
potential	risks	of	green	investing,	makes	product	selection	simple	and	standardised	
for	investors”	(Investor	19).	However,	some	informants	felt	that	this	approach	risks	
creating	a	misguided	sense	of	security,	and	that	some	banks	and	investors	“rely	
excessively	on	certification”	(Contractor	13)	when	making	decisions.	By	doing	this,	
PSF	actors	risk	themselves	being	exposed	to	any	perceived	or	actual	illegitimacy	
within	these	standards	that	might	label	their	activities	as	achieving	REDD+	Outcomes	
when	they	are	not,	and	erode	the	perceptions	of	their	GVC	partners	and	members	
that	such	standards	are	valid.	One	promising	example	of	applying	these	standards	is	
in	the	context	of	green	bonds	(previously	introduced	in	Chapters	5	and	7).	
	
Green	bonds	promise	a	certain	financial	return	to	the	investor	at	the	end	of	an	
agreed	period,	attempting	to	engage	and	reduce	the	contemporary	high-risk	
perceptions	of	the	REDD+	VER	exchange	commodity.	As	one	investor	put	it:	
“Everyone	from	the	world	I	come	from	equates	green	with	risk.	You	need	to	de-risk	
the	word	‘green’”	(Investor	19).	What	makes	green	bonds	‘green’	is	that	the	finance	
that	they	attract	is	only	invested	in	activities	that	are	considered	sustainable:	“A	
green	bond	will	have	a	stated	purpose	that	will	be	verified	independently.	So	it’s	a	
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purpose	in	an	era	where	we	didn’t	question	purpose	and	all	loans	were	given”	
(Contractor	15).	Several	informants	described	how	these	bonds	are	becoming	more	
popular	amongst	PSF	actors	and	expressed	how	their	strategy	and	REDD+	project	
was	adapting	to	this	trend.	This	is	particularly	evident	among	the	INGO	and	their	
partners	in	The	Swamp	case,	as	they	are	forced	to	seek	further	funding.	They	
recognised	that	for	PSF	actors	to	invest	in	VERs	they	require	more	certainty	and	that	
green	bonds	might	be	an	investment	vehicle	to	provide	that	certainty:		
	
You	know	exactly	what	the	risk	profile	is	in	terms	of	the	actual	capital	and	what	the	
cost	of	that	capital	is.	It	allows	us	to	take	more	control	of	that	financing	by	using	the	
bond	as	a	way	of	structuring	it.	It’s	a	method	of	structuring	(INGO	Informant	1	The	
Swamp).	
	
Structuring	the	investment	finance	within	a	bond	offered	a	more	secure	risk	profile	
of	the	REDD+	project	and,	by	doing	so,	promised	to	provide	the	financial	conditions	
necessary	to	attract	PSF	to	this	particular	REDD+	GVC.	The	high	level	of	interest	and	
demand	for	green	bonds	is	also	recognised	by	other	investors:	“The	finance	sector	is	
taking	green	bonds	very	seriously	in	terms	of	underwriting	and	subscribing	to	them,	
and	getting	our	private	clients	to	invest	in	them”	(Investor	19).	The	same	informant	
also	recognised	that	these	green	bonds	had	the	potential	to	dramatically	shift	
economies	towards	sustainable	development:	
	
Where	I	come	from,	sovereign	wealth	funds	will	be	buying	green	bonds.	This	activity	
will	lead	others	to	replicate	…	People	look	at	that	from	a	business	perspective	and	
think	that	it	might	be	a	good	opportunity	as	the	market	prices	the	risk	(Investor	19).	
	
Here	the	investment	decisions	of	sovereign	wealth	funds	(a	specific	PSF	actor	
introduced	in	Chapter	5)	indicate	the	future	directions	of	economies.	Their	large	size	
reduces	the	risk	of	investing	in	novel	markets	like	REDD+.		
	
The	above	section	introduced	how	processes	of	financialisation	concerned	with	
environmental	risks	are	influencing	REDD+	GVCs	and	wider	institutional	PSF	actor	
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networks.	The	advent	of	novel	banking	and	stock	exchange	regulations	is	seen	to	
exert	financialised	pressure	on	PSF	actors	to	engage	standardised	and	legitimated	
tools	like	green	bonds	to	offset	or	mitigate	their	unsustainable	activities.	This	drew	
attention	to	REDD+	projects	and	knowledge	commodities	that	are	legitimated	by	
REDD+	standards	and	are	seen	to	facilitate	the	epistemic	circulation	of	sustainable	
and	green	stories	along	GVCs	and	toward	would-be	investors,	customers,	
shareholders	and	public	stakeholders.	Such	utility	positioned	the	REDD+	commodity	
as	a	promising	instrument	to	attract	interest	from	PFS	actors	and	regulators.		
	
The	following	sections	examine	how	this	form	of	increasingly	financialised	
governance	came	to	have	such	influence	in	the	development	of	REDD+	knowledge	
commodities.	The	following	focuses	on	the	value	drivers	of	investors	(including	
institutional	investors,	foundations	and	sovereign	wealth	funds);	companies	
(including	extractive	industry,	corporate	sponsors	and	corporate	offsetters);	
peripheral	shareholders,	customers	and	public;	and	local	actors	to	demonstrate	how	
different	REDD+	GVC	actors	influenced	and	are	influenced	by	financialisation.		
8.3	Investor	value	drivers	
The	search	for	financial	returns	by	investor	PSF	actors	makes	them	prominent	actors	
within	REDD+	GVCs.	Informants	felt	that	financialised	governance	would	shift	
investors	toward	sustainable	development	and	REDD+	Outcomes	in	their	
investments	if	they	could	deliver	the	required	financial	returns	for	their	associated	
risk.	Investors	are	active	in	Indonesian	forestry,	agriculture	and	extractive	industries:	
“We’re	seen	as	having	impact	through	our	clients.	We	can	have	an	impact	by	having	
dialogue	through	supply	chains,	as	we’re	involved	in	most;	kind	of	omnipresent”	
(Investor	20).	These	informants	also	recognised	the	large	scale	on	which	they	could	
have	an	influence	given	the	amount	of	capital	under	their	control:		
	
We’re	a	big	international	bank	and	there’s	more	expectation	on	us	to	have	standards	
than	a	small	Indonesian	or	Malaysian	bank	(Investor	16).		
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We’re	a	private	sector	financial	institution	so	we	don’t	really	deal	with	small	
businesses.	There’s	a	certain	scale	that	is	relevant	to	an	international	bank	(Investor	
20).		
	
Their	size	amplifies	their	potential	to	financially	adapt	and	drive	changes	throughout	
a	large	proportion	of	the	international	agricultural	and	forestry	land-use	economy.	
The	quotes	below	demonstrate	the	influence	that	investors	can	have	on	their	GVCs	
to	drive	companies	they	invest	in	towards	incorporating	REDD+	knowledge	
commodities:		
	
The	most	important	role	of	large	mainstream	investors	is	to	put	pressure	on	the	
companies	in	their	portfolios	and	the	companies	in	the	supply	chains	of	those	
companies	to	protect	and	value	natural	capital	and	internalise	those	externalities	
(Contractor	9).	
	
We	are	starting	to	see	banks	say	that	they’re	not	going	to	provide	finance	unless	
[companies]	meet	these	benchmarks.	Some	of	these	commitments	have	come	
because	some	of	the	international	institutional	investors	and	others	have	said	frankly	
that	they’re	not	going	to	invest	in	them	or	provide	financial	services	unless	they	
adopt	a	‘no	deforestation’	policy	(Contractor	13).	
	
Companies	can	be	excluded	if	there	is	an	unacceptable	risk	that	they	cause	severe	
environmental	degradation	...	All	based	on	thorough	research	on	the	ground	
(Investor	9).	
	
Despite	these	broader	interests,	PSF	actors	are	recognised	as	ultimately	being	driven	
by	their	pursuit	for	financial	profits:	“That’s	where	the	bank	comes	in,	and	that’s	our	
business	case.	If	the	client	can	produce	more	with	less	then	they	are	more	profitable	
and	pay	the	loan	back	more	quickly”	(Investor	15).	Producing	‘more	with	less’	in	this	
context	refers	to	their	client’s	ability	to	create	more	efficient	and	sustainable	
operations	to	reduce	their	environmental	pollution	and	degradation;	particularly	
concerning	forests.	Investors	have	considerable	influence	as	agents	that	facilitate	
and	encourage	financialised	governance,	regardless	of	how	novel	it	may	seem:	
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“Perhaps	natural	capital	standards	are	not	the	role	of	a	bank.	We	are	intermediaries.	
But	we	can	certainly	play	a	significant	role	in	pushing	this	process	as	this	does	make	
economic	sense”	(Investor	23).	The	same	informant	offers	insight	into	the	specific	
mechanics	of	how	they	drive	their	GVC	members	to	engage	REDD+	knowledge	
commodities	in	Indonesia:		
	
We	have	a	number	of	gatekeeper	functions	to	implement	our	sustainable	policies	…	
At	the	point	of	a	transaction	or	relationship	these	gatekeepers	will	intercept	and	
refer	it	to	the	sustainability	desk.	The	sustainability	desk	will	look	at	a	transaction	via	
our	forest	policy	which	includes	no	conversion	of	high	conservation	value	forest	…	
We	do	due	diligence	via	a	screening	using	RepRisk,29	and	MSCI30	risk	analysis	
consultancies.	We	have	a	number	of	ways	of	getting	information	on	a	project.	Then	
we’re	interested	in	the	asset	level;	the	location	becomes	everything.	We	run	the	
screening	and	can	make	a	best	judgement	based	on	levels	of	comfort.	We	then	get	
into	the	due	diligence	directly	with	the	company	…	We’re	interested	in	the	four	C’s:	
commitment	(internal	controls);	capacity	(human	resource	and	expertise	to	continue	
that	commitment);	capacity	(by	far	most	important:	what	performance	indicators	
they	have	and	what	kind	of	story	they	can	share	with	us);	and,	communications	
(we’re	looking	for	a	whole	cycle)	(Investor	20).		
	
The	detailed	methodology	that	this	PSF	actor	follows	in	their	assessment	of	the	
sustainability	of	a	client,	illustrates	a	robust	and	deliberate	approach	to	financialised	
governance.	Their	ability	to	exert	influence	through	such	financial	controls	on	the	
basis	of	an	investment’s	exposure	to	risk	from	unsustainable	operations	creates	an	
incentive	for	their	clients	to	engage	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	and	other	green	
options.		
	
																																																						
29	RepRisk	collects	and	analyses	negative	incidents,	criticism,	and	controversies	about	
companies	and	projects	worldwide,	and	offers	information	on	activities	related	to	human	
rights	violations,	poor	working	conditions,	corruption,	and	environmental	destruction.	They	
help	their	clients	to	proactively	assess	environmental,	social	and	governance	(ESG)	issues	
that	may	present	financial,	reputation	and	compliance	risks	(www.reprisk.com).	
30	MSCI	provides	research,	ratings	and	analysis	of	environmental,	social	and	governance	
(ESG)	related	business	practices	of	thousands	of	companies	worldwide.	The	research	and	
updates	help	investors	uncover	risks	and	opportunities	to	implement	their	responsible	
investment	objectives	(www.msci.com).	
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A	specific	example	of	an	attempt	to	financially	govern	forest	land	use	by	leveraging	
REDD+	knowledge	commodities	is	the	Landscape	Fund	(Alforte,	Matias,	Munden,	&	
Perron,	2013;	Wardell	&	Bowie,	2014).	The	Landscape	Fund	is	the	product	of	a	
partnership	between	The	Centre	for	International	Forestry	Research	(CIFOR)	and	The	
Munden	Project.	It	aims	to	advance	what	has	been	learnt	from	REDD+	but	move	
away	from	the	PES-based	REDD+	exchange	commodity	and	towards	a	debt-based	
model	contingent	on	delivering	a	similar	REDD+	knowledge	commodity.	At	the	time	
of	writing	the	Landscape	Fund	model	was	still	developing,	but	it	can	be	understood	
as	a	fund	to	collate	and	allocate	capital	through	loans	for	sustainable	activities	within	
forested	landscapes,	similar	to	the	loans	behind	green	bonds.	Loans	are	to	be	
offered	to	organisations	accounting	their	natural	capital	and	meeting	sustainable	
development	standards	to	incorporate	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	while	
promising	financial	return:		
	
The	Landscape	Fund	has	an	aggregator	of	preferential	loans	to	environmental	
performers.	The	aggregator	has	a	condition	to	expand	the	loans	and	access	to	
capital	from	the	fund.	Access	is	cut	if	borrowers	don’t	comply	with	the	sustainability	
requirements.	It’s	conditional	access	based	on	performance	(Contractor	14).	
	
Informants	anticipated	that	profits	from	loans	would	be	reinvested	into	the	fund	to	
then	supply	a	greater	number	and	size	of	loans	to	borrowers	and	environmental	
performers.	Notably,	the	Landscape	Fund	will	actively	discontinue	access	to	finance	
if	borrowers	fail	to	comply	with	sustainability	standards	and	REDD+	Outcomes.		
	
Through	such	mechanisms	financial	pressures	comes	to	influence	actors	within	
GVCs.	Investors	are	cognisant	of	this:	“I	think	for	some	small-to-medium	enterprises	
this	would	become	a	challenge	straight	away	inevitably.	I	think	also	the	local	and	
regional	banks	will	also	have	capacity	challenges”	(Investor	20).	Subsequently,	some	
investors	told	of	how	they	focused	their	efforts	to	introduce	sustainable	policies	to	
particular	clients	that	are	of	a	particular	scale	or	impact:	“We	look	at	what	the	most	
important	sectors	are,	where	we	have	the	most	customers,	then	try	to	introduce	a	
policy	and	try	to	ensure	that	the	customers	that	we	support	don’t	have	unacceptable	
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practices”	(Investor	16).	These	pragmatic	moves	illustrate	a	phasing-in	of	REDD+	
knowledge	commodities	into	the	operations	of	investors	and	their	clients.		
	
Some	investors	are	further	adapting	their	processes	and	standards	to	be	consistent	
with	their	industry	partners	and	competitors:	“In	this	case	there’s	a	shared	interest.	
If	us	banks	all	have	the	same	customer	then	it’s	not	very	helpful	if	we	all	have	our	
own	policy,	it	becomes	confusing”	(Investor	16).	By	doing	so,	investors	are	helping	
their	clients	to	comply	with	sustainability	standards.	Furthermore,	some	informants	
explained	how	they	actively	assisted	companies	that	are	applying	to	them	for	
financial	support	to	change	their	operations	so	they	could	meet	required	
sustainability	standards:	“Environmental	and	social	risk	assessments	are	compulsory	
for	clients’	credit	applications,	and	we	make	sure	it’s	done	properly	and	give	advice	
on	certificates	they	should	ask	for”	(Investor	17).	By	assisting	GVC	actors	to	adopt	
sustainable	operations,	investors	are	encouraged	to	redirect	capital	towards	
activities	that	support	the	epistemic	circulation	of	REDD+	and	other	green	
commodities.		
	
Those	actors	receiving	finance	from	investors	demonstrated	that	the	
aforementioned	drivers	from	investors	to	meet	sustainability	standards	had	a	
measurable	impact	on	their	projects	and	activities.	The	effect	of	the	conditionality	of	
financial	support	is	evident	in	The	Valley	case	study	REDD+	project	where:	“INGOs	
may	say	that’s	not	what	drives	it,	but	essentially	they’ve	written	a	proposal	
depending	on	that.	They’ve	said	they	would	deliver	something	that’s	based	on	the	
values	of	that	funding	institution”	(Standard	Consultant	1	The	Valley).	Here	it	is	clear	
that	investor-driven	financialised	governance	is	having	a	meaningful	impact	on	
REDD+	projects.	In	this	case,	the	project	developer,	the	INGO,	has	designed	its	
proposal	to	comply	with	the	values	of	the	funding	institution	because	it	depends	on	
the	source	of	finance	to	maintain	its	activities.	This	is	a	substantial	change	from	
complying	with	in-house	or	government	standards	and	requirements.	
	
Similarly,	when	speaking	about	their	investor	clients,	one	contractor	shared	how:	
“What’s	really	important	to	us	is	that	we	ensure	that	we’re	communicating	the	value	
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to	them	and	delivering	value	to	our	clients	in	that	process,	to	ensure	they	stick	
around	and	keep	doing	what	they’re	doing”	(Contractor	16).	This	pressure	was	made	
clear	in	The	Swamp	REDD+	project	where	the	Indonesian-based	actors	needed	to	
engage	an	INGO	with	sufficient	capacity	to	ensure	the	project	would	meet	the	
required	standards	and	demands	of	its	investors:	
	
International	buyers	will	have	more	trust	if	there	is	an	international	organisation	
involved.	This	is	a	performance-based	system	and	many	international	organisations	
doubt	Indonesian	performance	so	far,	especially	with	forestry	issues.	…	Local	NGOs	
and	local	government	cannot	access	the	private	sector	to	invest.	So	they	need	
someone	to	connect	them	to	international	buyers	…	That’s	what	the	INGO	can	bring:	
capacity,	connections,	and	trust,	especially	regarding	the	international	REDD+	
standards	like	VCS	and	CCB	(Indonesian	Business	3	The	Swamp).		
	
The	importance	of	investor	confidence	or	trust	in	the	REDD+	project’s	ability	to	
deliver	on	its	performance	necessitated	the	INGO’s	involvement	as	a	connector	and	
guarantor	that	the	REDD+	standards	will	be	met.	Hence	investors	are	looking	to	
transform	their	value	chains	towards	sustainability	–	most	directly	from	their	driving	
position	at	the	head	of	the	GVC,	but	also	by	actively	modifying	and	shaping	the	
operations	of	other	actors	on	their	GVCs	to	most	effectively	and	efficiently	produce	
REDD+	knowledge	commodities.		
8.4	Company	value	drivers	
Pressure	on	companies	to	account	for	natural	capital	and	to	adapt	their	practices	to	
meet	sustainability	standards,	and	REDD+	standards	in	particular,	is	not	simply	a	
response	to	the	desires	of	their	investors	or	other	organisations.	Some	informants	
felt	that	companies’	interest	in	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	was	a	response	to	
future	profit	sources:	“Companies	are	interested	in	doing	it,	as	long	as	it’s	profitable	
for	them”	(Contractor	22).	Companies	pursued	profits	while	keeping	up	with	industry	
competition,	which	increasingly	required	the	adoption	of	sustainable	practices:	“The	
game	changers	are	supply	chain	security.	That’s	a	trillion	dollars	of	business	that	
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needs	to	be	secured.	They	want	to	make	sure	that	it	works.	They’re	worried	about	
demand	and	supply	side”	(Contractor	3).	In	this	sense	these	companies	are	worried	
about	the	security	of	their	GVCs	that	source	from	primary	producers,	through	
manufacturing	and	supply	to	consumer	markets	internationally.	There	was	concern	
that	the	effects	of	climate	change	will	reduce	their	ability	to	supply	primary	produce	
to	their	manufacturing	activities.	Additionally,	they	worry	that	climate	change	will	
also	reduce	the	demand	from	consumer	markets	because	of	perceptions	of	
unsustainable	businesses	and	decreased	purchasing	power	as	economies	become	
disrupted	by	volatile	and	changing	climate	conditions.	These	are	proving	to	be	
powerful	drivers	for	companies	to	engage	in	sustainable	business:	
	
There	is	a	new	paradigm	for	doing	business	and	the	private	sector	is	starting	to	
adopt	this.	International	companies	that	have	been	blacklisted31	are	starting	to	
adopt	it,	as	otherwise	nobody	will	recognise	them	(Investor	and	Developer	10).	
	
There’s	a	much	bigger	move	where	companies	are	starting	to	recognise	that	they	
need	sustainable	servicing	...	They’re	starting	to	look	at	developing	methodologies	
around	monitoring	and	changing	their	supply.	They’re	starting	to	look	at	standards	
and	establishing	–	themselves	–	standards	(Contractor	3).	
	
This	increasing	turn	to	natural	capital	accounting	does	not	necessarily	mean	that	
REDD+	projects	are	favoured.	Informants	told	of	how	companies	are	often	interested	
in	improving	the	sustainability	of	their	own	GVCs	and	would	typically	look	for	
opportunities	to	incorporate	REDD+	knowledge	commodity	within	them:	“Big	
commodity	producers	are	not	so	interested	in	REDD+	and	offsetting.	They	use	a	term	
called	insetting.	They	want	to	invest	in	their	own	internal	supply	chain”	(Contractor	
7).	These	techniques	of	‘insetting’	are	established	and	implemented	through	
company	policies:	“There	is	interest	in	natural	capital.	There’s	growing	interest.	But	
it’s	largely	based	on	company	policy”	(Contractor	5).	In	this	sense,	PSF	informants	
																																																						
31	Blacklisted	refers	to	a	company	being	recognised	by	investors	and	having	a	reputation	as	
being	unsustainable,	risky	and	an	unattractive	investment.		
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felt	that	their	own	business	practices	and	those	of	their	competitors	would	bring	
about	change	through	competition:		
	
Corporations	are	in	an	ideal	place	to	take	a	leadership	role	and	getting	involved	in	
REDD+	and	climate	projects.	It’s	just	the	nature	of	us;	we	want	to	keep	up	with	each	
other.	If	one	of	us	are	taking	a	leadership	role	then	another	company	says	‘we	need	
to	do	this,	we	need	to	come	on	board	as	well’.	The	more	companies	that	do	that	I	
think	creates	a	tipping	effect	and	then	the	consumer	catches	on	to	what	all	of	us	are	
doing.	Then	the	consumer	starts	to	demand	more.	If	the	consumers	are	demanding	
more	and	the	private	sector	is	doing	more	then	legislation	will	come	and	then	
hopefully	we’ve	got	a	nice	perfect	storm	that	evolves	(Extractive	Industry	8).	
	
This	quote	describes	a	dynamic	and	potentially	powerful	process	of	change	within	
and	between	these	companies,	which	push	each	other	further	towards	sustainable	
operations	whilst	pushing	and	being	pulled	by	their	customers	along	the	way.	Other	
companies	described	how	they	preferred	to	wait	for	the	benchmarks	to	rise	around	
them	and	then	follow	the	crowd,	rather	than	pioneering	ahead:	“We	rely	on	
international	norms	of	deforestation	...	We	are	not	a	front-runner	but	align	ourselves	
with	what	seems	to	be	internationally	accepted”	(Investor	9).			
	
For	these	actors,	the	source	of	the	REDD+	knowledge	commodity	shifted	from	
external	projects	that	PSF	actors	are	associated	with	through	sponsorship	or	
offsetting,	to	being	directly	incorporated	into	the	operative	norms	of	GVCs	through	
changing	their	production	activities.	This	incorporation	was	ultimately	driven	by	
company	recognition	of	the	risks	of	unsustainable	operations	while	those	failing	to	
change	are	being	perceived	by	investors	as	a	risky	and	unappealing	option.	
Informants	described	how	if	a	company	is	unaware	of	these	trends	and:	“hasn’t	yet	
realised	what’s	happening	in	the	world,	if	they’re	in	a	commodity	business,	then	you	
do	not	want	not	be	investing	in	them	as	they	don’t	even	understand	their	supply	
chain”	(Contractor	1).	These	types	of	concerns	suggest	investors	are	becoming	
watchful	of	companies	not	adapting	to	sustainable	practices.		
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Consultants	explained	that	it	is	primarily	early	adopters	and	already	progressive	
companies	that	are	interested	in	the	REDD+	knowledge	commodity:	“Trying	to	sell	
REDD+	to	a	corporate	is	really	hard.	They	don’t	get	it.	Most	corporates	don’t	have	an	
environmental	or	social	profit	and	loss	sheet.32	We	have	to	address	at	least	the	early	
adopter	15	per	cent”	(Contractor	6).	There	is	only	a	minority	of	PSF	actors	willing	to	
experiment	with	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	and	pioneer	sustainability	
standards.	Doing	so	exposes	these	companies	to	additional	costs	and	risks	without	
guarantee	that	their	customers	will	support	them.		
	
Informants	reported	that	in	cases	where	companies	are	interested	in	becoming	
involved	with	REDD+	there	remained	a	series	of	gatekeepers	that	presented	barriers	
along	GVCs;	namely	carbon	offset	brokers	that	connect	producers	with	buyers.	One	
informant	explained	how	they	managed	to	circumvent	these	barriers	and	brokers	
through	the	knowledge	commodity	character	of	REDD+;	for	the	broker	to	
communicate	what	the	offset	commodity	was,	they	had	to	tell	its	story,	which	then	
conveyed	who	the	offset	producers	were:		
	
We	didn’t	know	who	was	buying	what	because	everyone	was	buying	through	brokers	
…	Our	pitch	to	the	broker	was	that	‘you	need	a	charismatic	credit	with	a	story’.	If	the	
broker	pitched	that	successfully	then	the	company	they	were	talking	to	knew	who	we	
were	because	they	had	to	tell	the	story	(Investor	and	Developer	12).	
	
This	same	informant	shared	how	companies	could	support	projects	and	
interventions	to	generate	the	REDD+	knowledge	commodity	without	supporting	
them	financially.	Companies	could	have	a	promoting	effect	by	being	vocal	about	the	
importance	of	natural	capital	accounting	and	meeting	standards	of	sustainable	
practice.	By	doing	so,	companies	can	lend	legitimacy	to	REDD+	knowledge	
commodities	among	their	customers	and	the	public:	
	
																																																						
32	Environmental	and	social	profit	and	loss	balance	sheet	refers	to	practices	of	natural	capital	
accounting	that	also	include	social	costs	and	benefits	of	activities.		
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Many	of	them	communicate	with	consumers,	consumers	are	voters,	voters	move	
governments	more	than	we	do.	So	consumer-facing	companies	in	particular	can	play	
a	role	in	promoting	these	ideas	widely	(Investor	and	Developer	12).	
	
The	motivations	for	companies	to	respond	to	natural	capital	accounting	and	
standards	that	constitute	REDD+	appear	to	be	shifting	beyond	the	incorporation	of	
external	REDD+	projects	(as	offsets)	and	towards	the	direct	inclusion	into	their	GVCs	
via	‘insetting’	–	further	tying	the	fluidity	of	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	and	
finance	together.	For	example,	a	company	may	comply	with	their	investor’s	
requirement	to	source	from	sustainable	palm	oil	plantations	employing	standards	
modelled	on	REDD+.	The	recognition	of	resource	limitations	within	their	supply	
networks	is	bringing	larger,	more	influential	companies	around	to	accounting	for	
natural	capital.	In	this	way,	the	REDD+	knowledge	commodity	and	constituent	
standards	are	becoming	an	incorporated	component	of	these	companies’	business.	
Similarly,	these	companies	are	responding	to	and	anticipating	the	desires	of	their	
investors,	customers	and	the	public.	The	following	section	explores	in	greater	detail	
the	role	of	customers,	the	public	and	shareholders	in	the	financialised	governance	of	
REDD+	projects	and	commodity	in	greater	detail.	
8.5	Customer,	public	and	shareholder	value	drivers	
Customers	and	shareholders	of	companies	and	their	investors	occupy	a	variety	of	
positions	on	REDD+	GVCs,	each	contributing	to	and	influenced	by	public	opinion.	
These	actors	are	often	highly	interconnected	and	exert	agency	over	the	revenues	
companies	and	investors	can	expect	within	a	consumptive	economy.	Companies	and	
investors	are	very	concerned	with	satisfying	the	desires	of	their	customers,	
shareholders	and	the	wider	public.	The	following	illustrates	how	these	actors	
influence	the	pressures	and	requirements	from	finance	on	REDD+	GVCs.		
	
Of	the	three	groups	of	actors	(customers,	shareholders	and	public),	shareholders	are	
recognised	by	one	informant	as	the	least	likely	to	push	for	inclusion	of	the	REDD+	
knowledge	commodity	into	a	company’s	operations:	“The	shareholders	have	been	
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the	laggards.	In	most	companies	the	shareholders	can	be	a	significant	influence,	but	
historically	they	haven’t	been”	(Investor	Developer	2).	The	INGO	from	The	Swamp	
REDD+	project	experienced	these	influences	differently,	and	expressed	the	
complexity	that	shareholder	preferences	can	have	within	REDD+	GVCs	and	
commodities:	
	
The	way	that	companies	are	structured	is	that	shareholder	returns	are	the	be	all	and	
end	all.	But	there	are	a	lot	of	things	that	play	into	those	shareholder	returns,	which	
are	perceptions	of	how	your	company	operates	and	relationships	that	you	have	with	
your	stakeholders	as	well.	So	even	if	you	were	looking	at	it	from	a	purely	commercial	
perspective,	those	sorts	of	softer	issues	actually	come	into	those	calculations	of	risk	
as	well	(INGO	Informant	2	The	Swamp).	
	
Shareholder	preference	for	‘softer	issues’	are	sometimes	incorporated	into	cost-
benefit	calculation	and	risk	assessments.	The	INGO	sought	to	take	advantage	of	this	
and	arrange	the	REDD+	project	as	best	they	could	to	reflect	those	‘softer	issues’	
within	PSF	actor’s	risk	calculations.	In	this	sense,	shareholders	can	influence	
companies	to	shift	their	GVC	strategies	to	incorporate	REDD+	knowledge	
commodities:		
	
A	large	cement	company	is	talking	to	us	about	biomass	energy	because	of	internal	
shareholder	commitments	to	reduce	GHG	emissions.	In	that	sense,	it’s	about	more	
than	their	supply	chains,	and	more	about	the	way	they	do	business	(Contractor	3)	
	
Here,	shareholders	are	interested	in	securing	the	GVCs	and	profitability	of	
companies	they	are	invested	in,	but	at	the	same	time	recognise	the	importance	of	
sustainable	business	practice.		
	
Informants	reflected	that,	like	shareholders,	company	staff	also	influenced	company	
governance	as	they	appealed	to	the	social	and	environmental	justice	desires	of	
existing	and	future	employees.	By	offering	attractive	careers,	companies	sought	to	
select	and	retain	the	best	staff	possible	to	contribute	to	maximising	profits:		
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The	way	companies	look	at	the	world	is	that	they	have	three	stakeholders:	the	
customers,	the	shareholders,	and	the	staff.	So	the	truth	is	that	they	care	more	about	
their	staff	…	If	you	look	at	the	opinions	of	graduates	across	the	world,	what	are	the	
characteristics	of	the	company	that	you	want	to	work	for?	They	all	put	‘ethics’	at	the	
top	of	the	list	…	So	that	is	a	real	driver	(Investor	Developer	2).	
	
While	balancing	the	interests	of	shareholders	and	staff,	companies	are	
simultaneously	trying	to	appeal	to	customers.	Companies	reiterated	that	a	primary	
focus	was	the	desires	of	their	customers,	because	their	sales	and	revenues	
depended	upon	it:	“It’s	all	about	branding;	that’s	how	we	turn	this	into	a	commercial	
proposition”	(Extractive	Industry	9).	This	branding	appears	particularly	important	
when	PSF	actors	that	want	to	offset	their	GHG	emissions	are	deciding	whether	a	
variation	of	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	will	best	appeal	to	their	customers:		
	
Depends	what	my	customers	like:	monkeys?	Or	basket-weaving?	It’s	about	carbon,	
but	it’s	about	what	other	things	my	customers	like.	You	weigh	it	up.	Will	cheap	
credits	from	a	factory	in	China	cut	it?	Or	do	you	need	something	that	looks	good	on	
your	website?	(Investor	and	Developer	1).		
	
Customer	preferences	are	seen	to	influence	the	types	of	REDD+	knowledge	
commodities	that	PSF	actors	are	creating	and	pursuing	because	they	influence	the	
ultimate	profitability	of	their	businesses.	However,	informants	reported	how	these	
preferential	signals	from	customers	are	not	clear	and	are	the	cause	for	some	
frustration	and	confusion	amongst	PSF	actors:		
	
Some	companies	will	take	the	risk	and	follow	consumer	demand.	However,	the	
consumer	has	presented	very	poor	signals	(Contractor	5).		
	
Hard	to	know	if	the	customer	will	want	something	like	RSPO33	or	something	GHG	
focused	like	REDD+,	we’re	unsure	(Extractive	Industry	4).	
																																																						
33	Roundtable	of	Sustainable	Palm	Oil	(RSPO)	is	a	voluntary	sustainable	standard	for	palm	oil	
plantations	and	includes	the	preservation	of	high	conservation	value	forests.	
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However,	while	recognising	these	weak	and	unclear	signals	from	customers,	some	
informants	pointed	out	that:	“The	new	young	consumer	will	reject	products	that	are	
not	environmentally	sound.	If	you’re	building	your	strategy	for	the	mid-term,	be	
aware	of	that”	(Extractive	Industry	9).	It	is	these	sorts	of	shifts	in	market	demand	
towards	sustainable	commodities	that	the	‘early	adopter’	companies	in	the	above	
section	are	anticipating.		
	
By	responding	to	these	customer	desires	and	publicising	their	support	for	REDD+	
knowledge	commodities,	PSF	actors	boost	their	reception	among	their	customers	
and	the	public	as	well	as	their	attractiveness	to	each	other	and	across	agriculture	
and	forestry	supply	chains:	“Making	a	public	statement	on	forests	is	about	how	can	
we	jointly	assist	our	major	clients	...	If	we	want	to	continue	to	do	business	then	they	
want	us	to	be	doing	something”	(Investor	12).	PSF	informants	recognised	that	their	
CSR	response	to	customer	and	public	opinion	needed	to	be	genuine	if	it	was	to	be	
effective	and	reflect	their	duty	as	global	citizens,	rather	than	misinformation	and	
deception:	“It’s	their	responsibility	to	figure	out	what	is	the	right	thing	to	do,	not	just	
figure	out	what	the	public	will	basically	buy	because	they’re	dim”	(Contractor	1).	The	
nature	of	the	marketing	and	branding	benefits	from	involving	themselves	in	REDD+	
knowledge	commodities	required	that	PSF	actors	looked	beyond	fast	profits	and	
towards	helping	inform	customers	and	the	public	to	transition	towards	sustainable	
consumption:	“Advertising	needs	to	be	more	about	information	and	not	about	
pervasiveness”	(Contractor	15).	If	such	impressions	are	not	secured	then,	according	
to	informants,	public	and	consumer	opinion	could	backfire	and	damage	companies’	
branding	and	profits.	Attempting	to	appeal	to	public	and	consumer	epistemic	desires	
that	resonate	with	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	can	appear	fickle	and	be	a	source	
of	immense	risk	to	PSF	actors:		
	
We	get	a	lot	of	heat	for	financing	these	palm	oil	type	activities.	We’re	a	target	
(Investor	14).	
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It	comes	from	so	far	away	and	it’s	all	mixed	up	and	not	transparent	for	[customers].	
They	don’t	trust	any	of	it	(Extractive	Industry	6).	
	
The	thing	that	really	scares	me	is	that	one	day	the	consumer	is	going	to	say	‘I	don’t	
want	anything	to	do	with	you’	(Extractive	Industry	9).	
	
Additionally,	informants	had	experienced	that	small	groups	of	customers	or	
members	of	the	public	have	the	ability	to	influence	large	numbers	of	other	
customers	that	can	have	a	considerable	impact	on	PSF	business:	“It’s	a	small	
percentage	of	the	total	customers,	but	we	cannot	ignore	them	as	they	are	active	and	
shape	peoples	thinking”	(Extractive	Industry	6).	This	sort	of	risk	from	customers	and	
the	public	puts	pressure	on	companies	to	be	perfect.	This	pressure	risks	and	reduces	
the	willingness	of	PSF	actors	to	involve	REDD+,	as	their	actions	might	be	ridiculed	
and	put	them	at	a	disadvantage:	
	
“But	the	markets	demand	nothing	less	than	maximum,	and	if	we	don’t,	then	we	lose	
the	credibility	and	are	accused	of	not	really	wanting	to	change”	(Extractive	Industry	
6).	
	
“If	they	put	something	on	the	brand	they	feel	they	will	get	a	lot	of	comments	on	it	if	
it’s	not	perfect.	There	are	too	many	issues	for	buyers	to	take	that	step”	(Investor	15).	
	
This	tendency	for	companies	to	protect	their	profits	by	avoiding	engaging	or	
publicising	their	involvement	in	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	has	been	
detrimental	to	the	popularisation	of	REDD+.	This	risk-avoidance	approach	of	some	
PSF	informants	was	driven	by	the	financial	pressure	to	secure	their	customers	and	
revenue	sources.	Other	PSF	informants	described	how	companies,	even	if	they	find	
REDD+	knowledge	commodities	too	risky	to	invest	in,	or	to	incorporate	directly	into	
their	GVC,	could	support	REDD+	by	using	their	trusted	brands	and	influence	to	
inform	their	customers	of	its	merits:	“The	perfection	idea	is	killing	the	opportunity.	
So	I	tell	them	that	I	don’t	care	if	they	don’t	buy	my	stuff.	Just	tell	your	customers	that	
REDD+	is	a	good	thing.	They	trust	you	and	your	brand”	(Investor	and	Developer	12).	
The	desire	of	companies	to	secure	the	profitability	of	their	brands,	and	the	
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recognition	of	PSF	actors	of	the	influence	such	brands	can	have	on	customers,	
illustrates	the	character	of	the	knowledge	economy	that	REDD+	commodities	are	
engaging.		
	
For	some	companies,	the	financialised	influence	of	customers	reached	a	point	where	
they	felt	they	had	lost	control	of	their	brand	to	their	customers.	Subsequently,	these	
customers	are	indirectly	deciding	the	approach	companies	might	take	to	REDD+	
knowledge	commodities	on	the	GVCs	they	share:	“Public	opinion	owns	our	brand.	
You	have	to	be	transparent.	The	people	that	certify	our	brand,	in	the	same	way	as	
people	certify	REDD+	production,	is	the	consumer”	(Extractive	Industry	9).	The	
fragility	and	fluidity	of	perceptions	moving	along	GVCs	that	involve	PSF	actors	create	
complex	contexts	for	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	to	infiltrate	and	balance.	
Within	this	knowledge	economy,	a	company’s	act	of	surrendering	their	brand	to	
public	opinion	appears	to	facilitate	an	entangled	and	self-directed	circulation	of	
finance	and	knowledge,	governed	by	customers	that	both	produce	and	consume	it.	
The	following	section	explores	the	influence	of	financialisation	at	the	‘upstream’	
ends	of	REDD+	GVCs,	within	forests	and	forest	communities.	
8.6	Local	value	drivers	
The	REDD+	knowledge	commodity,	at	its	forest	area	source,	was	described	
differently	in	different	places.	It	was	often	presented	as	a	partnership	between	the	
forest	communities	and	the	consuming	community:		
	
A	community-to-community	exchange	where	people	are	mutually	supporting	and	
they	have	different	needs	that	they	can	support	each	other	with	and	have	a	
reciprocal	relationship	of	a	long-term	nature	(Standard	Consultant	1	The	River).	
	
One	project	developer	described	how	forest	communities	receive	the	minimum	
benefit	necessary	to	influence	their	relationship	with	their	forests.	This	minimum	is	
based	upon	the	relatively	small	proportion	of	benefits	these	forest	communities	
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currently	receive	from	other	conventional	palm	oil,	mining	and	timber	type	
operations	that	request	the	use	of	their	forests:		
	
Most	of	the	value	does	not	accrue	to	the	local	people	but	goes	out	of	the	forest	to	
the	investors.	So	competing	with	the	needs	at	the	local	level	is	not	that	difficult	
because	they	don’t	get	that	much	value	out	of	their	forests	and	they	don’t	have	very	
many	alternatives	(Investor	and	Developer	12).	
	
Subsequently,	providing	a	better	deal	to	forest	communities	than	their	alternative	
offers	was	perceived	as	relatively	easy.	The	financial	pressures	and	rationality	of	PSF	
actors	from	investors,	companies,	shareholders,	customers,	and	the	public	coalesced	
to	demand	the	minimum	required	cost	of	REDD+	projects.	This	left	forest	
communities	with	restricted	scope	to	influence	how	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	
are	generated.	However	local	communities	established	a	baseline	that	the	project	
needed	to	improve	upon:	“In	the	end	it	will	be	the	local	people	and	the	local	
governments	that	will	decide	whether	the	value	we’re	producing	for	them	from	their	
local	forests	is	an	adequate	substitute	for	the	destructive	use	that	was	going	on”	
(Investor	and	Developer	12).	In	this	way,	some	forest	communities	and	local	
jurisdictions	are	able	to	push	back	on	PSF	actor	preferences	to	develop	knowledge	
commodities	at	minimal	cost.	Furthermore,	the	unconventional	management	of	PES	
finance	by	forest	communities	provided	a	barrier	to	the	influence	other	GVC	
members	attempted	to	express	through	financial	signals:			
	
When	community	groups	get	money	from	their	own	jobs	and	businesses	they	
manage	that	money	very	effectively.	They	did	risk	free	or	low	risk	activities	with	their	
money.	But	with	the	PES	money	they	were	doing	risky	activities	…	still	treating	it	like	
donor	money	(Standard	Consultant	1	The	River).	
	
This	describes	community	members	using	REDD+	PES	finance	for	apparently	
irrational	activities	that	appear	to	contradict	expected	money	management	
strategies	by	such	waged	workers.	By	doing	so	it	indicates	that	the	performance-
based	payments	intended	to	incentivise	certain	behaviour	and	influence	the	
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governance	of	forests	are	weakened	at	this	end	of	the	GVC.	This	effectively	
illustrates	forest	communities	as	expressing	elements	of	resistance	or	incompatibility	
with	the	processes	and	governing	program	of	financialisation.	
	
The	financial	principles	upon	which	REDD+	GVCs	rely	may	become	un-hinged	as	the	
community	do	not	always	share	them:	“In	a	capitalist	society	money	becomes	
necessary.	But	until	then,	it’s	not.	This	community	is	in	the	middle	of	that	
somewhere”	(Standard	Consultant	1	The	River).	The	forest	communities	associated	
with	the	REDD+	projects	studied	here	did	not	appear	to	be	governed	by	financial	
concerns	in	the	same	way	that	the	other	PSF	actors	on	REDD+	GVCs	are.	The	
consumption-based	resource	allocation	system	of	capitalism	that	dominates	the	rest	
of	the	REDD+	GVC	did	not	yet	appear	to	have	established	its	roots	in	the	lives	of	
these	forest	peoples.	This	is	not	to	discard	the	influence	of	REDD+	projects	and	the	
knowledge	commodities	that	are	created.	Project	developers	acting	as	
intermediaries	ensured	that	the	resultant	REDD+	commodity	delivered	on	the	
preferences	of	its	funders,	as	Chapters	6	and	7	demonstrated.	However,	it	is	worth	
noting	that	financial	rationales	met	challenges	in	forest	communities.		
	
Conversely,	financial	concerns	did	influence	the	behaviour	of	local	government	
bodies	and	politicians:	“The	only	way	to	influence	a	local	government	is	through	the	
buyers	and	who	they	say	they	will	buy	from”	(Contractor	22).	Here	the	buyers	are	
international	companies	looking	to	buy	forestry	and	agriculture	products.	Their	
choice	to	buy	from	Indonesian	companies	that	produce	sustainable	products	that	
incorporate	the	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	would	mean	that	local	governments	
in	Indonesia	would	support	measures	to	implement	REDD+	projects	and	develop	
such	knowledge	commodities.	This	illustrates	the	close	and	effectual	financial	
relationship	between	Indonesian	authorities	and	businesses	at	these	local	levels	of	
government.	Money	is	influential	across	all	levels	of	government	that	are	
responsible	for	Indonesia’s	forest	areas;	PSF	actors	that	progressed	their	interests	in	
local	jurisdictions	typically	purchased	permissions.	
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8.7	Conclusion	
The	above	sections	have	analysed	processes	of	financialisation	within	REDD+	GVCs	in	
Indonesia.	Financially	driven	governance	was	witnessed	across	REDD+	GVCs	–	among	
investors,	companies,	shareholders,	customers,	and	the	public.	GVCs	are	seen	to	
transform	as	each	actor	adjusts	their	operations	to	suit	the	financial	pressures	and	
performance	preferences	of	surrounding	and	supporting	actors.	This	financial	
influence,	largely	driven	by	the	preferences	of	investors	and	customers	that	
surrounded	companies,	jostled	actors	across	GVCs	to	reposition	and	legitimise	them	
in	an	apparently	coordinated	manner:	“The	idea	you	can	pay	someone	upstream	and	
downstream	doesn’t	work.	You	have	to	be	coordinated.	You	have	to	shift	the	market”	
(Contractor	3).	Shifting	GVCs	and	the	market	in	this	way	was	seen	to	involve	a	
reformulation	of	the	evaluative	norms	by	which	they	operated,	pushed	through	by	
financial	interests.	The	actors	on	these	evolving	GVCs	are	using	tools	to	value	
attributes	within	REDD+	standards	and	natural	capital	accounting.		
	
Financial	mechanisms	come	with	both	strengths	and	weaknesses.	They	are	both	
quietly	influential	and	obviously	exposed,	covering	the	world’s	networks	of	exchange	
and	value	creation.	A	decision	to	allocate	capital	would	send	a	financial	signal	to	
other	GVC	actors,	who	may	then	re-gear	their	practices	and	reallocate	capital	in	
similar	or	competitive	ways.	Like	a	spider-web	with	several	flies	entrapped,	each	fly’s	
struggle	excites	neighbours	to	struggle,	which	excites	their	neighbours	to	struggle,	
and	so	on.	Each	fly	is	committed	to	perpetual	and	repeating	actions	of	response	and	
initiation.		
	
The	non-linearity	of	this	is	an	important	feature	of	financialisation	within	REDD+.	
Financial	mechanisms	function	as	a	complex	network	of	substantive	connections	and	
open	relationships	that	facilitate	an	immense	fluidity	of	action	and	re-action	among	
actors.	When	coupled	with	the	epistemic	circulation	of	REDD+	knowledge	
commodities,	financialisation	has	amplified	the	efficiency	of	reflexive	knowledge	
formation	and	evaluation	by	PSF	actors.	In	this	sense,	change	is	constant,	and	
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isolating	the	beginning	or	starting	point	of	such	governance	influences	is	difficult.	
However,	noticeable	developments	in	geographical	political	economy	can	be	
understood	to	begin	when	a	particular	actor	allocates	finance	to	produce	a	particular	
commodity	in	a	particular	way	(Sheppard,	2011);	in	this	case,	with	the	epistemic	
circulation	of	REDD+.		
	
Financialisation	ensured	that	the	knowledge	commodity	generated	favoured	
arrangements	that	would	deliver	the	meanings	and	outcomes	desired	by	finance	and	
the	GVC	actors	aligned	with	finance,	empowering	PSF	actors	accustomed	to	
paradigms	of	financial	accumulation.	Previous	chapters	demonstrated	how	this	
typically	manifested	in	a	close	and	effectual	relationship	between	PSF	actors	and	
their	agents	responsible	for	creating	the	REDD+	project,	to	secure	their	desired	
REDD+	knowledge	commodities.		
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9		Conclusion		
Exploring	PSF	actors	involved	with	REDD+	projects	and	knowledge	commodities	in	
Indonesia	has	provided	interesting	insights	into	this	example	of	market	
environmentalism	and	the	revaluation	of	certain	forest	areas	in	the	global	economy.	
This	chapter	draws	together	the	analysis	and	discussion	within	previous	chapters	to	
respond	to	the	research’s	aim:	to	bring	to	the	surface	and	tease	out	the	diverse	
characteristics	of	PSF	actors	and	their	influence	as	agents	of	private	governance	
within	REDD+	projects	in	Indonesia.	This	conclusion	responds	to	each	research	
question	in	turn,	and	begins	by	engaging	research	question	1:	who	are	PSF	actors	
that	support	REDD+	projects?	It	then	responds	to	research	question	2:	why	do	PSF	
actors	support	REDD+	projects?	and	discusses	why	these	actors	evaluate	them	as	
desirable.	Finally,	the	conclusion	addresses	research	question	3:	what	are	the	
governance	implications	of	PSF	actors	on	REDD+	projects?,	and	discusses	private	
governance	in	the	context	of	REDD+	market	environmentalism.		
	
Whilst	engaging	these	questions	this	chapter	also	responds	to	calls	to	apply	a	GVC	
framework	to	analyse	REDD+	(Bumpus	&	Liverman,	2011).	It	demonstrates	the	
usefulness	of	the	GVC	framework	when	investigating	an	empirical	example	of	value	
within	a	knowledge	commodity	like	REDD+	(Gibbon	et	al.,	2008;	Lee,	2011b;	
Starosta,	2010a;	Vagneron	&	Roquigny,	2011).	Specifically,	the	GVC	lens	helped	to	
understand	the	actors	involved	and	the	governance	characteristics	of	the	case	study	
REDD+	projects.	Mapping	and	analysing	the	REDD+	GVCs	in	Chapter	6	captured	the	
inputs	and	outputs	of	REDD+	projects,	providing	insight	into	their	processes	of	
commodification.	The	REDD+	GVC	diagrams	also	captured	a	slice	of	the	wider	
institutional	and	governance	network	that	the	projects	are	nested	within.		
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9.1	Who	are	PSF	actors	that	support	REDD+	projects?	
The	research	sought	to	differentiate	within	the	category	of	‘private	finance’	and,	
more	specifically,	the	adopted	frame	of	‘profit-seeking	finance’,	drawing	attention	to	
the	different	types	of	finance	strategies	and	tactics	in	REDD+	projects	(Bernard	et	al.,	
2012;	Lövbrand	&	Stripple,	2012).	Market	environmentalism	and	associated	
processes	of	privatisation	and	commercialisation	are	illuminated	through	this	
approach	(Bakker,	2005;	Leys,	2001),	which	helps	to	reveal	key	actors	and	the	ways	
in	which	they	relate	to	global	markets.	Through	investigating	the	institutional	
context	of	REDD+	GVCs	in	Indonesia	the	research	found	that	PSF	actors	may	be	from	
either	the	public	or	the	private	sector.		
	
Corporate	sponsors,	corporate	offsetters	and	extractive	industry	typically	used	
private	sources	of	finance,	while	the	finance	within	sovereign	wealth	funds	was	from	
public	sources.	Foundations	and	institutional	investors	typically	draw	on	private	
sources	of	finance,	but	could	also	include	a	mix	of	public	and	private	sources.	In	such	
cases,	public	sources	are	often	a	way	of	mitigating	the	risks	to	private	sources,	as	any	
losses	can	be	shared	or	directed	toward	the	public	sources	of	funds.	By	managing	
the	balance	of	risk	within	investment	funds	in	this	way,	institutional	investors	could	
attract	greater	amounts	of	private	PSF	to	invest	in	their	funds.	Understanding	the	
types	of	PSF	actors	involved	in	REDD+	projects	is	helpful	in	understanding	why	they	
are	involved.	
9.2	Why	do	PSF	actors	support	REDD+	projects?	
This	section	engages	with	the	question	of	why	PSF	actors	support	REDD+	projects,	
and	explores	their	motivations	and	desires.	The	relationship	between	the	mandate	
that	a	PSF	actor	has,	and	the	risk	involved	with	certain	REDD+	investment	options,	is	
an	important	determinant	of	whether	that	actor	will	become	involved	at	all.	If	a	
project	seems	unlikely	to	achieve	its	goals	and	fulfil	the	desires	of	PSF	actors,	then	
they	are	unlikely	to	invest.	This	research	finds	that	certain	outcomes	are	more	easily	
achieved	than	others.	Specifically,	social	and	environmental	outcomes	tended	to	be	
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more	easily	achieved	than	financial	returns.	This	finding	was	helpful	in	exploring	the	
above	types	of	PSF	actor	to	better	understand	why	they	became	involved	in	REDD+	
in	Indonesia.	The	behaviour	of	PSF	actors	is	mapped	in	relation	to	how	financial	
incentives	are	balanced	against	non-financial	incentives	in	Figure	5.1	.	REDD+	PSF	in	
Indonesia	is	found	to	have	adopted	four	broad	strategies:	CSR,	impact	investment,	
sustainable	commodities	and	REDD+	VERs.	
	
Given	the	situation	within	the	REDD+	program	in	Indonesia	at	the	time	this	research	
was	conducted,	the	most	active	participants	tended	to	be	those	actors	most	willing	
to	derive	little	or	no	financial	return,	and	comprised	mainly	corporate	sponsors	or	
foundations	pursuing	CSR	strategies.	Actors	such	as	institutional	investors	and	
corporate	offsetters,	that	prioritised	financial	returns,	were	typically	found	to	have	
paused	or	slowed	their	activities,	speculating	that	the	price	of	their	VERs	might	
increase.	These	actions	are	driven	by	an	anticipated	continuation	of	consumer	
preferences	towards	carbon	neutral	and	conservation	associations	in	consumer	
products,	and	the	UNFCCC’s	inclusion	of	REDD+	in	the	2015	global	climate	
agreement.	Others	are	either	spreading	their	risk	across	CSR	initiatives,	sustainable	
commodities	projects	or	impact	investments,	or	withdrawing	from	REDD+	
altogether.		
	
Because	of	this	variety	of	responses	and	behaviour	among	PSF	actors,	the	four	PSF	
strategies	(CSR,	impact	investment,	sustainable	commodities	and	REDD+	VERs)	are	
best	considered	as	tendencies,	rather	than	discrete	categories	of	mutually	exclusive	
PSF	actor	behaviour.	The	research	did	find	that,	despite	this,	most	PSF	actors	are	still	
primarily	concerned	with	their	financial	‘bottom	line’	and	reluctant	to	pursue	REDD+	
VERs	in	isolation,	preferring	to	adopt	aspects	of	CSR,	sustainable	commodities,	or	
impact	investment	type	strategies	to	provide	some	branding	and	marketing	
compensation	for	projects	that	had	little	financial	return.	In	this	way,	despite	being	
the	initial	attraction,	REDD+	VERs	had	taken	on	the	nature	of	a	secondary	co-benefit	
or	a	contingency	strategy,	to	be	engaged	if	the	market	for	carbon	offsets	stabilised	in	
the	future.		
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9.2.1	Why	PSF	actors	desire	REDD+	knowledge	commodities		
The	GVC-inspired	analysis	of	REDD+	project	case	studies,	and	the	PSF	actor	types	and	
strategies	across	these	REDD+	GVCs,	laid	the	groundwork	for	further	analysis	of	why	
PSF	actors	support	REDD+	projects	and	view	them	as	desirable	(Büscher,	2014;	
Graham,	2006;	Rainnie	et	al.,	2011;	Selwyn,	2012;	Starosta,	2010a,	2010b).	The	
analysis	in	Chapter	7	explored	REDD+	as	a	commodification	process	to	imbue	certain	
values	into	REDD+	projects	and	deliver	a	REDD+	commodity	to	PSF	actors.	This	
analysis	exposed	REDD+	as	a	commodity	that	facilitates	a	specific	type	of	exchange:	
where	specific	REDD+	Outcomes34	are	attached	to	REDD+	VERs.	As	such,	REDD+	
projects	are	defined	as	those	that	access	finance	by	selling	REDD+	VERs	with	REDD+	
Outcomes	attached.	This	specific	exchange	of	REDD+	VERs	became	the	hook	upon	
which	a	variety	of	meanings	(beyond	the	REDD+	Outcomes)	could	become	attached,	
thus	reflecting	‘value	in	motion’	of	capital	and	epistemic	circulation	(Büscher,	2014,	
p.	81).	This	characteristic	also	mirrors	Lansing’s	(2011)	analysis	of	forest	carbon	
commodities	as	simultaneously	the	material	inputs	and	the	abstracted	knowledges	
of	attached	meanings.		
	
The	non-VER	REDD+	Outcomes	(particularly	the	‘sustainable	management	of	
forests’)	exposed	them	to	infiltration	by	additional	meanings	beyond	deforestation	
and	forest	degradation.	This	enabled	the	attachment	of	general	sustainable	
development	stories	and	meanings	to	the	REDD+	project,	its	VERs	and	exchange	
commodity.	Subsequently,	the	REDD+	commodity	came	to	facilitate	a	malleable	
platform	to	accumulate	meanings	and	knowledges,	resembling	the	characteristic	of	
knowledge	commodities	(Büscher,	2014;	Graham,	2006).	These	REDD+	knowledge	
commodities	are	then	integrated	into	the	circulation	of	objects	and	ideas	between	
actors.	In	doing	so,	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	become	subject	to	the	multiple	
and	diverse	mediations	and	evaluations	of	actors,	which	is	characteristic	of	epistemic	
circulation	(Büscher,	2014).		
																																																						
34	REDD+	Outcomes	refers	to	the	specific	outcomes	defined	as	avoided	deforestation	and	
forest	degradation,	sustainable	management	of	forests	and	conservation	and	enhancement	
of	forest	carbon	stocks.	
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The	extrapolation	and	mediation	of	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	proceeded	to	
the	extent	that	the	VER	and	PES	components	of	some	REDD+	projects,	along	with	
their	REDD+	label,	had	receded	completely	from	their	initial	meanings.	Such	REDD+	
components	and	their	associated	knowledges	and	meanings	are	abandoned	in	
favour	of	finance	from	PSF	actors	willing	to	invest	in	developing	locally	produced	
sustainable	commodities.	Removing	the	REDD+	VERs	and	exchange	commodity	
component	from	projects	made	them	no	longer	technically	REDD+	projects.	
However,	importantly,	many	of	the	material	inputs	and	legitimacy	measures,	such	as	
REDD+	standards,	are	still	being	used	to	secure	these	PSF	investments	into	local	
sustainable	commodity	production.		
	
The	diverse	and	nuanced	knowledges	and	meanings	that	appealed	to	specific	PSF	
actors	are	imbued	into	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	through	the	crafting	of	
stories	as	part	of	developing	REDD+	projects.	Material	inputs	to	projects	are	
arranged	and	legitimised	to	constitute	important	ingredients	of	the	story	as	it	is	
written	and	embellished	for	consuming	PSF	actors.	Here,	the	REDD+	knowledge	
commodity	entailed	the	commodification	of	the	REDD+	story.	This	illustrates	the	
creation	of	value	as	more	complex	than	some	traditional	GVC	analyses	that	
conceptualise	value	as	the	difference	in	price	(Gibbon	et	al.,	2008;	Starosta,	2010a;	
Vagneron	&	Roquigny,	2011).	By	mapping	the	tangible	and	knowledge-based	inputs	
in	REDD+	projects	and	their	arrangements	that	became	stories	and	knowledge	
commodities,	the	way	that	PSF	actors	evaluate	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	
could	be	explored	(Lee,	2011b).	
	
The	REDD+	knowledge	commodity	and	its	story	is	an	important	part	of	how	PSF	
actors	evaluate	REDD+	projects	as	desirable,	alongside	the	projects’	ability	to	be	
financially	sustainable	and	deliver	secure	REDD+	VERs.	PSF	actors	draw	on	a	mixture	
of	knowledges	as	they	make	evaluations	and	decisions	(Lee,	2011b).	At	the	same	
time,	their	knowledges	are	shaped	by	their	experiences	with	REDD+,	which	then	
influence	their	desires	and	motivations	(Lee,	2011b).	Project	developers	tamper	with	
this	dynamic	by	mediating	the	production	of	the	REDD+	knowledge	commodity	
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(shown	in	Figure	7.2).	These	project	developers,	typically	NGOs,	juggle	the	attributes	
of	the	knowledge	commodity	to	ensure	that	desirable	features	are	reflected	back	to	
PSF	actors	and	forest	communities.	In	this	way	PSF	actors	and	forest	localities	see	
what	they	want	to	see	and	their	knowledges	are	reinforced	and	recreated.	
	
This	reflection	of	desires	came	to	represent	the	win-win	rhetoric	that	REDD+	and	
market	environmentalism	espouse,	whereby	both	PSF	actors	and	forest	communities	
are	happy,	and	their	evaluations	and	realities	are	re-affirmed.	One	informant	
described	REDD+	as	mythical:	“It’s	a	unicorn	discussion.	If	there	was	a	unicorn:	who	
would	feed	it,	groom	it,	ride	it.	The	whole	thing	is	a	discussion	about	unicorns”	
(International	Consultant	23).	These	insights	illuminate	the	inner	workings	of	such	a	
‘moral	commodity’	and	hints	that	REDD+	projects	may	be	less	about	rescuing	nature	
and	more	about	satisfying	the	desires	of	certain	actors	(Castree,	2003;	Knox-Hayes,	
2015;	Liverman,	2004).		
	
Therefore,	rather	than	an	objective	natural	capital	value	measured	through	REDD+	
standards,	the	value	of	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	appear	to	resemble	PSF	
actors’	subjective	and	reflexive	evaluation.	This	is	exacerbated	by	the	shifting	
meanings	that	actors	bestow	upon	these	commodities,	such	that	their	evaluations	
exist	only	in	transitory	moments	(Bakker,	2005;	Bridge	&	Smith,	2003;	Sayer,	2003;	
Swyngedouw,	1999).	Value	became	a	moment	of	judgement	–	the	act	of	evaluation	
(Lee,	2011b).	In	this	light,	market	environmentalism’s	call	to	‘put	a	value	on	nature’	
appears	to	be	less	about	‘putting	a	value’	and	more	about	‘customising	value’	to	
attract	PSF	actors	(Sukhdev,	2011).		
9.3	What	are	the	governance	implications	of	PSF	actors	on	
REDD+	projects?		
This	section	responds	to	research	question	3	and	discusses	the	contribution	of	this	
research	to	understanding	new	non-state	governing	actors	(Bernard	et	al.,	2012;	
Lövbrand	&	Stripple,	2012;	Okereke	et	al.,	2009)	and	the	privatisation	of	governance	
within	REDD+	market	environmentalism	(Adler,	2002;	Bakker,	2005;	Ervine,	2013;	
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Newell	&	Paterson,	2010).	The	PSF	actors	in	REDD+	have	important	implications	for	
the	governance	of	REDD+	projects	and	the	program	more	broadly,	and	for	thinking	
about	the	emergence	of	PSF	actors	and	finance	in	environmental	governance	and	
market	environmentalism	more	generally.	The	governing	implications	of	PSF	actors	
within	Indonesia’s	REDD+	effort	in	three	key	areas	that	are	detailed	below:	
rationales	and	strategies;	GVCs	and	financialised	networks;	and	evaluation	and	
desires.		
9.3.1	PSF	governing	rationales	and	strategies		
Describing	the	variety	of	rationales	and	strategies	by	which	PSF	actors	pursue	for	
triple	bottom	line	(environmental,	social	and	financial)	returns	through	REDD+	
projects	helped	to	understand	the	governing	influence	of	these	actors.	Each	
different	type	of	PSF	actor	approached	REDD+	with	certain	motivations	and	
rationales	that	pushed	them	towards	adopting	certain	strategies.	The	regulatory	and	
market	uncertainty	around	REDD+,	both	in	Indonesia	and	internationally,	has	
created	opportunities	for	(and	driven)	investment	and	accumulation	strategies	that	
have	embraced	social	and	ecological	co-benefits	alongside,	and	even	over	and	
above,	REDD+	VERs.		
	
However,	despite	actors’	engagement	with	these	aspects	of	REDD+	projects,	interest	
appeared	to	be	driven	primarily	by	a	hedging	or	diversification	logic,	given	the	
perceived	high-risk	nature	of	securing	REDD+	VERs.	Therefore,	although	actors	are	
found	to	have	engaged	in	a	range	of	strategies	and	activities	generating	
combinations	of	financial,	social	and	ecological	benefits,	the	likelihood	that	PSF	and	
market-based	governance	will	support	a	scaled-up	REDD+	while	ensuring	social	
justice	and	environmental	sustainability	(beyond	climate	change	mitigation),	remains	
questionable.	
	
If	or	when	REDD+	VERs	become	significantly	less	financially	risky,	it	is	not	to	be	taken	
for	granted	that	PSF	actors	will	continue	to	pursue	social	and	ecological	outcomes	
with	the	same	enthusiasm	found	here.	It	may	be	that	those	types	of	PSF	actors	that	
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prioritise	financial	returns	re-enter	the	REDD+	market	and	effectively	crowd	out	the	
current	PSF	actors	prioritising	social	and	ecological	outcomes.	In	this	sense,	critiques	
of	capitalist	climate	governance	and	market	environmentalism	may	yet	be	borne	out	
for	REDD+.	Ironically,	this	may	only	become	clear	once	an	international	agreement	
has	been	reached	on	an	avoided	deforestation	mechanism.	Hence	the	current	
interest	in	co-benefits	may	turn	out	to	be	temporary	and	the	character	of	private	
finance	may	exert	different	pressures	in	future	scenarios.	In	this	way,	the	different	
rationales	and	strategies	of	PSF	actors	influence	the	governance	of	REDD+	projects	in	
Indonesia	and	internationally.	
9.3.2	Governing	GVCs	and	financialised	networks	
The	financial	motives	of	PSF	actors	also	influence	REDD+	project	governance.	The	
difficulty,	risks	and	costs	of	securing	VERs	and	the	permanence	of	each	project	
through	gaining	land-use	concession	over	the	forest	area,	forced	the	departure	of	
some	PSF	actors	and	deterred	others.	This	land-use	concession	component	of	REDD+	
projects	–	alongside	REDD+	standards	–	reduces	the	risk	and	secures	the	legitimacy	
of	each	project.	By	doing	so,	these	concessions	and	standards	become	codified	
forms	of	governance	that	sends	objective	signals	to	PSF	actors	to	inform	them	
whether	the	REDD+	project	embodies	specific	attributes.	In	this	way,	concessions	
and	standards	enable	PSF	actors	to	more	easily	grasp	what	each	REDD+	project	
offers	and	enables	them	to	make	decisions	consistent	with	the	time-bound	demands	
of	capital.		
	
The	governing	influence	of	PSF	actors	within	REDD+	project	GVCs	becomes	clear	as	
project	developers	attempt	to	craft	their	projects	around	concessions	and	standards	
to	match	the	desires	of	remaining	PSF	investors.	Subsequently,	the	desires	of	distant	
PSF	actors	are	seen	to	influence	the	governance	of	REDD+	projects	in	subtle	but	
important	ways.	These	are	less	direct	than	traditional	GVC	governance	descriptions	
of	chains	driven	by	lead	actors,	and	are	more	relational	and	market	based	where	
projects	are	adapted	to	appeal	to	the	custom	demands	of	different	PSF	actors	
(Gereffi	et	al.,	2005).	This	emphasised	the	importance	of	the	position	and	function	of	
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project	developers	in	managing	the	customisation	of	REDD+	stories	and	knowledge	
commodities.	For	example,	in	the	case	of	The	Valley	the	project	developer	changed	
their	biodiversity	monitoring	in	a	direct	and	hurried	response	to	the	desires	of	a	
recently	interested	PSF	actor.			
	
The	governing	influence	of	PSF	actors	is	also	traced	away	from	REDD+	projects	to	PSF	
companies,	shareholders,	customers	and	the	public.	Financial	pressures	shape	
REDD+	GVCs	by	adjusting	the	character	of	each	actor’s	operations	to	suit	the	
financial	and	performance	preferences	required.	Financial	signals	are	sent	across	
GVCs	where	each	actor	then	re-gears	their	operations	and	reallocates	resources	in	
response,	influencing	their	associates	in	turn	(Fieldman,	2013;	Knox-Hayes	&	Levy,	
2011;	Lazonick	&	O’Sullivan,	2000;	Lohmann,	2011).	This	demonstrated	a	growing	
governing	influence	emerging	from	finance	sources	through	market	
environmentalism	(Bakker,	2010,	2012;	Knox-Hayes,	2013;	McAfee,	1999).		
	
PSF	actors	are	very	responsive	to	the	preferences	of	those	they	are	financially	bound	
to,	which	tended	to	be	other	PSF	actors	(investors,	companies	and	shareholders),	
customers	or	the	public.	Understanding	this	governance	relationship	between	PSF	
actors	and	the	financial	pressures	in	their	contexts	help	understand	how	and	why	
PSF	actors	influence	ecosystem	service	commodities	more	generally	(Fieldman,	
2013;	Harmes,	2011;	Knox-Hayes	&	Levy,	2011;	Lazonick	&	O’Sullivan,	2000;	
Lohmann,	2011;	Pattberg,	2012).	PSF	actors’	responsiveness	to	financialisation	
appears	to	encourage	the	epistemic	circulation	of	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	
on	GVCs.	In	this	way,	PSF	actors	facilitate	the	movement	of	entangled	finance	and	
ideas	about	their	networks;	appearing	as	both	‘objects	and	subjects’	of	governance	
(Sending	&	Neumann,	2006).	Their	activities	seem	to	respond	to	pressures	to	
operate	sustainable	business,	and	at	the	same	time	contribute	to	and	constitute	
these	governance	signals	and	influences	(Levy	&	Newell,	2005).		
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9.3.3	Governing	PSF	actor	evaluation	and	desire		
The	dynamics	of	evaluation	-	of	why	PSF	actors	are	involved	-	is	seen	to	have	
influenced	the	character	of	REDD+	projects,	their	GVCs	and	resultant	knowledge	
commodities.	The	function	of	evaluation	acts	upon	commodities,	enabling	market	
exchange	and	market	environmentalism	(Bakker,	2005;	Watts,	2014).	These	
evaluations	drive	the	circulation	of	commodities	about	a	neoliberal	capitalist	
economy,	governing	their	allocation	in	ways	that	may	worsen	the	deforestation	that	
REDD+	knowledge	commodities	are	attempting	to	remediate	(Bakker,	2010,	2012;	
Castree,	2008;	Dunlap,	2015;	McAfee,	2012).	
	
In	this	regard,	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	reflected	market	environmentalism’s	
complex	processes	of	renaturing	economies	with	sustainable	commodities	(Bakker,	
2005;	Boyd	et	al.,	2011;	Bumpus	et	al.,	2010;	Dunlap,	2015;	Dwyer	&	Ingalls,	2015;	
Lohmann,	2010;	Robertson,	2012).	REDD+	projects	and	their	knowledge	
commodities	packaged	meanings,	identities	and	values	to	suit	PSF	actors’	desires	
(Bakker,	2005;	Kaika	&	Swyngedouw,	2000;	Robertson,	2000;	Castree,	2003)	and	in	
doing	so	provide	an	example	of	how	“economics	has	become	the	language	of	policy,	
whether	we	like	it	or	not”	(Contractor	15),	privatising	governance	so	REDD+	responds	
to	the	logics	of	PSF	actors.	
	
In	these	ways,	market	environmentalism	uses	the	morality	within	the	REDD+	
knowledge	commodity	to	service	an	economy	that	depends	on	the	moral	compass	of	
GVC	members	(Bakker,	2005;	Bryant	&	Goodman,	2004;	Goodman,	2004;	Sayer,	
2003).	As	one	informant	described:	“There	was	this	blinding	belief	that	somehow	
markets	will	do	that	for	us	and	that	the	fund	manager	is	the	conscious	keeper	of	the	
world”	(Contractor	15).	REDD+	in	Indonesia	illustrated	the	global	economy’s	
increasing	dependency	on	PSF	actors	to	desire	moral,	ethical	and	sustainable	
commodities	so	they	might	purchase	their	way	out	of	the	climate	change	issue	
(Barnett	et	al.,	2005;	Ciscell,	2010;	Clarke,	2008;	Krahmann,	2012;	Lovell	et	al.,	2009;	
Spaargaren	&	Mol,	2013).		
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However,	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	do	not	always	cooperate	with	the	
commodification	ambitions	of	actors	on	the	REDD+	project’s	GVC	(Bakker,	2005).	
This	is	demonstrated	in	the	struggle	to	secure	land-use	concessions,	the	
displacement	of	deforestation	pressure	to	areas	outside	protection	zones,	the	
uncertainty	that	protection	zones	actually	face	imminent	deforestation	pressure,	
and	the	non-fungible	nature	of	project	stories	and	knowledge	commodities.	
However,	while	not	consistently	delivering	VER	or	PES	returns,	these	commodities	
do	cooperate	in	that	they	reflect	the	meanings	that	GVC	members	and	supporting	
PSF	actors	want	to	see.	These	findings	support	ideas	of	how	transient,	partial	and	
plural	nature’s	neoliberalisation,	commodification	and	privatised	governance	can	be	
(Bakker,	2005,	2012).		
9.4	Summary		
Mapping	REDD+	commodification	processes	and	PSF	actors’	desires	and	evaluations	
in	Indonesia	enabled	the	research	to	develop	insights	into	who	PSF	actors	are,	why	
they	are	involved,	and	their	governing	influence.	The	variety	of	PSF	actors	involved	
saw	REDD+	projects	as	offering	a	mixture	of	potential	benefits.	PSF	actors	of	
different	types	and	strategies	balanced	their	desires	for	financial	gain	with	social	and	
environmental	outcomes.	The	variety	of	ways	PSF	actors	evaluate	REDD+	projects	is	
encouraged	by	the	adaptability	of	REDD+	knowledge	commodities	to	PSF	actors’	
desires,	and	their	capacity	to	shape	actors’	knowledges	of	what	is	desirable.	This	
characteristic	of	the	REDD+	knowledge	commodity	mitigated	the	otherwise	effective	
demands	of	PSF	actors	to	actively	shape	the	character	and	specific	activities	of	
REDD+	projects.	The	governing	influence	of	PSF	actors	was	extended	by	their	
tradition	of	applying	and	responding	to	financial	pressure	–	something	REDD+	
projects	were	seen	to	both	facilitate	and	resist.		
	
More	generally,	this	thesis	untangled	how	‘private	finance’	is	conceptualised	within	
Indonesia’s	REDD+	program	providing	a	unique	view	on	PSF	from	in-depth	fieldwork	
and	observation.	This	research	also	provides	a	unique	and	important	view	on	REDD+	
from	the	perspective	of	PSF.	In	doing	so	it	contributes	to	broader	understandings	of	
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market	environmentalism	and	private	governance.	This	research	illustrates	a	
snapshot	of	REDD+	projects	in-the-making	and	is	restricted	by	that	temporality.	Any	
similar	future	endeavours	could	be	improved	by	accessing	case	studies	that	present	
active	PSF	actors	that	have	achieved	land-use	concession	and	progressed	toward	
carbon	offset	production	and	sale.	This	might	generate	more	in-depth	insights	into	
functioning	REDD+	market	environmentalism	and	may	yield	additional	character	
aspects	of	PSF	actors,	the	REDD+	commodity	and	the	relationships	they	share.	
Furthermore,	such	work	could	deliver	insights	into	the	distribution	of	costs	and	
benefits	across	these	GVCs,	particularly	if	this	was	accompanied	by	in-depth	analyses	
of	value	distributions	among	communities	within	REDD+	forests,	and	consumers	of	
products	that	support	REDD+	projects.		
	
This	research	found	that	while	the	influence	of	PSF	actors	within	environmental	
governance	is	increasing,	it	is	doing	so	in	diverse	ways	and	delivering	a	variety	of	
benefits	for	biodiversity	conservation,	emissions	reductions	and	community	
development.	This	is	important	to	remember	when	analysing	interventions	of	
privatised	governance,	particularly	that	the	accumulation	of	finance	is	not	always	the	
primary	or	only	motivation.	Furthermore,	motivations	for	financial	accumulation	do	
not	necessarily	preclude	the	pursuit	of	activities	that	align	with	immediate	
conservation	and	sustainable	development	goals.	This	is	not	to	cast	off	caution	of	
capitalist	motivations,	but	to	posit	a	blurry	optimism	in	what	PSF	actors	might	offer.	
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Appendices	
Appendix	A	-	interview	guide		
1. What	is	your	role	in	REDD+?		
2. Why	are	you/your	organisation	involved	in	REDD+?	
3. What	finance	are	you	using?	
4. Why	are	they	financing	you?	
5. Why	do	you	think	they	are	involved?	
6. What	do	they	want	from	REDD+?	
7. How	have	other	organisations	helped	you	/	this	project?	
8. Why	are	they	involved?	
9. Where	do	you	think	REDD+	is	going?	
10. How	does	REDD+	relate	to	Indonesia’s	and	the	global	economy?	
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Appendix	B	-	ethics	approval,	information	sheets	and	consent	
form	
Human	ethics	approval	
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Interview	and	observation	information	sheets	
Commodification and Governance of REDD+ in Indonesia 
Information Sheet for Interview Participants 
 
Thank you for your interest in taking part in this research. Please read this information sheet before 
deciding whether or not to participate. 
 
This research is investigating how the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
(REDD+) programme is being implemented in Indonesia. This research aim is to understand the 
process that organisations and actors go through to create REDD+ offsets in Indonesia and how these 
processes are governed.  
 
To conduct this research, I plan to interview REDD+ stakeholders in Indonesia. Participants include 
representatives from: government, Indonesian NGOs, international NGOs, research organisations, 
donor agencies, the private sector, and academics. 
 
Interview Format 
This interview will take approximately 45 – 60 minutes of your time and, with your permission, will be 
audio recorded. It will follow a semi-structured format, so the exact nature of the questions has not been 
determined in advance but will depend on the way that the interview develops. Should the line of 
questioning progress in a way that makes you uncomfortable you can decline to answer any question(s) 
at any stage. 
 
Translation 
Please inform us if you would prefer to communicate in a language other than English. Translation 
services can readily be made available. 
 
Participation 
Your participation is completely voluntary and you can leave the interview at any time and retract any 
statements made before 31 August 2014 without any disadvantage to yourself. On the consent form, 
you are given the option of using an organisation’s name, or a code name to maintain anonymity (for 
instance, Participant One or a fictional name). 
 
Data Use and Storage 
All the data will be kept confidential and securely stored in a password-protected computer, and only my 
supervisors and I will have access to the raw data. At the end of the project any personal information 
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will be destroyed, except that on which published results rely. These data will be stored securely for a 
period of five years.  
 
It is intended that this research will form the basis of the researcher’s PhD thesis, articles and book 
publications, and also conference presentations. Direct quotes will be used in the publications and 
although every effort will be made to keep your identity confidential, anyone very close to the issues 
may be able to identify you through your comments.  
 
Feedback  
You may receive a final report with the findings if you wish (please indicate on the consent form). You 
may also receive a copy of any interview transcript. Any request for transcript change will be taken into 
consideration. 
 
This research has been approved by the Human Ethics Committee at Victoria University of Wellington.  
 
If you have any further questions at any time, please contact either Rowan Dixon (primary researcher) 
or Dr Ed Challies (supervisor) on the details below. 
 
Researcher: Rowan Dixon, School of Geography, Environment and Earth Sciences, Victoria University 
of Wellington, PO Box 600, Wellington, New Zealand. Phone: +64 21 228 6066. Email: 
rowan.dixon@vuw.ac.nz 
 
Supervisor: Dr Ed Challies, Leuphana University of Lüneburg, Scharnhorststrasse, 121335 Lüneburg, 
Germany. Phone: +49 4131 677 1387. Email: challies@leuphana.de 
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Commodification and Governance of REDD+ in Indonesia  
Information Sheet for Observation Participants/Representatives 
 
Thank you for your interest in taking part in this research. Please read this information sheet before 
deciding whether or not to participate. 
 
This research is investigating how the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
Plus (REDD+) Programme is being implemented in Indonesia. This research aim is to understand the 
process that organisations and actors go through to create REDD+ offsets in Indonesia and how these 
processes are governed so that these organisations and actors can benefit.  
 
To conduct this research, I wish to observe REDD+ operations and meetings organized by various 
REDD+ stakeholders.  
 
Observation Format 
This observation will take place during my time with your organisation and any meetings that I attend. 
With your permission these observations will be audio recorded. Should any of the participants feel 
uncomfortable to be observed, they can ask the researcher to exclude any of their statements from the 
observation notes.  
 
Data Use and Storage 
All the data will be kept confidential and securely stored in a password-protected computer, and only my 
supervisors and I will have access to the raw data. At the end of the project any personal information 
will be destroyed, except that on which published results rely. These data will be stored securely for a 
period of five years.  
 
It is intended that this research will form the basis of the researcher’s PhD thesis, articles and book 
publications, and also conference presentations. Direct quotes will be used in the publications and that 
although every effort will be made to keep participant’s identity confidential (for instance Participant One 
or a fictional name), anyone close to the issues may be able to identify him/her through his/her 
comments.  
 
Feedback  
You may receive a final summary report with the findings if you wish (please indicate on the consent 
form). You may also receive a copy of any observation notes. Any request for notes change will be 
taken into consideration. 
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This research has been approved by the Human Ethics Committee at Victoria University of Wellington.  
 
If you have any further questions at any time, please contact either Rowan Dixon (primary researcher) 
or Dr Ed Challies (supervisor) on the details below. 
 
Researcher: Rowan Dixon, School of Geography, Environment and Earth Sciences, Victoria University 
of Wellington, PO Box 600, Wellington, New Zealand. Phone: +64 21 228 6066. Email: 
rowan.dixon@vuw.ac.nz 
 
Supervisor: Dr Ed Challies, Leuphana University of Lüneburg, Scharnhorststrasse, 121335 Lüneburg, 
Germany. Phone: +49 4131 677 1387. Email: challies@leuphana.de 
	
	
Interview	and	observation	consent	forms	
Commodification and Governance of REDD+ in Indonesia 
Consent Form for Interview Participants 
 
 
You have been asked to take part in a research study by Rowan Dixon from the School of Geography, 
Environment and Earth Sciences at Victoria University of Wellington (VUW), New Zealand. This study 
will explore REDD+ implementation and governance in Indonesia. The results of this study will be 
included in the researcher’s doctoral thesis. It is also anticipated that the findings of the study will be 
written up for publications.  
 
Thank you for taking part in this research.  
 
• I have read and understood the Information Sheet and had the research explained to me. 
• I am aware that participation is purely voluntary and I can withdraw at any time, refuse to 
answer any questions, or retract any statements before 28 Feb 2014, without any 
disadvantage. 
• I understand that I can request more information at any time. 
• I am aware that I may be quoted in any results or publications, but that my name will not be 
used. A pseudonym or identifier such as ‘Interview 1’ or ‘Participant One’ will be used. 
• I understand that that information I give will not be used for any purpose other than those listed 
below and in the information sheet without my consent.  
 
I would like to receive a copy of the transcript of my interview  Y / N  
(please circle)  
I would like to receive a final summary report of the research Y / N 
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I give consent for the researcher to use my organisation’s name Y / N 
My contact details are:   Email:____________________________________ 
  Address:__________________________________ 
 
Participant’s Statement: 
 
I ________________________________________________agree that the research project named 
above has been explained to me to my satisfaction and I agree to take part in the study. I have read 
both the notes written above and the Information Sheet about the project, and understand what the 
research study involves. 
 
Signed 
 
 
……………………………………….. 
Date 
 
 
…………………………………………. 
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Commodification and Governance of REDD+ in Indonesia  
Consent Form for Observation Participants/Representatives 
 
 
You have been asked to take part in a research study by Rowan Dixon from the School of Geography, 
Environment and Earth Sciences at Victoria University of Wellington (VUW), New Zealand. This study 
will explore REDD+ implementation and governance in Indonesia. The results of this study will be 
included in the researcher’s doctoral thesis. It is also anticipated that the findings of the study will be 
written up for publications.  
 
Thank you for taking part in this research.  
 
• I have read and understood the Information Sheet and had the research explained to me. 
• I am aware that participation is purely voluntary and I can ask the researcher to exclude any 
statements I have made from the observation notes before 28 February 2014 without any 
disadvantage.  
• I understand that I can request more information at any time. 
• I am aware that I may be quoted in any publication of results, but that my name will not be 
used. A pseudonym or identifier such as ‘Participant One’ will be used. 
• I understand that that information I give will not be used for any purpose other than those listed 
below and in the information sheet without my consent.   
 
I would like to receive a copy of the transcript of the observation notes Y / N  
(please circle)  
I would like to receive a final summary report of the research Y / N 
I give consent for the researcher to use my organisation’s name Y / N 
My contact details are:   Email:____________________________________ 
  Address:__________________________________ 
 
Participant’s Statement: 
 
I ________________________________________________agree that the research project named 
above has been explained to me to my satisfaction and I agree to take part in the study. I have read 
both the notes written above and the Information Sheet about the project, and understand what the 
research study involves. 
 
Signed 
 
 
……………………………………….. 
Date 
 
 
…………………………………………. 
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Appendix	C	–	list	of	non-government	informants	
• ADM	Capital	Ltd.	
• Aidenvironment	Ltd.	
• Allianz	Ltd.	
• Althelia	Ltd.	
• Asia	Pulp	&	Paper	Ltd.	
• Association	of	Indonesian	Forest	
Concessionaires		
• Australian	National	University	
• Baastel	Ltd.	
• PT.	Bank	Negara	Indonesia		
• BioCarbon	Group	Pte	Ltd.	
• BioClimate	Ltd.	
• BirdLife	International		
• Business	for	Social	Responsibility	
Inc.	
• Carbon	Partnership	Ltd.	
• CARE	International	
• Carrefourr	S.A.	
• Climate	Advisers	Inc.	
• Climate	and	Land	Use	Alliance	
• Climate	Policy	Initiative	Inc.	
• Clinton	Climate	Initiative		
• Code	REDD	
• Credit	Suisse	Group	Ltd.	
• PT.	Daemeter	Consulting		
• Desso	Ltd.	
• Deutsche	Bank	AG		
• EcoAgriculture	Ltd.	
• Ecosystem	Innovation	Institute	Ltd.	
• Eneco	Holding	N.V.	
• Environmental	Defence	Fund	
• Fauna	and	Flora	International	
• Forest	Carbon	Ltd.	
• Forest	Peoples	Program	
• General	Mills	Inc.	
• GIST	Advisory	Pvt.	Ltd.	
• Global	Green	Growth	Institute	
• Golden	Agri-Resources	Ltd.	
• Governors’	Climate	&	Forests	Task	
Force		
• HSBC	Holdings	plc	
• Indigenous	Peoples	Alliance	of	the	
Archipelago	(AMAN)	
• Indonesia	Business	Council	for	
Sustainable	Development		
• Infinite	Earth	Inc.	
• Institute	of	Chartered	Accountants	–	
England	and	Wales		
• International	Labour	Organisation	
• International	Union	for	
Conservation	of	Nature	
• Kaban		
• KeeptheHabitat	Ltd.	
• Kering	Ltd.	
• KnowlEdge	Srl	
• Markets	for	Change		
• Markit	Ltd.	
• Mars	Inc.	
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• Mazars	Starling	Resources	Ltd.	
• Microsoft	Corporation	Ltd.	
• Migros	Group	Ltd.	
• Millenium	Challenge	Corporation		
• Monsanto	Company	Ltd.	
• Neste	Corporation	Ltd.	
• Nestlé	S.A.		
• New	Forests	Ltd.	
• Nordea	Asset	Management	Ltd.	
• Office	Depot	Inc.	
• Olam	International	Ltd.	
• Oriflame	Cosmetics	Ltd.	
• PT.	Penta		
• Permian	Global	Ltd.	
• PT	Rajawali	Corporation	
• PT.	Astra	Agro	Lestari	Tbk	
• PT.	Gajah	Tunggal	Tbk	
• PT.	Rimba	Makmur	Utama		
• PT.	Rimba	Raya	Conservation		
• PT.	Wana	Hijau	Nusantara	
• PUMA	SE	
• PWC	Ltd.	
• Rabobank	Groep	N.V.	
• Saachi	and	Saachi	Ltd.	
• Seventythree	Ltd.	
• Sinar	Mas	Group	Ltd.	
• Solidaridad		
• Syngenta	Asia	Pacific	Pte	Ltd.	
• The	Asian	Development	Bank		
• The	CarbonNeutral	Company	Ltd.	
• The	Climate	Community	and	
Biodiversity	Alliance	
• The	Economics	of	Ecosystems	and	
Biodiversity	
• The	European	Investment	Bank	
• The	Forest	Carbon	Partnership	
Facility		
• The	Forest	Investment	Programme	
• The	Global	Canopy	Programme		
• The	Government	Pension	Fund	of	
Norway		
• The	International	Finance	
Corporation	
• The	International	Tropical	Timber	
Organisation			
• The	Munden	Project	Ltd.	
• The	Nature	Conservancy		
• The	Orangutan	Foundation	United	
Kingdom		
• The	Overseas	Development	Institute	
• The	Royal	Society	
• The	Verified	Carbon	Standard	Ltd.	
• The	Walt	Disney	Company	Ltd.	
• The	World	Bank		
• Trucost	Ltd.		
• UK	Green	Investment	Bank	plc	
• UN	Environmental	Programme	
• UN	Environmental	Programme	–	
Finance	Initiative	
• UN	Food	and	Agriculture	
Organisation	
• UN	Global	Compact	–	Indonesia	
• UN	Office	for	REDD+	Coordination	in	
Indonesia	
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• UN	Principles	for	Responsible	
Investment		
• UN	REDD+	Programme	
• Unilever	Ltd.	
• University	of	Indonesia	
• Volcom	Inc.	
• Wildlife	Works	Inc.		
• Winrock	International	Ltd.	
• World	Agroforestry	Centre	
• World	Wide	Fund	for	Nature	
• Yayasan	Palung		
• Yayorin		
• Zoological	Society	of	London	
• Zurich	Insurance	Group	Ltd.	
